Free Market Anarchism: A Justification

[dan2100]

Introduction

I’ve been arguing the free market anarchist position in one form or another now for several years. Last year, in an online forum, a critic of anarchism asked me for a short explanation of free market anarchism. Providing this in a brief email forced me to boil down a lot of ideas to what I believed were essential to the position. Here follows an expanded version of that email explanation. Let’s start by defining some terms. Anarchy is the absence of government. By “government” is meant a single agency that enforces social rules, particularly what is called “law.” Naturally, this can cover many things, just as government can. If someone says a society has a government, this doesn’t tell us whether the government is limited or unlimited, democratic or oligarchic or autocratic, or the character of its laws. To give but one example, Spain and the US both had governments during the Spanish-American War, but they were quite different in character. The same is true of anarchy. The absence of government could mean something like a civil war, such as we see in Somalia today, or it could mean a fairly peaceful society, such as that of the American Old West or Iceland circa 1000 CE.

Anarchism is the view that some form anarchy would be a better way of organizing society -- that things would be better without a government at least in some circumstances. This does not mean that any form of anarchy -- any absence of government is better than any government. The worst form of anarchy might be far worse than the best form of government -- whether one compares theoretical cases or historical ones. The anarchist need not posit that all anarchies are better than any government. Nor is anarchism flawed if there indeed is some government that is better than some anarchy.

The absence of government, as noted above, can take many forms, some tried and some hypothesized. Just as there are many forms of anarchy, there are many forms of anarchism. Each particular variant of the latter posits some particular kind of anarchy that is better than government -- either in general or as one is likely to find. E.g., free market anarchism posits that legal authority should be competitive. Anarcho-socialism, on the other hand, mainly focuses on dispensing with private property. (I won’t go into anarcho-socialism in any detail.)

Minarchism is minimal government. While there are many different flavors of minarchism, the general idea is to strictly limit government to only what is seen as legitimate role. The legitimate role for minarchism is to have the government act only to respond to the initiation of force and perhaps to settle disputes. Usually, this boils down to government protecting only individual negative rights, such as the right to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness in the classical liberal sense of those rights. (I use “individual negative rights” to distinguish them from collective rights -- rights supposed to belong to groups, such as ethnic groups, nations, classes, gender-based groups, or what have you -- and from positive rights -- rights supposed to guarantee something, such as rights to a job, education, medical treatment, food, housing, etc.)

Statism is any social or political system that concentrates power in the hands of governments at the expense of individual negative rights or freedoms. Statism per se is different from minarchism -- at least in theory. (Some anarchists would argue that a having a government at all violates individual rights and freedoms because to remain a government it must not allow competitors to operate inside its territory. Some minarchists would argue that there’s no right to choose between competing governments.)

Resolving Disputes

Why worry about anarchy and government? There is one major problem of living in society: how to get along with other people. As long as no disputes arise, there is no problem, but when they do arise -- as they have in all known societies -- there needs to be a means of resolving them. So what happens when people can't coordinate their actions? E.g., if Stan does something that negatively impacts Eileen, such as, to use an example from Ellickson (1994), let's his sheep graze on Eileen's wheat field.

One generally accepted solution to this problem is to define property rights between such parties. This way, each party can be sure, to some extent, of what is expected of her or him (or them) and can reduce social conflict. (I'm not claiming here that this is a planned outcome, but more that it's a spontaneous order that evolves based on human actions not human design. Put another way, societies that are able to resolve such conflicts and increase social coordination tend to be more successful and flourish. Hence, relatively free societies. Those that can’t resolve such conflicts in a mostly peaceful fashion and otherwise increase social cooperation have to rely on other policies to continue to exist or grow. Hence, statism and imperialism.)

Defining property rights alone is not enough. They can provide a framework within which to resolve disputes, but they don’t enforce themselves. So how should property rights be enforced? (Many minarchists claim that property rights exist independent of government, so no government is needed define them ab initio. Most natural rights theorists, such as John Locke and Ayn Rand, believe much the same. Rights precede government.) The problem is not so hard if one postulates that the people involved have the incentive and information to do so. However, in the real world, not only might incentives be otherwise (after all, in any real society some people steal, assault, rape, and kill), there's still an information problem. On the latter, in any given case, it might be hard to define a concrete right to property and hard to define when a violation of such a right happens or what should be done in such a case; e.g., if Stan walks across Eileen's lawn today, should she be able to shoot him two years later when she finds out about it?

By the way, this example is not a strike against anarchism, but a general problem with enforcing rights or any social rule. Arbitrary laws and punishments exist under government. There is no guarantee that even the best minarchy won't have such, given the potential for errors and corruption. A question to ask here is: What type of system is more likely to have these kinds of outcomes? A related question is: What type of system is more likely to correct them when they do happen?

These problems, however, are regularly overcome, again, by spontaneous orders. In a free market, people have an incentive to overcome the information problem to further social coordination mainly out of self-interest and through the ability of market actors to use dispersed and even tacit information. (Hayek 1980)

This does not mean every last member of society will perceive the incentives or once perceiving them not forego short-term gains over long-term ones. In fact, in markets, this happens all the time. Aside from sheer ignorance (not knowing what and that you don’t know: not knowing even the scope of your ignorance; see Kirzner 1992), people sometimes misjudge and incentives don't impact each individual the same way. However, the costs of such mistakes are visited locally and mostly on those making the choices.

Despite these shortcomings, markets do fairly well in the provisioning all sorts of goods and services. (It is more accurate to say that individuals interacting through markets do fairly well in the provisioning all sorts of goods and services. Alternatives to markets are, likewise, ways of people interacting through some alternate system.) The alternative to markets is to have some form of central control over such provision. Most minarchists accept markets in general, but still believe there are certain activities that markets either can't do well or can't do at all. For minarchists, the main one of these is the provision of rights enforcement services. They argue for having central control over such services, usually configured for a given geographical area. This would mean that, in the area of rights enforcement (for now, let’s bundle security as well as dispute resolution into this function), there must be a centrally planned and controlled order -- in short, a government. Hence the debate over anarchism (or polycentric legal orders) and government (or monocentric legal orders).

I believe that one can be objective here by asking a few questions that won't prejudice the issue. For example: would a polycentric or a monocentric legal order work better at rights enforcement? (It could be that the answer to these questions is neither -- that both work equally well, as good or as bad.) Which type of order is more stable? Do different types of cultures fit better into one type of order or the other? How do such orders evolve over time? Are there historical examples of either worth considering? Can either be applied to today’s world? How do we get to either from current social arrangements? (It might be that there is no easy path to either or that one is much easier to accomplish than the other, so we should take the easier path.)

I would add to the above that minarchism is not just any monocentric legal order, but a certain type. Obviously, neither type of legal order mentioned above has to be rights respecting. One can imagine a polycentric one that is probably many a minarchist’s view of anarchism: civil war or the international system of today. In the latter case, there is no international government, so the legal order is polycentric, but not the type most anarchists would applaud. (Waltz 1979) Note that this condition is not completely lawless as even between nation states spontaneous orders can arise -- as well as planned ones such as treaties, agreements, alliances, and international institutions.

Likewise, monocentric legal orders need not be rights respecting. All known nation states within their own borders are monocentric legal orders and all of them have violated rights on a greater or lesser scale and not just by accident. An auxiliary question, one related to the one about social evolution above, is: Is one type of legal order more likely to change into a worse form even if it starts out near its optimum? More concretely: would a minarchy be more likely over time to evolve into statism? Would a good form of anarchy be more likely to evolve into lawlessness? This also goes for evolution to something else entirely. After all, one can imagine a quite limited government having a civil war and that leading to lawlessness. One can also conceive of an anarchic society evolving into a statist one. In fact, at this time in history, some form of statism seems to be the end state of all socio-political evolution.

Where I stand here should be quite clear: I believe free market anarchism is more effective and efficient at rights enforcement than minarchism or any form of government. I also believe polycentric legal orders are more stable in the long run, while monocentric ones tend toward less stability. In fact, from the historical record, they tend to undergo revolutionary changes after periods of stasis leading until pressure builds (discontent rises) for the next revolutionary change. This has been the history of nation states. This tendency exists because monocentric legal systems are less efficient at solving the information problem -- for the same reason central planning in other areas fails relative to free markets -- and also because the incentives are decoupled or only loosely coupled with costs. Thus, even if saints peopled governments, they would still have the information problem to contend. They are not, so they also have the incentive problem.

(The difference between polycentric and monocentric legal systems might be put into terms of the difference between exit and voice systems. (Lieberman 1989) In an exit system, one can select between providers for a good or service. In a voice system, one can't select between such providers, but one can have in a say -- a voice -- in how a good or service is provided. These are, respectively, incarnated in free markets and governments. In a free market, one usually selects between providers. That's the main form of feedback between providers and consumers. In a government, one cannot make such selection (save by emigrating), though often one has some voice in the government -- whether through elections, polls, lobbying, or other means. Which system responds better to the people it services?)

Anarchic societies, likewise, are not peopled by saints, but by having competition in rights enforcement, the knowledge problem is, while not completely solved, much more manageable because there will be a free market in law. The incentive problem, again while not completely solved, is mostly solved because costs and incentives are aligned with costs. The ability to select between different providers of law means that such providers have to compete to better their product or lose clients to other purveyors -- at least, at the margin.

This is a mostly political-economic justification for anarchism and more Hayekian than Rothbardian. (Not that Hayek was an anarchist, but I rely on his view of the market here instead of Rothbard's view of natural rights.) This is not to say Rothbard’s rights basis for anarchy is wrong. I believe it complements the Hayekian social order basis. One would expect this if natural rights derive from human nature. One would expect them to be consistent with human economic and social nature as well as with psychology and the rest of human nature. The two are compatible. Or, as Hegel would put it, the True is the Whole. Each perspective is part of that Whole.

Some Evidence

Examples of this type of anarchy have existed in the past, such as the Law Merchants (Benson 1990), Early Iceland (Friedman 1989; Long 2002), Celtic Ireland (Rothbard 1973), the Kapauku Papuans (Benson 1990), the American Old West (Benson 1990), and, perhaps, the ancient Harappan civilization (Thompson 2006). There are many others and there are also borderline cases, such as the British Colonies in North America. George H. Smith pointed out that a competitive condition existed between the British government and colonial governments and this checked each other’s powers before the War of Independence. While some might argue this was not anarchy per se, it was an instance of not having a monopoly government in one geographic area. (Polycentrism, of course, can come in degrees.)

Law also preceded government. As Roderick Long points out, "for the overwhelming preponderance of historical and anthropological evidence verifies that law is far older than the state. Until recently, states were the exception, not the norm, in human society; and stateless societies have enjoyed quite sophisticated and long-lasting legal codes." (Long 1998) In other words, societies had laws long before they had governments. The first evidence of governments seems to date back maybe five or six thousand years. Even then, such governments were small and most of mankind still lived without any government. So, it’s safe to say that humanity has lived for most of its history -- maybe one hundred to three hundred thousand years or even more -- without government.

Whither Minarchism?

What of minarchism? No government has yet been a full-fledged minarchy. Some constitutional states in the West may have come close, but only for a very short space of time. The limited governments of the United States, Britain, and other nations have violated individual rights as a matter of routine. It's also notable that even the most limited constitutional state has grown outside its limits very quickly. The problem with using constitutional and other legal limits -- at least in the way it's been done -- is that such checks on power rely on the government to police itself. The problem always turns on who guards the guardians. (This, and again the knowledge problem that exists for any monopoly.) Perhaps newer methods of limiting power would work, such as sortition (adding a random factor into elections to prevent influence-peddling; this could be having several rounds of voting for an office where the last round is decided by random selection; see Knag 1998) and the use of supermajorities for key decisions (e.g., increasing spending, engaging in military operations). Yet these all seem like cosmetic solutions as the incentives to increase power and the overall structures remain in place. As long as government stays a monopoly and some people want power, there will be a tendency for the latter to use the former for their ends. New and better limits might make that difficult, but the obstacles will probably never be so great that no one will think the race isn’t worth the candle.

Now, this is a critique of limiting government. It’s not an argument for anarchy, though by showing some of the problems inherent in even the best form of government, it might be found that anarchism, in some form, is as least as appealing if not more so. Also, inherent in systematic thinking is that often many questions are answered at once -- the solution to one problem is related to others. The answer of how anarchism works is, to some extent, a challenge to any form of government. This naturally leads, if anarchism is possible, people to question government. After all, if anarchism can do anything minarchism can do, maybe minarchism isn't necessary. A free and open market in political discourse might lead to more people selecting anarchism over minarchism.

Works Cited:

Bruce L. Benson. 1990. The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State. Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy: San Francisco.

Robert C. Ellickson. 1994. Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts.

David Friedman. 1989 [1973]. The Machinery of Freedom: A Guide to Radical Capitalism. Open Court: Las Salle, Illinois.

Freidrich Hayek. 1980 [1948]. "The Use of Knowledge in Society" in Individualism and Economic Order. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

Hans-Hermann Hoppe. 2001. Democracy -- The God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order. Transaction: New Brunswick, New Jersey.

Israel Kirzner. 1992. The Meaning of Market Process: Essays in the Development of Modern Austrian Economics. Routledge: New York.

Sigmund Knag. 1998. "Let's Toss for It: A Surprising Curb on Political Greed" in Independent Review, Vol. 3 No. 2, Autumn 1998, and available online at http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=323

Myron Lieberman. 1989. Privatization and Educational Choice. Saint Martin’s Press: New York.

Roderick T. Long. 1998. "Why Objective Law Requires Anarchy" in Autumn 1998 Formulations, and available online at http://libertariannation.org/a/f61l1.html

Roderick T. Long. 2002. “Privatization, Viking Style: Model or Misfortune?” in LewRockwell.com June 6, 2002 issue.

Murray N. Rothbard. 1973. For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto. Macmillian: New York, and available online at http://mises.org/rothbard/newlibertywhole.asp

George H. Smith. 1991. "Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market" in Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies. Prometheus Books: Buffalo, New York.

Thomas J. Thompson. "An Ancient Stateless Civilization: Bronze Age India and the State in History" in Independent Review, Vol. 10 No. 3, Winter 2006, and available online at http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?issueID=44&articleID=560

Kenneth M. Waltz. 1979. Theory of International Politics. McGraw-Hill: New York.

[imurray]

Introduction

I’ve been arguing the free market anarchist position in one form or another now for several years. Last year, in an online forum, a critic of anarchism asked me for a short explanation of free market anarchism. Providing this in a brief email forced me to boil down a lot of ideas to what I believed were essential to the position. Here follows an expanded version of that email explanation. Let’s start by defining some terms. Anarchy is the absence of government. By “government” is meant a single agency that enforces social rules, particularly what is called “law.” Naturally, this can cover many things, just as government can. If someone says a society has a government, this doesn’t tell us whether the government is limited or unlimited, democratic or oligarchic or autocratic, or the character of its laws. To give but one example, Spain and the US both had governments during the Spanish-American War, but they were quite different in character. The same is true of anarchy. The absence of government could mean something like a civil war, such as we see in Somalia today, or it could mean a fairly peaceful society, such as that of the American Old West or Iceland circa 1000 CE.

Anarchism is the view that some form anarchy would be a better way of organizing society -- that things would be better without a government at least in some circumstances. This does not mean that any form of anarchy -- any absence of government is better than any government. The worst form of anarchy might be far worse than the best form of government -- whether one compares theoretical cases or historical ones. The anarchist need not posit that all anarchies are better than any government. Nor is anarchism flawed if there indeed is some government that is better than some anarchy.

The absence of government, as noted above, can take many forms, some tried and some hypothesized. Just as there are many forms of anarchy, there are many forms of anarchism. Each particular variant of the latter posits some particular kind of anarchy that is better than government -- either in general or as one is likely to find. E.g., free market anarchism posits that legal authority should be competitive. Anarcho-socialism, on the other hand, mainly focuses on dispensing with private property. (I won’t go into anarcho-socialism in any detail.)

Minarchism is minimal government. While there are many different flavors of minarchism, the general idea is to strictly limit government to only what is seen as legitimate role. The legitimate role for minarchism is to have the government act only to respond to the initiation of force and perhaps to settle disputes. Usually, this boils down to government protecting only individual negative rights, such as the right to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness in the classical liberal sense of those rights. (I use “individual negative rights” to distinguish them from collective rights -- rights supposed to belong to groups, such as ethnic groups, nations, classes, gender-based groups, or what have you -- and from positive rights -- rights supposed to guarantee something, such as rights to a job, education, medical treatment, food, housing, etc.)

Statism is any social or political system that concentrates power in the hands of governments at the expense of individual negative rights or freedoms. Statism per se is different from minarchism -- at least in theory. (Some anarchists would argue that a having a government at all violates individual rights and freedoms because to remain a government it must not allow competitors to operate inside its territory. Some minarchists would argue that there’s no right to choose between competing governments.)

Resolving Disputes

Why worry about anarchy and government? There is one major problem of living in society: how to get along with other people. As long as no disputes arise, there is no problem, but when they do arise -- as they have in all known societies -- there needs to be a means of resolving them. So what happens when people can't coordinate their actions? E.g., if Stan does something that negatively impacts Eileen, such as, to use an example from Ellickson (1994), let's his sheep graze on Eileen's wheat field.

One generally accepted solution to this problem is to define property rights between such parties. This way, each party can be sure, to some extent, of what is expected of her or him (or them) and can reduce social conflict. (I'm not claiming here that this is a planned outcome, but more that it's a spontaneous order that evolves based on human actions not human design. Put another way, societies that are able to resolve such conflicts and increase social coordination tend to be more successful and flourish. Hence, relatively free societies. Those that can’t resolve such conflicts in a mostly peaceful fashion and otherwise increase social cooperation have to rely on other policies to continue to exist or grow. Hence, statism and imperialism.)

Defining property rights alone is not enough. They can provide a framework within which to resolve disputes, but they don’t enforce themselves. So how should property rights be enforced? (Many minarchists claim that property rights exist independent of government, so no government is needed define them ab initio. Most natural rights theorists, such as John Locke and Ayn Rand, believe much the same. Rights precede government.) The problem is not so hard if one postulates that the people involved have the incentive and information to do so. However, in the real world, not only might incentives be otherwise (after all, in any real society some people steal, assault, rape, and kill), there's still an information problem. On the latter, in any given case, it might be hard to define a concrete right to property and hard to define when a violation of such a right happens or what should be done in such a case; e.g., if Stan walks across Eileen's lawn today, should she be able to shoot him two years later when she finds out about it?

By the way, this example is not a strike against anarchism, but a general problem with enforcing rights or any social rule. Arbitrary laws and punishments exist under government. There is no guarantee that even the best minarchy won't have such, given the potential for errors and corruption. A question to ask here is: What type of system is more likely to have these kinds of outcomes? A related question is: What type of system is more likely to correct them when they do happen?

These problems, however, are regularly overcome, again, by spontaneous orders. In a free market, people have an incentive to overcome the information problem to further social coordination mainly out of self-interest and through the ability of market actors to use dispersed and even tacit information. (Hayek 1980)

This does not mean every last member of society will perceive the incentives or once perceiving them not forego short-term gains over long-term ones. In fact, in markets, this happens all the time. Aside from sheer ignorance (not knowing what and that you don’t know: not knowing even the scope of your ignorance; see Kirzner 1992), people sometimes misjudge and incentives don't impact each individual the same way. However, the costs of such mistakes are visited locally and mostly on those making the choices.

Despite these shortcomings, markets do fairly well in the provisioning all sorts of goods and services. (It is more accurate to say that individuals interacting through markets do fairly well in the provisioning all sorts of goods and services. Alternatives to markets are, likewise, ways of people interacting through some alternate system.) The alternative to markets is to have some form of central control over such provision. Most minarchists accept markets in general, but still believe there are certain activities that markets either can't do well or can't do at all. For minarchists, the main one of these is the provision of rights enforcement services. They argue for having central control over such services, usually configured for a given geographical area. This would mean that, in the area of rights enforcement (for now, let’s bundle security as well as dispute resolution into this function), there must be a centrally planned and controlled order -- in short, a government. Hence the debate over anarchism (or polycentric legal orders) and government (or monocentric legal orders).

I believe that one can be objective here by asking a few questions that won't prejudice the issue. For example: would a polycentric or a monocentric legal order work better at rights enforcement? (It could be that the answer to these questions is neither -- that both work equally well, as good or as bad.) Which type of order is more stable? Do different types of cultures fit better into one type of order or the other? How do such orders evolve over time? Are there historical examples of either worth considering? Can either be applied to today’s world? How do we get to either from current social arrangements? (It might be that there is no easy path to either or that one is much easier to accomplish than the other, so we should take the easier path.)

I would add to the above that minarchism is not just any monocentric legal order, but a certain type. Obviously, neither type of legal order mentioned above has to be rights respecting. One can imagine a polycentric one that is probably many a minarchist’s view of anarchism: civil war or the international system of today. In the latter case, there is no international government, so the legal order is polycentric, but not the type most anarchists would applaud. (Waltz 1979) Note that this condition is not completely lawless as even between nation states spontaneous orders can arise -- as well as planned ones such as treaties, agreements, alliances, and international institutions.

Likewise, monocentric legal orders need not be rights respecting. All known nation states within their own borders are monocentric legal orders and all of them have violated rights on a greater or lesser scale and not just by accident. An auxiliary question, one related to the one about social evolution above, is: Is one type of legal order more likely to change into a worse form even if it starts out near its optimum? More concretely: would a minarchy be more likely over time to evolve into statism? Would a good form of anarchy be more likely to evolve into lawlessness? This also goes for evolution to something else entirely. After all, one can imagine a quite limited government having a civil war and that leading to lawlessness. One can also conceive of an anarchic society evolving into a statist one. In fact, at this time in history, some form of statism seems to be the end state of all socio-political evolution.

Where I stand here should be quite clear: I believe free market anarchism is more effective and efficient at rights enforcement than minarchism or any form of government. I also believe polycentric legal orders are more stable in the long run, while monocentric ones tend toward less stability. In fact, from the historical record, they tend to undergo revolutionary changes after periods of stasis leading until pressure builds (discontent rises) for the next revolutionary change. This has been the history of nation states. This tendency exists because monocentric legal systems are less efficient at solving the information problem -- for the same reason central planning in other areas fails relative to free markets -- and also because the incentives are decoupled or only loosely coupled with costs. Thus, even if saints peopled governments, they would still have the information problem to contend. They are not, so they also have the incentive problem.

(The difference between polycentric and monocentric legal systems might be put into terms of the difference between exit and voice systems. (Lieberman 1989) In an exit system, one can select between providers for a good or service. In a voice system, one can't select between such providers, but one can have in a say -- a voice -- in how a good or service is provided. These are, respectively, incarnated in free markets and governments. In a free market, one usually selects between providers. That's the main form of feedback between providers and consumers. In a government, one cannot make such selection (save by emigrating), though often one has some voice in the government -- whether through elections, polls, lobbying, or other means. Which system responds better to the people it services?)

Anarchic societies, likewise, are not peopled by saints, but by having competition in rights enforcement, the knowledge problem is, while not completely solved, much more manageable because there will be a free market in law. The incentive problem, again while not completely solved, is mostly solved because costs and incentives are aligned with costs. The ability to select between different providers of law means that such providers have to compete to better their product or lose clients to other purveyors -- at least, at the margin.

This is a mostly political-economic justification for anarchism and more Hayekian than Rothbardian. (Not that Hayek was an anarchist, but I rely on his view of the market here instead of Rothbard's view of natural rights.) This is not to say Rothbard’s rights basis for anarchy is wrong. I believe it complements the Hayekian social order basis. One would expect this if natural rights derive from human nature. One would expect them to be consistent with human economic and social nature as well as with psychology and the rest of human nature. The two are compatible. Or, as Hegel would put it, the True is the Whole. Each perspective is part of that Whole.

Some Evidence

Examples of this type of anarchy have existed in the past, such as the Law Merchants (Benson 1990), Early Iceland (Friedman 1989; Long 2002), Celtic Ireland (Rothbard 1973), the Kapauku Papuans (Benson 1990), the American Old West (Benson 1990), and, perhaps, the ancient Harappan civilization (Thompson 2006). There are many others and there are also borderline cases, such as the British Colonies in North America. George H. Smith pointed out that a competitive condition existed between the British government and colonial governments and this checked each other’s powers before the War of Independence. While some might argue this was not anarchy per se, it was an instance of not having a monopoly government in one geographic area. (Polycentrism, of course, can come in degrees.)

Law also preceded government. As Roderick Long points out, "for the overwhelming preponderance of historical and anthropological evidence verifies that law is far older than the state. Until recently, states were the exception, not the norm, in human society; and stateless societies have enjoyed quite sophisticated and long-lasting legal codes." (Long 1998) In other words, societies had laws long before they had governments. The first evidence of governments seems to date back maybe five or six thousand years. Even then, such governments were small and most of mankind still lived without any government. So, it’s safe to say that humanity has lived for most of its history -- maybe one hundred to three hundred thousand years or even more -- without government.

Whither Minarchism?

What of minarchism? No government has yet been a full-fledged minarchy. Some constitutional states in the West may have come close, but only for a very short space of time. The limited governments of the United States, Britain, and other nations have violated individual rights as a matter of routine. It's also notable that even the most limited constitutional state has grown outside its limits very quickly. The problem with using constitutional and other legal limits -- at least in the way it's been done -- is that such checks on power rely on the government to police itself. The problem always turns on who guards the guardians. (This, and again the knowledge problem that exists for any monopoly.) Perhaps newer methods of limiting power would work, such as sortition (adding a random factor into elections to prevent influence-peddling; this could be having several rounds of voting for an office where the last round is decided by random selection; see Knag 1998) and the use of supermajorities for key decisions (e.g., increasing spending, engaging in military operations). Yet these all seem like cosmetic solutions as the incentives to increase power and the overall structures remain in place. As long as government stays a monopoly and some people want power, there will be a tendency for the latter to use the former for their ends. New and better limits might make that difficult, but the obstacles will probably never be so great that no one will think the race isn’t worth the candle.

Now, this is a critique of limiting government. It’s not an argument for anarchy, though by showing some of the problems inherent in even the best form of government, it might be found that anarchism, in some form, is as least as appealing if not more so. Also, inherent in systematic thinking is that often many questions are answered at once -- the solution to one problem is related to others. The answer of how anarchism works is, to some extent, a challenge to any form of government. This naturally leads, if anarchism is possible, people to question government. After all, if anarchism can do anything minarchism can do, maybe minarchism isn't necessary. A free and open market in political discourse might lead to more people selecting anarchism over minarchism.

Works Cited:

Bruce L. Benson. 1990. The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State. Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy: San Francisco.

Robert C. Ellickson. 1994. Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts.

David Friedman. 1989 [1973]. The Machinery of Freedom: A Guide to Radical Capitalism. Open Court: Las Salle, Illinois.

Freidrich Hayek. 1980 [1948]. "The Use of Knowledge in Society" in Individualism and Economic Order. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

Hans-Hermann Hoppe. 2001. Democracy -- The God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order. Transaction: New Brunswick, New Jersey.

Israel Kirzner. 1992. The Meaning of Market Process: Essays in the Development of Modern Austrian Economics. Routledge: New York.

Sigmund Knag. 1998. "Let's Toss for It: A Surprising Curb on Political Greed" in Independent Review, Vol. 3 No. 2, Autumn 1998, and available online at http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=323

Myron Lieberman. 1989. Privatization and Educational Choice. Saint Martin’s Press: New York.

Roderick T. Long. 1998. "Why Objective Law Requires Anarchy" in Autumn 1998 Formulations, and available online at http://libertariannation.org/a/f61l1.html

Roderick T. Long. 2002. “Privatization, Viking Style: Model or Misfortune?” in LewRockwell.com June 6, 2002 issue.

Murray N. Rothbard. 1973. For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto. Macmillian: New York, and available online at http://mises.org/rothbard/newlibertywhole.asp

George H. Smith. 1991. "Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market" in Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies. Prometheus Books: Buffalo, New York.

Thomas J. Thompson. "An Ancient Stateless Civilization: Bronze Age India and the State in History" in Independent Review, Vol. 10 No. 3, Winter 2006, and available online at http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?issueID=44&articleID=560

Kenneth M. Waltz. 1979. Theory of International Politics. McGraw-Hill: New York.

Interesting, but I was surprised there was no mention of Paine's "Common Sense" or Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" - two works that help to inform the "why" and to a lesser degree the "how" of American government and that are still relevant to the philosophical discussion.

[dan2100]

Interesting, but I was surprised there was no mention of Paine's "Common Sense" or Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" - two works that help to inform the "why" and to a lesser degree the "how" of American government and that are still relevant to the philosophical discussion.

Thanks. I don't deny their continued relevance, though I believe that, in so far as I understand them, they're mistaken on the central issue of government itself. And, going to back to something George said in another topic, I do think that once the "consent door" is opened, the end is no government -- at least, no government of the traditional territorial monopolist of legitimate force variety.

[George H. Smith]

Interesting, but I was surprised there was no mention of Paine's "Common Sense" or Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" - two works that help to inform the "why" and to a lesser degree the "how" of American government and that are still relevant to the philosophical discussion.

Thanks. I don't deny their continued relevance, though I believe that, in so far as I understand them, they're mistaken on the central issue of government itself. And, going to back to something George said in another topic, I do think that once the "consent door" is opened, the end is no government -- at least, no government of the traditional territorial monopolist of legitimate force variety.

Since Dan is a member of Atlantis II, he has probably seen this before, but others may find it of interest. I submitted it to A2 on 12/04/09:

Speaking of first-hand experiences of anarchy, one of the most interesting examples of this is found in Part II of Thomas Paine's "Rights of Man." In Chapter 1, Paine writes:

"Government is no farther necessary than to supply the few cases to which society and civilization are not conveniently competent, and instances are not wanting to show, that everything which government can usefully add thereto, has been performed by the common consent of society without government."

To buttress his contention that government is a convenience, not a necessity, Paine points out that many American communities during the Revolution functioned quite well without any government:

"For upwards of two years from the commencement of the American war, and to a longer period in several of the American States, there were no established forms of government. The old governments had been abolished, and the country was too much occupied in defence, to employ its attention in establishing new governments; yet during this interval, order and harmony were preserved as inviolate as in any country in Europe."

The view that government is a convenience, not an absolute necessity, was also expressed by Thomas Jefferson, especially in his numerous references to anarchistic Indian communities. For example: "I am convinced that those societies (as the Indians) which live without government, enjoy in their general mass an infinitely greater degree of happiness than those who live under the European governments." (Letter to Colonel Edward Carrington, January 16, 1787).

Jefferson once remarked that anarchy is the ideal social condition, but that it is impractical for larger societies for which a republican form of government serves as second-best, in effect. The position that government is a convenience rather than a necessity was rooted in Locke's observation that a government is needed to remedy certain "inconveniences" that will arise in a state of nature. These radical Lockeans were not anarchists, of course, but their position differs radically from that of Ayn Rand, who is much more of a Hobbesian than a Lockean in her argument for the necessity of government.

Ghs

[dan2100]

Interesting, but I was surprised there was no mention of Paine's "Common Sense" or Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" - two works that help to inform the "why" and to a lesser degree the "how" of American government and that are still relevant to the philosophical discussion.

Thanks. I don't deny their continued relevance, though I believe that, in so far as I understand them, they're mistaken on the central issue of government itself. And, going to back to something George said in another topic, I do think that once the "consent door" is opened, the end is no government -- at least, no government of the traditional territorial monopolist of legitimate force variety.

Since Dan is a member of Atlantis II, he has probably seen this before, but others may find it of interest. I submitted it to A2 on 12/04/09:

Speaking of first-hand experiences of anarchy, one of the most interesting examples of this is found in Part II of Thomas Paine's "Rights of Man." In Chapter 1, Paine writes:

"Government is no farther necessary than to supply the few cases to which society and civilization are not conveniently competent, and instances are not wanting to show, that everything which government can usefully add thereto, has been performed by the common consent of society without government."

To buttress his contention that government is a convenience, not a necessity, Paine points out that many American communities during the Revolution functioned quite well without any government:

"For upwards of two years from the commencement of the American war, and to a longer period in several of the American States, there were no established forms of government. The old governments had been abolished, and the country was too much occupied in defence, to employ its attention in establishing new governments; yet during this interval, order and harmony were preserved as inviolate as in any country in Europe."

The view that government is a convenience, not an absolute necessity, was also expressed by Thomas Jefferson, especially in his numerous references to anarchistic Indian communities. For example: "I am convinced that those societies (as the Indians) which live without government, enjoy in their general mass an infinitely greater degree of happiness than those who live under the European governments." (Letter to Colonel Edward Carrington, January 16, 1787).

Jefferson once remarked that anarchy is the ideal social condition, but that it is impractical for larger societies for which a republican form of government serves as second-best, in effect. The position that government is a convenience rather than a necessity was rooted in Locke's observation that a government is needed to remedy certain "inconveniences" that will arise in a state of nature. These radical Lockeans were not anarchists, of course, but their position differs radically from that of Ayn Rand, who is much more of a Hobbesian than a Lockean in her argument for the necessity of government.

Ghs

Yes, I think I do remember you posting this. Also, I recall something recorded of you a long time ago giving a presentation on that period where you discussed what sounded to me like a no government situation: the colonial legislatures were at a stalemate with the royally appointed governors and nothing or very little got done -- got done in terms of the government doing it.

Also, the recent book Indian Givers: How the Indians of the Americas Transformed the by Jack Weatherford goes over, in some detail, the influence of Native American examples of European and American political philosophy. I believe Weatherford might be overstating his case, though I don't doubt having these examples close at hand did provoke some thought and probably served to reinforce some liberal or proto-liberal political ideas in European and in British North American thought.

[imurray]

Interesting, but I was surprised there was no mention of Paine's "Common Sense" or Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" - two works that help to inform the "why" and to a lesser degree the "how" of American government and that are still relevant to the philosophical discussion.

Thanks. I don't deny their continued relevance, though I believe that, in so far as I understand them, they're mistaken on the central issue of government itself. And, going to back to something George said in another topic, I do think that once the "consent door" is opened, the end is no government -- at least, no government of the traditional territorial monopolist of legitimate force variety.

Since Dan is a member of Atlantis II, he has probably seen this before, but others may find it of interest. I submitted it to A2 on 12/04/09:

Speaking of first-hand experiences of anarchy, one of the most interesting examples of this is found in Part II of Thomas Paine's "Rights of Man." In Chapter 1, Paine writes:

"Government is no farther necessary than to supply the few cases to which society and civilization are not conveniently competent, and instances are not wanting to show, that everything which government can usefully add thereto, has been performed by the common consent of society without government."

To buttress his contention that government is a convenience, not a necessity, Paine points out that many American communities during the Revolution functioned quite well without any government:

"For upwards of two years from the commencement of the American war, and to a longer period in several of the American States, there were no established forms of government. The old governments had been abolished, and the country was too much occupied in defence, to employ its attention in establishing new governments; yet during this interval, order and harmony were preserved as inviolate as in any country in Europe."

The view that government is a convenience, not an absolute necessity, was also expressed by Thomas Jefferson, especially in his numerous references to anarchistic Indian communities. For example: "I am convinced that those societies (as the Indians) which live without government, enjoy in their general mass an infinitely greater degree of happiness than those who live under the European governments." (Letter to Colonel Edward Carrington, January 16, 1787).

Jefferson once remarked that anarchy is the ideal social condition, but that it is impractical for larger societies for which a republican form of government serves as second-best, in effect. The position that government is a convenience rather than a necessity was rooted in Locke's observation that a government is needed to remedy certain "inconveniences" that will arise in a state of nature. These radical Lockeans were not anarchists, of course, but their position differs radically from that of Ayn Rand, who is much more of a Hobbesian than a Lockean in her argument for the necessity of government.

Ghs

Yes, I think I do remember you posting this. Also, I recall something recorded of you a long time ago giving a presentation on that period where you discussed what sounded to me like a no government situation: the colonial legislatures were at a stalemate with the royally appointed governors and nothing or very little got done -- got done in terms of the government doing it.

Also, the recent book Indian Givers: How the Indians of the Americas Transformed the by Jack Weatherford goes over, in some detail, the influence of Native American examples of European and American political philosophy. I believe Weatherford might be overstating his case, though I don't doubt having these examples close at hand did provoke some thought and probably served to reinforce some liberal or proto-liberal political ideas in European and in British North American thought.

Excellent summary of Locke and Paine, George. That's the kind of thinking that, in my opinion, would have been a nice addition to Dan's article. It actually works to buttress some of his key points. To make myself clear - Dan's article and argument is no less elegant without it.

Ian

[dan2100]

Excellent summary of Locke and Paine, George. That's the kind of thinking that, in my opinion, would have been a nice addition to Dan's article. It actually works to buttress some of his key points. To make myself clear - Dan's article and argument is no less elegant without it.

Ian

If I ever expand that article, I'll probably follow your lead here and try to take into account Locke and Paine. I admit, if I wrote that today, I'd probably take a slightly different approach and also try to clean up the ending. It feels, to me, like it just winds down at the end -- rather than wraps up.

[Brant Gaede]

Interesting, but I was surprised there was no mention of Paine's "Common Sense" or Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" - two works that help to inform the "why" and to a lesser degree the "how" of American government and that are still relevant to the philosophical discussion.

Thanks. I don't deny their continued relevance, though I believe that, in so far as I understand them, they're mistaken on the central issue of government itself. And, going to back to something George said in another topic, I do think that once the "consent door" is opened, the end is no government -- at least, no government of the traditional territorial monopolist of legitimate force variety.

Since Dan is a member of Atlantis II, he has probably seen this before, but others may find it of interest. I submitted it to A2 on 12/04/09:

Speaking of first-hand experiences of anarchy, one of the most interesting examples of this is found in Part II of Thomas Paine's "Rights of Man." In Chapter 1, Paine writes:

"Government is no farther necessary than to supply the few cases to which society and civilization are not conveniently competent, and instances are not wanting to show, that everything which government can usefully add thereto, has been performed by the common consent of society without government."

To buttress his contention that government is a convenience, not a necessity, Paine points out that many American communities during the Revolution functioned quite well without any government:

"For upwards of two years from the commencement of the American war, and to a longer period in several of the American States, there were no established forms of government. The old governments had been abolished, and the country was too much occupied in defence, to employ its attention in establishing new governments; yet during this interval, order and harmony were preserved as inviolate as in any country in Europe."

The view that government is a convenience, not an absolute necessity, was also expressed by Thomas Jefferson, especially in his numerous references to anarchistic Indian communities. For example: "I am convinced that those societies (as the Indians) which live without government, enjoy in their general mass an infinitely greater degree of happiness than those who live under the European governments." (Letter to Colonel Edward Carrington, January 16, 1787).

Jefferson once remarked that anarchy is the ideal social condition, but that it is impractical for larger societies for which a republican form of government serves as second-best, in effect. The position that government is a convenience rather than a necessity was rooted in Locke's observation that a government is needed to remedy certain "inconveniences" that will arise in a state of nature. These radical Lockeans were not anarchists, of course, but their position differs radically from that of Ayn Rand, who is much more of a Hobbesian than a Lockean in her argument for the necessity of government.

Ghs

Yes, I think I do remember you posting this. Also, I recall something recorded of you a long time ago giving a presentation on that period where you discussed what sounded to me like a no government situation: the colonial legislatures were at a stalemate with the royally appointed governors and nothing or very little got done -- got done in terms of the government doing it.

Also, the recent book Indian Givers: How the Indians of the Americas Transformed the by Jack Weatherford goes over, in some detail, the influence of Native American examples of European and American political philosophy. I believe Weatherford might be overstating his case, though I don't doubt having these examples close at hand did provoke some thought and probably served to reinforce some liberal or proto-liberal political ideas in European and in British North American thought.

Excellent summary of Locke and Paine, George. That's the kind of thinking that, in my opinion, would have been a nice addition to Dan's article. It actually works to buttress some of his key points. To make myself clear - Dan's article and argument is no less elegant without it.

Ian

I don't know that government isn't necessary, but I do think it's inevitable. I also differentiate between government and the state in that the former doesn't have to be the latter but morphs into it over time when the government is taken over by those who govern and exclude, by various means, the governed, who then become the exploitable vassals. Such is the practical history of the United States.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

Yes, I think I do remember you posting this. Also, I recall something recorded of you a long time ago giving a presentation on that period where you discussed what sounded to me like a no government situation: the colonial legislatures were at a stalemate with the royally appointed governors and nothing or very little got done -- got done in terms of the government doing it.

I have discussed the point you mention in various lectures through the years. I think the only time I mentioned it in print was in Part Two of "The Ethics of Voting" (The Voluntaryist, Dec. 1982). I wrote:

"The American State was also designed, though under different conditions than those in Europe. As part of the British Empire, the colonies were subject to colonial administration. Under the aegis of Robert Walpole, however, the colonies enjoyed a lengthy period of “salutary neglect” wherein mercantilist regulations were loosely enforced, if at all. When this lax policy ended in 1763—owing to the crushing financial burden incurred by Britain during the Seven Years War—the English found enforcement to be extremely difficult. Lax policies, plus the difficulty of governing from thousands of miles away, had permitted the colonists to evolve their own systems of local government which hindered centralization. A system of “competing governments” arose which prevented either side from attaining complete domination.

"This changed with the successful completion of the American Revolution. Revolutions, however just, have unintended consequences of considerable magnitude. Two consequences of the American Revolution are important here: first, debts incurred during the war convinced many of the need for a centralized government with taxing power; second, with the British eliminated, there was no effective brake on the formation of a national State. The major competitor had been kicked out, and the field was clear for those who desired a State, provided it was not the British State."

See: http://www.anthonyflood.com/smithethicsofvoting02.htm

As I recall, I originally got this idea from Bernard Bailyn's book The Origins of American Politics (1968). Of course, Bailyn doesn't employ the notion of "competing governments," but he does discuss the conflict between the Colonial and British governments, and how this conflict hindered the growth and power of both sides. I don't recall if Bailyn discusses how the successful completion of the American Revolution cleared the path for a powerful centralized American government, as outlined in the Constitution.

Ghs

[Aaron]

I don't know that government isn't necessary, but I do think it's inevitable.

After traversing the road from minarchism to anarchocapitalism and back, I don't know whether your statement is incredibly cynical - but I do think it's true.

Aaron

[dan2100]

I don't know that government isn't necessary, but I do think it's inevitable.

After traversing the road from minarchism to anarchocapitalism and back, I don't know whether your statement is incredibly cynical - but I do think it's true.

Aaron

There's a difference between holding an ideal and realizing that the ideal might not be acheivable in its fullness in a certain situation -- and that situation might include your whole life. For instance, it's likely the case that people are biased and will let such baises creep into their thinking, but this should this stop us from aspiring to, say, objectivity in, say, science and other forms of discourse? Or would you just say, "Well, I hate to be cynical, but people will make mistakes and even outright lie, so let's no even try?"?

[Aaron]

There's a difference between holding an ideal and realizing that the ideal might not be acheivable in its fullness in a certain situation -- and that situation might include your whole life.

Of course. To think that there will never be murder is unrealistic and utopian - but that doesn't mean we shouldn't oppose and try to prevent or punish murder. With regard to government specifically, I'd say that anyone who truly thinks it will be reduced to zero (or who thinks whatever government exists will be all good) is also being utopian. However, that doesn't mean it's not worth trying to diminish what we have and keeping a system which does not institutionalize coercion as an ideal and target.

Aaron

[dan2100]

There's a difference between holding an ideal and realizing that the ideal might not be acheivable in its fullness in a certain situation -- and that situation might include your whole life.

Of course. To think that there will never be murder is unrealistic and utopian - but that doesn't mean we shouldn't oppose and try to prevent or punish murder. With regard to government specifically, I'd say that anyone who truly thinks it will be reduced to zero (or who thinks whatever government exists will be all good) is also being utopian. However, that doesn't mean it's not worth trying to diminish what we have and keeping a system which does not institutionalize coercion as an ideal and target.

Aaron

I would also turn this around slightly for those who see a free society as the ideal. This is to look for what would be necessary structural conditions to have and maintain a free society. I think, looking at historical examples of stateless societies, one might see that they are often what I call edge societies -- societies at the frontier or at the margins of states. These edge societies, in my view, had such conditions that made statism, at least in its centralized form, unworkable or unstable. This is regardless of ideological commitment or whether people living in these societies knew of and understand liberty. The problem then becomes how to create stable edge societies -- rather than how to convince statists to stop being statists. In other words, you look for ways to bring about conditions where statism becomes unworkable or unstable -- though not in the sense that you end up with civil war or something bad like that. (Note, too, the idea here is a long-term situation -- one that's stably stateless -- and not a short-term one where one state merely collapses only to be superseded by another or superseded by one after a brief period of statelessness.)

[tjohnson]

The problem then becomes how to create stable edge societies -- rather than how to convince statists to stop being statists.

I think the solution in the long run is more likely to be educating people away from statism. As was mentioned above, I think government is unavoidable but our best chance is to have better people in government. Humans evolved from tribes to countries - now you are suggesting we go back? There are reasons why "stateless" societies are unstable and invariably become states and these reasons have to do with the decidedly symbolic character of the human species.

[dan2100]

The problem then becomes how to create stable edge societies -- rather than how to convince statists to stop being statists.

I think the solution in the long run is more likely to be educating people away from statism.

I won't argue against that and won't try to stop people from trying -- and I even do some of this myself.

As was mentioned above, I think government is unavoidable but our best chance is to have better people in government.

This gambit has been tried time and again. Thus, there's a track record of failure. There are also strong theoretical reasons to suspect it won't work. Thus, the causes of the likely failures seem clear. In my mind, it's actually utopian to believe anyone can be trusted with this type of power. They either lack the will power or the knowledge not to abuse it.

Humans evolved from tribes to countries - now you are suggesting we go back? There are reasons why "stateless" societies are unstable and invariably become states and these reasons have to do with the decidedly symbolic character of the human species.

I don't know. Some stateless societies seem to have survived for a long time, such as Iceland during its stateless period and maybe the Harappan civilization. In fact, the stateless period in Iceland was about 300 years -- longer than the US has existed as an independent nation.

Also, nation states as we know them today are relatively recent and, if you look at the world since their beginnings, they don't look at all stable. They tend to go to war, have civils, gobble each other up, and break apart.

Of course, we need a robust measure of what stability is in this context -- and there might be several relevant measures of this. Two I can think of are 1) the same institutions stay in place and 2) the same basic institutional arrangements stay in place. What do you think?

[syrakusos]

... such as Iceland during its stateless period and maybe the Harappan civilization.

Blah, blah, blah. Screw Iceland.

Over on Rebirth of Reason, in the Dissent Forum, under "Police Forces and Courts of Law" I have given many, many, many examples from the real world of actual markets here and now. I will not repeat them all here. I will point to the fact that G4S and Securitas have transnational global forces larger than the armies of most nations and without the problems purchased by Blackwater. I will point also to the HUNDRED YEARS of General Motors and Ford Motor Company having private security in close promixity, with not a shot fired between them.

This is not theory. This is practice.

My website, Washtenaw Justice

http://www.washtenawjustice.com/

Edited April 21, 2010 by Michael E. Marotta

[dan2100]

... such as Iceland during its stateless period and maybe the Harappan civilization.

Blah, blah, blah. Screw Iceland.

Over on Rebirth of Reason, in the Dissent Forum, under "Police Forces and Courts of Law" I have given many, many, many examples from the real world of actual markets here and now. I will not repeat them all here. I will point to the fact that G4S and Securitas have transnational global forces larger than the armies of most nations and without the problems purchased by Blackwater. I will point also to the HUNDRED YEARS of General Motors and Ford Motor Company having private security in close promixity, with not a shot fired between them.

This is not theory. This is practice.

My website, Washtenaw Justice

http://www.washtenawjustice.com/

I'm not sure the Iceland, Harappan, and other historical examples aren't also practice. One reason, however, some might be skeptical of private security in the modern world is, some might argue, these work within the realm of current nation states -- states that already provide a matrix of social order for the firms to operate within.

I'm not saying I completely agree with this logic, but it does appeal to some, no?

[mcm]

Dan,

You conclude that

"... by showing some of the problems inherent in even the best form of government, it might be found that anarchism, in some form, is as least as appealing if not more so."

The ultimate problem with anarchism as a way to manage force that keeps it from being appealing in the long run is that liberty requires more than pursuit of the goal of eliminating the initiation of force. Over half of the value of achieving that goal lies in the resulting justifiable expectation of freedom from force in one's everyday life. And the same is true for the means by which that goal is pursued.

Note that in explanations of the Objectivist politics, Rand et al consistently recognized as an essential component that the exercise of defensive force must be objectified — the principles, laws, procedures and execution must be objectively defined, accompanied by proofs, and must be knowable to all in advance.

Consequently, regardless of how many different agencies of defensive force, both government and private, might exist in any given region, or how they would be organized, the ultimate difference between an anarchy existing there or an Objectivist government would be the absence or presence of a political entity charged with the task of securing the compliance of all such agencies, with a single, objectively defined set of principles, laws, and procedures known to all.

In an anarchy, the use of force cannot be publicly objectified. The principles, laws, procedures and execution are inherently open ended. No expectation of any particular state of liberty could ever be justified. Acts of justifiable defense would be impossible to distinguish from initiated force, and so, in effect, they would be equally arbitrary.

Thus, while an Objectivist government with a monopoly on force and an anarchy of capitalist sympathizers might each seek to eliminate initiated force, only the monopoly government could provide the component of liberty that requires the objectification of the process. And there would be nothing appealing about living in a region where the arbitrary exercise of physical force is condoned.

-----------------------

Note also that the phrase, "free-market anarchy" is a fallacy that relies on a stolen concept. It entails the establishment of a "free-market" source of defensive force. However, before any market can be said to be free, there must already exist a system that sufficiently monopolizes the use of force to be able to guarantee the freedom of economic action in that market.

[tjohnson]

If I understand Mike correctly I believe he is saying that an objectivist government is a more desirable goal than no government?

[dan2100]

If I understand Mike correctly I believe he is saying that an objectivist government is a more desirable goal than no government?

Quick reply. I don't think he means exactly "objectivist government" as "objective law." However, the problem here is his assumption that objective law can only be had under a government -- i.e., under a state or a territorial monopolist of legal authority and of force. I would maintain that objective law is, if not impossible under government, is very unlikely. Two of the sources I listed in my essay actually deal with this issue head on:

Roderick T. Long's "Why Objective Law Requires Anarchy," available online at http://libertarianna...rg/a/f61l1.html

and

George H. Smith's "Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market," available online, as a PDF, at https://www.mises.org/journals/jls/3_4/3_4_4.pdf

In fact, were he correct, we should expect objectivity in every field to only be possible were there's a monopoly and all competitors are kept out. So, objective science would only happen under a monopoly in the science profession. Objective history would only happen under a monopoly in the history profession. Objective definitions would only happen under a monopoly in dictionaries or in language. And so forth. That alone should make anyone suspicious of his argument.

This -- the supposed impossibility of objective law without a state -- is, by the way, a typical argument used by minarchists -- and one that's been answered, time and again, over the decades only to resurface again. Sadly, most minarchists never bother to read actual anarchist replies on this. (It's also, to me, a confusion between anarchism and antinomianism, but minarchists and other statists might argue for those being identical, if not in intent then in result. Actually, they usually just assume rather than argue they're identical.)

[Brant Gaede]

I don't know that government isn't necessary, but I do think it's inevitable.

After traversing the road from minarchism to anarchocapitalism and back, I don't know whether your statement is incredibly cynical - but I do think it's true.

If it's cynical in the least I'm purblind to it. My essential view is not an ideal state but an intelligent culture deciding the rational, correct thing to do is create a much smaller government over time--to move toward greater and greater freedom and personal responsibility. By fighting the state this way, the body politic develops the necessary muscles to make and maintain a tolerable society. The bad boy of government will always be there for freedom lovers to throw themselves against.

If the purity of the anarchist vision--or anyone else's--cannot be satisfied with that, it can be celebrated on the Internet and other such by those who can afford the time and effort.

--Brant

[mcm]

If I understand Mike correctly I believe he is saying that an objectivist government is a more desirable goal than no government?

Quick reply. I don't think he means exactly "objectivist government" as "objective law."

I mean a government consistent with the politics of Ayn Rand that monopolizes force in a specific jurisdiction. That obviously means that the laws shall be objectively defined and explicitly demonstrated to be valid. Pertinent to the difference between that government and anarchy, however, is that there may be only one set of principles, procedures, and enforcement practices in its jurisdiction, and knowledge of them must be readily available and easily understandable to all who live or visit there.

These are the necessary prerequisites to preventing the arbitrary exercise of force that diminishes liberty. Arbitrary force diminishes liberty by undermining everyone's justifiable expectations not only that it exists, but how it will be sustained in the entire range of possible circumstances one could face as one walks out the door each day to interact with the rest of the society.

In fact, were he correct, we should expect objectivity in every field to only be possible were there's a monopoly and all competitors are kept out.

And there is the error again — the one I pointed out at the end of my previous comment. You are trying to treat defensive force as a commodity that would become better and more abundant if created and distributed by a competitive market and would be harmed by a force wielding monopoly.

To repeat the point: there cannot be a competitive market in force. A competitive market can only exist after an effective institution monopolizing defensive force is already a fait accompli.

If the institution in charge of exercising defensive force and/or verifying that its sub-agencies, subcontractors, private security forces, or individuals acting in self-defense are complying with that single objectified set of standards is not a monopoly in its jurisdiction, then no market there can be fully free or competitive, because it would be subject to arbitrary acts of force by whatever extraneous agencies of force were being tolerated in addition to it.

[George H. Smith]

If the institution in charge of exercising defensive force and/or verifying that its sub-agencies, subcontractors, private security forces, or individuals acting in self-defense are complying with that single objectified set of standards is not a monopoly in its jurisdiction, then no market there can be fully free or competitive, because it would be subject to arbitrary acts of force by whatever extraneous agencies of force were being tolerated in addition to it.

You assume that the "set of standards" enforced by the government in question will be "objective." (By this, I assume you mean "just.") And you assume that the standards enforced by private agencies will be nonobjective (unjust).

Why the double standard? Why not begin with the assumption that the standards enforced by a government will be nonobjective and unjust. What happens then? Would you claim that a government, no matter how unjust, will always be preferable to competing justice agencies? Is even a tyrannical government preferable to competing justice agencies?

It is a simple and trivial matter to begin with the assumption that your government will be perfect, in effect, and then go on to argue that this "objective" government is better than any other system. Of course it would be. You have defined your terms in such a way that no alternative is possible.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

I mean a government consistent with the politics of Ayn Rand that monopolizes force in a specific jurisdiction.

Who or what determines the legitimate jurisdiction of a government? Is "consent of the governed" required, as Ayn Rand believed? Or may a "legitimate" government unilaterally decree sovereignty over whomever it likes, and extend its jurisdiction at will, regardless of consent?

And if consent is required for legitimate jurisdiction, then how must this consent manifest itself?

Ghs

[anthony]

Dan,

I apparently misunderstand something here.

How and why can an anarchistic system work?

Doesn't it presuppose a majority of freedom-seeking, self-responsible and rationally moral citizens?

And that an individual can be 100% rational, all the time?

This rings of Perfect Man, and Utopianism, to me.

I won't speak for your country, but here, I am surrounded by an overwhelming majority who would kick and scream at having the State downsized even a tad. (But I won't pursue this line, since S.Africa is too easy pickings for anti-Statist critics.)

In the U.S., the proliferation of competing agencies and services could lead to a confusing mass of separate mini Cantons, each providing its own version of Law, policing and Justice - couldn't it?

I just don't see the practicality (though I concede the morality) in doing away with a central Government - of course a severely limited, and self-limiting, government.

Please put me out of my misery.

Tony