The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics

[George H. Smith]

I have never heard of a study that enables us experience the subjective psychological and cognitive processes of other people. In the final analysis, every theory of knowledge and concept formation will depend a great deal on introspection.

George,

I know of neither a study nor a theory, no matter how good each of them might be, that would enable us to experience other people's conscious mental processes.

How does it follow that a theory of concept formation must rely on introspection?

If we didn't already have some notion of what concepts (or abstractions) are before undertaking a "psychological study," we wouldn't even know what to look for. Indeed, we wouldn't even know what it means to speak of a psychological study in the first place. Our observation of external behavior must be linked in some fashion to subjective psychological states and activities, and the only direct knowledge we have of such experiences is our own.

Would you argue that because no experiment on remembering or theory of memory will enable us to partake directly of the experiences that other people have when they remember, therefore our theories of memory must rely on our introspection?

First, I didn't say that all empirical studies are irrelevant to our understanding of concept formation. I said that "every theory of knowledge and concept formation will depend a great deal on introspection."

Second, if you didn't already know what memory is, based on your own subjective experiences, experiments or theories pertaining to memory would mean absolutely nothing to you. Empirical studies of concept formation, memory, and the like may enhance our understanding of psychological activities, but our primary knowledge of those activities is, and must be, based on introspection.

Ghs

[Neil Parille]

George,

I think one could observe toddlers as they learn concepts and also ask them questions. Perhaps one could show that they learn causality in the way Harriman says.

I can't introspect about how I formed the concept table or anything else when I was young. I can introspect about how I form concepts now, but I don't think I can conclude that this is how my mind worked when I was young.

I suspect that Rand's two objects plus a foil approach in ITO is probably not correct. Her theory of concept formation implies that you can't conceptualize a single existent, which isn't true. Do you need to observe two planetary systems to form the concept? If so we didn't understand what the solar system was until we observed similar systems.

-Neil Parille

Edited July 11, 2010 by Neil Parille

[Brant Gaede]

George,

I think one could observe toddlers as they learn concepts and also ask them questions. Perhaps one could show that they learn causality in the way Harriman says.

I can't introspect about how I formed the concept table or anything else when I was young. I can introspect about how I form concepts now, but I don't think I can conclude that this is how my mind worked when I was young.

I suspect that Rand's two objects plus a foil approach in ITO is probably not correct. Her theory of concept formation implies that you can't conceptualize a single existent, which isn't true. Do you need to observe two planetary systems to form the concept? If so we didn't understand what the solar system was until we observed similar systems.

-Neil Parille

How is a planetary system "a single existent"?

--Brant

could be, I suppose

[merjet]

I suspect that Rand's two objects plus a foil approach in ITO is probably not correct. Her theory of concept formation implies that you can't conceptualize a single existent, which isn't true. Do you need to observe two planetary systems to form the concept? If so we didn't understand what the solar system was until we observed similar systems.

I disagree with the second sentence. The main topic of ITOE is the so-called "problem of universals." The basic question of it is: what justifies using the same term/idea to refer to multiple existents? For reasons not wholly clear to me Rand chose to often use the term "theory of concepts" instead. I see nothing in ITOE to bar one from having an idea about a single and unique existent.

[BaalChatzaf]

Harriman's lecture on the philosophical corruption of physics is available free here:

http://www.aynrand.o...=reg_ls_physics

I just noticed that the new Harriman book is available from Audible.com. But new recordings of Woody Allen's short story collections are coming out 7/20/10, read by the author, there's even a free sample available. The Whore of Mensa is one of my all time favorite short stories, but I haven't looked at these books in a long time. So I'm saving my credits, thus far, from what RC has written, the Harriman book doesn't look good.

y

He placed his essay in system (namely a page on display on a computer system accessed and maintained in a transistor based electronic computer network) said system being the product of corrupt and philosophically defective physics (to wit; quantum electro-dynamics). No doubt he used a computer based word processor to compose it. One may ask what physics or new basic technology has been produced by Objectivists lately.

The test of any scientific theory of system of thinking is empirical evidence and corroberation, lack of empirical falsification and the products of the system, to wit, the technology it produces. Physics has some problems at the outer fringes (dark matter, dark energy) and a disconnect to between gravitation and the other physical interaction (no unified theory of all the know interactions, particularly gravitation and the other "forces"). But at the core it is sound and applied physics has never been healthier. New technologies flow out all the time.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[BaalChatzaf]

I suspect that Rand's two objects plus a foil approach in ITO is probably not correct. Her theory of concept formation implies that you can't conceptualize a single existent, which isn't true. Do you need to observe two planetary systems to form the concept? If so we didn't understand what the solar system was until we observed similar systems.

The interactions that make the solar system what it is was learned from watching bodies fall in a gravitational field. Gravity is learned early by toddlers. Count the skinned knees.

[Neil Parille]

Brant and Merlin,

When I get a chance I'll search for the reference in ITOE appendix where Rand says the concept of "God" is meaningless because, since there is only one God, you can't form a concept of it (or words to that effect).

-Neil Parille

[Brant Gaede]

Brant and Merlin,

When I get a chance I'll search for the reference in ITOE appendix where Rand says the concept of "God" is meaningless because, since there is only one God, you can't form a concept of it (or words to that effect).

-Neil Parille

There are many gods.

--Brant

[merjet]

When I get a chance I'll search for the reference in ITOE appendix where Rand says the concept of "God" is meaningless because, since there is only one God, you can't form a concept of it (or words to that effect).

I did it for you.

Prof. D: Yes. And what common features of particulars are retained in order to get the concept "God"—

AR: I would have to refer you to a brief passage about invalid concepts [page 49]. This is precisely one, if not the essential one, of the epistemological objections to the concept "God." It is not a concept. At best, one could say it is a concept in the sense in which a dramatist uses concepts to create a character. It is an isolation of actual characteristics of man combined with the projection of impossible, irrational characteristics which do not arise from reality—such as omnipotence and omniscience.

Besides, God isn't even supposed to be a concept: he is sui generis, so that nothing relevant to man or the rest of nature is supposed, by the proponents of that viewpoint, to apply to God. A concept has to involve two or more similar concretes, and there is nothing like God. He is supposed to be unique. Therefore, by their own terms of setting up the problem, they have taken God out of the conceptual realm. And quite properly, because he is out of reality.

1. Rand says the concept of God is meaningless because it is the projection of impossible characteristics.

2. She said it is an invalid concept, not that it is entirely improper to call it a concept.

3. The appendix is the record of an extemporaneous dialog. Undoubtedly she said things which she would have said differently or edited given the chance. I believe that holds for "A concept has to involve two or more similar concretes, and there is nothing like God." The first part is true for a universal or general term, but not for every concept or idea.

4. You cite no evidence from the body of ITOE, where it would carry far more weight.

5. I submit that she would not have said a person could not have a concept of actual singular and unique things.

[Neil Parille]

Merlin,

A concept has to involve two or more similar concretes, and there is nothing like God. He is supposed to be unique. Therefore, by their own terms of setting up the problem, they have taken God out of the conceptual realm. And quite properly, because he is out of reality.

And:

A concept is a mental integration of two or more units . . . (ITOE, p. 10)

I don't see what is unclear here.

-Neil Parille

Edited July 12, 2010 by Neil Parille

[Robert Campbell]

Neil,

Rand could have gotten from her attempted definition of a concept (I say "attempted" because it doesn't have a real genus, and Rand's approach to definitions requires it to have one) to the remarks in the appendix about "God" not qualifying as a concept because it has one entirely unique instance.

She could have...

Whether she actually did is a judgment I'll reserve till I hear the recording of the relevant workshop session. Both errors of transcription and deliberate rewriting are distinct possibilities with this material.

Robert Campbell

[James Heaps-Nelson]

Neil,

Rand could have gotten from her attempted definition of a concept (I say "attempted" because it doesn't have a real genus, and Rand's approach to definitions requires it to have one) to the remarks in the appendix about "God" not qualifying as a concept because it has one entirely unique instance.

She could have...

Whether she actually did is a judgment I'll reserve till I hear the recording of the relevant workshop session. Both errors of transcription and deliberate rewriting are distinct possibilities with this material.

Robert Campbell

I have to laugh. This is the long term effect of the "sanitization" policies that ARI has engaged in. It erodes credibility. The same applies to publishing a book on physics from a philosophically correct point of view. The problem is that you become biased toward what you are trying to prove. There is a lot to criticize in modern physics, superstring theories with dimensions that can't be verified with experiment to name one. However, when you have a theory that is repeatable, predictive, generalizable and accounts for the available experimental evidence, scientists will give it credence and there is nothing corrupt about that.

Jim

[Xray]

Rand also believed that love can be 'measured'; she seemed to think that terms like 'affection', 'tenderness' etc. had comparable objective quality as degrees have on a measuring scale.

Wrong. Rand specifically states that she is talking about ordinal, not cardinal, measurement. In this case, ordinal measurement is a matter of intensity, of more or less. (See ITOE, pp. 33-34.)

Ghs

Doesn't make much difference if it was to measure intensity. For one could also say e. g. for a temperature measuring scale that the higher the degrees, the more intense is the warmth.

Ordinal numbers applied don't necessarily indicate degrees of 'intensity'. The first, second, third car standing behind at at traffic light - intensity plays no role here.

But let's go along, for discussion's sake, with Rand ordinal number system by which she thinks love can be measured.

Now one would think she starts with "like" as the first and "love" as the last, most intense term.

But this is not the case. Instead she takes love as the basic "concept" and then creates sub-categories ranging from like to the "highest level" "romantic love".

But this categorization is completely arbitrary. One could as well regard "like" as the basic concept and make "love" a subcategory.

Also, the basic concept love shows up again as subcategory with the modifier romantic: "romantic love", whatever she connotes by that.

So per Rand, we get the basic concept "LOVE" divided in subcategories

"liking"

"affection" (per Rand, "applicable only in regard to persons"

- does she think one can't have affection for animals?)

"romantic love" (highest level)

As mentioned above: to make "liking" a subcategory of "LOVE" is arbitary as well.

She calls this measuring in ordinal numbers "teological measurement" - what telos is to be achieved?

Does Rand believe that the use of language constitues any "objective" measuring tool when it comes to intensity? These terms exist to describe certain feelings, sure, but that's about it. How easily such allegedly "objective" (but actually purely personal) scales will collapse is demonstrated when e. g. one imagines a mystic placing "love of god" as the highest in intensity from his/her perspective.

And some languages may not even have an extra term for "love".

As she proceeds, Rand suddenly leaps from epistemology to morality: ITOE, p. 34

"If one wants to measure the intensity of a particular instance of love, one does so by reference to the hierarchy of values of the person experiencing it. A man may love a woman, yet may rate the neurotic satisfaction of sexual promiscuity higher than her value to him." (Rand)

Maybe the "highest level" on this man's scale is "loving many women" (Casanova-type)?

"Another man may love a woman, but may give her up, rating his fear of the disapproval of others of his family, his friends or any random strangers) higher than her value. Still another man may risk is life to save the woman he loves, because all his other values would lose meaning without her. The emotions of these examples are not the emotions of the same intensity or dimension. Do not let a James Taggart type of mystic tell you that love is immeasurable." (Rand)

James Taggart a "mystic"??

If memory serves, NB said somewhere that Rand knew very little about mysticism.

Edited July 12, 2010 by Xray

[Xray]

When I get a chance I'll search for the reference in ITOE appendix where Rand says the concept of "God" is meaningless because, since there is only one God, you can't form a concept of it (or words to that effect).

I did it for you.

Prof. D: Yes. And what common features of particulars are retained in order to get the concept "God"—

AR: I would have to refer you to a brief passage about invalid concepts [page 49]. This is precisely one, if not the essential one, of the epistemological objections to the concept "God." It is not a concept. At best, one could say it is a concept in the sense in which a dramatist uses concepts to create a character. It is an isolation of actual characteristics of man combined with the projection of impossible, irrational characteristics which do not arise from reality—such as omnipotence and omniscience.

Besides, God isn't even supposed to be a concept: he is sui generis, so that nothing relevant to man or the rest of nature is supposed, by the proponents of that viewpoint, to apply to God. A concept has to involve two or more similar concretes, and there is nothing like God. He is supposed to be unique. Therefore, by their own terms of setting up the problem, they have taken God out of the conceptual realm. And quite properly, because he is out of reality.

1. Rand says the concept of God is meaningless because it is the projection of impossible characteristics.

2. She said it is an invalid concept, not that it is entirely improper to call it a concept.

3. The appendix is the record of an extemporaneous dialog. Undoubtedly she said things which she would have said differently or edited given the chance. I believe that holds for "A concept has to involve two or more similar concretes, and there is nothing like God." The first part is true for a universal or general term, but not for every concept or idea.

4. You cite no evidence from the body of ITOE, where it would carry far more weight.

5. I submit that she would not have said a person could not have a concept of actual singular and unique things.

Merlin,

A concept has to involve two or more similar concretes, and there is nothing like God. He is supposed to be unique. Therefore, by their own terms of setting up the problem, they have taken God out of the conceptual realm. And quite properly, because he is out of reality.

And:

A concept is a mental integration of two or more units . . . (ITOE, p. 10)

I don't see what is unclear here.

-Neil Parille

"God" is of course, a concept. But like so often, Rand the moralist makes the mistake of letting her morality influence her epistemology, and the result is the creation of terms like "invalid" concept.

A concept is a "conceived idea of" and god is the audiovisual symbol used in the English language to refer to the idea of a supernatural being. Whether this being exists or not is irrelevant in that context.

Therefore a person's belief in the nonexistence of such being doesn't make it "invalid" as a concept. This would be the same as arguing that the concept "fairy tale character" is invalid because Rumpelstilzkin and Cinderella don't exist.

"It is not a concept. At best, one could say it is a concept in the sense in which a dramatist uses concepts to create a character. It is an isolation of actual characteristics of man combined with the projection of impossible, irrational characteristics which do not arise from reality—such as omnipotence and omniscience." (Rand)

That precisely IS the concept of god.

As for god supposed to be unique - has Rand forgotten that polytheistic concepts exist as well?

A concept has to involve two or more similar concretes, and there is nothing like God. He is supposed to be unique. Therefore, by their own terms of setting up the problem, they have taken God out of the conceptual realm. And quite properly, because he is out of reality.

Who says that a concept has to involve two or more similar concretes? Who is "they"?

What may work on a simple level with objects like "table" and "fork" may prove insufficient when more complex language issues are concerned.

Let's put the claim "that a concept has to involve two or more similar concretes" to the test: What are the two or more concretes of e. g. the concept "pride"?

Edited July 12, 2010 by Xray

[merjet]

"God" is of course, a concept.

Agreed. The word "god" on the other hand is a universal. There were Roman gods, Greek gods, etc.

Who says that a concept has to involve two or more similar concretes? Who is "they"?

A universal, a subset of concepts or ideas, does designate two or more things with something in common. The "problem of universals" is a long-standing topic in philosophy and the main topic of ITOE.

Let's put the claim "that a concept has to involve two or more similar concretes" to the test: What are the two or more concretes of e. g. the concept "pride"?

Easy. Somebody on a safari says: "There is another pride of lions. It isn't the same pride we saw a while ago."

[merjet]

Rand also believed that love can be 'measured'; she seemed to think that terms like 'affection', 'tenderness' etc. had comparable objective quality as degrees have on a measuring scale.

Wrong. Rand specifically states that she is talking about ordinal, not cardinal, measurement. In this case, ordinal measurement is a matter of intensity, of more or less. (See ITOE, pp. 33-34.)

Ghs

It don't believe Rand thought love could be measured as objectively as temperature, length, velocity, etc. On the other hand, I hold that ordinal measurement and teleological measurement are oxymorons. They are ways of quantifying, but not measuring. They lack a uniform and additive unit akin to inch, degrees Celsius, kilogram, etc. I give a more thorough explanation here.

[Neil Parille]

NB told me that Rand didn't know anything about religion or mysticism (I don't remember which).

I don't think Rand knew anything about either. She didn't like religion so she took what she thought were its central ideas and projected in on anything she didn't like. So anyone she disagreed with was a mystic or semi-religious.

-Neil Parille

[Brant Gaede]

NB told me that Rand didn't know anything about religion or mysticism (I don't remember which).

I don't think Rand knew anything about either. She didn't like religion so she took what she thought were its central ideas and projected in on anything she didn't like. So anyone she disagreed with was a mystic or semi-religious.

-Neil Parille

Mysticism is what he'd been saying to people generally. I don't recall any comments from him about Rand's ignorance of religion.

--Brant

[Neil Parille]

Brant,

I don't know for sure what NB's view of this is, but did Rand know much about religion?

Did she read Calvin's Institutes for example, which is the Protestant version of the Summa?

-Neil Parille

[9thdoctor]

I don't know for sure what NB's view of this is, but did Rand know much about religion?

She was exposed to Judaism and Russian Orthodox religion in her youth. I don’t recall if it was Heller or Sciabarra (both I think) who detailed the extent of the exposure she had to the latter in her schooling, but she reportedly was able to recite material (catechisms?) from memory later in life. Lossky was Russian Orthodox.

[Philip Coates]

More Bullshit: Rand as Ignoramus

> NB told me that Rand didn't know anything about religion or mysticism

Really?? Not anything? Nothing at all?

All you have to do is *read her* and you'll see she had lots of good insights about both, about the consequences, about what makes people adopt them, about the psychological damage that might result, about the differences in several instances, about contrasts between Augustine and Aquinas, analyses of various papal encyclicals, about the logic of the concept of God and of believing in a higher power, the contradictions of an omnipotent and omniscient and benevolent being allowing and fostering massive evil...

...and that's just off the top of my head!!!!!!!!

That's a howler, right up there with the one that she didn't know history, didn't read much, never read any philosophy, never understood psychology...only got the preceding two spoonfed her by NB and Leonard Peikoff, etc.

Oh, I forgot: Never read any literature. Didn't understand poetry. Didn't follow the news. Didn't know anything about science.

Yada, yada...

Hmmm... Sounds like someone still angry at her after all these years and who wants to cut her down to size???

If the sexes were reversed, I have to say penis envy.

Edited July 13, 2010 by Philip Coates

[Brant Gaede]

NB has said many times that Ayn Rand knew very little about mysticism. According to Phil, this is "bullshit."

NB has also said that Rand knew much more about philosophy than she wrote down and published. Is this also "bullshit"?

--Brant

get a grip

[Brant Gaede]

Brant,

I don't know for sure what NB's view of this is, but did Rand know much about religion?

Did she read Calvin's Institutes for example, which is the Protestant version of the Summa?

-Neil Parille

I have no idears.

--Brant

[Neil Parille]

Phil,

I never said Rand was an ignoramus. At one time she may have known a lot about philosophy and a little bit about religion, but I get the impression that by the time the 50s rolled around (or maybe later) she lost interest in these topics. Have you read her marginalia? They are comments on largely forgotten books and Rand's comments are more to make a point than appreciate the arguments the authors' make.

http://michaelprescott.typepad.com/michael_prescotts_blog/2005/07/the_importance_.html

-Neil Parille

Edited July 13, 2010 by Neil Parille

[James Heaps-Nelson]

Phil,

I never said Rand was an ignoramus. At one time she may have known a lot about philosophy and a little bit about religion, but I get the impression that by the time the 50s that she lost interest in these topics. Have you read her marginalia? They are comments on largely forgotten books and Rand's comments are more to make a point than appreciate the arguments.

http://michaelprescott.typepad.com/michael_prescotts_blog/2005/07/the_importance_.html

-Neil Parille

Neil,

Can we really conclude from Rand's margin notes not meant for publication in some given book she was reading what her considered judgment was of the author or the book beyond an initial gut reaction? Rand was an insightful cultural critic, if not always a nuanced one. That she did not publish something from her journals or her marginalia also says something. It says that she had a thought that she did not consider worthy of publication. Prescott has had a field day with Rand's Journals and other posthumous sources. Why doesn't he get to the meat and consider her published arguments directly or indicate someone whose arguments, in totality, he finds more convincing?

I don't see what is wrong with Rand's contemptuous view of religion and mysticism. She didn't consider them to have truth value. I don't think you need to read every verse of the Bible or the Koran, to take a negative opinion of their truth value. Some people derive benefit from spiritual practices, but that has more to do with a person's inner brain and body states than external reality and is highly personal. Does the fact that Rand didn't find value in it an indication that she didn't understand it or that she rejected it after considering some main contentions of the major religious and mystic systems and found them wanting?

Jim

Edited July 13, 2010 by James Heaps-Nelson