A Critique of Ayn Rand's Contextual Theory of Knowledge

[George H. Smith]

C'mon George. The 'third man in' in a hockey fight according to you, just protecting a weaker teammate doesn't start anything? Wrong, he's the one that 'starts' the brawl, justified or not, and is often punished more harshly than the initial combatants - rightly or wrongly. But nobody would argue he didn't "start" anything.

I suggest we reach a conclusion on your first example before introducing yet another example, especially since your latest one is far more vague and, in addition, is situated within a rule-governed game -- a context that may require a different type of analysis. If we cannot agree on your first example, which has far fewer variables than your second, there is no way we will agree on the second.

The child in the example clearly "started" the fight between he and the running-knife-boy. You could argue that he didn't start the violence, although only a threat existed previously. Knife-boy could change his mind before he got to his target, but he introduced HIMSELF into the situation and started a NEW conflict. He started HIS fight in any sense of "start".

I am not exactly a stranger to the problems that arise from Third Party intervention, having published two major articles on the subject. If you want to see how I would analyze these problems in detail, see the links from a post on the What's Happening thread at: http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8235&view=findpost&p=91973

None of this should be necessary, however. I would not use the expression "start a fight" in a technical philosophical analysis. But we are talking about a young child here, so the term is quite adequate. I don't think a reasonably bright child would have a problem understanding my intended meaning; if he did, it could be explained to him. You are teaching the kid basic moral principles, after all, not how to engage in a complex philosophical analysis.

"Taking what does not belong to you is stealing."

Okay, since you are fond of examples, here are a couple for you.

1)Suppose a thug shoots you with his gun, and you later have the bullet removed. Are you "stealing" the bullet if you don't make an effort to return it to the thug? It is his bullet, after all.

2) Before the thug has a chance to shoot you, you manage to wrestle the gun away from him. Have you "stolen" the gun? The gun does not belong to you, after all, and you took it without his permission.

He would be equally be justified in stealing the cleaver from the boy's desk if he suspected possible violence before it started.

Not necessarily.

Even stealing it and taking it home and using it in the kitchen forever while morally wrong, is still morally preferable compared to leaving it there.

Those are not the only two options. The option I mentioned would be morally preferable to both of yours.

So, I'll concede that disarming an opponent is not stealing.

This statement appears to conflict with your previous definition above.

"But I don't think you're implying that there are no examples where flat out stealing is moral?"

Let me put it this way: I can think of extreme situations where respecting the rights of another person might conflict with your own survival. But those emergency situations don't qualify as legitimate exceptions to the general rule.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

The pursuit of truth, taught to a child, is a psychological virtue. The tentativeness of knowledge is a philosophical virtue and comes somewhat later. Mix them up too soon and you could ruin him for life because he needs a good, psychological foundation for everything to come.

--Brant

Suppose you teach a child that it is wrong to steal, or that he shouldn't start fights with other children. Would you also recommend that these be taught as tentative moral principles?

Ghs

I would - absolutely - because they are.

Nope.

--Brant

I can think of a number of situations where stealing from a classmate or starting a fight would be the right thing to do. I think you can too.

Bob

Since you bring it up come with an example or two.

--Brant

Well, fine, I'll give you both principles in one scenario.

My son sees a boy (say with a history of violence for argument's sake) who had a angry outburst just previously with a girl in his class running down the hallway at school with a meat cleaver in his hand yelling "I'm gonna kill that bitch!!". My instructions to my son - hit him in the head as hard as you can with any object you have or your fists (in other words, start a fight - hopefully finish it) and then steal his meat cleaver.

Bob

I'm disappointed with your example as it displays lack of understanding both of rights' political philosophy or even good practical advice.

I was in a bar in Nha Trang, Vietnam in 1966 when a whore got into an argument with an American soldier and the bartender slid a meat cleaver down the bar to the whore who had the sense not to pick it up. The MPs got there soon after and hauled the soldier away. The proper response to a meat cleaver is a gun or run.

--Brant

[tjohnson]

I was in a bar in Nha Trang, Vietnam in 1966 when a whore got into an argument with an American soldier and the bartender slid a meat cleaver down the bar to the whore who had the sense not to pick it up. The MPs got there soon after and hauled the soldier away. The proper response to a meat cleaver is a gun or run.

--Brant

Damn whores!

[bmacwilliam]

The pursuit of truth, taught to a child, is a psychological virtue. The tentativeness of knowledge is a philosophical virtue and comes somewhat later. Mix them up too soon and you could ruin him for life because he needs a good, psychological foundation for everything to come.

--Brant

Suppose you teach a child that it is wrong to steal, or that he shouldn't start fights with other children. Would you also recommend that these be taught as tentative moral principles?

Ghs

I would - absolutely - because they are.

Nope.

--Brant

I can think of a number of situations where stealing from a classmate or starting a fight would be the right thing to do. I think you can too.

Bob

Since you bring it up come with an example or two.

--Brant

Well, fine, I'll give you both principles in one scenario.

My son sees a boy (say with a history of violence for argument's sake) who had a angry outburst just previously with a girl in his class running down the hallway at school with a meat cleaver in his hand yelling "I'm gonna kill that bitch!!". My instructions to my son - hit him in the head as hard as you can with any object you have or your fists (in other words, start a fight - hopefully finish it) and then steal his meat cleaver.

Bob

I'm disappointed with your example as it displays lack of understanding both of rights' political philosophy or even good practical advice.

I was in a bar in Nha Trang, Vietnam in 1966 when a whore got into an argument with an American soldier and the bartender slid a meat cleaver down the bar to the whore who had the sense not to pick it up. The MPs got there soon after and hauled the soldier away. The proper response to a meat cleaver is a gun or run.

--Brant

Poor deflection attempt, very poor. Either there are examples where starting a fight and stealing is morally acceptable or they're are not. You challenged me to provide an example, but you're disappointed that it isn't good enough? I don't buy that for a second. It doesn't matter if it's a meat cleaver, a butter knife, or a toothpick. The point is there are whole classes of scenarios where it's perfectly moral to start a fight, or do you wish to quibble with what "start" means too?

"The proper response to a meat cleaver is a gun or run." Wrong - even if the victim or perpetrator is a "whore".

Bob

[Brant Gaede]

Poor deflection attempt, very poor. Either there are examples where starting a fight and stealing is morally acceptable or they're are not. You challenged me to provide an example, but you're disappointed that it isn't good enough? I don't buy that for a second. It doesn't matter if it's a meat cleaver, a butter knife, or a toothpick. The point is there are whole classes of scenarios where it's perfectly moral to start a fight, or do you wish to quibble with what "start" means too?

"The proper response to a meat cleaver is a gun or run." Wrong - even if the victim or perpetrator is a "whore".

Bob, the guy who started the fight is the guy with the meat cleaver. As for stealing the thing, I'd bet it was already stolen. How many boys do you suppose own meat cleavers?

--Brant

Edited March 5, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[Daniel Barnes]

It is by blending the relativity of justification with the absolutism of truth that we arrive at a true contextual theory of knowledge. Justification without truth leads to a futile relativism, while truth without justification, by equating knowledge with infallibility, leads to a skepticism that is equally futile.

Getting back to epistemology, I agree with this essay almost entirely, in that I don't quite understand the above passage. Are you proposing an alternative "contextual" theory to the Randian one?

The only other thing is that if Randian epistemology is false, (or worse, relativist, or subjectivist), which I think it is, what are the consequences for the rest of her theories, given that they are all supposedly logically interlocking with epistemology as the foundation?

It seems to be then her interlocking theories are either a. false or b. true but have false premises. Neither seems a very acceptable outcome from an Objectivist POV.

Edited March 5, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Robert Campbell]

The only other thing is that if Randian epistemology is false, (or worse, relativist, or subjectivist), which I think it is, what are the consequences for the rest of her theories, given that they are all supposedly logically interlocking with epistemology as the foundation?

It seems to be then her interlocking theories are either a. false or b. true but have false premises. Neither seems a very acceptable outcome from an Objectivist POV.

Dan,

What if the other parts of Rand's system (the minimal post-Aristotelian metaphysics, the ethics, the political theory, and the aesthetics) are not always logically dependent on her epistemology?

This looks unavoidable to me, since (for example) Rand appeals to induction in her ethics, political theory, and aesthetics, but she never finished specifying how induction works.

Robert Campbell

[Daniel Barnes]

Dan,

What if the other parts of Rand's system (the minimal post-Aristotelian metaphysics, the ethics, the political theory, and the aesthetics) are not always logically dependent on her epistemology?

This looks unavoidable to me, since (for example) Rand appeals to induction in her ethics, political theory, and aesthetics, but she never finished specifying how induction works.

Hi Robert

Yeah you could be right. This would be different from how Rand viewed it tho, natch. Two major heresies at least...;-):

1.True epistemology is not necessary to arrive at true ethics, politics, aesthetics etc and 2. Objectivism cannot be logically consistent as a system.

But I guess her theories are either open to such criticism and revision, or they're not.

[Xray]

[All quotes George H. Smith]

Her reason for treating truth and justification as virtually synonymous is a compelling one, namely. that we cannot know what is true except in the context of knowledge that is available to us at any given time. All judgments of truth by which we justify a belief are contextual, so to treat truth as if it were an abstract correspondence between a proposition and a fact, divorced from the particular judgments of concrete individuals, is implicitly to establish omniscience as a standard of human knowledge.

Imo the definition of truth as correspondence betweeen a proposition and a fact of reality is excellent.

For example, the proposition: "There exists a section 'Epistemology' at OL" is true because it corresponds to a fact.

Whereas the proposition "The earth is flat" does not correspond to a fact, ergo is not true. Those who who held it to be true in past ages were in error about a fact.

"Truth is justifed belief", you wrote. I would keep the "belief" part out of it since it is not needed.

For the truth about facts is independent of belief/conjecture/speculation. Either the individual making the proposition is in error about a fact or not.

As for the lie, it is a special case since the person making the proposition is not in error about a fact. He/she knows the fact, wants to keep it hidden and therefore knows his/her proposition does not correspond to a fact, i. e. is not true.

As Peikoff puts it:

“There can be no ‘correspondence’ or ‘recognition’ without the mind that corresponds or recognizes….The true is identified by reference to a body of evidence; it is pronounced ‘true’ because it can be integrated without contradiction into a total context.”

What is pronounced to be true does not make it true. As for the "integrated without contradiction into a total context", the crucial point is always the premise on which the body of evidence is based. For example, in the black comedy classic movie Arsenic and Old Lace, Teddy's psychotic actions were based on the premise of him believing he was Roosevelt. Every action he took was "integrated without contradiction into a total context."

This is the foundation for Rand’s contextual theory of certainty. Human knowledge is necessarily limited, which means that man has “a specific cognitive context” at every stage in the development of his knowledge. If, therefore, an idea can be traced to its foundation in sense data and is based on sufficient evidence, then that idea has been “validated.” Again quoting Peikoff, “Logical processing of an idea within a specific context of knowledge is necessary and sufficient to establish the idea’s truth.”

This statement, through reasonable on its face, leads to the rather peculiar conclusion – peculiar at least for those who stress the objectivity of knowledge – that there exist different truths for people who work from different contexts of knowledge.

"Peculiar" is putting it mildly. It reflects Peikoff's confusion about what constitutes truth.

Consider one of Peikoff’s examples: the belief of early medical researchers that four types of blood (A, B, AB, and O), while incompatible with each other, are each compatible with their own type. It was later discovered that this was not always the case: a recipient of blood from a donor with the same type occasionally responded negatively – a problem that was later explained by the RH factor, which is present in the blood of some individuals but not others.

The philosophical question raised by this story is this: Was the early belief -- that each blood type is compatible with its own type – true or false?

It is not a philosophical question. It is a scientific question. The answer is clear: FALSE, i. e. it was an error about a fact.

According to the conventional view (which I am defending), this belief, though justified given the information available to researchers at the time, was in fact false, because it did not take into account the RH factor, which was discovered later.

The belief was not justified by facts. It was an error.

But Peikoff disagrees. Given the knowledge available to the earlier researchers, their belief that type A bloods are compatible was justified. Thus, within that context, the proposition, “A bloods are compatible” was true. As Peikoff says:

“This proposition represented real knowledge when it was first reached, and it still does so; in fact, like all properly formulated truths, this truth is immutable. Within the context initially specified, A bloods are and always will be compatible.” (My emphasis.)

Peikoff is wrong. Since the proposition represented only a limited amount of knowledge about the matter, it can't be a "properly formulated truth", let alone "immutable".

This is a difficult passage to interpret reasonably, since it seems so obviously wrong.

It IS wrong. Why not call a spade a spade? And a wrong statement can't be interpreted reasonably.

Edited March 5, 2010 by Xray

[George H. Smith]

What if the other parts of Rand's system (the minimal post-Aristotelian metaphysics, the ethics, the political theory, and the aesthetics) are not always logically dependent on her epistemology?

I would argue (and have argued for many years) that Rand's ethical and moral theories are not logically dependent on her epistemological theories. By this I mean that, within limits, someone who works from a different epistemological foundation (say, a conventional Aristotelian) could justify the same ethical and political principles that Rand defended.

This view is part of the reason that I have been very critical of Rand's approach to the history of philosophy. Specifically, she tends to focus on a philosopher's theory of knowledge, and, if she finds that faulty, she assumes that dire consequences will be the result. (This is an oversimplification, but I think most OL readers will know what I'm talking about.) Hence her infamous comment that Kant was the most evil man in history. In fact, however, Kant was a classical liberal who, despite his inconsistencies, had some valuable insights into the meaning of moral autonomy and its individualistic implications.

The effect of Kant's epistemology has yielded good results in other disciplines as well. The quasi-Kantian approach of Ludwig von Mises in economics is but one example.

Ghs

[Robert Campbell]

Yeah you could be right. This would be different from how Rand viewed it tho, natch. Two major heresies at least...;-):

1.True epistemology is not necessary to arrive at true ethics, politics, aesthetics etc and 2. Objectivism cannot be logically consistent as a system.

But I guess her theories are either open to such criticism and revision, or they're not.

Dan,

As George points out in the second post after yours, Rand fell well short of establishing that only her epistemology could adequately ground her ethics, politics, and aesthetics. Not just George's work but also "the Dougs" on political theory and Tibor Machan's work in various areas are prima facie counterexamples to that claim.

And if you accept Leonard Peikoff's 1991 tome as a canonical presentation of Objectivism, all you have to do is observe that the treatment of claims about God in Chapter 1 contradicts the treatment of claims about God in Chapter 5—and you've got inconsistency in Objectivism as a system.

Robert Campbell

[Robert Campbell]

I would argue (and have argued for many years) that Rand's ethical and moral theories are not logically dependent on her epistemological theories. By this I mean that, within limits, someone who works from a different epistemological foundation (say, a conventional Aristotelian) could justify the same ethical and political principles that Rand defended.

This view is part of the reason that I have been very critical of Rand's approach to the history of philosophy. Specifically, she tends to focus on a philosopher's theory of knowledge, and, if she finds that faulty, she assumes that dire consequences will be the result. (This is an oversimplification, but I think most OL readers will know what I'm talking about.)

George,

Your point should have become an obvious one by now, and not just because of your standard counterexample (the conventional Aristotelian).

Historically, the epistemology was the last part of Objectivism to be developed. What's more, Rand farmed parts of it out to others (obviously several chunks got assigned to Leonard Peikoff, but the first version of the doctrine of the arbitrary assertion appears to have been Nathaniel Branden's doing) and even with their help never finished crossing all of the major items off her to-do list. I'm not claiming that these developmental considerations are decisive in themselves, but they are consistent with the case you've made.

The Peikovian write-off of 20th century physics (which Rand appears to have endorsed) is another instance of assuming that if the epistemological theory on offer does not very closely resemble Objectivist epistemology, all further thought and research are irrevocably tainted.

Robert Campbell

[James Heaps-Nelson]

I would argue (and have argued for many years) that Rand's ethical and moral theories are not logically dependent on her epistemological theories. By this I mean that, within limits, someone who works from a different epistemological foundation (say, a conventional Aristotelian) could justify the same ethical and political principles that Rand defended.

This view is part of the reason that I have been very critical of Rand's approach to the history of philosophy. Specifically, she tends to focus on a philosopher's theory of knowledge, and, if she finds that faulty, she assumes that dire consequences will be the result. (This is an oversimplification, but I think most OL readers will know what I'm talking about.)

George,

Your point should have become an obvious one by now, and not just because of your standard counterexample (the conventional Aristotelian).

Historically, the epistemology was the last part of Objectivism to be developed. What's more, Rand farmed parts of it out to others (obviously several chunks got assigned to Leonard Peikoff, but the first version of the doctrine of the arbitrary assertion appears to have been Nathaniel Branden's doing) and even with their help never finished crossing all of the major items off her to-do list. I'm not claiming that these developmental considerations are decisive in themselves, but they are consistent with the case you've made.

The Peikovian write-off of 20th century physics (which Rand appears to have endorsed) is another instance of assuming that if the epistemological theory on offer does not very closely resemble Objectivist epistemology, all further thought and research are irrevocably tainted.

Robert Campbell

Robert,

What Objectivism doesn't cover is that there is necessarily a brain-based portion of epistemology. Real brains don't work solely or mostly in logical syllogisms. In many areas lots of brilliant and useful work is done through pattern recognition and analogy and simply tested directly. There are lots of logical theories of knowledge that map as well as Objectivism as a description of external reality. Where the Objectivist theory of concepts is useful is the degree to which it says something both about our internal neural processes and is valid empirically and logically.

Jim

[Daniel Barnes]

Where the Objectivist theory of concepts is useful is the degree to which it says something both about our internal neural processes and is valid empirically and logically.

The Objectivist theory of concepts doesn't appear to say anything about our internal neural processes AFAICS. Nor does it have any empirical foundation, if by that you mean actual science, as opposed to what Objectivists like James Valliant like to call "empirical". As to its logical validity, well I've never seen it formally laid out, so it's hard to say.

[Alfonso Jones]

Robert Campbell wrote:

Historically, the epistemology was the last part of Objectivism to be developed. What's more, Rand farmed parts of it out to others (obviously several chunks got assigned to Leonard Peikoff, but the first version of the doctrine of the arbitrary assertion appears to have been Nathaniel Branden's doing) and even with their help never finished crossing all of the major items off her to-do list. I'm not claiming that these developmental considerations are decisive in themselves, but they are consistent with the case you've made.

Robert -

Do you know whether anyone has attempted to chronicle some sort of a "History of Objectivist Philosophy?" (I can see some potent obstacles which would probably preclude it's even being considered in ARI-land!) Such work would be interesting.

I know you wrote in some detail about the history of the doctrine of the arbitrary assertion in your JARS paper which appeared fairly recently. Do you know of other similar work on other threads of Objectivist thought?

Bill P

[Robert Campbell]

Bill,

As far as I know, no one has tried to do a history of Objectivist philosophy yet.

I've used a historical orientation in my Journal of Ayn Rand Studies articles, with the most detail appearing in the piece about the arbitrary. Roger Bissell has done some digging on the history of Objectivist aesthetics. And there are bits and pieces elsewhere, including the hint in Jennifer Burns' book about Leonard Peikoff urging Rand to single out Kant.

Lots more is needed. If I am ever granted access to the Ayn Rand Archives, I want to trace the history of the epistemology, to the extent that the documents there will clarify it.

But no, this is not a project that would meet with the approval of ARI's leadership. One wonders whether they have even tried to preserve all of the NBI-era lectures.

Jim Valliant's response to Jennifer Burns, over at SOLOP a little while ago, resembles the traditional Muslim belief that the archetype of the Qur'an has subsisted eternally in God's mind.

Robert Campbell

[Daniel Barnes]

Jim Valliant's response to Jennifer Burns, over at SOLOP a little while ago, resembles the traditional Muslim belief that the archetype of the Qur'an has subsisted eternally in God's mind.

LOL, too true.

[imurray]

This statement, through reasonable on its face, leads to the rather peculiar conclusion – peculiar at least for those who stress the objectivity of knowledge – that there exist different truths for people who work from different contexts of knowledge. Consider one of Peikoff’s examples: the belief of early medical researchers that four types of blood (A, B, AB, and O), while incompatible with each other, are each compatible with their own type. It was later discovered that this was not always the case: a recipient of blood from a donor with the same type occasionally responded negatively – a problem that was later explained by the RH factor, which is present in the blood of some individuals but not others.

The philosophical question raised by this story is this: Was the early belief -- that each blood type is compatible with its own type – true or false? According to the conventional view (which I am defending), this belief, though justified given the information available to researchers at the time, was in fact false, because it did not take into account the RH factor, which was discovered later. But Peikoff disagrees. Given the knowledge available to the earlier researchers, their belief that type A bloods are compatible was justified. Thus, within that context, the proposition, “A bloods are compatible” was true. As Peikoff says:

“This proposition represented real knowledge when it was first reached, and it still does so; in fact, like all properly formulated truths, this truth is immutable. Within the context initially specified, A bloods are and always will be compatible.” (My emphasis.)

This is a difficult passage to interpret reasonably, since it seems so obviously wrong. If “within the context initially specified, A bloods are and always will be compatible,” then what was the original problem that caused researchers eventually to discover the RH factor, if not the fact that A bloods were sometimes incompatible? The perception of a problem -- that a blood type was not always compatible with the same type -- necessarily preceded the search for a solution. Researchers had to become convinced that their current theory was false (at least in some respects) or they would never have looked for a better one. If Peikoff is correct, if the initial theory was immutably true within the context of knowledge available to medical researchers at that time, then there would have been no reason (and no motive) for them to improve upon that theory.

George,

I am not defender of Rand's contextual theory of knowledge, but this doesn't seem right to me. It would seem that you're conflating three possible contexts into one. Here's how I would interpret this: Context 1: Researcher's, using the accepted scientific methods of the time, concluded that "A bloods are and always will be compatible". Context 2: Something happens that proves their conclusions wrong, e.g., new techniques or instruments are discovered, complications from blood transfusions lead them to question the results, etc. Context 3: Researchers, using the accepted scientific methods of the time, concluded that the RH factor exists.

Now if you look back: in Context 1 the conclusions are true, in Context 2 the conclusions were brought into question, in Context 3 new conclusions are true. This is an oversimplification as I'm certain one could identify a multitude of contexts, but since finding more context would only reinforce my point, I'm comfortable with it. You seem to imply that there is no shift in context between the initial findings and the eventual discovery of the RH factor. Do you think that because something is thought to be true at one particular moment in time, it will never questioned? That's obviously not what happened in reality. The researches who originally concluded that "A bloods are and always will be compatible" (and the majority of the scientific community) did indeed think that their discovery was true, yet the RH factor was still discovered.

You aren't just conflating contexts, you're ignoring them altogether in your analysis. Here's what the contextual theory is telling us: that things are true when looked at within certain context. If we look at the statement "A bloods are and always will be compatible" within the context of the time it was believed to be true it is true. If you remove it from that context and place it into a context that came into existence after it was proven false it is false. I think you understand this and I think I understand your argument, but you've written it in such a way that you seem to be confused on this basic principle.

What you're offering as an alternative seems like a slippery slope. According to your theory everything should always be considered tentatively true for at least two reasons: 1. if something is considered to be true then nobody would ever take the time to try to prove it otherwise and 2. because history dictates that things we think are true tend to become false, so why would we ever even consider anything as true in the first place? Unless, of course, you believe that we have reached the limits of our knowledge and can now feel comfortable calling things true because there is no longer the possibility of an unforeseen method, technique, problem, etc. that may disprove a current truth.

Your idea of using "justified" instead of true is okay with me (in terms of being coherent with your general argument), but you don't seem to want to do that universally and, in my opinion,you can't have it both ways.

Although we have no royal roads to knowledge, although we cannot know what is true apart from what we are justified in believing to be true, this does not mean that we can, or should, dispense with the notion of absolute truth. This notion, if it is an abstract ideal, also functions as a concrete reminder of our fallibility. It stands, like Mordicai at the gate, as a reminder that no belief can claim a privileged immunity from critical evaluation; and that every reflective person, however justified his beliefs may be, is prey to the same errors of fallibility as everyone else.

So, this is how you solve the problem? Do you honestly believe setting up something which you all but state does not exist, at least in the minds of a mere mortal human, as an abstract ideal is philosophically useful (perhaps I'd agree if you argued that it was somehow psychologically useful - since that's the only realm in which it seems to exist)? And to remind us of our fallibility? Our fallibility compared to...God? Nature? Our spouse?

[Robert Campbell]

Ian,

I don't see George's position as failing to take context into account.

Quite the contrary. If you're trying to understanding how knowledge grows and changes you need lots of context in your account.

I believe he's merely pointing out the troubles that ensue if you try to characterize truth as dependent on a context of knowledge.

I think they may actually extend further than George has suggested in this excerpt.

How tightly bounded is a context of knowledge? It is extends no further than all of the currently known evidence, or the data collected to date, then what's the warrant for generalizing beyond the data collected to date?

Objectivism incorporates a strong commitment to induction (which is not the same as offering a theory of induction).

But if the sum of all human knowledge up to March 18, 2010, encompasses 650, 231, 522 observations of what happens when human blood of differing types is mixed, what's the contextually valid conclusion to be drawn: a conclusion about the properties or behavior of all human blood of types A/B/AB/O, and all human blood of types Rh-positive and Rh-negative?

Or a conclusion about the properties or behavior of 650, 231, 522 instances of mixtures of human blood of those different types?

Which should we consider true in the present context, if we want to be contextually certain of its truth in the present context?

Robert Campbell

[imurray]

Ian,

I don't see George's position as failing to take context into account.

Quite the contrary. If you're trying to understanding how knowledge grows and changes you need lots of context in your account.

I believe he's merely pointing out the troubles that ensue if you try to characterize truth as dependent on a context of knowledge.

I think they may actually extend further than George has suggested in this excerpt.

How tightly bounded is a context of knowledge? It is extends no further than all of the currently known evidence, or the data collected to date, then what's the warrant for generalizing beyond the data collected to date?

Objectivism incorporates a strong commitment to induction (which is not the same as offering a theory of induction).

But if the sum of all human knowledge up to March 18, 2010, encompasses 650, 231, 522 observations of what happens when human blood of differing types is mixed, what's the contextually valid conclusion to be drawn: a conclusion about the properties or behavior of all human blood of types A/B/AB/O, and all human blood of types Rh-positive and Rh-negative?

Or a conclusion about the properties or behavior of 650, 231, 522 instances of mixtures of human blood of those different types?

Which should we consider true in the present context, if we want to be contextually certain of its truth in the present context?

Robert Campbell

Robert,

That would depend on what you want to know - do you want to know about the properties or behaviors of 650,231,522 instances of mixtures of human blood or do you want to know about the properties or behavior of all human blood types of A/B/AB/O and all human blood types of Rh-positive and Rh-negative? I guess it would depend on your research parameter, i.e., the context of the study.

How tightly bound is the context of knowledge? I guess that also dependent on the context itself. For instance I'm sitting in a chair now and typing this response that's true in this context, but I will no longer be sitting down and typing in a chair when I go to bed in a little while. So if you wanted to know what I did tonight you could say that it's true that I sat in my chair and typed and slept in my bed, if you wanted to know what I was doing when I typed this it would only be true that I was sitting down and typing. George is conflating everything into a meta-context which makes the need to discuss contexts pointless.

I'm not sure why this would suggest that you couldn't generalize beyond the data collected to date? Of course you can, but it doesn't mean what you've generalized will always be true in every future context. Do you expect absolute certainty before you consent to generalizations?

Here's what George has done:

-He's identified an imbalance towards relativism in Rand's contextual theory of knowledge as problematic.

-He's misrepresented the problem by confusing the theory. Just because something is "immutably true" in one context does not exclude that it may be found false in another context. Something can be true in one context and not in another. Unless we're talking about absolute or universal truth, which I assumed we weren't because we were discussing it as posited in the contextual theory of knowledge - right? If not, it's even more confused that I thought.

-He's decided to differentiate between the terms justifiable and truth.

-To insure balance between relativism and absolutism he's decided to retain the "truth", but only as absolute truth, which he himself states we cannot know.

So let me get this straight. By his own admission we have "no royal roads to knowledge", yet we're going to go ahead and make believe that absolute truth exists because it somehow fixes his problem. Can anybody else see the error in this? Why is this better than simply stating truth is relative and contextual or "justifiable"? Isn't pretending that absolute truth exist a truth that is relative to this particular theory of knowledge, i.e. in the context of this theory? It's relative truth right down to the foundation of his philosophy, but he'd rather pretend it's based on absolute truth because he thinks that we'll simply stop our quest for knowledge without it. The only things impeding our quest for knowledge are meta-theories that posit absolute truth as their foundation.

Unless of course he did it for utilitarian or pragmatic reasons, but then why not just become a pragmatist and drop the whole absolute truth thing altogether because you won't need it there.

Anyway, people have already come up with much better theories that account for the problem he's identified. See: Heidegger, Foucault (regimes of truth, conditions of possibility), Kuhn (paradigms), Deleuze (rhizomes), etc. Each tries to account for the reasons things are considered "true" within a certain context and how what's "true" changes as conditions/contexts/etc. change.

Ian

Edited March 19, 2010 by Panoptic

[Daniel Barnes]

Here's what George has done:

-He's identified an imbalance towards relativism in Rand's contextual theory of knowledge as problematic.

It's not just an "imbalance". Rand's theory is relativist. This is easily demonstrated. To wit, when everyone thought the sun orbited the earth this was the full extent of their knowledge at the time. This, according to Randian theory, this made it absolutely true.

Now, according to the full extent of our knowledge at the time, we know the sun does not go round the earth. This, according to Randian theory, makes it also absolutely true.

This is therefore clearly a relativist theory of truth ie truth is relative to the knower. I don't see how this can be avoided other than by mere word-games - which is in fact the method Rand attempted.

-He's misrepresented the problem by confusing the theory. Just because something is "immutably true" in one context does not exclude that it may be found false in another context. Something can be true in one context and not in another. Unless we're talking about absolute or universal truth, which I assumed we weren't because we were discussing it as posited in the contextual theory of knowledge - right? If not, it's even more confused that I thought.

It's Rand that bandies about the "absolutes" on this topic. She's the source of the confusion.

BTW what you're saying boils down to claiming something is, in effect, "mutably immutable". Obviously a problem. "Contextual absolute" is a similar oxymoron.

-He's decided to differentiate between the terms justifiable and truth.

There's no real problem with this. Let's say I throw a bunch of matches down in front of you and ask you guess at the number. You take a wild guess at 27 - and sure enough, it turns out there are in fact 27 matches there. You have arrived at the truth, undeniably; but you have no justification for it.

Thus there is no necessary connection between 1) having the truth, and 2) having a justification for it.

-To insure balance between relativism and absolutism he's decided to retain the "truth", but only as absolute truth, which he himself states we cannot know.

Once again, this is not the problem you think it is. I will give my standard example of the theoretical physical state of "absolute zero." Now, if quantum mechanics is true, it may be that we can never attain a state of "absolute zero". But that doesn't mean such a proposed standard is useless or as Randians like to hyperventilate, Platonic and evil. In fact such a standard is of the greatest usefulness, as we may discover amazing things (eg superconductors) in attempting to attain such allegedly "evil" standards.

Now consider that as an analogy for "absolute truth" - how the proposal of that as a standard to be sought leads to amazing unexpected discoveries, even if we never find the truth itself.

So let me get this straight. By his own admission we have "no royal roads to knowledge", yet we're going to go ahead and make believe that absolute truth exists because it somehow fixes his problem. Can anybody else see the error in this?

There's no error there. There is another wrinkle, however, in that you may in fact have the truth in your possession - it is possible, even if highly unlikely. But you can never finally know that you have it - not even after a thousand years. This is the upshot of Hume's problem.

Anyway, people have already come up with much better theories that account for the problem he's identified. See: Heidegger, Foucault (regimes of truth, conditions of possibility), Kuhn (paradigms), Deleuze (rhizomes), etc. Each tries to account for the reasons things are considered "true" within a certain context and how what's "true" changes as conditions/contexts/etc. change.

This is what makes those thinkers so Randian!

[merjet]

Now, according to the full extent of our knowledge at the time, we know the sun does not go round the earth. This, according to Randian theory, makes it also absolutely true.

Like Mr. Barnes has a habit of doing, he tries to put words in Ayn Rand's mouth that she did not say. Per my Objectivist Research CD-ROM Rand used the phrase "absolutely true" one time in ITOE2 and here it is:

Prof. E: ... Whereas, when you use a word, you retain the essence of what's in common without being tied to one concrete and without being required to ignore its particular concreteness in order to use it as a symbol.

AR: That's right. That's absolutely true. (ITOE2, 174)

Obviously Barnes used it in a different way than Rand did.

It's Rand that bandies about the "absolutes" on this topic. She's the source of the confusion.

BTW what you're saying boils down to claiming something is, in effect, "mutably immutable". Obviously a problem. "Contextual absolute" is a similar oxymoron.

This is another case of Mr. Barnes trying to put words in Ayn Rand's mouth that she did not say. Per my Objectivist Research CD-ROM Rand used the phrase "contextual absolute" in ITOE2 one time without saying what it meant. She used the phrase "contextually absolute" three times, two saying what it meant and here they are:

Since man is not omniscient, a definition cannot be changelessly absolute, because it cannot establish the relationship of a given group of existents to everything else in the universe, including the undiscovered and unknown. And for the very same reasons, a definition is false and worthless if it is not contextually absolute—if it does not specify the known relationships among existents (in terms of the known essential characteristics) or if it contradicts the known (by omission or evasion). (ITOE2, 48)

An objective definition, valid for all men, is determined according to all the relevant knowledge available at that stage of mankind's development. Definitions are not changelessly absolute, but they are contextually absolute. A definition is false if it does not specify the known relationships among existents (in terms of the known essential characteristics) or if it contradicts the known. (ITOE2, 85)

Again, obviously Barnes used it in a different way than Rand did.

[tjohnson]

An objective definition, valid for all men, ...

i would like to know what she meant by "valid for all men".

[imurray]

Here's what George has done:

-He's identified an imbalance towards relativism in Rand's contextual theory of knowledge as problematic.

It's not just an "imbalance". Rand's theory is relativist. This is easily demonstrated. To wit, when everyone thought the sun orbited the earth this was the full extent of their knowledge at the time. This, according to Randian theory, this made it absolutely true.

Now, according to the full extent of our knowledge at the time, we know the sun does not go round the earth. This, according to Randian theory, makes it also absolutely true.

This is therefore clearly a relativist theory of truth ie truth is relative to the knower. I don't see how this can be avoided other than by mere word-games - which is in fact the method Rand attempted.

-He's misrepresented the problem by confusing the theory. Just because something is "immutably true" in one context does not exclude that it may be found false in another context. Something can be true in one context and not in another. Unless we're talking about absolute or universal truth, which I assumed we weren't because we were discussing it as posited in the contextual theory of knowledge - right? If not, it's even more confused that I thought.

It's Rand that bandies about the "absolutes" on this topic. She's the source of the confusion.

BTW what you're saying boils down to claiming something is, in effect, "mutably immutable". Obviously a problem. "Contextual absolute" is a similar oxymoron.

-He's decided to differentiate between the terms justifiable and truth.

There's no real problem with this. Let's say I throw a bunch of matches down in front of you and ask you guess at the number. You take a wild guess at 27 - and sure enough, it turns out there are in fact 27 matches there. You have arrived at the truth, undeniably; but you have no justification for it.

Thus there is no necessary connection between 1) having the truth, and 2) having a justification for it.

-To insure balance between relativism and absolutism he's decided to retain the "truth", but only as absolute truth, which he himself states we cannot know.

Once again, this is not the problem you think it is. I will give my standard example of the theoretical physical state of "absolute zero." Now, if quantum mechanics is true, it may be that we can never attain a state of "absolute zero". But that doesn't mean such a proposed standard is useless or as Randians like to hyperventilate, Platonic and evil. In fact such a standard is of the greatest usefulness, as we may discover amazing things (eg superconductors) in attempting to attain such allegedly "evil" standards.

Now consider that as an analogy for "absolute truth" - how the proposal of that as a standard to be sought leads to amazing unexpected discoveries, even if we never find the truth itself.

So let me get this straight. By his own admission we have "no royal roads to knowledge", yet we're going to go ahead and make believe that absolute truth exists because it somehow fixes his problem. Can anybody else see the error in this?

There's no error there. There is another wrinkle, however, in that you may in fact have the truth in your possession - it is possible, even if highly unlikely. But you can never finally know that you have it - not even after a thousand years. This is the upshot of Hume's problem.

Anyway, people have already come up with much better theories that account for the problem he's identified. See: Heidegger, Foucault (regimes of truth, conditions of possibility), Kuhn (paradigms), Deleuze (rhizomes), etc. Each tries to account for the reasons things are considered "true" within a certain context and how what's "true" changes as conditions/contexts/etc. change.

This is what makes those thinkers so Randian!

Daniel,

Thank you for your thoughtful response. After reading my responses over again it's obvious that I've been outclassed - I was trying to be cute and came across as pompous. I apologize to anyone I may have put off.

Merlin did a better job than I did elucidating the contextual theory of knowledge. My point is, I don't know how you can escape relativism and I don't agree that setting up an arbitrary ideal truth that is absolute across all past, present and future contexts is helpful in a philosophical system. I agree that in a mathematical system it is extremely practical, if not necessary, to use values like absolute zero. I just don't think it's necessary in a philosophical system, that is, I don't agree that without it we'd somehow stall out and stop searching for knowledge or that it would lead to extremes like nihilism or solipsism.

As far as your examples go, I can see where you are coming from and they are interesting points. However, it seems to me like you're doing a lot of unnecessary work to defend something that is only serving as a make believe counter balance relativism (which I'm yet to be convinced is really a problem). My only arguments would be: as far as the cards go - it would remain a guess unless someone counted them and confirmed it, then it would be justified. What purpose does it serve to speculate that you possess absolute truths that you don't know you possess and can never know you possess? I'd like to ask another question that I touched on before: isn't the concept of this kind of "absolute truth" an unjustified relative "truth" itself?

Also, I'm not sure if you were joking about those thinkers being Randian or not! Haha. I would say that they shared some of the same influences, but I wouldn't call them Randian.

Again, I'm not a Randian. I just think the argument set forth in this particular article is weak.

[Daniel Barnes]

Like Mr. Barnes has a habit of doing, he tries to put words in Ayn Rand's mouth that she did not say.

Well it seems pretty close to what I'm saying, especially as according to Rand all human knowledge depends on definitions. And its still an oxymoron - "cannot be changelessly absolute" when of course that's what absolutes usually are.

BTW, your search engine has missed at least one as I recall - she uses "contextual absolute" in her ethics too. So she does bandy "absolute" about all over the show. She uses it to describe physical objects, such as a speck of dust, as well as claiming to be able to produce "absolutely precise" measurement in the ITOE (a claim which turns out to be merely a word-game). And further, Peikoff uses contextual absolutes, but I suppose that is not good enough for you, as I called the idea Randian, although somehow I doubt Peikoff picked up the phrase by reading the ARCHNblog. And of course the phrase is used by students of Objectivism such as this fellow in precisely the way I have.

So I fear you are being somewhat pedantic here - I think my usage accurately captures the intent.

If not "contextually absolute truth" isn't right then what do you suggest?

1) Truth is absolute

2) Truth is contextual

?

Edited March 19, 2010 by Daniel Barnes