Rand and Deacon
Rand was not a biological teleologist, in the traditional sense of
teleology. She took functionality in biology to be the result of efficient and material causes; no final causes at the non-conscious, physical level.
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A plant must feed itself in order to live; the sunlight, the water, the chemicals it needs are the values its nature has set it to pursue. . . . There are alternatives in the conditions [a plant] encounters [heat or frost, drought or flood], but there is no alternative in its function: it acts to further its life (AS 1013).
[By now you know my refrain that an individual organism such as a plant also acts (without choice) so as to reproduce, so as to further the life of its species, etc.]
From Rand’s “The Objectivist Ethics”
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Only a living entity can have goals or can originate them. And it is only a living organism that has the capacity for self-generated, goal-directed action. On the physical level, the functions of all living organisms, from the simplest to the most complex—from the nutritive function in the single cell of an amoeba to the blood circulation in the body of a man—are actions generated by the organism itself and directed to a single goal: the maintenance of the organism’s life.*
*When applied to physical phenomena, such as the automatic functions of an organism, the term ‘goal-directed’ is not to be taken to mean ‘purposive’ (a concept applicable only to the actions of a consciousness) and is not to imply the existence of any teleological principle operating in insentient nature. I use the term ‘goal-directed’, in this context, to designate the fact that the automatic functions of living organisms are actions whose nature is such that they result in the preservation of the organism’s life. (VS 16)
In “Causality v. Duty” she contracts the Aristotelian concept of final causality to animals, specifically, animals who engage in conscious ends-means cognition (
PWNI 99). To reject teleology in vegetative biological nature is not necessarily to embrace biological evolution. The naturalist Buffon rejected biological teleology without embracing an evolutionary biology.
In “The Missing Link” Rand said she was not sufficiently informed to be either an opponent or an exponent of “the theory of evolution” (
PWNI 45). She indicated, however, that she had had a certain conjectural picture of the long human past, and it was an evolutionary picture.
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There is an enormous breach of continuity between man and all the other living species. The difference lies in the nature of man’s consciousness, in its distinctive characteristic: his conceptual faculty. It is as if, after aeons of physiological development, the evolutionary process altered its course, and the higher stages of development focused primarily on the consciousness of living species, not their bodies.
To that point of her paragraph, Rand was talking uniformly about the human species. She then abruptly begins talking about individual development:
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The development of a man’s consciousness is volitional: no matter what the innate degree of his intelligence, he must develop it, he must learn how to use it, he must become a human being by choice.
Would Rand have been thinking about species-evolution in a Lamarckian way, in which acquisition of useful abilities by learning during an individual animal’s life could be transmitted to progeny by sexual inheritance? Most likely she was thinking more along the lines of Baldwinian evolution (1895–96, 1902), which comports with Darwinian evolution. “Baldwin suggested that learning and behavioral flexibility can play a role in amplifying and biasing natural selection because these abilities enable individuals to modify the context of natural selection that affects their future kin” (Deacon 1997, 322; see also Richards 1987; both in #13 of this thread).
The link between human individual development and human species evolution is missing in Rand’s paragraph. In
The Symbolic Species, Terrence Deacon, a researcher in neuroscience and evolutionary anthropology, has put forth a theory of the evolution of human, conceptual consciousness. This is a theory that can deliver what Rand was groping for in that fractured paragraph.
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This book began by considering the curious lack of natural symbolic systems in all nonhuman species, the limited capacity to gain symbolic understanding in most, and the failure of domesticated animals—immersed in the dense web of human interactions—to discover more than a few rote associations of words and phrases. What are the implications of this species difference and its associated neurological basis?
Evolution has widened the cognitive gap between the human species and all others into a yawning chasm. Taken together, the near-universal failure of nonhumans and the near-universal success of humans in acquiring symbolic abilities suggest that this shift corresponds to a major reassignment of cognitive resources to help overcome natural barriers to symbol learning. Other species’ failures at symbol learning do not result from the lack of some essential structure present only in human brains. As we have seen, chimpanzees can, under special circumstances, be brought to understand symbolic communication, though at best on a comparatively modest scale. The difference between symbolic and nonsymbolic communication may be a categorical difference in semiotic terms, but the neurological basis of our symbolic advantage is not due to a categorical difference in brain structure, only to a quantitative rearrangement of existing parts. Nevertheless, this shift in proportions spans a critical learning threshold that stands between indexical associations and symbolic reference. Although it is possible for other species to cross this threshold by learning and unlearning sets of associations in just the right way, it is incredibly unlikely. Yet in humans, a restructuring of the brain has acted like a catalyst, making the immensely improbable nearly inevitable.
In evolutionary terms, it would be accurate to say that the genetic basis for symbol-learning abilities has been driven to ‘fixation’. In other words, it has become a universal trait of the species. Though there may be variations in this ability among people, essentially all of this variability is above the threshold necessary for acquiring symbols. Whenever most variation of a trait is eliminated, we can usually assume that selection for it has been and still is immense. There must have been some very significant reproductive advantages to symbol acquisition, and severe reproductive costs in cases of failure to acquire symbols. An individual born into a symbolic culture with an ape’s bias against acquiring symbolic associations would be deprived of access to most realms of know-how and social influence, and have little chance to reproduce successfully. The ancestral lineages that succeeded best and left the most progeny were those in which symbolic abilities were able to develop despite a wide range of interfering influences. Language acquisition had to become fail-safe. After 2 million years it has clearly reached this status.
The simplest way to make something fail-safe is to design it far beyond the basic requirements. . . .
This symbol-learning insurance policy is provided by a comparatively overdeveloped prefrontal cortex, whose connections have gained the upper hand in numerous synaptic competitions throughout the brain. The extraordinary extent of this disproportional feature reflects its overdesign. . . . (Deacon 1997, 411–13)
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James Lennox on Darwinism, including Teleology in a Special Sense
http://plato.stanfor.../darwinism/#3.3
Aristotle on Teleology by Monte Ransome Johnson
http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0199238502..._pt#reader-link
“Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality” by Allan Gotthelf
In
Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology
http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0521310911..._pt#reader-link
This post has been edited by Stephen Boydstun: 24 September 2008 - 06:03 AM