The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics

[BaalChatzaf]

There are already cases of generalizing inductions starting from a finite set of true instances and leading to a general conclusion which is false.

-(x)P(x) == Ex[-P(x)]

Ba'al Chatzaf

Some does not imply all. Or are you trying to claim it does?

I am stating a theorem in first order predicate logic.

In plain language the one negates a general statement is to instantiate its negative. One counterexample is sufficient to bust a general statement. Have you ever heard the old chestnut ("chestnut" used metaphorically here) the exception PROVES the rule. The correct meaning is that the exception TESTS the rule. One exception and the rule is false.

Ba'al Chatzaf

I am familiar with symbolic logic, and I also know that we don't need symbolic logic to tell us that one counterexample can disprove a general rule. Aristotelian logicians were discussing examples like "All swans are white" centuries before Russell and Whitehead happened along.

The problem with your formulation is that it does not clearly specify the inductive "rule" that is supposedly falsified. So what inductive "rule" would that be? Try stating it in plain English.

Ghs

Counter example: a zillion white swans are seen. This leads to the generalization: all swans are white. Then a black swan is seen in Australia. Generalization is false.

This counter example is sufficient to show that not all enumerative inductions starting with a finite number of true instances leads to a true general conclusion.

Not all inductive generalizations are valid. On the other hand ALL deductions starting with true premises lead to true conclusions. Every last one of them in the past, in the present and in the future. Why? Because the law of non-contradiction holds now and forever. Modus Ponens Rules.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[merjet]

Counter example: a zillion white swans are seen. This leads to the generalization: all swans are white. Then a black swan is seen in Australia. Generalization is false.

This counter example is sufficient to show that not all enumerative inductions starting with a finite number of true instances leads to a true general conclusion.

Whoop-de-do. All swans have necks. Where is your counterexample?

Not all inductive generalizations are valid. On the other hand ALL deductions starting with true premises lead to true conclusions. Every last one of them in the past, in the present and in the future. Why? Because the law of non-contradiction holds now and forever. Modus Ponens Rules.

How do you start with a true premise in the form 'All S is P' -- while not already having verified it for every S, e.g. not 'every coin in my pocket has a date after 1963' -- and never use induction?

[George H. Smith]

There are already cases of generalizing inductions starting from a finite set of true instances and leading to a general conclusion which is false.

-(x)P(x) == Ex[-P(x)]

Ba'al Chatzaf

Some does not imply all. Or are you trying to claim it does?

I am stating a theorem in first order predicate logic.

In plain language the one negates a general statement is to instantiate its negative. One counterexample is sufficient to bust a general statement. Have you ever heard the old chestnut ("chestnut" used metaphorically here) the exception PROVES the rule. The correct meaning is that the exception TESTS the rule. One exception and the rule is false.

Ba'al Chatzaf

I am familiar with symbolic logic, and I also know that we don't need symbolic logic to tell us that one counterexample can disprove a general rule. Aristotelian logicians were discussing examples like "All swans are white" centuries before Russell and Whitehead happened along.

The problem with your formulation is that it does not clearly specify the inductive "rule" that is supposedly falsified. So what inductive "rule" would that be? Try stating it in plain English.

Ghs

Counter example: a zillion white swans are seen. This leads to the generalization: all swans are white. Then a black swan is seen in Australia. Generalization is false.

This counter example is sufficient to show that not all enumerative inductions starting with a finite number of true instances leads to a true general conclusion.

Not all inductive generalizations are valid. On the other hand ALL deductions starting with true premises lead to true conclusions. Every last one of them in the past, in the present and in the future. Why? Because the law of non-contradiction holds now and forever. Modus Ponens Rules.

Ba'al Chatzaf

No one ever said that all inductive generalizations are valid. That's why Bacon, Mill, and others specified various methods of inductive reasoning to increase its reliability. Harriman uses two of these, namely, Mill's Method of Agreement and Method of Difference. For an explanation, see the Wiki article .

Modus Ponens is a conditional form of argument:

If P, then Q

P

Therefore, Q

The problem here, as with all formal logic, is that the validity of the reasoning does not establish the truth of the premises. So how do we know that "If P, then Q" is true to begin with? Inductive reasoning plays a major role here. Even if we verify "If P, then Q" via experiments, the assumption that the same experiments now will yield the same results as experiments in the future is based on inductive reasoning.

In other words, from a limited number of experiments, we infer that all future experiments of the same kind will yield the same results. Without this inductive reasoning, the experimental method would have no cognitive value.

Ghs

[BaalChatzaf]

The problem here, as with all formal logic, is that the validity of the reasoning does not establish the truth of the premises. So how do we know that "If P, then Q" is true to begin with? Inductive reasoning plays a major role here. Even if we verify "If P, then Q" via experiments, the assumption that the same experiments now will yield the same results as experiments in the future is based on inductive reasoning.

Ghs

Which is why we have the notion of soundness. A sound argument is one

1. which is valid

and

2. with true premises.

Which corresponds to the two parts of Modus Ponens.

1. The implication p -> q

2 The premise p asserted as true

yielding

the conclusion q which may be asserted as true.

And yes, we must assume uniformity of physical law as a condition for doing science. There is no guarantee that the universe works the same both Here and There and both Now and Later but without that assumption we may as well go home and play scrabble. That does not make Uniformity true, but it is a necessary assumption to carry out science. If perchance we ever travel to a part of the Cosmos where our supposed physical laws break down we will have to find a more abstract context in which to formulate physical laws so that our current physical laws can function as heuristics. Sort of like Newton's Law of Gravitation which is NOT generally true, but it works often enough that we can plan our journeys to the outer solar system based on it. It is close enough to right so we can fiddle in some mid course corrections and make use of it. If we cannot have uniformity in fact, we can force it as a way of saving the appearances.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[James Heaps-Nelson]

The problem I have with Harriman is not the lack of mathematics. It is that his model of causality is fundamentally flawed. Physics, at bedrock, is based on a small cluster of conservation laws, which globally cannot be broken. Conservation of energy, conservation of momentum, conservation of angular momentum, conservation of charge and conservation of certain quantities related to weak and strong forces plus gravity. There is no global requirement for entity action causality. That it happens to be true in most cases to a reasonable approximation is of great benefit to us, but it does not fully describe some of the most interesting physical phenomena out there.

I disagree with this. Our knowledge of all causes derives from our knowledge of entities which have certain natures and exhibit certain behaviors. There are no behaviors not of entities of which we know. When you get down to subatomic particles you run up against the Heisenberg uncertainty principle which explains that, since our tools have a necessary limit in their bluntness (Bob will scream Plank length) you cannot measure both the position and velocity of the smallest particles without affecting them. In macroscopic observation, the mass energy of the light that reflects off the moon is insignificant in comparison with the moons mass. It can safely be ignored and we can very accurately measure the moon's position and motion. But with subatomic particles, the mass energy of the photons and the particles involved approach parity and we reach a horizon across which we cannot observe.

This epistemological limit due to the bluntness of our instruments does not amount to a metaphysical claim about the entities at that level. The uncertainty in the measurement is not a lack of identity in the thing. That is the problem with modern philosophical interpretations of subatomic physics. This is not to say that the identity of the thing is not to fluctuate in ways that are not observed at macroscopic levels. That is the problem with some Objectivists' views of physics. The law of identity does not require subatomic particles to behave like discrete billiard balls.

Perhaps we will never achieve the energies necessary to observe the scales we need to reach to get to the next level of understanding. Perhaps we will never have the ability to make the observations needed to posit the entities underlying the phenomena. This does not mean a priori that such entities do not exist. Furthermore, if we were to reach some smaller level underlying the Planck level (I don't imagine we can, but let's posit it) the we would still run up against the uncertainty principle, simply moved down to the next lower level of scale. All knowledge comes at a cost and all effort to achieve it is finite. There will always be horizons and singularities limiting our knowledge. This does not mean that nothing exists beneath those singularities or beyond those horizons.

Ted,

I just read Stephen Boydstun's article of Identity and another connected post where he talks about causality consisting of entities, actions, attributes and relations (from Aristotle). This is a richer conception of causality than the stress Objectivists sometimes put on entitities and actions. I think conservation laws etc. that form the cornerstone of a lot of physics fall under the category of relations of attributes. They aren't really captured by entities and actions inclusively. Food for thought...

Jim

[kiaer.ts]

There are several problems and assumptions for using it in a physics context for subatomic particles. I will list only a few to avoid being tedious:

1. You are assuming that a particle is an entity that is "separable" causally from the space surrounding it.

2. The term particle connotes things which import a Newtonian context such as fixed mass, energy etc. or even a fixed character as a certain kind of particle. Probably the term energy resonance is better for subatomic "particles". What happens when physicists add energy to a particle in a particle accelerator is that it becomes a very different "entity".

These are possible but not necessary misconceptions, and I see no hint of them in what Dennis wrote above. Indeed, Rand dealt with such mistakes in her treatment of the Frozen Concept. Entity doesn't mean unchangeable existent. The hylomorphic Objectivist metaphysics deals with such change. An acorn is no less an entity because it changes into an oak. If it is the nature of a particle to decay by emitting photon and other particles, then that is its nature as an entity.

Ted, sure. I don't see any problem with quantum behavior or other unpredictable phenomena with regard to Rand's identity-based metaphysics. What is a problem is when certain a priori preconceptions of what an entity can or cannot be or can or cannot do are made without making observations.

Take the example of what happens in muon catalyzed nuclear fusion. One method of getting two heavy hydrogen atoms to fuse is to chemically bond them with a muon which has a much bigger rest mass than an electron. Now the interesting part is that without quantum behavior, the two hydrogen atoms would be too far away from each other to fuse via the strong nuclear force, but they do anyway because of quantum tunneling.

Thanks, Jim. Can you explain, wikipedia says that the mass of the Muon is 207 that of the electron, and that it draws the two atoms 207 times closer. Do they simply mean that the gravitic attraction due to the muon is 207 times greater than that of an electron, small but less than the mass of the nucleus? Or are the actually saying that the distance between the nuclei is reduced to 1/207 of the former distance? If so, in relation to what charges at what powers? Fascinating in any sense. It is something new and brilliant, again, my thanks.

[James Heaps-Nelson]

There are several problems and assumptions for using it in a physics context for subatomic particles. I will list only a few to avoid being tedious:

1. You are assuming that a particle is an entity that is "separable" causally from the space surrounding it.

2. The term particle connotes things which import a Newtonian context such as fixed mass, energy etc. or even a fixed character as a certain kind of particle. Probably the term energy resonance is better for subatomic "particles". What happens when physicists add energy to a particle in a particle accelerator is that it becomes a very different "entity".

These are possible but not necessary misconceptions, and I see no hint of them in what Dennis wrote above. Indeed, Rand dealt with such mistakes in her treatment of the Frozen Concept. Entity doesn't mean unchangeable existent. The hylomorphic Objectivist metaphysics deals with such change. An acorn is no less an entity because it changes into an oak. If it is the nature of a particle to decay by emitting photon and other particles, then that is its nature as an entity.

Ted, sure. I don't see any problem with quantum behavior or other unpredictable phenomena with regard to Rand's identity-based metaphysics. What is a problem is when certain a priori preconceptions of what an entity can or cannot be or can or cannot do are made without making observations.

Take the example of what happens in muon catalyzed nuclear fusion. One method of getting two heavy hydrogen atoms to fuse is to chemically bond them with a muon which has a much bigger rest mass than an electron. Now the interesting part is that without quantum behavior, the two hydrogen atoms would be too far away from each other to fuse via the strong nuclear force, but they do anyway because of quantum tunneling.

Thanks, Jim. Can you explain, wikipedia says that the mass of the Muon is 207 that of the electron, and that it draws the two atoms 207 times closer. Do they simply mean that the gravitic attraction due to the muon is 207 times greater than that of an electron, small but less than the mass of the nucleus? Or are the actually saying that the distance between the nuclei is reduced to 1/207 of the former distance? If so, in relation to what charges at what powers? Fascinating in any sense. It is something new and brilliant, again, my thanks.

Ted,

The reduction of distance is due to the fact that a lepton in circular orbit around a hydrogen nucleus occupies quantized energy levels. The quantized angular momentum nhbar=mvr. So if the mass goes up 207 times, the radius decreases 207 times for the muon to occupy the lowest quantized energy level.

Jim

Edited November 28, 2010 by James Heaps-Nelson

[kiaer.ts]

There are several problems and assumptions for using it in a physics context for subatomic particles. I will list only a few to avoid being tedious:

1. You are assuming that a particle is an entity that is "separable" causally from the space surrounding it.

2. The term particle connotes things which import a Newtonian context such as fixed mass, energy etc. or even a fixed character as a certain kind of particle. Probably the term energy resonance is better for subatomic "particles". What happens when physicists add energy to a particle in a particle accelerator is that it becomes a very different "entity".

These are possible but not necessary misconceptions, and I see no hint of them in what Dennis wrote above. Indeed, Rand dealt with such mistakes in her treatment of the Frozen Concept. Entity doesn't mean unchangeable existent. The hylomorphic Objectivist metaphysics deals with such change. An acorn is no less an entity because it changes into an oak. If it is the nature of a particle to decay by emitting photon and other particles, then that is its nature as an entity.

Ted, sure. I don't see any problem with quantum behavior or other unpredictable phenomena with regard to Rand's identity-based metaphysics. What is a problem is when certain a priori preconceptions of what an entity can or cannot be or can or cannot do are made without making observations.

Take the example of what happens in muon catalyzed nuclear fusion. One method of getting two heavy hydrogen atoms to fuse is to chemically bond them with a muon which has a much bigger rest mass than an electron. Now the interesting part is that without quantum behavior, the two hydrogen atoms would be too far away from each other to fuse via the strong nuclear force, but they do anyway because of quantum tunneling.

Thanks, Jim. Can you explain, wikipedia says that the mass of the Muon is 207 that of the electron, and that it draws the two atoms 207 times closer. Do they simply mean that the gravitic attraction due to the muon is 207 times greater than that of an electron, small but less than the mass of the nucleus? Or are the actually saying that the distance between the nuclei is reduced to 1/207 of the former distance? If so, in relation to what charges at what powers? Fascinating in any sense. It is something new and brilliant, again, my thanks.

Ted,

The reduction of distance is due to the fact that a lepton in circular orbit around a hydrogen nucleus occupies quantized energy levels. The quantized angular momentum nhbar=mvr. So if the mass goes up 207 times, the radius decreases 207 times for the muon to occupy the lowest quantized energy level.

Jim

Understood. Thanks.

[James Heaps-Nelson]

There are several problems and assumptions for using it in a physics context for subatomic particles. I will list only a few to avoid being tedious:

1. You are assuming that a particle is an entity that is "separable" causally from the space surrounding it.

2. The term particle connotes things which import a Newtonian context such as fixed mass, energy etc. or even a fixed character as a certain kind of particle. Probably the term energy resonance is better for subatomic "particles". What happens when physicists add energy to a particle in a particle accelerator is that it becomes a very different "entity".

These are possible but not necessary misconceptions, and I see no hint of them in what Dennis wrote above. Indeed, Rand dealt with such mistakes in her treatment of the Frozen Concept. Entity doesn't mean unchangeable existent. The hylomorphic Objectivist metaphysics deals with such change. An acorn is no less an entity because it changes into an oak. If it is the nature of a particle to decay by emitting photon and other particles, then that is its nature as an entity.

Ted, sure. I don't see any problem with quantum behavior or other unpredictable phenomena with regard to Rand's identity-based metaphysics. What is a problem is when certain a priori preconceptions of what an entity can or cannot be or can or cannot do are made without making observations.

Take the example of what happens in muon catalyzed nuclear fusion. One method of getting two heavy hydrogen atoms to fuse is to chemically bond them with a muon which has a much bigger rest mass than an electron. Now the interesting part is that without quantum behavior, the two hydrogen atoms would be too far away from each other to fuse via the strong nuclear force, but they do anyway because of quantum tunneling.

Thanks, Jim. Can you explain, wikipedia says that the mass of the Muon is 207 that of the electron, and that it draws the two atoms 207 times closer. Do they simply mean that the gravitic attraction due to the muon is 207 times greater than that of an electron, small but less than the mass of the nucleus? Or are the actually saying that the distance between the nuclei is reduced to 1/207 of the former distance? If so, in relation to what charges at what powers? Fascinating in any sense. It is something new and brilliant, again, my thanks.

Ted,

The reduction of distance is due to the fact that a lepton in circular orbit around a hydrogen nucleus occupies quantized energy levels. The quantized angular momentum nhbar=mvr. So if the mass goes up 207 times, the radius decreases 207 times for the muon to occupy the lowest quantized energy level.

Jim

Understood. Thanks.

Thank you for your interest in the topic! My interest in high energy and particle physics goes back to when I was a kid. I had an uncle who worked at Fermilab and SLAC. The heyday for particle physics was in the 1970's and 1980's, Hopefully some discoveries about the strong force will come out of CERN. Approx. 1% of the world's stored computer data will now come from the LHC experiments.

Jim

Edited November 29, 2010 by James Heaps-Nelson

[Robert Campbell]

I just point out that the field concept is the second most important idea in physics. The first most important idea is that everything material is made of atoms*. I can see that the book will be not only interesting for what it said, but for what it did not say. Omissions count nearly as much as commissions.

* Feynman: Lectures on Physics Vol 1.

Bob K,

That's why I thought it was significant that Harriman mentioned Faraday, but not fields.

Meanwhile, Harriman wants to rule out both ancient atomism and Descartes' variety of atomism as products of unfounded speculation. He doesn't mention anything that Newton had to say about "corpuscles." For Harriman, atomism wasn't OK until Dalton came along.

Robert C

[bmacwilliam]

This epistemological limit due to the bluntness of our instruments does not amount to a metaphysical claim about the entities at that level.

If you look at the equations, I believe this statement is wrong. The equations have nothing to do with instruments. If the equations are a correct model, the more precise you know momentum, the more imprecise position MUST be. One interpretation of this is that there is an epistimelogical wall here, not a measurement one. I believe that this interpretation is yet to be discounted.

Bob

[George H. Smith]

The problem here, as with all formal logic, is that the validity of the reasoning does not establish the truth of the premises. So how do we know that "If P, then Q" is true to begin with? Inductive reasoning plays a major role here. Even if we verify "If P, then Q" via experiments, the assumption that the same experiments now will yield the same results as experiments in the future is based on inductive reasoning.

Ghs

Which is why we have the notion of soundness. A sound argument is one

1. which is valid

and

2. with true premises.

Which corresponds to the two parts of Modus Ponens.

1. The implication p -> q

2 The premise p asserted as true

yielding

the conclusion q which may be asserted as true.

This doesn't solve anything. The problem, to repeat, is this. How do we justify the truth of the proposition "If P, then Q"? In symbolic (propositional) logic, this means that the antecedent (P) cannot be true without the consequent (Q) also being true. In other words, in all cases where P is true, Q is also true.

This is a universal claim, so when dealing with the empirical claims of science, including physics, we must have a method of justifying the truth of universal empirical propositions. And this is simply impossible without inductive reasoning. Hence if, as you stated previously, induction is an invalid mode of inference, then the modus ponens form of reasoning cannot get off the ground. The formal reasoning is valid, but the empirical truth of the premise, according to your dismissal of induction, rests on an invalid mode of inference and so can never be accepted as trustworthy.

And yes, we must assume uniformity of physical law as a condition for doing science. There is no guarantee that the universe works the same both Here and There and both Now and Later but without that assumption we may as well go home and play scrabble. That does not make Uniformity true, but it is a necessary assumption to carry out science. If perchance we ever travel to a part of the Cosmos where our supposed physical laws break down we will have to find a more abstract context in which to formulate physical laws so that our current physical laws can function as heuristics. Sort of like Newton's Law of Gravitation which is NOT generally true, but it works often enough that we can plan our journeys to the outer solar system based on it. It is close enough to right so we can fiddle in some mid course corrections and make use of it. If we cannot have uniformity in fact, we can force it as a way of saving the appearances.

The "uniformity of nature" is simply another formulation of causal uniformity, and causal uniformity is the bedrock of inductive reasoning. Thus you are saying, in effect, that although we cannot guarantee the validity of inductive reasoning, it is a necessary assumption to carry out science. This was also the position of J.S. Mill, among others.

I don't agree that inductive reasoning and the causal regularity on which it depends are merely assumptions -- they have a much stronger foundation that this -- but I do agree with your statement, when adapted to induction, that inductive inference is close enough to being right that we can "fiddle in some mid course corrections and make use of it." Such is the nature of human fallibility.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

This epistemological limit due to the bluntness of our instruments does not amount to a metaphysical claim about the entities at that level.

If you look at the equations, I believe this statement is wrong. The equations have nothing to do with instruments. If the equations are a correct model, the more precise you know momentum, the more imprecise position MUST be. One interpretation of this is that there is an epistemological wall here, not a measurement one. I believe that this interpretation is yet to be discounted.

Bob

The proper way of stating the problem is this: The more precisely we know momentum, the less precise our knowledge of position must be. This follows from the disturbing effects of photons used in the process of measurement. But this problem entails no metaphysical conclusions. This, as I understand it, is Ted's point.

Ghs

[kiaer.ts]

This epistemological limit due to the bluntness of our instruments does not amount to a metaphysical claim about the entities at that level.

If you look at the equations, I believe this statement is wrong. The equations have nothing to do with instruments. If the equations are a correct model, the more precise you know momentum, the more imprecise position MUST be. One interpretation of this is that there is an epistemological wall here, not a measurement one. I believe that this interpretation is yet to be discounted.

Bob

The proper way of stating the problem is this: The more precisely we know momentum, the less precise our knowledge of position must be. This follows from the disturbing effects of photons used in the process of measurement. But this problem entails no metaphysical conclusions. This, as I understand it, is Ted's point.

Ghs

Yes, George.

The statement that the equations have nothing to do with instruments drops the context of the fact that force has no meaning without reactive mass. There is no such thing as momentum by itself, a noumenal momentum that never effects any real body.

[bmacwilliam]

This epistemological limit due to the bluntness of our instruments does not amount to a metaphysical claim about the entities at that level.

If you look at the equations, I believe this statement is wrong. The equations have nothing to do with instruments. If the equations are a correct model, the more precise you know momentum, the more imprecise position MUST be. One interpretation of this is that there is an epistemological wall here, not a measurement one. I believe that this interpretation is yet to be discounted.

Bob

The proper way of stating the problem is this: The more precisely we know momentum, the less precise our knowledge of position must be. This follows from the disturbing effects of photons used in the process of measurement. But this problem entails no metaphysical conclusions. This, as I understand it, is Ted's point.

Ghs

Ted's point was also the "bluntness of the instrument" assertion that I don't think is correct. I seems you agree with this with your use of the word "must" above.

As far as metaphysical conclusions, IIRC many have drawn conclusions - even Heisenberg himself I think, but correctly or not I don't know.

Metaphysical or not, I think the "bluntness" oversimplification doesn't do justice to the mathematical description. It is not a problem of precision (at least according to the equation).

Bob

Edited November 29, 2010 by Bob_Mac

[kiaer.ts]

This epistemological limit due to the bluntness of our instruments does not amount to a metaphysical claim about the entities at that level.

If you look at the equations, I believe this statement is wrong. The equations have nothing to do with instruments. If the equations are a correct model, the more precise you know momentum, the more imprecise position MUST be. One interpretation of this is that there is an epistemological wall here, not a measurement one. I believe that this interpretation is yet to be discounted.

Bob

The proper way of stating the problem is this: The more precisely we know momentum, the less precise our knowledge of position must be. This follows from the disturbing effects of photons used in the process of measurement. But this problem entails no metaphysical conclusions. This, as I understand it, is Ted's point.

Ghs

Ted's point was also the "bluntness of the instrument" assertion that I don't think is correct. I seems you agree with this with your use of the word "must" above.

As far as metaphysical conclusions, IIRC many have drawn conclusions - even Heisenberg himself I think, but correctly or not I don't know.

Metaphysical or not, I think the "bluntness" oversimplification doesn't do justice to the mathematical description. It is not a problem of precision (at least according to the equation).

Bob

Let me know when you get some values to plug into your equations that have not been determined by interaction with an outside force.

[bmacwilliam]

This epistemological limit due to the bluntness of our instruments does not amount to a metaphysical claim about the entities at that level.

If you look at the equations, I believe this statement is wrong. The equations have nothing to do with instruments. If the equations are a correct model, the more precise you know momentum, the more imprecise position MUST be. One interpretation of this is that there is an epistemological wall here, not a measurement one. I believe that this interpretation is yet to be discounted.

Bob

The proper way of stating the problem is this: The more precisely we know momentum, the less precise our knowledge of position must be. This follows from the disturbing effects of photons used in the process of measurement. But this problem entails no metaphysical conclusions. This, as I understand it, is Ted's point.

Ghs

Ted's point was also the "bluntness of the instrument" assertion that I don't think is correct. I seems you agree with this with your use of the word "must" above.

As far as metaphysical conclusions, IIRC many have drawn conclusions - even Heisenberg himself I think, but correctly or not I don't know.

Metaphysical or not, I think the "bluntness" oversimplification doesn't do justice to the mathematical description. It is not a problem of precision (at least according to the equation).

Bob

Let me know when you get some values to plug into your equations that have not been determined by interaction with an outside force.

Doesn't make sense.

Dp * Dq > h / 4(pi)

"Uncertainty" is perhaps not the best word. "Indeterminate" is perhaps better. The equation expresses a fundamental or at least mathematical "uncertainty" not a measurement problem. There's a difference, a big one... a philosophical one.

p = momentum

q = position

[Xray]

What precisely do you mean by "I do literal reading"? I suppose when you read e. g. the sentence "That's a pretty kettle of fish", you will know that it is not about actual fish but about something else, so you would not be doing literal reading.

There is where you are wrong.

My first inclination is to seek the kettle of fish in the context. Failing to find it, I will conclude that the phrase in the sentence was idiomatic and I will search my mental idiom data base for a probable meaning.

So you have to search through your mental files where idioms are stored? For example, when you come across the phrase "dead as a doornail", you reason "doornails can't be dead, so this must be an idiom"?

My inclination is to be literal in my reading and over the years it has also become my preference. When I do use puns in my speech and writing I often mark them carefully as puns so no one else will be confused.

It is generally good advice to mark one's puns in some way. And as a non-native speaker, one has to be especially careful when trying to make puns; I speak from experience here ...

If the context of the sentence contains fish or kettles thereof how should I have read the sentence?

How would you read it?

Suppose I were invited to a party where a real fish soup was served in a real kettle, and the host says, "That's a pretty kettle of fish!" I would interpret it as a pun where the joke lies in reality accidentally matching the figurative picture used in an idiom.

Often, in such jokes, phrases like "in the literal sense", "literally", or "in the true sense of the word" are added by the speaker.

My literalness, at times, causes social awkwardness (for me). So when I am among people who I care for I have to consciously suppress my literalness. That is one of the prices I pay for getting along with the NTs.

What does "NT" stand for?

Edited December 4, 2010 by Xray

[BaalChatzaf]

What does "NT" stand for?

Neurotypical. One who is not fortunate enough to be a high functioning autistic person.

I have the good fortune to have Asperger's Syndrome.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Xray]

I think even Objectivists will miss DF's outstanding contributions to this forum.

Absolutely. I miss DF's secret credentials, his incessant appeals to authority in matters of philosophy, and his contempt for everything having to do with Objectivism. What shall we do without him?

If you want to check if what DF wrote about physics is correct or not, feel free to submit his posts to an expert in the field.

As for "credentials", on a forum of this type, you earn these if what you say stands up to scrutiny. Simple as that.

DF addressed this point here:

Would my argument be less valid when I just turned out to be a truck driver? My arguments stand on their own, I never used the argument that I am an authority in the field, in contrast to some other people on this list.

And as for DF's alleged appeals to authority to in matters of philosophy, I got exactly the opposite impression. He even quoted Mencken's unflattering remarks about this group:

Philosophy consists very largely of one philosopher arguing that all others are jackasses. He usually proves it, and I should add that he also usually proves that he is one himself.

Regarding DF's "contempt for everything having to with Objectivism", I inferred from his stating that he read Atlas Shrugged many times, that he may once have been an Objectivist (or influenced by Objectivsm), perhaps as a young person. (Frankly, I find it difficult to imagine that anyone would become an Objectivist at a more advanced age. But as always, I'll stand corrected should any of my speculations turn out to be wrong).

And I'm certainly not telling you anything new in pointing out that ex-adherents to a philosophy/belief/ideology often see its flaws very clearly.

A few days ago, when browsing the net searching for your article "Objectivism as a Religion", I came across a book review by Mimi Gladstein where she quotes you stating that you "experienced an abrupt deconversion from orthodox Randianism", but credit Rand with the important contribution of convincing you and countless other young people, that ideas matter.

http://books.google.com/books?id=zwWNNobLD5oC&pg=PA105&lpg=PA105&dq=Gerge+H.+Smith+,+objectivism+as+a++religion+gladstein&source=bl&ots=h4Fta6P5Ph&sig=aIXieJbw0fR8oyLmOA5PlJ8Watc&hl=de&ei=2GH6TJb7M4GRswbW0fTYAw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&sqi=2&ved=0CBgQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

It would really interest me if there are any people here who became Objectivists later in life.

Edited December 4, 2010 by Xray

[George H. Smith]

If you want to check if what DF wrote about physics is correct or not, feel free to submit his posts to an expert in the field.

I forwarded a number of DF's posts to an old friend of mine -- a non-Objectivist professor of physics (who also has a doctorate in applied mathematics). He described a number of DF's remarks as "bluff and bluster," and in one case as "bullshit." This is what originally got me thinking that DF might be a fake, and why I wanted to know his credentials.

Ghs

[syrakusos]

I added my review of The Logical Leap to my website.

[BaalChatzaf]

I added my review of The Logical Leap to my website.

That was a very good review.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Roger Bissell]

I added my review of The Logical Leap to my website.

Good job, Michael.

For me, the crucial point in the whole review was contained in the final paragraph, where you wrote:

"Therefore, contractions do not exist."

You see, if you had instead written, "Therefore, contractions don't exist," you would have completely blown it.

Granted, you would be thrown out of Lamaze class in ~either~ case, for saying such a thing, but you're into aviation, not obstetrics.

So, again, nice review, and a classic dismount. :-)

REB

[syrakusos]

"Therefore, contractions do not exist."

You had me laughing... I just fixed it. Can't proofread your own stuff.

Thanks, Roger. I appreciate your taking the time both to read it and to point out the gaffe. I am still laughing.

Mike M.