Two Kinds of "Induction": Important similarities and trivial differences

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dismissing these concepts curtly as (mere) concepts of method does not really deal with them.

Bob,

Will you stop competing? Rand did not dismiss math with "concepts of method." She identified. Actually her entire system of concept formation is based on mathematics.

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

Dismissing these concepts curtly as (mere) concepts of method does not really deal with them.

Bob,

Will you stop competing? Rand did not dismiss math with "concepts of method." She identified. Actually her entire system of concept formation is based on mathematics.

Michael

No it isn't. It is based on something, but not on mathematics. Rand "defined" mathematics as the science of quantity. That is not what mathematics is. And measurement omission does not cover non-metric structures.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

No it isn't. It is based on something, but not on mathematics. Rand "defined" mathematics as the science of quantity. That is not what mathematics is.

Bob,

Please get it right. ITOE, 2nd, p. 7:

Mathematics is the science of measurement.

. . .

Measurement is the identification of a relationship—a quantitative relationship established by means of a standard that serves as a unit.

If you want to jump over the word "measurement" and truly understand what Rand was saying, think "the science of relationships" and then add the concept "quantity."

And measurement omission does not cover non-metric structures.

It depends on what you are measuring in those structures in order to arrive at a concept.

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

No it isn't. It is based on something, but not on mathematics. Rand "defined" mathematics as the science of quantity. That is not what mathematics is.

Bob,

Please get it right. ITOE, 2nd, p. 7:

Mathematics is the science of measurement.

. . .

Measurement is the identification of a relationship—a quantitative relationship established by means of a standard that serves as a unit.

If you want to jump over the word "measurement" and truly understand what Rand was saying, think "the science of relationships" and then add the concept "quantity."

And measurement omission does not cover non-metric structures.

It depends on what you are measuring in those structures in order to arrive at a concept.

Michael

Measure implies a dense linear order. Where I come from we call it quantity.

There are totally non-metric mathematical structures with no related quantities.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[merjet]

If you want to jump over the word "measurement" and truly understand what Rand was saying, think "the science of relationships" and then add the concept "quantity."

Is this your intuition of the essence of Rand's mind again?

I read Rand literally, just as she advised reading other philosophers. Of course, philosophers sometimes use words metaphorically, cavalierly, even sloppily. That is what Rand did with "measurement." You have bent over backward trying to make "measurement" essential to concept formation. It does not work. If measurement were essential to concept formation, then forming a concept before learning to count would be impossible. Yet children do form concepts before they learn about numbers -- which they first acquire by learning to count and is a prerequisite to even a minimal understanding of measurement.

And measurement omission does not cover non-metric structures.

It depends on what you are measuring in those structures in order to arrive at a concept.

Michael

This reply makes as much sense as talking about the DNA of a rock. A non-metric structure is not measurable by definition.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Merlin,

I have not read your articles yet, but from my previous skimming, I am well aware that you do not consider counting to be a form of measurement and do not like the idea of cardinal and ordinal measurements. I need to digest all this properly (including the rest of your ideas) before I can make any kind of intelligent comment on it.

At least you seem to be agreeing that I am making the same kind of so-called mistakes Rand has made. I have no doubt you would object to Rand's sleight-of-hand with measurement-omission (and still calling it "measurement") as given in "Abstraction from Abstractions" (ITOE, 2nd, pp. 21-22 - my bold).

The first stages of integrating concepts into wider concepts are fairly simple, because they still refer to perceptual concretes. For instance, man observes that the objects which he has identified by the concepts "table," "chair," "bed," "cabinet," etc. have certain similarities, but are different from the objects he has identified as "door," "window," "picture," "drapes"—and he integrates the former into the wider concept "furniture." In this process, concepts serve as units and are treated epistemologically as if each were a single (mental) concrete—always remembering that metaphysically (i.e., in reality) each unit stands for an unlimited number of actual concretes of a certain kind.

The distinguishing characteristics of these units are specified categories of measurements of shape, such as "a flat, level surface and support(s)" in the case of tables. In relation to the new concept, these distinguishing characteristics are now regarded in the same manner as the measurements of individual table-shapes were regarded in forming the concept "table": they are omitted, on the principle that a piece of furniture must have some shape, but may have any of the shapes characterizing the various units subsumed under the new concept.

and pp. 23-24 (my bold):

When concepts are integrated into a wider one, the new concept includes all the characteristics of its constituent units; but their distinguishing characteristics are regarded as omitted measurements, and one of their common characteristics determines the distinguishing characteristic of the new concept: the one representing their "Conceptual Common Denominator" with the existents from which they are being differentiated.

When a concept is subdivided into narrower ones, its distinguishing characteristic is taken as their "Conceptual Common Denominator"—and is given a narrower range of specified measurements or is combined with an additional characteristic(s), to form the individual distinguishing characteristics of the new concepts.

I had to do a double take when I reread this a couple of years ago (not counting my several readings decades ago in my Randroid phase). Thinking on this actually tipped me off as to the commensurable nature of the distinguishing characteristic as a fundamental component of it. The reason a distinguishing characteristic can be treated as a measurement and be omitted is because it is used for measurement in the first place.

I do see that you use a different—much narrower—definition for measurement than Rand does. Regardless of any other agreement or disagreement, this is clear to me. More later, after I chew and digest.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

The following excerpts from posts speak for themselves. The first is from this thread, posted on October 8, 2007, and the second is from my Report on TAS’s 50th Anniversary Celebration of Atlas Shrugged (that post being dated 10 days later, October 18).

Probably one of the highlights of the event I attended in terms of our own discussions was when Tibor Machan was asked in an Q&A about the is/ought problem. He mentioned Hume's argument and stated that Hume basically was claiming that one cannot deduce a conclusion regarding a fact that is not given in the premises, so in this instance he is correct. There is no ought in the premises, so no ought can be deduced from them (as in a syllogism). However, there is a big difference between deducing is from ought, which can't be done, and deriving is from ought, which not only can be done but should be done.*

Rand never claimed anyone can deduce is from ought, but she did claim that one can derive is from ought.*

I do have to point out one error in the above report, Michael. You actually got the order reversed when you were talking about the is/ought problem. It should have read:

There is a big difference between

deducing

ought from is, which can't be done, and

deriving

ought from is, which not only can be done but should be done...Rand never claimed anyone can

deduce

ought from is, but she did claim that one can

derive

ought from is.

Roger,

Thank you for that correction. It was made from being tired, not from misunderstanding. I presented this on another thread discussing it with some who think Rand was all wrong (and others no) and I was still recovering from the event. Not one of them corrected me. That is a pretty good indicator of how carefully they read my posts. I will keep that in mind when I discuss things with them in the future.

I am going to post this over there.

Dayaamm!

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

Repeating what I posted "over there."

Roger,

Thank you for that correction. It was made from being tired, not from misunderstanding. I presented this on another thread discussing it with some who think Rand was all wrong (and others no) and I was still recovering from the event. Not one of them corrected me. That is a pretty good indicator of how carefully they read my posts. I will keep that in mind when I discuss things with them in the future.

I am going to post this over there.

Dayaamm!

Michael

Don't kid yourself that it wasn't noticed, Michael. I, for one, noticed it but didn't care to extend the courtesy of correcting it in the midst of the charges you were occupied with leveling against me and others and your multiple misreports/misreadings which were considerably more important to the thread. I assumed, on that particular error, that you actually knew better and had merely mistyped and that anyone with any understanding of the subject would likewise chalk the transposition up as a typo.

Ellen

___

[Dragonfly]

Thank you for that correction. It was made from being tired, not from misunderstanding. I presented this on another thread discussing it with some who think Rand was all wrong (and others no) and I was still recovering from the event. Not one of them corrected me. That is a pretty good indicator of how carefully they read my posts. I will keep that in mind when I discuss things with them in the future.

We are not proofreaders. The meaning of that phrase was of course obvious and the focus of the discussion was on the alleged difference between "derive" and "deduce". And if we're talking about people not reading carefully, I can think of a few other examples as well.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen and Dragonfly,

Whatever you say. I certainly have been corrected on a lot less. For the record, here are your posts immediately following my error—actually quoting the error—trying to correct me on deduce and derive and determine while ignoring the error:

Rand never claimed anyone can deduce is from ought, but she did claim that one can derive is from ought.

Huh? What is the difference? All the dictionaries that I've checked confirm that "deduce" and "derive" are synonyms.

Rand never claimed anyone can deduce is from ought, but she did claim that one can derive is from ought.

Huh? What is the difference? All the dictionaries that I've checked confirm that "deduce" and "derive" are synonyms.

Besides, as was discussed ad infinitum on one (or more) of the threads, if she didn't mean "derive"** in the sense of arrive at by logical entailment in the context in which she said it, she wasn't addressing the point of "those philosophers" at whom the off-hand dismissal was purportedly aimed, so what was the relevance of the remark?

Ellen

** Correction: She didn't use the word "derive" in the paragraph which starts "In answer to those philosophers [...]." She used "determines," which is highly nebulous as to meaning. Also "validation," which again is nebulous. "Derive," if MSK is quoting Tibor correctly, is Tibor's interpretation, and was also the interpretation of some in the dicussions here. Later in the same work, she said, "to a living consciousness, every "is" implies an "ought". Again, the wording is nebulous; she doesn't explicitly say "entails," but neither does she say "provides a conditional [if you want X, doing Y is required]." I think that the two most plausible options in "parsing" these passages are: Either to conclude that she was claiming to have established entailment of an "ought" statement from an "is" statement, or to conclude that she was writing masterly weasel-wording. (The other option is to conclude that she was writing carelessly and wasn't clear herself on what she was saying, but I think that's less likely.)

___

The posts are up as they are. Oversight or "not extending courtesy"? People will interpret them according to their own evaluations.

Michael

[merjet]

I have no doubt you would object to Rand's sleight-of-hand with measurement-omission (and still calling it "measurement") as given in "Abstraction from Abstractions" (ITOE, 2nd, pp. 21-22 - my bold).

The first stages of integrating concepts into wider concepts are fairly simple, because they still refer to perceptual concretes. For instance, man observes that the objects which he has identified by the concepts "table," "chair," "bed," "cabinet," etc. have certain similarities, but are different from the objects he has identified as "door," "window," "picture," "drapes"—and he integrates the former into the wider concept "furniture." In this process, concepts serve as units and are treated epistemologically as if each were a single (mental) concrete—always remembering that metaphysically (i.e., in reality) each unit stands for an unlimited number of actual concretes of a certain kind.

The distinguishing characteristics of these units are specified categories of measurements of shape, such as "a flat, level surface and support(s)" in the case of tables. In relation to the new concept, these distinguishing characteristics are now regarded in the same manner as the measurements of individual table-shapes were regarded in forming the concept "table": they are omitted, on the principle that a piece of furniture must have some shape, but may have any of the shapes characterizing the various units subsumed under the new concept.

and pp. 23-24 (my bold):

Yes, there is sleight-of-hand in that passage. The distinguishing characteristics of these items of furniture are not measurements, but their specific purposes as follow:

table - for putting other objects on and flat horizontal top

chair - for a person to sit on

bed - for a person to sleep in

cabinet - for storing other objects in and has shelves

door - for entering or exiting a building or room

window - for seeing in or out of a building or room

picture - for showing an image

drape - for covering a window

Note that each has some specific purpose, but may have any specific purpose that would make it furniture.

Edited October 18, 2007 by Merlin Jetton