An axiomatic paradox?

[merjet]

GS,

I might start calling you "Wet Nurse."

(I hope you have read AS.)

Michael

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Characters_in...urse_.28Tony.29

[tjohnson]

GS,

I might start calling you "Wet Nurse."

(I hope you have read AS.)

Michael

Sorry, I have not read it.

[Mindy Newton]

One can absolutely prove that an argument is false.

=Mindy

I don't agree.

Because...? :logik:

= Mindy

[tjohnson]

Because...? :logik:

= Mindy

Very briefly, the world is not black and white, there are many gray areas. Unless you are speaking about pure mathematics then there is always room for interpretation.

[Paul Mawdsley]

You now have a file folder for "metacontext." Who knows, you may find some existent to fill it with some day so it won't seem like such an empty concept to you.

Paul

You can't open a file folder without a concept, an idea of a kind of thing. You can't just take a word and label a space and expect ever to file anything beyond new occurrences of that word in speech. I, also, am against jargon.

= Mindy

A very flattering picture you paint of me. I assume you are describing me as the one who has a file folder without a concept and who is using (meaningless or empty) jargon. This certainly doesn't match my self-concept.

You say I don't have a concept for the metacontext file folder? Wrong. It is an idea of an epistemic process. All we have established is that you and Roger don't have a concept for it; or are you claiming clairvoyance? It's only jargon if it's an empty concept. It's not.

The interesting thing is I have seen evidence of the existence of this epistemic process in your writing; whether you have isolated it as a concept or not. There are two sides you have expressed: one is committed to a fixed central context and looking to justify your position (which you are doing here and which Rand did in developing Objectivism); and the other is looking to learn and grow through creative context building and systematically eliminating errors through exposure to criticism and falsification (the process I assume was necessary to produce your wonderful insights into romantic visibility and is the essence of scientific progress). These are two different epistemic metacontexts, or orientations of consciousness, which determine how you process information based on different assumptions. The first is based on an assumed need to take a fortified offensive/defensive stand relative to competing positions (take a look at the history of philosophy). The second is based on the assumption of personal security, a playfulness in generating new ways of looking at things and an open and defenseless position relative to criticism and falsification (this most commonly occurs within the privacy of our own minds but is made systematic in the ideal of scientific testing and peer review).

It's unfortunate people generally assume the need to take a fortified defensive stand relative to competing positions. Dialogue would be much more productive if people could get past this. Psychologically, it's because we attach our egos to the position rather than to the process of generating and reevaluating positions. Philosophically, it's because we commit ourselves to the first epistemic metacontext rather than the second.

Now it's time for me to do more reading than writing. If I'm still clear as mud, so be it.

Paul

Edited September 16, 2008 by Paul Mawdsley

[Mindy Newton]

You now have a file folder for "metacontext." Who knows, you may find some existent to fill it with some day so it won't seem like such an empty concept to you.

Paul

You can't open a file folder without a concept, an idea of a kind of thing. You can't just take a word and label a space and expect ever to file anything beyond new occurrences of that word in speech. I, also, am against jargon.

= Mindy

A very flattering picture you paint of me. I assume you are describing me as the one who has a file folder without a concept and who is using (meaningless or empty) jargon. This certainly doesn't match my self-concept.

You say I don't have a concept for the metacontext file folder? Wrong. It is an idea of an epistemic process. All we have established is that you and Roger don't have a concept for it; or are you claiming clairvoyance? It's only jargon if it's an empty concept. It's not.

The interesting thing is I have seen evidence of the existence of this epistemic process in your writing; whether you have isolated it as a concept or not. There are two sides you have expressed: one is committed to a fixed central context and looking to justify your position (which you are doing here and which Rand did in developing Objectivism); and the other is looking to learn and grow through creative context building and systematically eliminating errors through exposure to criticism and falsification (the process I assume was necessary to produce your wonderful insights into romantic visibility and is the essence of scientific progress). These are two different epistemic metacontexts, or orientations of consciousness, which determine how you process information based on different assumptions. The first is based on an assumed need to take a fortified offensive/defensive stand relative to competing positions (take a look at the history of philosophy). The second is based on the assumption of personal security, a playfulness in generating new ways of looking at things and an open and defenseless position relative to criticism and falsification (this most commonly occurs within the privacy of our own minds but is made systematic in the ideal of scientific testing and peer review).

It's unfortunate people generally assume the need to take a fortified defensive stand relative to competing positions. Dialogue would be much more productive if people could get past this. Psychologically, it's because we attach our egos to the position rather than to the process of generating and reevaluating positions. Philosophically, it's because we commit ourselves to the first epistemic metacontext rather than the second.

Now it's time for me to do more reading than writing. If I'm still clear as mud, so be it.

Paul

No, Paul, I was talking about Roger, to whom you made the remark about now having a file folder. I'm all for exploring and discovering, but I have a mulish attitude against new terminology when it doesn't seem to be accompanied by new facts or new formulations. Call it (for my sake) a taste for parsimony.

When words are used in a puzzling way, or when a set of new terms shows up in a context I'm familiar with, my (mulish) tail starts swishing. "Pancritical rationalism," "metacontext," "subcontext," and "creating contexts" were all crowding into a space barely big enough to round-pen a gelding!

When I read that "metacontext" was an attitude (read bias) toward a new "position," I felt like I'd been rode hard and put away wet! (It's late here, and my pre-frontal cortex has already gone to sleep.) "Metacontext" was supposedly a term on a par with "context," but here it was being used as a claim of bias towards certain philosophical stances. (I'm taking this not from your use of that term, but from the link you provided.)

I agree that people can have one or the other of those two mind-sets when arguing, and that it is a good thing to know about it. But that perspective is psychological, not philosophical. While I might seem to sometimes have one attitude, and at other times the other, how can you be certain that there are underlying "assumptions" at work? How do you know that I am not sincere in what I'm saying? I know my criterion for entertaining psychological explanations for what someone says (or does) is: manifest irrationality. If the person flies in the face of his own knowledge, or the explicit factual context, he's not thinking or reasoning, and knowledge or truth are not his goal. And I hold that one must always err on the side of caution in coming to this judgment.

Perhaps, if you point out one or two instances of my falling into (or out of?) a metacontext, I could see if I can spot the change. I wonder if your metacontext isn't just dissing my metacontext...

Anyway, I did not mean any disrespect for you, Paul, assuming, that is, that I may continue to abstract you from pancritical rationalism.

=Mindy :angel:

(And thanks for the kind words.)

((Clear as mud? What's a little mud when you've got a muck bucket nearby!))

Edited September 16, 2008 by Mindy

[merjet]

What Rand seems to appeal to here is the idea of unity. That is my thesis as well, with the addition that it is organization that provides the foundation of unity. Ray & Radcliffe seem to hold that edges provide the foundation of entities. However, I have a partial problem with that. Edges exist within entities as well as distinguish an entity with its background.

Is the donut more real, as real or less real than its hole?

Ba'al Chatzaf

I don't know how your question relates to what I wrote. I think "as real." But maybe you should ask Homer Simpson.

[Guyau]

Concerning Boundaries and Entities

http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/Objectivi...A/0290.shtml#10

http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/Objectivi...0290_1.shtml#21

http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/Objectivi...0290_1.shtml#35

Concerning Roger’s Initial Post and #14

Rand’s most elementary sense of the concept objective is the sense of ordinary parlance. This is the sense she talks of when explaining why she has chosen Objectivism as the name of her philosophy. She credits Aristotle as the first to correctly define “the basic principle of a rational view of existence and of man’s consciousness: that there is only one reality, the one man perceives—that it exists as an objective absolute (which means: independently of the consciousness, the wishes, or the feelings of any perceiver).” That was in 1960 (FNI 22).

In 1965 Rand distinguished a metaphysical from an epistemological aspect of objectivity. Her metaphysical sense of objectivity proclaims the recognition of the mind-independence of existence in the relationship of existence and consciousness. Her epistemological sense of objectivity proclaims recognition of the mind’s dependence on logical identification and integration of the evidence of the senses to acquire knowledge of existence. Both of these senses of objectivity proclaim norms of volitional, conceptual consciousness (FAE 18).

Those were some of Rand’s elaborations of the idea that existence exists independently of our perceiving it, thinking it, imagining it, etc.

Roger, say you are playing “Stardust.” You get distracted by a racket, then get back on the performance, noticing that you had gotten distracted. The event of being distracted was independent of your follow-on noticing that you had been distracted. But it seems mysterious (#14) to categorize the distraction as generating consciousness and the follow-on noticing as observing consciousness. Is that how you would analyze this case?

Edited September 16, 2008 by Stephen Boydstun

[BaalChatzaf]

I don't know how your question relates to what I wrote. I think "as real." But maybe you should ask Homer Simpson.

Smiley aside, I encapsulated what you wrote with elegant brevity. I love reducing complication to simplicity when I can.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Paul Mawdsley]

No, Paul, I was talking about Roger, to whom you made the remark about now having a file folder.

Oh! That's different then. Now I just disagree without any smart remarks about clairvoyance. We start with empty file folders (whether you consider these to be conceptual entities themselves or contexts that integrate entities and their properties-- all a matter of whether you are applying a part-to-whole or a whole-to-part orientation of consciousness; Rand's vs Popper's epistemic perspectives or everyone vs MSK's perspective; it's the same principle as wave/particle duality) all the time. Starting with an empty file folder is the nature of the academic approach to learning: here is a new word, "epistemology"; now go and figure out what it means-- i.e.: fill the file folder with a concept by using these authors as a guide.

I'm all for exploring and discovering, but I have a mulish attitude against new terminology when it doesn't seem to be accompanied by new facts or new formulations. Call it (for my sake) a taste for parsimony.

Good! I didn't misread you.

When words are used in a puzzling way, or when a set of new terms shows up in a context I'm familiar with, my (mulish) tail starts swishing. "Pancritical rationalism," "metacontext," "subcontext," and "creating contexts" were all crowding into a space barely big enough to round-pen a gelding!

Don't worry. The space expands as existents are isolated and the concept/context gets filled in.

When I read that "metacontext" was an attitude (read bias) toward a new "position," I felt like I'd been rode hard and put away wet! (It's late here, and my pre-frontal cortex has already gone to sleep.) "Metacontext" was supposedly a term on a par with "context," but here it was being used as a claim of bias toward certain philosophical stances. (I'm taking this not from your use of that term, but from the link you provided.)

To interpret it as a "claim of bias toward certain philosophical stances" would be a mistake. That would just make it another context, not a metacontext. It is a metal framework, or orientation of consciousness, through which we create contexts and interpret contexts.

I agree that people can have one or the other of those two mind-sets when arguing, and that it is a good thing to know about it. But that perspective is psychological, not philosophical.

It's both. It is a psychological orientation and a philosophical concept/context (again, concept and context are two sides of the part-whole relationship, wave/particle duality).

While I might seem to sometimes have one attitude, and at other times the other, how can you be certain that there are underlying "assumptions" at work? How do you know that I am not sincere in what I'm saying? I know my criterion for entertaining psychological explanations for what someone says (or does) is: manifest irrationality. If the person flies in the face of his own knowledge, or the explicit factual context, he's not thinking or reasoning, and knowledge or truth are not his goal. And I hold that one must always err on the side of caution in coming to this judgment.

I'm not suggesting insincerity. If it's just an attitude, it's not a metacontext. A metacontext is a commitment to a way of processing information about existence on principle. It is an epistemic commitment to generating a body of knowledge according to certain principles. If we have not identified the concept/context, we cannot evaluate the consistency by which we operate, nor whether we always are applying the best principles.

Perhaps, if you point out one or two instances of my falling into (or out of?) a metacontext, I could see if I can spot the change. I wonder if your metacontext isn't just dissing my metacontext...

This will take more time to think about than I have right now. But I'll think about it and pay attention.

Anyway, I did not mean any disrespect for you, Paul, assuming, that is, that I may continue to abstract you from pancritical rationalism.

Heh! That's the whole point. I am more than any concept/context I have. And I am definitely more than any concept/context that anyone has of me. No disrespect taken. I was just pointing out your view was mistaken and you should check your premises.

Paul

[tjohnson]

We start with empty file folders (whether you consider these to be conceptual entities themselves or contexts that integrate entities and their properties-- all a matter of whether you are applying a part-to-whole or a whole-to-part orientation of consciousness; Rand's vs Popper's epistemic perspectives or everyone vs MSK's perspective; it's the same principle as wave/particle duality) all the time. Starting with an empty file folder is the nature of the academic approach to learning: here is a new word, "epistemology"; now go and figure out what it means-- i.e.: fill the file folder with a concept by using these authors as a guide.

Interesting Paul, as I think I mentioned here before, the work of Northrop is similar to this. He describes 2 basic kinds of concepts, concept by intuition, roughly equivalent to an idea formed from observation, like a pencil, and concept by postulation, which is an idea formed from a symbolic description, like a quark. Then there is a constant interplay between these concepts in our brain which he calls epistemic correlation.

Edited September 16, 2008 by general semanticist

[merjet]

I don't know how your question relates to what I wrote. I think "as real." But maybe you should ask Homer Simpson.

Smiley aside, I encapsulated what you wrote with elegant brevity. I love reducing complication to simplicity when I can.

Ba'al Chatzaf

I failed to see the equivalence, and still do.

[Mindy Newton]

What Rand seems to appeal to here is the idea of unity. That is my thesis as well, with the addition that it is organization that provides the foundation of unity. Ray & Radcliffe seem to hold that edges provide the foundation of entities. However, I have a partial problem with that. Edges exist within entities as well as distinguish an entity with its background.

Is the donut more real, as real or less real than its hole?

Ba'al Chatzaf

I don't know how your question relates to what I wrote. I think "as real." But maybe you should ask Homer Simpson.

Baal, you missed the point. The question is, are both the doughnut, and the doughnut hole entities? Then you can argue about why some entities are more filling.

= Mindy

[Mindy Newton]

We start with empty file folders (whether you consider these to be conceptual entities themselves or contexts that integrate entities and their properties-- all a matter of whether you are applying a part-to-whole or a whole-to-part orientation of consciousness; Rand's vs Popper's epistemic perspectives or everyone vs MSK's perspective; it's the same principle as wave/particle duality) all the time. Starting with an empty file folder is the nature of the academic approach to learning: here is a new word, "epistemology"; now go and figure out what it means-- i.e.: fill the file folder with a concept by using these authors as a guide.

Interesting Paul, as I think I mentioned here before, the work of Northrop is similar to this. He describes 2 basic kinds of concepts, concept by intuition, roughly equivalent to an idea formed from observation, like a pencil, and concept by postulation, which is an idea formed from a symbolic description, like a quark. Then there is a constant interplay between these concepts in our brain which he calls epistemic correlation.

GS,

When you say, "the work of Northrop is similar to this," in reply to Paul's comment about alternative "epistemic perspectives," one of which is Ayn Rand's, aren't you implying that you are familiar with Rand's epistemology? You would have to be familiar with it to claim it is similar to Northrop's view, right?

= Mindy

[tjohnson]

When you say, "the work of Northrop is similar to this," in reply to Paul's comment about alternative "epistemic perspectives," one of which is Ayn Rand's, aren't you implying that you are familiar with Rand's epistemology?

No, I'm not. For the record, the only thing I have read by Rand is what I've found on this list and other places on the net. I am not interested in reading Rand, I am interested having discourse with people on this list.

You would have to be familiar with it to claim it is similar to Northrop's view, right?

Yes, you would.

[Brant Gaede]

When you say, "the work of Northrop is similar to this," in reply to Paul's comment about alternative "epistemic perspectives," one of which is Ayn Rand's, aren't you implying that you are familiar with Rand's epistemology?

No, I'm not. For the record, the only thing I have read by Rand is what I've found on this list and other places on the net. I am not interested in reading Rand, I am interested having discourse with people on this list.

You would have to be familiar with it to claim it is similar to Northrop's view, right?

Yes, you would.

Essentially, then, you are a troll. I don't know what value you bring to our table. I don't see how you pay for your discourse or why people here want to give you something for what seems to be nothing in return. For Objectivism, you are a Black Hole.

--Brant

[Mindy Newton]

When you say, "the work of Northrop is similar to this," in reply to Paul's comment about alternative "epistemic perspectives," one of which is Ayn Rand's, aren't you implying that you are familiar with Rand's epistemology?

No, I'm not. For the record, the only thing I have read by Rand is what I've found on this list and other places on the net. I am not interested in reading Rand, I am interested having discourse with people on this list.

You would have to be familiar with it to claim it is similar to Northrop's view, right?

Yes, you would.

Essentially, then, you are a troll. I don't know what value you bring to our table. I don't see how you pay for your discourse or why people here want to give you something for what seems to be nothing in return. For Objectivism, you are a Black Hole.

--Brant

I have to disagree, Brant. Nothing comes out of a black hole.

=Mindy

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Paul,

I don't know if I am reading you correctly, but a concept does not start as an "empty file folder." It starts as a file that is opened with a group of observations already in it. The observations, while noticing similarities and differences, made the file necessary, not the other way around.

Here is an empty file folder:

sxtwerkjsywy

You can fill that with anything you like. (I doubt anyone will.)

That's just an example, though, because a concept is even more abstract. It does not start as a word, but as a mental grouping.

Michael

[tjohnson]

I don't know if I am reading you correctly, but a concept does not start as an "empty file folder." It starts as a file that is opened with a group of observations already in it. The observations, while noticing similarities and differences, made the file necessary, not the other way around.

What about when we postulate the existence of things we have not (and will never be) observed, like an electron? Or what about things that live inside our brains, like concepts themselves? Did we discover the file concept by observing several concepts first?

[Ellen Stuttle]

Roger, I believe you somewhat misportray Ray & Radcliffe. They don't say entities don't exist apart from our cognitive processes. Rather they hold that more important metaphysically are edges, to wit:

To understand how we form our concepts of entities, we must ask how we distinguish entities from the stuff around them. One basic premise that would seem to be indisputable is that an entity is a unity. A unity is some part of reality that is bounded by an edge. The question immediately arises,

To what in reality do we refer when we use the concept EDGE?

We argue that it refers to the results of the act of selective attention whereby the subject distinguishes some portion of reality from everything else. Because we construe all entities with edges that--whatever other metaphysical properties they may trace out--are created by the subject's attention, all entities are equal. Some are more interesting than others, but all are bounded by edges of the same type and origin.

I happen to agree with Rand. In the Appendix to ITOE [....]

What Rand seems to appeal to here is the idea of unity. That is my thesis as well, with the addition that it is organization that provides the foundation of unity. Ray & Radcliffe seem to hold that edges provide the foundation of entities. However, I have a partial problem with that. Edges exist within entities as well as distinguish an entity with its background.

It looks to me like there's a metaphysics/epistemology mix-up, at least in Ray & Radcliffe's formulation, if they indeed "hold that more important metaphysically are edges" [MJ; my bold emphasis]. I'd say that organization is what makes something an entity, whereas edges are the primary means by which "we distinguish entities" [R&R], both visually and tactilely.

Ellen

___

[BaalChatzaf]

Baal, you missed the point. The question is, are both the doughnut, and the doughnut hole entities? Then you can argue about why some entities are more filling.

= Mindy

An entity is something that is. There are things that are, but not in the real physical world. Like points and lines, for example. These are artifacts of our intellect or figments of our imagination.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Mindy Newton]

Baal, you missed the point. The question is, are both the doughnut, and the doughnut hole entities? Then you can argue about why some entities are more filling.

= Mindy

An entity is something that is. There are things that are, but not in the real physical world. Like points and lines, for example. These are artifacts of our intellect or figments of our imagination.

Ba'al Chatzaf

It was a joke. I'll be Aspbergers-obvious :poke: next time!

[tjohnson]

It was a joke. I'll be Aspbergers-obvious :poke: next time!

Oh I get it, the doughnut is more filling, good one!

[Paul Mawdsley]

Paul,

I don't know if I am reading you correctly, but a concept does not start as an "empty file folder." It starts as a file that is opened with a group of observations already in it. The observations, while noticing similarities and differences, made the file necessary, not the other way around.

Here is an empty file folder:

sxtwerkjsywy

You can fill that with anything you like. (I doubt anyone will.)

That's just an example, though, because a concept is even more abstract. It does not start as a word, but as a mental grouping.

Michael,

It's a matter of perspective. Aristotle created the label and file folder for metaphysics (correct me if I'm wrong). He filled the concept with a group of existents he isolated. Others have added to this file folder throughout history. So far this is as you have described. Now think of my son who is 8 years old. This week we found ourselves talking about science and philosophy. One of the concepts I introduced him to was "metaphysics." For him, what came first, the label and file folder or the isolation of existents? I think you would agree it's the former. Now he can use this concept as a map, or context, with which to seek out the existents that fit and fill it. These existents can be sought reflectively within the recalled perceptual field, creatively through the intuitively generated phenomenological field, or empirically through direct observation of the extrospective world.

Paul

BTW--Lucas said this morning that he wants to be a scientist who does philosophy as a hobby. A scientist and philosopher....hmmmm! Works for me.

[Roger Bissell]

Roger, I believe you somewhat misportray Ray & Radcliffe. They don't say entities don't exist apart from our cognitive processes. Rather they hold that more important metaphysically are edges, to wit:

To understand how we form our concepts of entities, we must ask how we distinguish entities from the stuff around them. One basic premise that would seem to be indisputable is that an entity is a unity. A unity is some part of reality that is bounded by an edge. The question immediately arises,

To what in reality do we refer when we use the concept EDGE?

We argue that it refers to the results of the act of selective attention whereby the subject distinguishes some portion of reality from everything else. Because we construe all entities with edges that--whatever other metaphysical properties they may trace out--are created by the subject's attention, all entities are equal. Some are more interesting than others, but all are bounded by edges of the same type and origin.

I happen to agree with Rand. In the Appendix to ITOE [....]

What Rand seems to appeal to here is the idea of unity. That is my thesis as well, with the addition that it is organization that provides the foundation of unity. Ray & Radcliffe seem to hold that edges provide the foundation of entities. However, I have a partial problem with that. Edges exist within entities as well as distinguish an entity with its background.

It looks to me like there's a metaphysics/epistemology mix-up, at least in Ray & Radcliffe's formulation, if they indeed "hold that more important metaphysically are edges" [MJ; my bold emphasis]. I'd say that organization is what makes something an entity, whereas edges are the primary means by which "we distinguish entities" [R&R], both visually and tactilely.

Ellen

___

Ellen, I (think I) agree with you.

The edge of an entity is its boundary(s). It is the limit(s) of the spatial extension of the entity. Just as the beginning and end of an event are the limits/boundaries/edges of the temporal extent of the event. The edge of an entity is thus an ~attribute of an attribute~ of an entity. It is what limits the extent of the entity, and is thus what we focus on to "mark off" the entity in our field of awareness. But there has to be an entity first in order for us to be able to use this attribute of it (actually this attribute of its attribute of spatial extension) in order to grasp it perceptually. There has to be a ~something~ in order for us to perceive its ~limit~ as setting it apart from ~everything else~ in our perceptual field.

I still say (to Merlin et al) that Ray & Radcliff (and David Jilk in JARS) were arguing that ~all~ entities are simply products of our awareness of reality, and that entities do not exist independently of our awareness. All that exists is whatever-it-is, and entities are the form in which we perceptually grasp this whatever-it-is. That is why (they argue) that there are no metaphysically privileged entities (such as mountains vs. piles of dirt, the latter not being an entity according to Rand).

REB