fiscal insanity...

[moralist]

7 hours ago, jts said:

The USA constitution was made for self-employed people, not employees.

I can clarify your statement because you omitted the essential moral qualifier...

The American Constitution was also made for ethical employees as well as the ethically self employed...

... because only an ethical employee has the courage to refuse to work for an unethical employer.

 

Greg

[moralist]

13 hours ago, SteveWolfer said:

"If by "higher moral law" you are referring to a moral code derived from scripture, or revelation, or any form of mysticism or faith, then we aren't on the same page..."

"...Actually, it can control you whether you 'need the government' or not - it has that capacity.  It regulates nearly every aspect of our lives."

Steve, I juxtaposed these two quotes of yours to highlight how the second quote is a direct consequence of the first.

It is your own deliberate freely chosen rejection of moral law which has placed you under the thumb of the very government you decry.

 

Greg

[SteveWolfer]

11 minutes ago, moralist said:

America's Judeo/Christian values based government is unique and exceptional in all of the world

America is unique and exceptional because it was explicitly founded to serve the individual by protecting individual rights.  The founding fathers, some of whom were quite religious - others not at all, specifically kept Judeo/Christian views OUT of government and along with the states, ratified as the first amendment that government was to stay out of religion so that religion might remain a completely private matter.

There are other governments throughout history and around the globe that have adopted religious values from which to form their laws.  They didn't turn out well and to the extent that they pursued religious ends, they became tyrants and harmed their citizens.

If you want to discuss religion as a  net positive value, you came to the wrong forum and by now you'd know that.  So, you must like contention even when it will serve no practical purpose.

[moralist]

Just now, SteveWolfer said:

America is unique and exceptional because it was explicitly founded to serve the individual by protecting individual rights. 

America is a unique nation in that it was founded on the spiritual principle that rights come from God... not from the government

Greg

[SteveWolfer]

1 minute ago, moralist said:

It is your own deliberate freely chosen rejection of moral law 

If you think that only the religious have moral laws, then you are wearing self-made blinders.  If you think I've rejected morality or moral law then you haven't read my posts.  We are done. 

[SteveWolfer]

1 minute ago, moralist said:

America is a unique nation in that it was founded on the spiritual principle that rights come from God

I don't argue with religious zealots.

[moralist]

I'm fine with that, Steve.

I merely described the reason why the government regulates almost every aspect of your life. Whether you agree or disagree with the reason is irrelevant to the undeniable reality of it's control over you.

 

Greg

 

[moralist]

32 minutes ago, SteveWolfer said:

If you think that only the religious have moral laws, then you are wearing self-made blinders.

The only truly accurate indicator of how good your moral laws are is how much control the government has over your life. By your own declaration it exerts control over almost every aspect. So your argument isn't with me as I'm just someone who is reading your own words. Your argument is actually with yourself because you're the only one with the power to grant the government sanction to control your life.

I didn't do it.

The government didn't do it.

You did.

 

Greg

[BaalChatzaf]

10 hours ago, SteveWolfer said:

I agree.  Let's assume I was talking about a kind of cancer that is not preventable (so far as we know these days).  That is what was in my mind.

 

Physical law would exclude laws of motivational psychology, and motivational psychology would exclude physical laws.  We construct areas of knowledge, but if they don't relate to reality, they are floating abstractions or some other kind of nonsense.  Humans are a part of nature.  We have a consciousness.  There are things that are good for us and things that are bad for us. 

Nature (if we discuss it from the perspective of being what is not you, and not me, and not another person, might not give a damn about our thoughts on right or wrong, but that is a kind of anthropomorphizing, isn't it?  A billiard ball doesn't give a damn, but this or that person might - so why put ourselves in the position of defining nature so as to exclude humans, much less the position of having taken that position, to then say non-humans don't concern themselves with our thoughts on ethics.

Yes. It is anthropomorphizing (a little bit).   Natural laws do not entail moral principles.  Only physical processes occur in nature.  Processes we consider the product of our "minds"  are in fact neural processes.   Objectively, all that exists are the discharge of neurons and the migration of Sodium and Potassium ions across protein membranes.   Belief in some sort of non-material happenings is  fanciful wishing and projection (which humans do quite a bit).  Nature is physical from top to bottom. There are no ghosts, gobblins, gods or spirits.  

[moralist]

Your cancer side discussion has no bearing on the validity of what I've said, as I've only referenced your relationship to the government you deserve that you have freely chosen to be determined by your own personal morality.

 

Greg

[anthony]

2 hours ago, BaalChatzaf said:

Yes. It is anthropomorphizing (a little bit).   Natural laws do not entail moral principles.  Only physical processes occur in nature.  Processes we consider the product of our "minds"  are in fact neural processes.   Objectively, all that exists are the discharge of neurons and the migration of Sodium and Potassium ions across protein membranes.   Belief in some sort of non-material happenings is  fanciful wishing and projection (which humans do quite a bit).  Nature is physical from top to bottom. There are no ghosts, gobblins, gods or spirits.  

Your constancy is impressive, Bob. How many times we've gone over this physicalism... Look at it this way. If you're a bird, you fly. If you're a fish, you swim. Stop those activities and you die. If you're a rational animal, you think - to live, and to live well - and that's how the is becomes the ought.

[BaalChatzaf]

5 minutes ago, anthony said:

Your constancy is impressive, Bob. How many times we've gone over this physicalism... Look at it this way. If you're a bird, you fly. If you're a fish, you swim. Stop those activities and you die. If you're a rational animal, you think - to live, and to live well - and that's how the is becomes the ought.

All of which I agree with and all of which are physical activities or processes.  

[anthony]

43 minutes ago, BaalChatzaf said:

All of which I agree with and all of which are physical activities or processes.  

So, "to think". But to think precisely -- What? Do you believe that any specific thought is automated in man? Do you think that there are not a thousand other chains of thinking possible to anyone, besides the one you choose at this moment? It's interesting that self-styled empiricists I've known are usually also hard, "physical" determinists. Having the ability to oversee one's thoughts, to select what one focuses to think upon, and to redirect the process, by choice, or to "switch off", are not the acts of a physical automaton.

[moralist]

24 minutes ago, anthony said:

So, "to think". But to think precisely -- What? Do you believe that any specific thought is automated in man? Do you think that there are not a thousand other chains of thinking possible to anyone, besides the one you choose at this moment? It's interesting that self-styled empiricists I've known are usually also hard, "physical" determinists. Having the ability to oversee one's thoughts, to select what one focuses to think upon, and to redirect the process, by choice, or to "switch off", are not the acts of a physical automaton.

They are acts of volition.

 

Greg

[anthony]

11 minutes ago, moralist said:

They are acts of volition.

 

Greg

Exactly, and likely the acts of a rationally selfish morality (but don't tell Bob)

[BaalChatzaf]

4 hours ago, anthony said:

So, "to think". But to think precisely -- What? Do you believe that any specific thought is automated in man? Do you think that there are not a thousand other chains of thinking possible to anyone, besides the one you choose at this moment? It's interesting that self-styled empiricists I've known are usually also hard, "physical" determinists. Having the ability to oversee one's thoughts, to select what one focuses to think upon, and to redirect the process, by choice, or to "switch off", are not the acts of a physical automaton.

I sing the body electric.  We are what we are.  We are large bags of mostly water with a substructure of carbon, calcium and other chemicals.  Everything about us,  goes according to physical laws.  The "redirection" may be due to quantum uncertainties that take place at the molecular level.  Subjectively we feel like we are in control  the the "we" is a bundle of electrochemical processes.  There is no unitary I or You as our brains are modular in their structure and functioning.  The unitary "self" we experience is a subjective artifact. 

[SteveWolfer]

5 hours ago, BaalChatzaf said:

Processes we consider the product of our "minds"  are in fact neural processes

There is no question but that as I sit here composing this sentence, it is a process that is mediated by neural processes.  But, the thoughts are thoughts.  If I build a boat from wooden planks, when I sail it far out to sea, it will be much more comforting to think of it as a "boat" and not just a set of planks that happen to be going the same direction at the same time.  The "boat" is real.  I don't have to keep explaining to anyone that it is just wood planks.

 

5 hours ago, BaalChatzaf said:

Objectively, all that exists are the discharge of neurons and the migration of Sodium and Potassium ions across protein membranes.

No.  Physically, all that exists are the discharge of neurons and the migration of Sodium and Potassium ions across protein membranes.  Physically that boat was nothing but planks.  Physically, this sentence, if written on paper with ink would be nothing but paper and ink - no meaning - no subject - no predicate - no context - etc.

I can code a software program that simulates blood flow in a cardiovascular system, and physicians can watch a graphic display of the algorithms output. But physically, it is only electrons moving through conductors and glowing LED elements.  If you can't say that there is much, much more than just the physical dimension, then what are we talking about?

Because we can conceptualize things, and because those things can be objective even if they are not physical, does NOT mean we are in a world of duality, or spirit-beings, or mysticism.

You mentioned "neuron" and you say that is a physical thing.  But you had to construct a sentence where you used a name (that once upon a time was made up) to symbolize the actual physical thing... but wait, it is a single physical thing, is it?  It is a concept that subsumes an entire category of actual, concrete things.  Then with rules of grammar, logic, and purpose, you converted a thought into a sentence where "neuron" - the concept - had something predicated of it.  You got a long ways away from just the physical to do all of that.

Let me ask, are you saying that we have no volition?

 

[SteveWolfer]

1 hour ago, BaalChatzaf said:

Everything about us,  goes according to physical laws.  The "redirection" may we due to quantum uncertainties that take place at the molecular level.

Everything physical about us, goes according to physical laws.  The laws of grammar and logic come into play as we construct sentences that convey the meanings we desire to communicate.  The laws of epistemology and psychology are at work as we pursue our purpose.  (I freely admit that I'm using the concept "laws" a bit loosely here, but contend my meaning stays clear and the logic isn't impaired.  I also admit that each body of knowledge contains rules or principles that differ from other bodies of knowledge.)

Personally, I'd feel a bit uncomfortable insisting that all of the other bodies of knowledge, other than physics, had to somehow have everything in them be reducible to physics, that all that I said and wrote and thought was just a product of a chain of quantum uncertainties (something that I could not prove or even find despite them being physical and a part of every human action that was mediated by neuronal activity).  I'd feel uncomfortable using words, discussing thoughts, acting as if there could be meaning, asserting something as true, or just feeling that I'm me... if I took the positions you are taking. 

Physical things are more than the properties and principles attended to by physics.  We humans created, and maintain, this body of knowledge called "physics" - it is, in its entirety, an abstraction from the reality.  We abstract the physical elements.  Neither that abstraction, nor that body of knowledge are physical things.

[BaalChatzaf]

1 hour ago, SteveWolfer said:

Everything physical about us, goes according to physical laws.  The laws of grammar and logic come into play as we construct sentences that convey the meanings we desire to communicate.  The laws of epistemology and psychology are at work as we pursue our purpose.  (I freely admit that I'm using the concept "laws" a bit loosely here, but contend my meaning stays clear and the logic isn't impaired.  I also admit that each body of knowledge contains rules or principles that differ from other bodies of knowledge.)

Personally, I'd feel a bit uncomfortable insisting that all of the other bodies of knowledge, other than physics, had to somehow have everything in them be reducible to physics, that all that I said and wrote and thought was just a product of a chain of quantum uncertainties (something that I could not prove or even find despite them being physical and a part of every human action that was mediated by neuronal activity).  I'd feel uncomfortable using words, discussing thoughts, acting as if there could be meaning, asserting something as true, or just feeling that I'm me... if I took the positions you are taking. 

Physical things are more than the properties and principles attended to by physics.  We humans created, and maintain, this body of knowledge called "physics" - it is, in its entirety, an abstraction from the reality.  We abstract the physical elements.  Neither that abstraction, nor that body of knowledge are physical things.

All there is  is the physical us.  The Cosmos is physical from top to bottom and from beginning to end. 

Read what Lucretius has to say on the matter. 

[Peter]

Ba’al wrote: The unitary "self" we experience is a subjective artifact . . . .  Read what Lucretius has to say on the matter.  end quote

Steve replied: You mentioned "neuron" and you say that is a physical thing . . . . You got a long ways away from just the physical to do all of that. Let me ask, are you saying that we have no volition? end quote

I agree with Steve, Bob, and then I *decide* to speak in the language of bad puns. The urinating "self" we experience is no subjective artifact. It’s my party and I can pee when I want to . . . up to a point. Up to the point that I “have to pee,” I am utilizing volition.

Peter.

Lucretius, Ba’al? How about some Aristotle? Some oldies but goodies.

From: "George H. Smith" As I have noted before, one of the best treatments of "choice" ever written appears in Book III of Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics.* The following sketch of his basic points is from the translation by W.D. Ross in *The Basic Works of Aristotle,* ed. Richard McKeon (Random House, 1941). This summary is taken from Aristotle's introductory remarks on pp. 967-71, after which he explains and defends his views in more detail -- so please don't take this as a comprehensive statement. I encourage everyone to read Aristotle's discussion in its entirety, for two reasons. First, it exerted an enormous influence on subsequent advocates of "free will." Second, it is filled with insights, distinctions, and arguments that every volitionist (including Objectivists) will find of value, even if they take exception to some points.

Summary. Choice does not pertain to what is impossible. We can wish for something impossible (e.g., immortality), but we cannot choose it. An agent chooses "only the things that he thinks could be brought about by his own efforts." Wish relates the end of action, whereas choice relates to the means. For example, we can wish to be healthy but we cannot choose to be healthy per se, because this does not lie directly in our power. Instead, we choose *means,* or specific actions, that we think will make us healthy. Choice "involves a rational principle and thought." This means that choice is preceded by deliberation. This distinguishes the realm of choice from the realm of the voluntary. All chosen actions are voluntary, but not all voluntary actions are chosen. Something is voluntary if "the moving principle is in the agent himself, he being aware of the particular circumstances of the action." Hence if we act spontaneously from a strong passion, this action is voluntary (i.e., it  was not compelled by an external agent) but not chosen per se, because it was not the result of deliberation. The same is true of habitual actions. These are voluntary but not chosen, since to act from habit is to act without conscious reflection or deliberation. We can, however, choose means that we believe will alter our habits; and it is also the case that our habits are the result of earlier choices. This notion of indirect choice (which is my characterization, not Aristotle's) plays a crucial role in Aristotle's treatment of virtues and vices, which are essentially good and bad moral habits. (Aristotle's distinction between the voluntary and the chosen – which he discusses in far more detail than indicated here -- is relevant to the topic of soft determinism. He would maintain that the soft determinist confuses voluntary actions with chosen actions. Suppose that all of our actions are necessitated by antecedent causes. Although these determined actions can be described a "voluntary" (because the source of action lies within the agent), they are not a matter of choice. This is because choice presupposes deliberation, and we deliberate only about *alternatives* that we regard as both possible and within our power to do or not to do.) Aristotle asks: "Do we deliberate about everything, and is everything a possible subject of deliberation, or is deliberation impossible about some things?" We do not deliberate about things that occur necessarily or by nature, nor about chance events. (These are other ways of saying that we do not deliberate about things that lie outside of our control.) For instance, we do not deliberate about solstices, droughts or rains, nor about the accidental finding of a treasure. Nor do we deliberate about every human action, but only about those things that "can be brought about by our own efforts." In short, "we deliberate about things that are in our own power and can be done." This means that we do not deliberate about the conclusions of the exact sciences in which conclusions follow with logical necessity from evident premises. Nor do we deliberate about how the letters of the alphabet shall be written, for such matters have already been determined (by convention, in this case) and present no options. Deliberation is possible only when (1) alternatives are possible, and (2) these alternatives lie within our own power to do or not to do. "Deliberation is concerned with things that happen in a certain way for the most part, but in which the event is obscure, and with things in which it is indeterminate."

"We deliberate about ends but not about means." A doctor qua doctor does not deliberate about whether he shall heal, for this purpose is a defining characteristic of his profession. This end is assumed -- it is accepted as a given by the doctor qua doctor -- who deliberates only about the means appropriate to healing, when different options present themselves and a course of action is not absolutely dictated by logical necessity. (Aristotle obviously does not deny that one can deliberate about becoming a doctor, but in this case the profession is viewed as a *means* to some other end, e.g., a fulfilling way of life, a good living, or happiness.) All deliberation is a type of investigation; to deliberate is to consider various means and to assess their relative desirability vis-à-vis a given end. And if, during the course of this investigation, we encounter an impossibility, we "give up the search" because we realize that something is not within our power. (E.g., "if we need money and this cannot be got; but if a thing appears possible we try to do   it.") Deliberation "is about the things to be done by the agent himself, and actions are for the sake of things other than themselves." The object of deliberation in a particular case is the same as the object of choice, "except that the object of choice is already determinate, since it is that which has been decided upon as a result of deliberation that is the object of choice."  Again: "The object of choice being one of the things in our own power which is desired after deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of things in our own power; for when we have decided as a result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation." (The term "deliberate desire" is very important. Aristotle denies that our choices are necessitated by our desires. True, we don't choose something unless we desire it in some sense, but can generate, and thereby control, our desires through deliberation, which is an intellectual process that a person has the power to initiate and direct. To put the same point in Randian terms, feelings are not a primary.) Ghs

From: "George H. Smith" Regarding my summary of "Aristotle on choice," Peter Taylor wrote: "George, I know we are delving into the realm of psychology and psychologizing but what would Aristotle say about the consequences of thinking of oneself as a determined being?  I try to imagine myself in that bizarre position and I can only imagine acting in a nihilistic manner, coming to a crossroads, and going which ever way "seems" right for me. The alternative is paranoia and waiting for the decision to be made by antecedent causality."

Aristotle doesn't discuss the free-will/determinism controversy explicitly (at least not in his extant texts). He seems to consider the power to choose freely to be an obvious characteristic of rational and purposeful human beings, one that is clearly revealed through introspection. And I think he would further maintain that a consistent empiricist should take introspective evidence as seriously as he takes extrospective evidence, especially since knowledge based on the latter *depends* on the reliability of the former. In short, if we cannot trust our internal experiences, then we have no foundation on which to base objective knowledge of anything, including the external world. .

In his classic book, *Outlines of Greek Philosophy,*  Eduard Zeller writes: "Aristotle presupposes quite arbitrarily the freedom of the will and attempts to prove it by the fact that virtue is voluntary and that we are universally held accountable for our actions" (Dover, 1980). Although I wouldn't put it this way -- for one thing, I think "arbitrarily" is an inaccurate characterization-- it is certainly correct to say that Aristotle's stresses the inextricable relationship between free choice and moral phenomena. It is scarcely coincidental that Aristotle discusses "choice" in his work on ethics, where he repeatedly emphasizes that moral judgments apply *only* to actions that lie within our power to do or to forbear.

According to Aristotle, "where it is in our power to act, it is also in our power not to act, and vice versa." This power of choice originates in reason. Choice is the "efficient cause" of an action, but the cause of choice is "desire and reasoning with view to an end." This latter is deliberation, which is a function of practical (as opposed to theoretic, or speculative) reason. Depending on the context, Aristotle also describes this fusion of reason and desire as "desiderative reason" and "ratiocinative desire." Here is a summary from Mortimer J. Adler's magnum opus, *The Idea of Freedom* (vol. I, p 469): "Beyond desiderative and practical reason, as the power by which man deliberates and chooses, there is no efficient cause of the choices he makes. When Aristotle, referring to desiderative reason, says that 'such an *origin* of action is a man,' he is attributing to a human being the power of *initiating* his own actions by virtue of his practical reason as a first or active moving principle. Just as in the speculative order (i.e., the sphere of knowing) Aristotle posits the *agent*-intellect which acts without being acted upon, so in the practical order (i.e., the sphere of doing or making) he treats practical reason as an *active* power and a *first* cause -- a first cause, that is, with respect to man's own acts, not with respect to the cosmos."

This is background information. I have yet directly to address Peter's question, viz: "what would Aristotle say about the consequences of thinking of oneself as a determined being?" I suspect he would maintain that determinism in any form flatly contradicts introspective evidence, and that it would make nonsense of our subjective experiences. There are a number of reasons for this, but the most obvious is our need for deliberation. We deliberate *only* because we believe that two or more alternatives are possible, and that it within our to choose among these alternatives. For Aristotle (as I noted above) choice presupposes "the power to act" or "not to act" in regard to particular means. .

This raises the interesting question of how Aristotle would argue against determinism. I suspect his argument would resemble his argument (in the *Metaphysics*) against a person who claims to deny the Law of Non-Contradiction (e.g., a person who claims that the same proposition can be both true and false at the same time and in the same respect). Aristotle contends that not all knowledge is strictly demonstrable, because we will ultimately encounter premises and axioms that cannot themselves be proven. Nevertheless, there is a kind of argument – which he calls "dialectical" -- that can be used here.

Unlike a demonstrative argument, which begins with "first principles," a dialectical argument begins with the *opinions* that men hold about a certain subject. The purpose of a dialectical argument is to back one's adversary into an untenable corner by showing that his opinion carries implications that even he would be unwilling to accept. As Zeller indicates, Aristotle would claim that a consistent determinist would be logically required to expunge all normative terms from his language and way of thinking, which is clearly impossible.

It is also likely (though I am obviously speculating here) that Aristotle would argue against the determinist by pointing out that deliberation itself presupposes free choice. We do not deliberate about things which we believe to be impossible. Deliberation *begins* at the point where we believe that various means are  possible* for us. Hence if we truly believed that only *one* action is possible, there would be nothing to deliberate *about.* We *stop* our investigation of means *precisely* at the point where we become convinced that something is *impossible.* Hence to deliberate between different means, X and Y, presupposes that we believe that we have the power to choose *either* X or Y.

Therefore, just as Aristotle claims that a person who denies the Law of Non-Contradiction reduces himself to the intellectual status of a vegetable, so he would probably maintain that the person who implicitly repudiates the function of deliberative reason, which chooses between *possible* means in pursuit of a goal, reduces himself to the status of a lower animal or automaton, in effect, by failing to understand the proper role of reason as an efficient cause (a fundamental explanatory principle) of human action. Ghs

[SteveWolfer]

1 hour ago, BaalChatzaf said:

All there is  is the physical us.

This must mean that neither you nor anyone, ever, can distinguish between a given thought in a given person, and a specific neural activity.  They must - by your assertion - be the same, identical, indistinguishable.  Actually, what you say implies that there isn't such a thing as a thought... only that neural activity. 

Clearly there is, at the least, something physical (like my computer) and a thought about that thing and the neural activity that mediates that thought about that thing.  So, there isn't just the physical us.

[moralist]

6 hours ago, anthony said:

Exactly, and likely the acts of a rationally selfish morality (but don't tell Bob)

It wouldn't matter if you did. According to Bob, the totality of his being is nothing more than a long string of dumb chemical reactions. And this is why he'll never figure out how his government keeps f**king him over because he keeps letting it. He's the ultimate sucker.

 

Greg

[BaalChatzaf]

1 hour ago, SteveWolfer said:

This must mean that neither you nor anyone, ever, can distinguish between a given thought in a given person, and a specific neural activity.  They must - by your assertion - be the same, identical, indistinguishable.  Actually, what you say implies that there isn't such a thing as a thought... only that neural activity. 

Clearly there is, at the least, something physical (like my computer) and a thought about that thing and the neural activity that mediates that thought about that thing.  So, there isn't just the physical us.

My brain is not connected (directly) to any one else's brain.  So we each have our very own brain.  My thoughts, I clearly sense come from inside.  Anything else comes though my external  sense organs.  So I can clear distinguish my own stuff from other people's. 

[moralist]

3 hours ago, BaalChatzaf said:

  So we each have our very own brain.

Its not your brain, Bob... and those thoughts aren't you.

You have no choice but to believe they are yours because your brains tells you they are. And since you believe all you are is the chemical reactions in your brain, you have to believe every stupid thought is you because you have no choice.

Your government positively loves people like you. 

Greg

 

[Brant Gaede]

18 hours ago, SteveWolfer said:

I don't argue with religious zealots.

Thomas Jefferson? (Joke.)

The right to lifers--today--say the right to life comes from God. While you see an intimation of that in the Declaration of Independence ("endowed by their Creator") the Lockeans essentially invented rights. References to God by them is merely to provide moral gravitas PR or propaganda to their invention. Some did believe in God too. Not Rand. What makes rights natural is they are predicated on human nature which matches up to the political philosophy.

Human rights are a human invention. They are and will remain seemingly something of an intellectualization out of the deterioration of critical thinking and proper liberal arts education over 200 years in this country which has snowballed into gigantic and gross imbecility. This can't be reversed by Objectivism; it might be by pantheism, a religion of no faith*, displacing monotheistic religion, Christianity first.

--Brant

*just the self evident validity of axioms