Illogical Leap: Why Harriman's account of induction is daft nonsense

[PDS]

"[The book] is a fraud."

Isn't this rather unnecessary? Come on now.

You forgot the challenge contained in the accusation: Show how Harriman actually did justify his notion of first-level generalizations.

Shayne

No thank you--I will let Harriman and his book speak for themselves.

I happen to be a trial attorney who defends companies against fraud allegations. The burden of proof is always on the person making the accusation in court, and here as well, in my opinion. All one needs to file a fraud lawsuit is a piece of a paper and a 100 dollar bill. All one needs to make a fraud allegation on the internet is to hit the "send" button, apparently.

Edited October 22, 2010 by PDS

[George H. Smith]

"[The book] is a fraud."

Isn't this rather unnecessary? Come on now.

You forgot the challenge contained in the accusation: Show how Harriman actually did justify his notion of first-level generalizations.

Shayne

"Pushing a ball causes it to roll." This is one example that Harriman (p. 16) gives of a first-level generalization.

So what is your objection to this? Are you claiming that this does not qualify as a first-level generalization? If so, then please give an example what you would regard as a first-level generalization.

Perhaps you wish to say that though "Pushing a ball causes it to roll" is a first-level generalization, it is not justified. If so, then what, in principle, would you accept as adequate justification for this generalization?

Or perhaps you wish to say that there is no such thing as a first-level generalization, and that the entire "notion" (your word) is unjustifiable. If this is your position, then you will need to explain your view of how generalizations are related to one another, if at all. Are some more fundamental than others?

My boycott obviously didn't last very long. I had to rush my dog to the vet yesterday morning and leave him there, and I wasn't in the best of moods while waiting to hear if he would be okay. I got him back this morning, and he's fine.

Ghs

[sjw]

No thank you--I will let Harriman and his book speak for themselves.

I happen to be a trial attorney who defends companies against fraud allegations. The burden of proof is always on the person making the accusation in court, and here as well, in my opinion. All one needs to file a fraud lawsuit is a piece of a paper and a 100 dollar bill. All one needs to make a fraud allegation on the internet is to hit the "send" button, apparently.

Well, I of course agree with your principles -- the burden of proof must always lie that way. But your remarks are disingenuous. Although a full case of fraud is not warranted (there are, as I have said elsewhere, redeeming aspects of the book), I have been making a case for fraud regarding the fundamental *and advertised* purpose of the book. You have not addressed a single one of my arguments. So don't stand on your principles like you're so high and mighty, you're not. In fact, your silly argument really does smack of what one often hears in a court of law nowadays -- with wily attorneys trying to trip up their opponents rather than actually being concerned with the truth.

I will refrain from making a joke about lawyers. A lawyer telling ME about burden of proof. That's enough of a joke already.

Shayne

Edited October 22, 2010 by sjw

[Selene]

Shayne:

"First-level generalizations are the base of the whole book, and without a justification of them, there is no justification for the book. It is a fraud."

Therefore, I would believe, you are revising the above statement?

Adam

[PDS]

No thank you--I will let Harriman and his book speak for themselves.

I happen to be a trial attorney who defends companies against fraud allegations. The burden of proof is always on the person making the accusation in court, and here as well, in my opinion. All one needs to file a fraud lawsuit is a piece of a paper and a 100 dollar bill. All one needs to make a fraud allegation on the internet is to hit the "send" button, apparently.

Well, I of course agree with your principles -- the burden of proof must always lie that way. But your remarks are disingenuous. Although a full case of fraud is not warranted (there are, as I have said elsewhere, redeeming aspects of the book), I have been making a case for fraud regarding the fundamental *and advertised* purpose of the book. You have not addressed a single one of my arguments. So don't stand on your principles like you're so high and mighty, you're not. In fact, your silly argument really does smack of what one often hears in a court of law nowadays -- with wily attorneys trying to trip up their opponents rather than actually being concerned with the truth.

I will refrain from making a joke about lawyers. A lawyer telling ME about burden of proof. That's enough of a joke already.

Shayne

Hmmm. And to think I had actually tried to rescue you on this thread from the thrashing George had been giving you, and with one arm behind his back at that.

Under the "life is short" principle, I will be joining Brant and yesterday's George in ignoring you from now on.

[sjw]

"Pushing a ball causes it to roll." This is one example that Harriman (p. 16) gives of a first-level generalization.

So what is your objection to this? Are you claiming that this does not qualify as a first-level generalization? If so, then please give an example what you would regard as a first-level generalization.

I think the natural and normal process for intelligent adults is: "When I pushed this ball it rolled. I wonder why it does that? ..." And then they would follow a pattern similar to what I highlighted in my very first post in this thread. They would not actually think "Pushing a ball causes it to roll" after pushing a ball for the first time. So if we really want to talk about "first level", it would be the first statement I made, one of association, not causation ("When I pushed this ball it rolled"). It's not a generalization or a principle, because in order to reach those, you must go through the process I sketched in my first post.

Perhaps you wish to say that though "Pushing a ball causes it to roll" is a first-level generalization, it is not justified. If so, then what, in principle, would you accept as adequate justification for this generalization?

Again, see my first post. I think you need explicit integration with your other knowledge in order to have a legitimate generalization. One can easily err in doing this integration, because one might have disorganized conceptual hierarchies, or might not remember some cases. But you have to at least try. You can't just stand and stare at a single instance and then think you can generalize from it.

Or perhaps you wish to say that there is no such thing as a first-level generalization, and that the entire "notion" (your word) is unjustifiable. If this is your position, then you will need to explain your view of how generalizations are related to one another, if at all. Are some more fundamental than others?

At the first, sensory-perceptual level, I think all we have are associations. Once we learn a lot, we tend to take new instances, deductively, as instances of cause and effect. But only because we previously learned about the cause and effect. We are merely applying previously-gained knowledge to the new instance, we are not "seeing" cause and effect. An intelligent adult can explicitly trace his reasons for making an affirmation of causality. A child generally can't. Many adults in fact, generally can't, or won't. Which is the audience Harriman intends to appeal to, evidently.

My boycott obviously didn't last very long. I had to rush my dog to the vet yesterday morning and leave him there, and I wasn't in the best of moods while waiting to hear if he would be okay. I got him back this morning, and he's fine.

Ghs

I'm glad he's OK.

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

I'm not privy to your particular inability to understand a statement that you refuse to identify. It is pure silliness to expect me to go back through this thread, sift out all my remarks about Hume, and rewrite them for you, trying to guess whether or not you'll actually understand them in a different form.

You needn't rewrite anything. Just repost one or more of your earlier comments and add some quotations from Hume that led you to make them. Here are two that I found especially troublesome:

It is brazenly obvious from his epistemological theory that he never had any intention of taking it "seriously" in the sense you wish to assert here.

I have italicized the troublesome parts in the following passage.

I'm just saying that the critical section where Hume examines induction, he very clearly indicates two premises 1) reason cannot justify induction; 2) but we'd better use induction anyway (he calls this "Custom" or "habit" not induction).

He is very clear that he has no intention to dismiss what he has failed to square with reason and what he claims cannot be squared with reason; on the contrary, he quite applauds this "intuition" that nature gave us. So for him, induction is just a black box where something magic happens, and he fully intends to employ this black box and live and work like an ordinary human being in that realm. He is really no worse off than someone who doesn't explicitly think about epistemology, basically all he's saying is that there's part of what his mind does that he can't justify in rational terms. He's not saying he's not going to use that part.

Ghs

[sjw]

Hmmm. And to think I had actually tried to rescue you on this thread from the thrashing George had been giving you, and with one arm behind his back at that.

Under the "life is short" principle, I will be joining Brant and yesterday's George in ignoring you from now on.

I'm tired of touchy people, so you go right ahead. When I have a criticism, I back it up, and I'm open to receiving criticism that is backed up (note how I backed off of the blanket "this book is fraud" comment). What touchy people do is just throw out unsubstantiated insults, and they also want to drag in all their past hurts into the conversation and make the discussion be about people instead of ideas.

You made an accusation of me. The accusation was wildly wrong. To add to this, you wanted to prance about saying you were a lawyer. I slammed you for it. You deserved it.

Shayne

[sjw]

Shayne:

"First-level generalizations are the base of the whole book, and without a justification of them, there is no justification for the book. It is a fraud."

Therefore, I would believe, you are revising the above statement?

Adam

Qualifying. The book is a fraud in the respect of its aims as stated on the back cover. It has other qualities that some may find redeeming, but which I personally find of no use.

Shayne

[sjw]

I'm not privy to your particular inability to understand a statement that you refuse to identify. It is pure silliness to expect me to go back through this thread, sift out all my remarks about Hume, and rewrite them for you, trying to guess whether or not you'll actually understand them in a different form.

You needn't rewrite anything. Just repost one or more of your earlier comments and add some quotations from Hume that led you to make them. Here are two that I found especially troublesome:

It is brazenly obvious from his epistemological theory that he never had any intention of taking it "seriously" in the sense you wish to assert here.

I have italicized the troublesome parts in the following passage.

I'm just saying that the critical section where Hume examines induction, he very clearly indicates two premises 1) reason cannot justify induction; 2) but we'd better use induction anyway (he calls this "Custom" or "habit" not induction).

He is very clear that he has no intention to dismiss what he has failed to square with reason and what he claims cannot be squared with reason; on the contrary, he quite applauds this "intuition" that nature gave us. So for him, induction is just a black box where something magic happens, and he fully intends to employ this black box and live and work like an ordinary human being in that realm. He is really no worse off than someone who doesn't explicitly think about epistemology, basically all he's saying is that there's part of what his mind does that he can't justify in rational terms. He's not saying he's not going to use that part.

Ghs

Thank you for highlighting these. I will get back on them when I have some more time, except for my use of the phrase "his epistemological theory": That was indeed an overly broad statement by me, I only meant to refer to his statements on induction. Since I have not read all of his works on epistemology I am not in any place to comment on his "epistemological theory" as such.

Shayne

[Brant Gaede]

give the guy a break

You'll never be quite at home with the filthy, gutter nastiness that often rears its head at OL will you? I respect your humanity if not your judgement earlier in this thread.

You should re-read what went on here and forget the fact that George is an Authority Figure. You're holding him and me to different standards, just as he holds himself to a different standard, just as, ironically enough, Leonard Peikoff does. You will notice that my only "sin" in this thread was to act as if the virtue of independence means anything, to expect that George and I should be equal before the laws of rational discussion.

George and Peikoff are happy when they can lord over you and you cower in their presumed greatness, but if you dare question them on anything, then "OUT!" is what you hear, and they expect you to bow your head in shame and walk out the door. I may yet do so out of boredom -- this authority mongering gets tedious.

"...Ayn Rand and other heresies" indeed. How laughably ironic.

Shayne

I see no reason after re-reading this thread to change anything I've written. Most of what you've written quoted above is not true. If you want to continue to engage George and he you that's between you two.

My contretemps with you had nothing specifically to do with Hume's epistemology.

Now, I really must go. I hope to be back in January.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

You should re-read what went on here and forget the fact that George is an Authority Figure. You're holding him and me to different standards, just as he holds himself to a different standard, just as, ironically enough, Leonard Peikoff does. You will notice that my only "sin" in this thread was to act as if the virtue of independence means anything, to expect that George and I should be equal before the laws of rational discussion.

As I have noted many times before on various threads, everyone is "equal" in matters of philosophy. As I have also noted, however, the same is not true in specialized disciplines like physics and history, including the history of ideas. Such disciplines require specific knowledge, and though such knowledge is attainable to everyone, not everyone has taken or will take the pains necessary to acquire it.

If we were arguing over the validity of a particular argument by Hume, then I would have no problem taking you seriously. But the issue of what Hume meant is a historical question, not a philosophical one. There are specialized Humean scholars who qualify as legitimate experts and authorities on his ideas; and though I don't claim to be one, I have read many of them and have used them as guides when reading Hume for myself.

Of course, this does not mean that such experts are necessarily right. On the contrary, they sometimes disagree with one another -- this is true of Humean scholars as well -- so not all of them can possibly be right. But this is not an issue of justification per se. Rather, it is an issue of credibility. As I wrote in Why Atheism?

A proposition must also appear credible before we will take it seriously. If I am told, for example, that American astronauts did not really land on the moon but that this event was an elaborate hoax concocted by NASA to secure funding for the space program, I would likely reject this assertion outright -- because, though interesting, it does not strike me as credible. True, I do not have the evidence in hand to prove that the moon landing was authentic, and we have abundant evidence of other governmental frauds; nevertheless, I would not take the time and effort to investigate this claim unless I was presented with enough presumptive evidence to establish its credibility. Only if I took it seriously enough to merit further investigation would I seek for more detailed information that would resolve the issue one way or another to my own satisfaction.

To assess a proposition as credible is to say not that it is justified but that it is worthy of being justified. A credible proposition is one that we regard as worthy of further consideration. Without credibility a proposition will simply pass through our consciousness without stopping long enough to be examined. Credibility is like an Ellis Island of cognition, a checkpoint for immigrating ideas that are seeking permanent residence in our minds. Whether a proposition is turned away or admitted for further investigation will depend on how we assess its credibility.

When an unusual interpretation of Hume (or any other philosopher) is given by a person who has read very little of him, then the problem of credibility kicks in. Although it is theoretically possible that you are right, this counts for nothing unless you can back up your viewpoint with specific passages from Hume.

Some years ago on a philosophy elist, I mentioned something about Aristotle's theory of universals -- his so-called "moderate realism." My remarks were challenged by a guy who obviously knew a lot more about Aristotle than I did. (He turned out to be philosophy PhD who had written his dissertation on Aristotle's theory of universals) I immediately realized that there was a good chance that he was correct. Although I had read a fair amount of Aristotle over the years, I had not read him recently, I could not read him in the original Greek, and I had always focused far more on his moral and political theory than on his epistemology.

I did not automatically assume that my critic, being an "authority" on Aristotle, was right. But given my own shortcomings on this matter, I granted him a great deal of credibility. Given that his level of knowledge on this issue was obviously much greater than mine, I did not presume to be his "equal." Such a thought never occurred to me, and I was not insulted when he recommended that I reread certain passages in Aristotle, as well as some secondary sources that I was unfamiliar with.

In short, I did not accuse my critic of an illicit appeal to authority, because, compared to me, he was an authority. Most of what we know, or think we know, about history relies on similar appeals to authority. As I said before, such authorities are not necessarily right -- but, within certain limits, they do have credibility.

Ghs

[sjw]

George I'm not going to argue with your last post because I essentially agree with it. I don't think that was the issue here. I think what happened is that I made an overly broad remark, which you took literally. And I don't blame you for that, even if there were signs that I didn't mean precisely what I said. What I blame you for was how you had (until today) refused to rub my nose in what particular thing you didn't like so I could know what you were going on about and address it rationally.

I'm going to go back and pull the quotes of Hume to back up my other statements as you requested a bit later, probably tomorrow. I think most of what I said in this thread is perfectly right concerning the sections of Hume I had read. But since I have not read all of Hume I obviously cannot speak concerning all of Hume. I speak concerning what is implied in what I did read, and if he contradicts himself later that's not my fault.

If I misinterpreted Hume that's my fault, but I don't think that I did. At most I might have taken a very slight liberty in presuming to be seeing the same thing he was, of giving him benefit of the doubt as being sane and rational. Now, I have done this with Peikoff and been flat out wrong to give him benefit of the doubt, so I hope I've gotten pickier now than I was a decade ago, but in any case, what I understand is far more important than what I understand Hume to be saying, and if reading Hume clarifies my own understanding of reason then that's what matters most to me.

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

I think the natural and normal process for intelligent adults is: "When I pushed this ball it rolled. I wonder why it does that? ..." And then they would follow a pattern similar to what I highlighted in my very first post in this thread. They would not actually think "Pushing a ball causes it to roll" after pushing a ball for the first time.

Nowhere does HarriPei say or suggest that the generalization "Pushing a ball causes it to roll" will (or should) be made after pushing a ball for the first time. On the contrary, given his comparison between generalizations and concept-formation, the latter of which involves noting similarities between two or more existents, the implication is that more than one instance of pushing a ball would be required.

So if we really want to talk about "first level", it would be the first statement I made, one of association, not causation ("When I pushed this ball it rolled"). It's not a generalization or a principle, because in order to reach those, you must go through the process I sketched in my first post.

I doubt if it takes very long before a child understands on some level, and if only implicitly, that he can cause things to happen. When a child pushes a ball and sees it roll, he does not perceive himself as another external object in relation to the ball and then assume an "association.". Rather, the child directly experiences his causal agency first hand.

Many philosophers have argued that this subjective experience of causation is the origin of our notion of a causal "force" or "power" -- the sort of thing that Hume claimed cannot be perceived. A child would need to have some notion of personal identity -- he would need to be able to distinguish between "me" and the external world -- but if I correctly recall my admittedly limited knowledge of developmental psychology, this fundamental distinction is made at a very early age.

In any case, I read your initial post again, and even if you are right about some issues, I don't think they would make any substantial difference to HarryPei's conception of first-level generalizations. They amount to differences of detail, not of substance.

Ghs

[BaalChatzaf]

To understand why a ball rolls when pushed one must do some mathematical idealization. Draw a line from the point of contact of the ball (or cylinder or hoop) with the ground through the center and beyond. What you have is a lever that instantaneously rotates around it fulcrum (the point of contact). The point of contact moves but the instantaneous lever rotates around its instantaneous fulcrum. That is the idealization which leads to the correct analysis of rolling bodies.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited October 22, 2010 by BaalChatzaf

[sjw]

Nowhere does HarriPei say or suggest that the generalization "Pushing a ball causes it to roll" will (or should) be made after pushing a ball for the first time. On the contrary, given his comparison between generalizations and concept-formation, the latter of which involves noting similarities between two or more existents, the implication is that more than one instance of pushing a ball would be required.

...

In any case, I read your initial post again, and even if you are right about some issues, I don't think they would make any substantial difference to HarryPei's conception of first-level generalizations. They amount to differences of detail, not of substance.

A big pile of associations justifies a concept designating association, not causality. Just as 10 million voters doesn't magically grant a right to steal, 10 million experiments that demonstrate association does not magically create a causal identification -- in Objectivist terms, a concept means its units, so if it's not in the instances already, it's not in the concept either.

I doubt if it takes very long before a child understands on some level, and if only implicitly, that he can cause things to happen. When a child pushes a ball and sees it roll, he does not perceive himself as another external object in relation to the ball and then assume an "association.". Rather, the child directly experiences his causal agency first hand.

Many philosophers have argued that this subjective experience of causation is the origin of our notion of a causal "force" or "power" -- the sort of thing that Hume claimed cannot be perceived. A child would need to have some notion of personal identity -- he would need to be able to distinguish between "me" and the external world -- but if I correctly recall my admittedly limited knowledge of developmental psychology, this fundamental distinction is made at a very early age.

Yes, I'm aware of those, and I'm aware that Harriman very briefly referred to these, as if that wasn't what his book was advertised to be about. As I said above, I don't think we're going to find the bedrock of induction by consulting childhood memories, however valid the child's approach may be. I have my own thoughts on this topic, and however bad or good they may be, they're better than Harriman's since contrary to his advertised claim he has no original thought whatsoever.

Shayne

[Selene]

Shayne:

This is not a logical argument because you are comparing 10 million pieces of data in one "experiment" an election [singular] versus 10,000,000 separate and distinct singular experiments which support the prior event.

"A big pile of associations justifies a concept designating association, not causality. Just as 10 million voters doesn't magically grant a right to steal, 10 million experiments that demonstrate association does not magically create a causal identification -- in Objectivist terms, a concept means its units, so if it's not in the instances already, it's not in the concept either."

Adam

[George H. Smith]

Nowhere does HarriPei say or suggest that the generalization "Pushing a ball causes it to roll" will (or should) be made after pushing a ball for the first time. On the contrary, given his comparison between generalizations and concept-formation, the latter of which involves noting similarities between two or more existents, the implication is that more than one instance of pushing a ball would be required.

...

In any case, I read your initial post again, and even if you are right about some issues, I don't think they would make any substantial difference to HarryPei's conception of first-level generalizations. They amount to differences of detail, not of substance.

A big pile of associations justifies a concept designating association, not causality. Just as 10 million voters doesn't magically grant a right to steal, 10 million experiments that demonstrate association does not magically create a causal identification -- in Objectivist terms, a concept means its units, so if it's not in the instances already, it's not in the concept either.

No one is talking about a "big pile of associations." This is an arbitrary construction on your part, and your analogy is irrelevant. When a dog jumps on a young child and knocks him over, the child does not merely associate the impact of the dog with falling down. He experiences that impact as a causal force. He feels the impact of the dog, and he feels the effect of falling down. These are not associational observations to which a causal connection can be added only via reasoning. They are primitive causal experiences.

As Thomas Reid pointed out, children are liable to posit causal relationships where none exists. It is only with more experience that they learn to discriminate true casual relationships from mere associations. Our personal experiences of causation are very basic. The notion of "association" is more complex.

As for the meaning of a concept, it is also true that a causal generalization includes all particular instances.

I doubt if it takes very long before a child understands on some level, and if only implicitly, that he can cause things to happen. When a child pushes a ball and sees it roll, he does not perceive himself as another external object in relation to the ball and then assume an "association.". Rather, the child directly experiences his causal agency first hand.

Many philosophers have argued that this subjective experience of causation is the origin of our notion of a causal "force" or "power" -- the sort of thing that Hume claimed cannot be perceived. A child would need to have some notion of personal identity -- he would need to be able to distinguish between "me" and the external world -- but if I correctly recall my admittedly limited knowledge of developmental psychology, this fundamental distinction is made at a very early age.

Yes, I'm aware of those, and I'm aware that Harriman very briefly referred to these, as if that wasn't what his book was advertised to be about. As I said above, I don't think we're going to find the bedrock of induction by consulting childhood memories, however valid the child's approach may be. I have my own thoughts on this topic, and however bad or good they may be, they're better than Harriman's since contrary to his advertised claim he has no original thought whatsoever.

Perhaps you should concern yourself less with advertising blurbs and more with the content of the book.

As I pointed out in an earlier post, Harriman's argument does not depend on childhood memories. I don't remember the particular experiences that led to my first causal generalizations. So what? This doesn't vitiate those generalizations.

Ghs

[sjw]

No one is talking about a "big pile of associations." This is an arbitrary construction on your part, and your analogy is irrelevant.

You are operating on the premise of "If I don't understand, then the other person must be wrong about something." Not much I can do to help with an attitude problem on your part, it's hard enough to communicate these kinds of concepts to a person who actually wants to understand, it's impossible when someone doesn't.

When a dog jumps on a young child and knocks him over, the child does not merely associate the impact of the dog with falling down. He experiences that impact as a causal force. He feels the impact of the dog, and he feels the effect of falling down. These are not associational observations to which a causal connection can be added only via reasoning. They are primitive causal experiences.

Yes, well, pointing out such obvious things doesn't move us any further along, and is no answer to Hume either.

Shayne

[sjw]

George: Here are my quotes from Hume relating to statements of mine you had trouble with:

It is brazenly obvious from his epistemological theory that he never had any intention of taking it "seriously" in the sense you wish to assert here.

As I said already, my use of "epistemological theory" is too broad, but here are quotes relating to what I was thinking of. I have taken some liberty in liberally quoting Hume as opposed to narrowly addressing the issue. My point here is that Hume's "theory" assigns a substantial portion of human mental activity to "custom" or "habit", and it is in that sphere that what we call "induction" happens. So Hume doesn't take his theory seriously in the sense of ignoring induction merely because it can't be rationally justified; on the contrary he regards it as a gift from nature that his mind can induce, even though he has no idea how reason can justify the procedure.

I say then, that, even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasoning, or any process of the understanding. This answer we must endeavour both to explain and to defend.

...

If a body of like colour and consistence with that bread, which we have formerly eat, be presented to us, we make no scruple of repeating the experiment, and foresee, with certainty, like nourishment and support. Now this is a process of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly know the foundation. It is allowed on all hands that there is no known connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; and consequently, that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction, by anything which it knows of their nature.

...

In reality, all arguments from experience are founded on the similarity which we discover among natural objects, and by which we are induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow from such objects. And though none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority of experience, or to reject that great guide of human life, it may surely be allowed a philosopher to have so much curiosity at least as to examine the principle of human nature, which gives this mighty authority to experience, and makes us draw advantage from that similarity which nature has placed among different objects. From causes which appear similar we expect similar effects. This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions.

...

Now where is that process of reasoning which, from one instance, draws a conclusion, so different from that which it infers from a hundred instances that are nowise different from that single one? This question I propose as much for the sake of information, as with an intention of raising difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine any such reasoning. But I keep my mind still open to instruction, if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it on me.

...

It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue so. In vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience. Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and influence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities.

...

My practice, you say, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my question. As an agent, I am quite satisfied in the point; but as a philosopher, who has some share of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no enquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty, or give me satisfaction in a matter of such importance. Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public, even though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution? We shall at least, by this means, be sensible of our ignorance, if we do not augment our knowledge.

...

I must confess that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investigation, that therefore it does not really exist.

...

It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants—nay infants, nay even brute beasts—improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance. If you assert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is led into this conclusion by any process of argument or ratiocination, I may justly require you to produce that argument; nor have you any pretence to refuse so equitable a demand.

...

If you hesitate, therefore, a moment, or if, after reflection, you produce any intricate or profound argument, you, in a manner, give up the question, and confess that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from causes which are, to appearance, similar. This is the proposition which I intended to enforce in the present section. If I be right, I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar; since I cannot now discover an argument which, it seems, was perfectly familiar to me long before I was out of my cradle.

...

Suppose a person, though endowed with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection, to be brought on a sudden into this world; he would, indeed, immediately observe a continual succession of objects, and one event following another; but he would not be able to discover anything farther. He would not, at first, by any reasoning, be able to reach the idea of cause and effect; since the particular powers, by which all natural operations are performed, never appear to the senses; nor is it reasonable to conclude, merely because one event, in one instance, precedes another, that therefore the one is the cause, the other the effect.

...

But still he finds himself determined to draw it: And though he should be convinced that his understanding has no part in the operation, he would nevertheless continue in the same course of thinking. There is some other principle which determines him to form such a conclusion. 36. This principle is Custom or Habit.

...

Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past.

...

As nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us the knowledge of the muscles and nerves, by which they are actuated; so has she implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to that which she has established among external objects; though we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which this regular course and succession of objects totally depends.

I have italicized the troublesome parts in the following passage.

I'm just saying that the critical section where Hume examines induction, he very clearly indicates two premises 1) reason cannot justify induction; 2) but we'd better use induction anyway (he calls this "Custom" or "habit" not induction).

He is very clear that he has no intention to dismiss what he has failed to square with reason and what he claims cannot be squared with reason; on the contrary, he quite applauds this "intuition" that nature gave us. So for him, induction is just a black box where something magic happens, and he fully intends to employ this black box and live and work like an ordinary human being in that realm. He is really no worse off than someone who doesn't explicitly think about epistemology, basically all he's saying is that there's part of what his mind does that he can't justify in rational terms. He's not saying he's not going to use that part.

Ghs

See the above quotes. E.g., "Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past."

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

No one is talking about a "big pile of associations." This is an arbitrary construction on your part, and your analogy is irrelevant.

You are operating on the premise of "If I don't understand, then the other person must be wrong about something." Not much I can do to help with an attitude problem on your part, it's hard enough to communicate these kinds of concepts to a person who actually wants to understand, it's impossible when someone doesn't.

Another nifty "response for all occasions."

Where does Harriman or any other defender of causation refer to something akin to a "big pile of associations"? This is a bit of Humean dogma that you have interjected into this discussion. You apparently wish to make the point that even a "big pile of associations" cannot establish a casual relationship and therefore cannot serve as the foundation for a first-level generalization. Fine, I agree, and so would Harriman. So your point is....?

When a dog jumps on a young child and knocks him over, the child does not merely associate the impact of the dog with falling down. He experiences that impact as a causal force. He feels the impact of the dog, and he feels the effect of falling down. These are not associational observations to which a causal connection can be added only via reasoning. They are primitive causal experiences.

Yes, well, pointing out such obvious things doesn't move us any further along, and is no answer to Hume either.

If I am right, then you are wrong, because our knowledge of causation precedes our knowledge of noncausal "associations." Such knowledge requires that we be able to identify relationships which appear to be causally connected but which in fact are not -- a distinction that would be impossible without a previous knowledge of causation.

And if I am right, then Hume -- who claimed that experience can provide no rational basis to believe in causation -- was wrong as well, because we are able to experience some causal relationships directly.

Therefore, since you regard my point as "obvious" -- an assessment that Hume would vigorously dispute -- you have given up the ghost of your argument, while abandoning Hume in the process.

I assumed that you would be able to understand the implications of my points without my filling in all the steps. I was obviously wrong. Would you like to reconsider your surrender?

Ghs

[sjw]

Another nifty "response for all occasions."

You mean like "This is an arbitrary construction on your part, and your analogy is irrelevant."?

Where does Harriman or any other defender of causation refer to something akin to a "big pile of associations"? This is a bit of Humean dogma that you have interjected into this discussion. You apparently wish to make the point that even a "big pile of associations" cannot establish a casual relationship and therefore cannot serve as the foundation for a first-level generalization. Fine, I agree, and so would Harriman. So your point is....?

It seems to me that you're forgetting the context that began just before this post: http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=9431&st=80&p=112410entry112410

The point was that a single observation is mere association, that you don't "just see" the causation. And you can't rely on Rand's theory of concepts to magically make causation appear where there is none in any of the single instances; it would have to be in a single instance if it were there at all in order for Rand's theory of concepts to come to the rescue on this issue.

If I am right, then you are wrong, because our knowledge of causation precedes our knowledge of noncausal "associations." Such knowledge requires that we be able to identify relationships which appear to be causally connected but which in fact are not -- a distinction that would be impossible without a previous knowledge of causation.

Are you trying to argue for apriori knowledge of some kind when you say "knowledge of causation precedes"? Or are you saying you got this knowledge from observations of preceding instances? I have been presuming the latter but I'm not sure now.

And if I am right, then Hume -- who claimed that experience can provide no rational basis to believe in causation -- was wrong as well, because we are able to experience some causal relationships directly.

Well, your example certainly doesn't show that, it shows a child who has already progressed through some development, enough that he can know how to interpret the forces and sights he's seeing and blame the dog for his predicament. I already touched on this issue here when I mentioned the fact that we deduce causal links based on previously formed conclusions: http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=9431&view=findpost&p=112385 .

In any case, I see the problem of induction as identifying the precise locus of where we make this "logical leap" and assign causality from our sensory experience. Just pointing to a 2-year-old and saying "see!?" doesn't focus in on anything at all, it is a circular appeal. I say this not to undermine this unidentified process, but rather to fully identify and explicate it. It does have some application in real life too, such as in machine "learning." If we can identify precisely how we make causal identifications, we may be able to leverage this in our technology, just as consulting nature in many other areas has lead to much of our technology.

So a proper validation in the sense I mean (and as I have already said elsewhere -- I think induction is axiomatic, you have to rely on it in order to argue one way or the other about it) has to make the case in terms of raw sensory data. You can't just rely on someone's already-existing knowledge, observe the fact that they have it (something I never disputed), and then say "See! It's all clear". I mean, you're entirely missing the point here.

When I read Hume I see him trying to explicate induction and he just can't bridge the gap, partly because he does not realize that at the base of it all must be an axiom that says induction is valid. I think this is one aspect of what he is trying to do, and in that aspect I think he has cleared away a lot of brush. I think he was wrong in other aspects, but I think it's wrong to only stare at where he was wrong and not learn from where he was right.

Therefore, since you regard my point as "obvious" -- an assessment that Hume would vigorously dispute -- you have given up the ghost of your argument, while abandoning Hume in the process.

I assumed that you would be able to understand the implications of my points without my filling in all the steps. I was obviously wrong. Would you like to reconsider your surrender?

Ghs

I think you aren't following along, so, no.

Shayne

[sjw]

The only nonsense involved here is your characterization of Harriman's argument. You need to read the book again.

Ghs

My characterization is not of the whole book, it is of part of the first chapter where he introduces first-level generalization and says that "pushing a ball makes it roll" is one. Are you saying that he didn't actually claim that was a first-level generalization?

Shayne

Okay, then you need to read the first chapter again.

I got my copy of the book back. It's not necessary to read the whole first chapter. Harriman writes "Thus the scientific principle of Galileo goes back level by level to an irreducible first-level generalization: Pushing a ball causes it to roll. That is the "axiom"--or starting point--of induction."

Harriman is evidently conflating sensory-perceptual experience, an experiment and a result, with a principle. The principle is not irreducible, as has already been demonstrated here by both me and Bob. The sensory-perceptual-conceptual experience -- the fact that an adult would push a ball, see it roll, and recognize the meaning -- not irreducible either, neither in terms of human development nor the mechanics of mind involved in a developed adult.

This kind of incompetence doesn't motivate one to read anything else. I would much rather read some more of my George H. Smith collection than re-read Chapter 1 of Harriman's trash.

Shayne

[Peter]

George wrote:

. . . . In short, I did not accuse my critic of an illicit appeal to authority, because, compared to me, he was an authority. Most of what we know, or think we know, about history relies on similar appeals to authority. As I said before, such authorities are not necessarily right -- but, within certain limits, they do have credibility.

end quote

Without commenting about the debate, I just wanted to reaffirm, that with this letter, you are the Master of the putdown.

I am glad your pooch is OK. My avatar, the white cat, Sparks is limping, holding her right front paw up. We may go to the vet, Monday. Two years ago, my rescued from the pound half rottweiller mix breed Mindy, was squashed by a pick up truck. She did not deserve a death like that. She was an amazing watch-dog, of the first order. It is amazing how creatures can seem like people.

Peter

[George H. Smith]

Another nifty "response for all occasions."

You mean like "This is an arbitrary construction on your part, and your analogy is irrelevant."?

You seem to think that I don't understand your points, but I understand them very well. They are simply a Classic Comics version of Hume. I had hoped that you would do some thinking outside the box. One can always hope, I suppose.

As for your analogy, it was totally off-base. What more do you expect me to say about it? If I say that your belief in "association" is analogous to snow falling on a winter day, would you feel obligated to explain in detail why the analogy fails? Or would you simply dismiss it? I assume and hope you would do the latter. Just because the thought of an analogy tumbles out of your head doesn't mean that I or anyone else is required to explain why it isn't relevant. If you disagree, then defend it.

The point was that a single observation is mere association....

Nope, not necessarily; it depends on what is being observed. You don't need to get burned by fire more than once to understand that the fire caused the burn. A child doesn't need to suffer from a beating more than once in order to understand that the beating caused his suffering.

It would be quite absurd to say that the child initially "associated" the beating with his suffering and only later, via a process of reasoning and additional beatings, concluded that there was a causal connection between the two. This would be absurd because the child experiences the causal relationship directly.

Even Hume said that children discern causal relationships long before they are able to reason about them. Indeed, this was an important element in his argument that our notion of causation is not grounded in reason. Hume was right about the former claim and wrong about the latter. Just because children discern casual relationships without reasoning about them, it does not follow that their belief in causation has no rational basis. These are two different things.

...that you don't "just see" the causation.

I presented the example of child getting knocked over by the impact of a dog, calling this a direct experience of causation. You called my example "obvious."

And you can't rely on Rand's theory of concepts to magically make causation appear where there is none in any of the single instances; it would have to be in a single instance if it were there at all in order for Rand's theory of concepts to come to the rescue on this issue.

I don't recognize this supposed procedure. Whom are you talking about?

If I am right, then you are wrong, because our knowledge of causation precedes our knowledge of noncausal "associations." Such knowledge requires that we be able to identify relationships which appear to be causally connected but which in fact are not -- a distinction that would be impossible without a previous knowledge of causation.

Are you trying to argue for apriori knowledge of some kind when you say "knowledge of causation precedes"? Or are you saying you got this knowledge from observations of preceding instances? I have been presuming the latter but I'm not sure now.

Read my discussion again. I am quite clear about what I mean. To refer to noncausal associations presupposes a knowledge of causal relationships. The former would have no meaning without knowledge of the latter. This has nothing to do with an a priori conception of causation.

If you don't agree agree with this analysis, then define what you mean by "association." Good luck with this one; you will need it. Hume could rely on this notion because he worked from an associationist theory of ideas, a psychological theory that was very popular in his day. You, in contrast, repeat Hume's conclusion without being aware of the psychological theory that supported it.

I may take up the remainder of your remarks later, but I'm not sure. At this point it is pretty clear that you are not giving more that a few nanoseconds of thought to what I have been saying, so additional efforts may be futile.

Of course, you will probably respond in kind, complaining that I have not been giving sufficient thought to your insights, etc., etc. Fine, I rather hope you respond this way, because the perceived absence of mutual understanding will give me a good excuse to nip this exchange in the bud. I've had similar discussions with dozens of people over the years (mainly philosophy undergraduates), and there is nothing I am going to learn from hearing the same hackneyed arguments one more time.

One great merit of Harriman's book is that he dares to challenge the conventional wisdom about causation. This is something you could learn from him, even if you disagree with some of his specific arguments.

Ghs