Beck and Hayek... yes, Hayek dude!

[dan2100]

There is a delicious irony here. Thomists, like Rand, typically despise Kant (though I don't think any went so far as to dub him the most evil man in the history of western civilization). But Higgins and other Thomists (and Aristotelians generally) have a better understanding of Kant's political ideas and influence than Rand did. They understand Kant's intense individualism -- this is a major reason why they dislike him -- so from their perspective, it would come as no surprise that two of the greatest individualists and free-market advocates of the 20th century, Mises and Hayek, hailed from a Kantian background. The same fact is more difficult for an orthodox O'ist to explain.

Ghs

Don't you think Mises's intellectual background was a bit more complicated than that? (Not that this negates your observations here.)

[Brant Gaede]

You could just as well argue that Rand's "man qua man" justifications for rights and freedom are implicitly collectivistic. As I pointed out in an earlier post, by MQM Rand doesn't mean you or me or any other particular individual. Rather, MQM refers to all individuals, collectively considered.

By using MQM arguments, Rand appears to avoid the notion of the common good, public good, etc. But this is only an appearance. MQM, despite presenting "himself" as an individual, does not denote any particular concrete individual to the exclusion of others. Rather, MQM is an abstract individual -- and this abstraction, when concretized, denotes all individuals, in virtue of their common characteristics.

When Rand speaks of the good of MQM, she is simply expressing in different terms what has traditionally been called the "common good." Thus, if you wish to brand appeals to the common good (as we find in find in Hayek and other rule utilitarians) implicitly collectivistic ("tacit" is not the best word here), then the same reasoning would apply to Rand, after we have unpacked the meaning of MQM.

A problem here is she implicitly excluded all individuals who were not men: women and children. Human qua human doesn't have the same cachet, but would be more inviting of empirical investigation and the creation of an inclusive, pluralistic society. I don't think the common good of freedom, however, is collectivistic in the least and is applicable to MQM, HQH, WQW, and even CQC (children qua children). Heh. If we orient ourselves to this human need and why it's a universal, we can be more clear about what she actually meant by MQM: rational, productive people free to pursue their happiness. In other words, bad people are free to exclude themselves from the category by violating rights and society is free to stop them with criminal justice. Bad people or good people, though, the commonality is human volition--choosing ends and means.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

You could just as well argue that Rand's "man qua man" justifications for rights and freedom are implicitly collectivistic. As I pointed out in an earlier post, by MQM Rand doesn't mean you or me or any other particular individual. Rather, MQM refers to all individuals, collectively considered.

By using MQM arguments, Rand appears to avoid the notion of the common good, public good, etc. But this is only an appearance. MQM, despite presenting "himself" as an individual, does not denote any particular concrete individual to the exclusion of others. Rather, MQM is an abstract individual -- and this abstraction, when concretized, denotes all individuals, in virtue of their common characteristics.

When Rand speaks of the good of MQM, she is simply expressing in different terms what has traditionally been called the "common good." Thus, if you wish to brand appeals to the common good (as we find in find in Hayek and other rule utilitarians) implicitly collectivistic ("tacit" is not the best word here), then the same reasoning would apply to Rand, after we have unpacked the meaning of MQM.

A problem here is she implicitly excluded all individuals who were not men: women and children. Human qua human doesn't have the same cachet, but would be more inviting of empirical investigation and the creation of an inclusive, pluralistic society.

This isn't fair to Rand. She used "man" in its traditional philosophical sense, to signify the human species.

I don't think the common good of freedom, however, is collectivistic in the least and is applicable to MQM, HQH, WQW, and even CQC (children qua children). Heh. If we orient ourselves to this human need and why it's a universal, we can be more clear about what she actually meant by MQM: rational, productive people free to pursue their happiness. In other words, bad people are free to exclude themselves from the category by violating rights and society is free to stop them with criminal justice. Bad people or good people, though, the commonality is human volition--choosing ends and means.

Although the "common good" traditionally referred to basic goods (values) that all individuals have in common, the term has become so corrupted that it should now be used with caution. The "public good" was (and is) a more problematic expression, one that could mean pretty much anything a given writer wanted it to mean. Although many economists prefer to speak of "social utility," this is also one of those rubber band terms that can be stretched to accommodate a variety of meanings.

For these and other reasons, I prefer the MQM approach, though I think it is useful to link it to the traditional meaning of the "common good." Even so, invoking MQM is merely a framework for moral and political theory. As I pointed out previously, MQM has frequently been used to reach collectivistic conclusions. By itself, MQM is not a solution to anything.

Ghs

[Christopher]

Two points here, one on Hayek & Rand, one on Beck:

1. Psychology shows that individualists tend to predominantly use differentiated thinking (that is, they spot differences more often than commonalities). There's a reason Rand was fiercely discriminatory - it comes with the psychological territory; therefore I assert she was more sensitive to spotting differences with Hayek than similarities (Rand seemed to rarely ever focus on integrating her philosophy with other belief sets).

2. Michael, you have given me evidence to begin looking back at Beck. The guy is on probation with me , but I'm going to reassess my opinion and give him some attention again.

[dan2100]

Two points here, one on Hayek & Rand, one on Beck:

1. Psychology shows that individualists tend to predominantly use differentiated thinking (that is, they spot differences more often than commonalities). There's a reason Rand was fiercely discriminatory - it comes with the psychological territory; therefore I assert she was more sensitive to spotting differences with Hayek than similarities (Rand seemed to rarely ever focus on integrating her philosophy with other belief sets).

2. Michael, you have given me evidence to begin looking back at Beck. The guy is on probation with me , but I'm going to reassess my opinion and give him some attention again.

Regarding #1, I've noticed that people who are closer ideologically or philosophically tend to be quickest to draw distinctions. By this view, one would expect people who are in the libertarian camp to be much more aware of their differences than would people outside that camp. Not sure if this applies to Rand and perhaps this doesn't trump your point.

[Christopher]

Regarding #1, I've noticed that people who are closer ideologically or philosophically tend to be quickest to draw distinctions. By this view, one would expect people who are in the libertarian camp to be much more aware of their differences than would people outside that camp. Not sure if this applies to Rand and perhaps this doesn't trump your point.

It's not so much about ideology, it's about psychology (although the latter will influence perceptions leading to the former). Someone can be very individualistic in their thinking and still be a communist (Marx, Lenin...). Individualistic here refers to apprehending individuals as discrete units, whether those units are volitional or parts of a machine. The opposite would be collectivistic, where individuals are experienced in relationship with each other, which again could be ideologically focused on individuals (Mother Teresa) or society at large (Gandhi perhaps?).

I could be choosing my exemplars poorly here, I have no idea about the psychology of any of these people. But with Rand, her psychological approach to worldview is fairly clear from her writings.

[George H. Smith]

Two points here, one on Hayek & Rand, one on Beck:

1. Psychology shows that individualists tend to predominantly use differentiated thinking (that is, they spot differences more often than commonalities). There's a reason Rand was fiercely discriminatory - it comes with the psychological territory; therefore I assert she was more sensitive to spotting differences with Hayek than similarities (Rand seemed to rarely ever focus on integrating her philosophy with other belief sets).

2. Michael, you have given me evidence to begin looking back at Beck. The guy is on probation with me , but I'm going to reassess my opinion and give him some attention again.

I think your point about Rand is very insightful.

Although Rand's curt dismissal of other pro-freedom philosophers can irritate me at times, I also recognize that this was part of her belief in the need for a vigorous and consistent moral defense of capitalism. Rand was absolutely right about this, and she infused a moral passion into the defense of capitalism that is lacking in Hayek and, to a lesser degree, in Mises. I regard this as one of Rand's greatest contributions.

Ghs

[dan2100]

Regarding #1, I've noticed that people who are closer ideologically or philosophically tend to be quickest to draw distinctions. By this view, one would expect people who are in the libertarian camp to be much more aware of their differences than would people outside that camp. Not sure if this applies to Rand and perhaps this doesn't trump your point.

It's not so much about ideology, it's about psychology (although the latter will influence perceptions leading to the former). Someone can be very individualistic in their thinking and still be a communist (Marx, Lenin...). Individualistic here refers to apprehending individuals as discrete units, whether those units are volitional or parts of a machine. The opposite would be collectivistic, where individuals are experienced in relationship with each other, which again could be ideologically focused on individuals (Mother Teresa) or society at large (Gandhi perhaps?).

I could be choosing my exemplars poorly here, I have no idea about the psychology of any of these people. But with Rand, her psychological approach to worldview is fairly clear from her writings.

I think you're probably right here, though I wonder if this isn't just a general trait of intellectuals or of intellectuals who are also ideologues. In this case, the focus would be more on ideology and particularly on ideological differences -- as these are seen as all important. Also, the focus would be on other intellectuals. This might lead to a two-tiered treatment of humanity: the non-intellectuals who are interchangeable in the scheme of things and the intellectuals, who are all individuals and highly particular (and the biggest threat to the ideologue since other intellectuals are her or his competition). But is there any evidence for this or is it merely a choice (or range) between "apprehending individuals as discrete units" versus them as parts of collectives?

[dan2100]

Although Rand's curt dismissal of other pro-freedom philosophers can irritate me at times, I also recognize that this was part of her belief in the need for a vigorous and consistent moral defense of capitalism. Rand was absolutely right about this, and she infused a moral passion into the defense of capitalism that is lacking in Hayek and, to a lesser degree, in Mises. I regard this as one of Rand's greatest contributions.

Ghs

Do you think that this is because Rand was fairly radical in terms of her ethics while Mises, Hayek, and most others basically accepted conventional morality -- often seeing a clash between morality and free markets. (This seems especially so in Hayek's The Fatal Conceit where it seems to me he's arguing conventional morality works at the family level while it doesn't work above that level or in markets. It's been a while since I've read this particular work, so maybe I'm misremembering it here.)

[George H. Smith]

Although Rand's curt dismissal of other pro-freedom philosophers can irritate me at times, I also recognize that this was part of her belief in the need for a vigorous and consistent moral defense of capitalism. Rand was absolutely right about this, and she infused a moral passion into the defense of capitalism that is lacking in Hayek and, to a lesser degree, in Mises. I regard this as one of Rand's greatest contributions.

Ghs

Do you think that this is because Rand was fairly radical in terms of her ethics while Mises, Hayek, and most others basically accepted conventional morality -- often seeing a clash between morality and free markets. (This seems especially so in Hayek's The Fatal Conceit where it seems to me he's arguing conventional morality works at the family level while it doesn't work above that level or in markets. It's been a while since I've read this particular work, so maybe I'm misremembering it here.)

As far as I can tell, neither Hayek nor Mises had a coherent moral theory. Mises rejected natural rights in a rather cavalier manner.

Hayek's views are more complex. He rejects the rationalistic tradition of "French" liberty and defends the empirical tradition of "English" liberty. This highly misleading dichotomy, which goes back to Edmund Burke but was first expressly articulated in the 19th century by the German-American philosopher Francis Lieber, causes a kind of intellectual schizophrenia in Hayek. At times Hayek defends freedom like a radical libertarian, but at other times his Burkean proclivities impart a decidedly conservative slant to his ideas.

I am far from the first to call attention to this dualism in Hayek's writings. I have always found it very frustrating.

Ghs

[Christopher]

Although Rand's curt dismissal of other pro-freedom philosophers can irritate me at times, I also recognize that this was part of her belief in the need for a vigorous and consistent moral defense of capitalism. Rand was absolutely right about this, and she infused a moral passion into the defense of capitalism that is lacking in Hayek and, to a lesser degree, in Mises. I regard this as one of Rand's greatest contributions.

I agree wholeheartedly. One of the additional beauties of Rand's confrontational manner was that she kept spotting all the little assumptions that had crept into our general cultural beliefs, and she shot them.

While others, perhaps like Mises & Heyek, tried to plant new ideas in the existing cultural dirt, Rand uprooted the entire garden and replanted in freshly-tilled soil. Of course, anyone nurturing ideas in the cultural dirt got shaken up a bit regardless of the quality of their ideas, for better or worse. Perhaps she judged a person's garden by the weeds in it more so than the plants. (that's my analogy for the day)

But is there any evidence for this or is it merely a choice (or range) between "apprehending individuals as discrete units" versus them as parts of collectives?

A group identity can still be perceived as a discrete unit of group identity.

It's not how individuals per se are viewed, it's about the perspective on identities in general. For example, does the carburetor function discretely and in unison with the engine, or does the carburetor have a relationship with the engine? (this might be far-fetched ) Tons of evidence about human motives and psychological organization, though.

Edited July 1, 2010 by Christopher

[Xray]

Try using man qua man to justify Obamacare in a way that would be plausible to anyone with half a brain. Go ahead. Make my day.

One could get the impression that Obama is something like the devil's disciple (for atheists: the 'enemy of mankind' or something similar) because he thinks it is rational to install a public health care system (which many countries already have).

I'm glad the state I live in does have public health care. Not only that, I also prefer working for a public employer over a private one. My understanding of individualism implies choices in that an individual can decide whether he/she wants to be a state employee or work for a private company, as well as the choice to own one's own business if one wants it. In today's world, aren't "The State" and "Capitalism" actually bedfellows far more than enemies?

For example, people who are self-employed get tax relief from "the state", since "the state" in a democratic society mostly encourages free enterprise - so where is your "enemy"?

George H. Smith, on 30 June 2010 - 02:35 PM, said:

Although Rand's curt dismissal of other pro-freedom philosophers can irritate me at times, I also recognize that this was part of her belief in the need for a vigorous and consistent moral defense of capitalism. Rand was absolutely right about this, and she infused a moral passion into the defense of capitalism that is lacking in Hayek and, to a lesser degree, in Mises. I regard this as one of Rand's greatest contributions.

I agree wholeheartedly. One of the additional beauties of Rand's confrontational manner was that she kept spotting all the little assumptions that had crept into our general cultural beliefs, and she shot them.

Christopher,

Can you give some examples of those "little assumptions" which Rand allegedly "shot"?

Although Rand's curt dismissal of other pro-freedom philosophers can irritate me at times, I also recognize that this was part of her belief in the need for a vigorous and consistent moral defense of capitalism. Rand was absolutely right about this, and she infused a moral passion into the defense of capitalism that is lacking in Hayek and, to a lesser degree, in Mises. I regard this as one of Rand's greatest contributions.

It would interest me what precisely you think is "moral" about "full, pure, uncontrolled, unregulated, laissez-faire capitalism" (Rand).

Edited July 4, 2010 by Xray

[Brant Gaede]

Try using man qua man to justify Obamacare in a way that would be plausible to anyone with half a brain. Go ahead. Make my day.

One could get the impression that Obama is something like the devil's disciple (for atheists: the 'enemy of mankind' or something similar) because he thinks it is rational to install a public health care system (which many countries already have).

I'm glad the state I live in does have public health care. Not only that, I also prefer working for a public employer over a private one. My understanding of individualism implies choices in that an idividual can decide whether he/she wants to be a state employee or work for a private company, as well as the choice to own one's own business if one wants it.

Yeah, right, doctors love being slaves to a "public health care system" and the taxpayers also.

--Brant

WTF do you think Objectivists are about?

[George H. Smith]

The following discussion of the "common good" is from The Common Sense of Politics (1971, pp. 21-22), by the Aristotelian philosopher Mortimer J. Adler. I quote it here without comment.

The term "common good"...has a number of meanings that we must distinguish and keep clear.

One of its meanings derives from that sense of "common" that refers to what is the same in a number of individuals. Thus, all real goods, which satisfy the natural needs of man, are common goods. Human nature being the same in all individual members of the human species, natural needs are the same in all individuals. Real goods being the goods that satisfy natural needs, they, too, are the same for all individuals. Consisting in the possession of all real goods, a really good life or happiness is the same for all men. Happiness or the good life is, therefore, a common good in this sense of the word "common."

But there is another sense in which something can be common to a number of individuals, not through their being the same in this or that respect, but through their participating or sharing in that one thing. Thus, for example, a tract of land is called a "common" when it is not exclusively owned by anyone and is shared by a number of individuals. In this sense, the good of an organized community is a common good, in which some (few, many, or all) of its members share. When we speak of the good society, the good we are referring to is the goodness of the organized community as such, and this goodness is a common good, one that is shared by or participated in by its members.

Two Latin phrases may help us to remember this distinction of senses. Bonum commune hominis signifies the good that is common to a number of men simply because as men they are all the same; bonum commune communitatis signifies the good that is common to a number of individuals because they are members of one and the same organized community. It should now be clear that the common good enters into the considerations of politics in both senses of the term. Since it aims at the good society, politics is concerned directly with the bonum commune communitatis, the good or goods of the organized community in which its members share -- some at least, if not all. And since a good society is itself a means to the good life, politics is concerned indirectly with the bonum commune hominis -- the ultimate good or happiness that is the same for all men because they are men.

In the early 1970s, Roy Childs published a series of articles on anarchism in The Individualist. As I recall, he wrote four lengthy installments but only three were published. One of these parts was a detailed critique of Adler's The Common Sense of Politics. (This may have been the unpublished part, but, not having seen these articles for many years, I cannot say for sure.)

Roy and I were living in the same Hollywood apartment building while he was writing these articles. I recall his telling me that Adler's book almost won him over to the pro-government side. (Among its chapters are "The Necessity of Government," "Concerning the Goodness of the State," and "The Anti-Political Philosophers." The last is a critique of anarchism.)

Ghs

[merjet]

Yesterday I returned from the TAS/Free Minds summer seminar. One lecture by David Kelley was titled Rand vs. Hayek on Abstraction. Some of Kelley's major points were:

1. For Rand reason is volitional, efficacious, and absolute. The case for freedom is essentially positive. For Hayek reason is limited and not autonomous. Moral rules are acquired by imitation and evolution. The case for freedom is essentially negative. Hayek was a critic of "rationalistic" government central planning.

2. For Rand perception is primary. On the other hand, Hayek wrote a chapter in a book titled "Primacy of the Abstract", which Kelley used as a major source. (The book is New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, published in 1978.) He quoted Hayek: "The formation of abstractions ought to be regarded not as actions of the human mind but rather as something which happens to the mind.” This portrays the mind as passive rather than active.

3. Kelley said about abstraction that Rand's focus was on the mind, but Hayek's was on the brain.

4. Kelley spoke about Hayek's neural net theory, a major topic of Hayek's 1952 book The Sensory Order.

5. Kelley claimed Hayek misapplied the idea of spontaneous order to the individual mind. In contrast Kelley said the mind has top-down control, i.e. volitional conceptual consciousness.

I haven't yet read "The Primacy of the Abstract", so I can't say to what extent I agree or disagree with Kelley's lecture. However, I believe it fair to say that Hayek for the most part wrote about abstraction and classification in perception. On the other hand Rand wrote about abstraction and classification in conception. Kelley emphasized their differences regarding abstraction and classification, but not perception versus conception. Kelley did not mention that he wrote much about perceptual categorization (a synonym of classification) in The Evidence of the Senses. If one is going to compare Rand and Hayek, I believe it is important to keep in mind they were writing about two different domains.

Kelley did not talk about Hayek's view of free will, which is a significant issue regarding conceptual abstraction and categorization. However, I did find a little about that here.

Edited July 10, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[BaalChatzaf]

3. Kelley said about abstraction that Rand's focus was on the mind, but Hayek's was on the brain.

There is much empirical evidence for the existence of brains: x-rays, MRI scans, trepaning the skull etc. There is no empirical evidence for the existence of mind as a substance or object. At most "mind" is a name for a subset of the processes occurring in the brain. At most, mind is the physical effect (brain processes, behavior) of physical causes. So Hayek has the better empirical case.

When I participated in a study of brain functioning in seniors (this was at Rutgers University back in 2007) I had several MRI scans done. I asked the head researcher if you could point out my mind in the MRI pictures. He looked at me as if to say: "You have got to be kidding!". I pressed him on this point and asked him if he ever had objective evidence of a mind in a body that was not his own. He answered (honestly) - no.

So all the evidence point to brains. We invoke mind as a hypothetical explanation for behavior we perceive in ourselves and others. But what we are really observing (I am putting on my David Hume hat here) is external behavior -- body language, posture, facial expression and verbal outputs. Any of these can be faked or simulated so there is no definitive proof of a "mind" behind these observables.

Brain - si

Mind - Maybe, doubtful

Maybe you have a mind. I don't have one. I only claim to have a functioning brain, nervous system and glandular system. It took me nearly 40 years to simulate human behavior using only my physical self and a lot of learning time. I now pass for human rather well. It is like learning a part.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Brant Gaede]

Maybe you have a mind. I don't have one. I only claim to have a functioning brain, nervous system and glandular system. It took me nearly 40 years to simulate human behavior using only my physical self and a lot of learning time. I now pass for human rather well. It is like learning a part.

Mind = functioning brain. It's easier to say and write "mind." But you can say "functioning brain" if you've a mind to.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

2. For Rand perception is primary. On the other hand, Hayek wrote a chapter in a book titled "Primacy of the Abstract", which Kelley used as a major source. (The book is New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, published in 1978.) He quoted Hayek: "The formation of abstractions ought to be regarded not as actions of the human mind but rather as something which happens to the mind.” This portrays the mind as passive rather than active.

Hayek's book is titled The Sensory Order and was first published in 1952. I've tried getting through it a few times, but without much luck; after a while, my mind just fuzzes over. I still have a copy and may give it another try one of these days.

The notion that all perception involves some abstraction has been argued by various philosophers. I think Brand Blanshard does a much better job of defending this position (in The Nature of Thought) than Hayek does.

Ghs

[merjet]

2. For Rand perception is primary. On the other hand, Hayek wrote a chapter in a book titled "Primacy of the Abstract", which Kelley used as a major source. (The book is New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, published in 1978.) He quoted Hayek: "The formation of abstractions ought to be regarded not as actions of the human mind but rather as something which happens to the mind.” This portrays the mind as passive rather than active.

Hayek's book is titled The Sensory Order and was first published in 1952. I've tried getting through it a few times, but without much luck; after a while, my mind just fuzzes over. I still have a copy and may give it another try one of these days.

Ghs

As best I can tell, the chapter or essay titled "Primacy of the Abstract" is in the book titled New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas. See the references in the Cato article I linked:

———. (1978c) The Primacy of the Abstract. New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

There is no section in The Sensory Order with that title.

Edited July 9, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[merjet]

3. Kelley said about abstraction that Rand's focus was on the mind, but Hayek's was on the brain.

There is much empirical evidence for the existence of brains: x-rays, MRI scans, trepaning the skull etc. There is no empirical evidence for the existence of mind as a substance or object. At most "mind" is a name for a subset of the processes occurring in the brain. At most, mind is the physical effect (brain processes, behavior) of physical causes. So Hayek has the better empirical case.

See Section 8.87 of The Sensory Order here.

[George H. Smith]

2. For Rand perception is primary. On the other hand, Hayek wrote a chapter in a book titled "Primacy of the Abstract", which Kelley used as a major source. (The book is New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, published in 1978.) He quoted Hayek: "The formation of abstractions ought to be regarded not as actions of the human mind but rather as something which happens to the mind.” This portrays the mind as passive rather than active.

Hayek's book is titled The Sensory Order and was first published in 1952. I've tried getting through it a few times, but without much luck; after a while, my mind just fuzzes over. I still have a copy and may give it another try one of these days.

Ghs

As best I can tell, the chapter or essay titled "Primacy of the Abstract" is in the book titled New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas. See the references in the Cato article I linked:

———. (1978c) The Primacy of the Abstract. New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

There is no section in The Sensory Order with that title.

You are correct: "The Primacy of the Abstract" is a separate article, one in which Hayek summarizes the views that he developed at greater length in The Sensory Order. I misread part of your original post.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Although I have not read it carefully, this article by Gary Dempsey looks like a good summary of Hayek's philosophy of mind.

Ghs