The Black Swan of Words

[thomtg]

It used to be considered as common knowledge that all swans were white. Then when Australia was colonized, black swans were discovered in 1790.

Does this mean the commonsense knowledge about swans before that time was invalidated by the discovery? Does it mean every advance in science must be acknowledged as a setback to common sense? According to Ayn Rand (ITOE 67b-c), the answer is, No. While the meaning of our concept "swan" remains the same, the statement "all swans are white" in the present context is falsified only because our knowledge about swans have been extended. Does it imply that those who asserted the statement before the discovery were wrong? No, they were not wrong or erroneous, just ignorant. Was the statement true then but false now? No. It was always false, but people were objective and rightfully so in believing it true.

I make reference of this discovery to highlight the common phenomenon regarding knowledge acquisition and to highlight an ignorance of judgment in Ayn Rand's ITOE on account of a little-known, recent discovery. On page 10 of ITOE, Rand writes: "Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e., that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind." This is statement of the logical form "every S is P"--an empirical universal statement waiting to be "falsified." Though its utterance prior to having knowledge (e.g., here) is not erroneous, I believe it is falsified. The statement, let us call it S1, "Every non-proper-name word is a symbol that denotes a concept," is false.

(Perhaps my saying about Rand's judgment being a judgment from ignorance, is also inexact. It may simply be a case of simplification on her effort at presenting her theory of concepts gradually, on the basis of her spiral theory of learning. Nevertheless, I contend that in the widest context of man's knowledge, S1 is false.)

Why do I believe this? Merely taking it as a hypothetical scenario, what if anything must the state of a man's knowledge be altered in order for him to come to or accommodate this as a truth? The meaning of the concept "word" in S1 has not changed. Nor has the concept "concept" per Rand's four definitions changed. (ITOE 10b, 13c, 31d, 83d) Every Objectivist still knows what the word "word" means. (ITOE 11b) And the word "mean" still means the same. (ITOE 20a, 40b, 237) What has to change is for there to be a discovery of the existence of a word that does not denote a concept.

David Kelley, a more knowledgeable epistemologist than Rand, acknowledges: "One of the major functions of language is to divide the world up into categories. Except for proper names, most words stand for groups of things." (TAOR 1st 9, my emphasis) What is the black swan of S1? And if it does not stand for groups of things, for what in reality does it symbolically stand?

The word I have in mind is this . (The Random House College Dictionary, Revised Edition, 1367a) This word is not a concept. Notice that it is not even definable. Since it is not a concept, the open question is, what is it?

I think that Rand provides for the means of answering this last when she describes the psycho-epistemological role of proper names in a language: "Proper names are used in order to identify and include particular entities in a conceptual method of cognition." (ITOE 11a) What else does our conceptual method of cognition require besides particular entities and universal groups of things? The basic answer depends on an introspective understanding of what human cognition is. Several chapters in ITOE are devoted to its discussion.

By the way, the existence of these words--and there are many--implies a fundamental re-interpretation of the linguistic notion of the sign.

[tjohnson]

While the meaning of our concept "swan" remains the same, the statement "all swans are white" in the present context is falsified only because our knowledge about swans have been extended. Does it imply that those who asserted the statement before the discovery were wrong? No, they were not wrong or erroneous, just ignorant. Was the statement true then but false now? No. It was always false, but people were objective and rightfully so in believing it true.

The real problem is that you cannot make statements about all swans because one cannot observe all swans. If this rule had been observed in the first there would be no need for this contrived theory 'open ended concepts'. What we could have said (and could now) "almost all swans are white" or "all swans we have observed are white", etc.

[kiaer.ts]

Thomas, forgive me, but you sound a bit like

here. What word are you talking about?

[Michelle]

Thomas, forgive me, but you sound a bit like

here. What word are you talking about?

Ugh. British 'comedy.'

[Brant Gaede]

Thomas, forgive me, but you sound a bit like

here. What word are you talking about?

I think this is the word: this. I am somewhat perplexed; it is defined in any dictionary. Hey, Thom. Help us out here. Did you leave something out?

--Brant

[BaalChatzaf]

While the meaning of our concept "swan" remains the same, the statement "all swans are white" in the present context is falsified only because our knowledge about swans have been extended. Does it imply that those who asserted the statement before the discovery were wrong? No, they were not wrong or erroneous, just ignorant. Was the statement true then but false now? No. It was always false, but people were objective and rightfully so in believing it true.

The real problem is that you cannot make statements about all swans because one cannot observe all swans. If this rule had been observed in the first there would be no need for this contrived theory 'open ended concepts'. What we could have said (and could now) "almost all swans are white" or "all swans we have observed are white", etc.

The correct way of putting the matter is: "It is very likely that the next swan anyone observes will be a white swan". This is based on the assumption that the future observables will be very much like past observables.

Even with black swans in Australia it still may be the case that most swans are white swans.

Or we can make the meta-statement: Enumerative (or exhaustive) Induction is a useful heuristic. It is not always right, but it is right often enough to produce good rules of thumb.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[merjet]

My hunch is that Thom means the word 'this'. It is only defined with examples of usage. It has no clear set of referents. It is indexical or deictic. My hunch is that Thom thinks a 'concept' has a clear set of referents.

Edited June 13, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[thomtg]

Thomas, forgive me, but you sound a bit like

here. What word are you talking about?

I think this is the word: this. I am somewhat perplexed; it is defined in any dictionary. Hey, Thom. Help us out here. Did you leave something out?

--Brant

I think you are right, Ted. This is funny! And yes, Brant and Merlin, that is the word I meant. No, I did not leave anything out although I thought I had underlined it with some BB code. (There is supposed to be another photo image as well, but I don't see it either.)

Notice that the dictionary entries don't define it; the entries are all parenthetical. The absence of a concept may explain partly the variability of meaning, which Ted ably illustrated in "The Opposite of Nothing ..." (Post #155).

Edited June 13, 2009 by Thom T G

[Brant Gaede]

So THIS is what we have: common nouns, proper nouns and THIS.

--Brant

[Brant Gaede]

So THIS is what we have: common nouns, proper nouns and THIS.

--Brant

How about this: concept helpers. This (thing). Above (the rim). Blue (sky).

--Brant

[kiaer.ts]

Thomas, forgive me, but you sound a bit like

here. What word are you talking about?

Ugh. British 'comedy.'

See, Michelle, I told you liking Python, Doctor Who and LotR was all of a kind. You have to realize this sort of satire is often much better than a serious reply. I am glad Thomas took it as kiddingly as it was meant in this context.

[thomtg]

So THIS is what we have: common nouns, proper nouns and THIS.

--Brant

How about this: concept helpers. This (thing). Above (the rim). Blue (sky).

--Brant

No, Brant, I see "above," "blue," "throw," "selfishly" as words denoting concepts respectively of a relationship, an attribute, an action, a quality of a property. What they aren't is that they aren't classified by your categories.

[Brant Gaede]

So THIS is what we have: common nouns, proper nouns and THIS.

--Brant

How about this: concept helpers. This (thing). Above (the rim). Blue (sky).

--Brant

No, Brant, I see "above," "blue," "throw," "selfishly" as words denoting concepts respectively of a relationship, an attribute, an action, a quality of a property. What they aren't is that they aren't classified by your categories.

We're doomed! :shocked:

--Brant

[kiaer.ts]

My hunch is that Thom means the word 'this'. It is only defined with examples of usage. It has no clear set of referents. It is indexical or deictic. My hunch is that Thom thinks a 'concept' has a clear set of referents.

Merlin is correct, as I have mentioned on other threads, words like "this" and "that" as well as pronouns such as "I" and "mine" are deictic, the indicate another referent within the context of a certain speech act. "This" is certainly a concept. Its specific referent is the previously mentioned object, fact or phrase within a discourse. E. g., "Unemployment is high, and this is something we should all lament." In this phrase, the referent of "this" is (the fact that) unemployment is high. Or, "this" can simply mean the object nearer the speaker. I like this (dress, car, etc.,) but I don't like that.

Just like the word this, the pronoun I is radically contextual. Its referent is the speaker in a speech act. When Ted Keer says "I" the pronoun refers to Ted Keer. When you (the listener or adressee in this speech act) say "I" the reference is entirely different. This does not mean that "I" is not a concept. It is just a special kind of concept.

The confusion is that these deictic pronouns referents are radically context dependent, whereas common nouns refer to classes of things and proper nouns refer to specific individuals or collectives. The definition of the common noun bachelor is not context dependent in the way that the definition if "this" is. Yet even the concepts of common nouns need contextual specification when the statement is not a universal claim. Most presidents are a mixed bag, but this one is an unmitigated disaster.

[thomtg]

My hunch is that Thom means the word 'this'. It is only defined with examples of usage. It has no clear set of referents. It is indexical or deictic. My hunch is that Thom thinks a 'concept' has a clear set of referents.

Merlin is correct, as I have mentioned on other threads, words like "this" and "that" as well as pronouns such as "I" and "mine" are deictic, the indicate another referent within the context of a certain speech act. "This" is certainly a concept. Its specific referent is the previously mentioned object, fact or phrase within a discourse. E. g., "Unemployment is high, and this is something we should all lament." In this phrase, the referent of "this" is (the fact that) unemployment is high. Or, "this" can simply mean the object nearer the speaker. I like this (dress, car, etc.,) but I don't like that.

Just like the word this, the pronoun I is radically contextual. Its referent is the speaker in a speech act. When Ted Keer says "I" the pronoun refers to Ted Keer. When you (the listener or adressee in this speech act) say "I" the reference is entirely different. This does not mean that "I" is not a concept. It is just a special kind of concept.

The confusion is that these deictic pronouns referents are radically context dependent, whereas common nouns refer to classes of things and proper nouns refer to specific individuals or collectives. The definition of the common noun bachelor is not context dependent in the way that the definition if "this" is. Yet even the concepts of common nouns need contextual specification when the statement is not a universal claim. Most presidents are a mixed bag, but this one is an unmitigated disaster.

If "this," "that," and pronouns were to denote concepts, then Ayn Rand would be correct in her universal judgment that S1 ("Every non-proper-name word is a symbol that denotes a concept")--unless David Kelley had in mind some other words that didn't denote concepts. Since I do not think Kelley uses the quantifier "most" in his statement for false modesty, I conclude that there are words that don't denote concepts, and "this," "that," pronouns, and other deictics are my candidates for such words.

Now Ted is claiming that "this" is "certainly" a concept and can be defined. If this turns out to be the case, then the second part of my conclusion is wrong, but the first part is still valid. Either Rand is correct, or else Kelley is.

So, is "this" a concept? Ted defines the denoted concept as "the previously mentioned object, fact or phrase within a discourse." Is this a valid verbal definition? Does it have a genus and differentia? Does it name the essential characteristic(s)? Does it narrow down the referents and delimit their broadness? Does it avoid circularity? Does it avoid vague language?

If a child can understand the word "this," then I would suggest that a definition of its concept--if there were one--would use language a child can understand. The statement of definition above it seems to me uses some obscure words. What is "discourse"? What does it mean to be "within a discourse"? And what does the word "mentioned" mean in the statement? Could some other clearer words or phrases be used?

I cannot help but think that the above statement is circular. That "the" in the statement seems to point deictically to "this." It's like "the whatever" is equivalent to "this." In this sense, we haven't come closer to understanding what "this" is. We have merely described its indexicality.

Along with the immediately above objection, I think the "whatever" part to be highly interesting. The statement names intrinsic objects, objective facts, and linguistic phrases as candidates to be grouped together for being indexed. This is a highly heterogenous grouping. Alternatively, it could be too narrow a grouping. For example, I can use "this" to refer to a false statement.

I certainly agree that the statement does describe a primary function of the use of "this," so in a sense we have identified an essential characteristic. The question remains though as to what it is that has this characteristic. What is the genus of the "this" if it were a concept?

Ted suggests that the words "this," "that," "these," and "those" are related to pronouns in their being "radically contextual." This suggests that perhaps their genus is "pronoun." "Pronoun" is defined as words which can be used in place of other noun words or phrases. But this we already knew: "this" is a word. The question is, does it denote a concept? And more generally, if "this" is a pronoun, do pronouns denote concepts? "Pronoun" it would seem is a concept of second intention. Thus, it is an open question as to whether the individual words here-called pronouns are concepts.

An example Ted cites is the pronoun "I": "Just like the word this, the pronoun I is radically contextual. Its referent is the speaker in a speech act. When Ted Keer says 'I' the pronoun refers to Ted Keer. When you (the listener or adressee in this speech act) say 'I' the reference is entirely different. This does not mean that 'I' is not a concept. It is just a special kind of concept." We have extrospective concepts and introspective concepts. We have concepts that divide up objective and subjective reality. In what sense are these concepts "special"--if they are concepts? As opposed to what other kinds of concepts are they different?

Deictic pronouns are said to be "radically context dependent." What does this mean? Does it mean that that which you refer is not the same as that which I refer? But isn't this tantamount to saying that what is true for you is not the same as what is true for me? If I grant you the fact that deictic pronouns are indeed radically context dependent, then something has to be resolved such that my truth and your truth must be the same truth. The only way out, as I see it, is to resolve that deictics aren't concepts.

[kiaer.ts]

Thomas, if "this" is not a concept, then what is it? A percept? A phrase? A proper noun? There seems little point to me in denying that it is a concept, just a member of a special class of concepts, one based not on the expression of natural kinds (which suffer definition by genus and species) but of deixis. Rand touched very briefly on concepts of conjunctions like "but" and "and" in ItOE. She calls these words concepts, and I take it from your attitude here that you would not. But that seems a matter of terminology, and if you wish to deny that deictic words are concepts it is up to you to say what they are.

Meanwhile, keep in mind that not all concepts are definable by genus and differentia. (E.g. existence.) Also, the fact that we use the word "the" or "a" obligatorily in English is not a proof of circularity of definition. Russian has the word "this" but it does not have the word "the" and you can define "this" easily enough in a grammitical sentence of Russian. I am not really interested in picking such nits. It is quite obvious that you can define the word this, and that it is a concept, just not a concept of kind.

[DavidMcK]

I believe that science progresses from induction (All the swans I've ever seen are white) to a more deductive model with increased knowledge; for example a knowledge of the chromosomes and dna of swans might (some day) prove that all swans are either black or white, there isn't a chromosome for any other color let us say. The point is (whether this example is true of false) that you've gone from making an inductive case to a more detailed and deductive case, and the knowledge becomes more certain. This is the way Newton discovered his laws of gravity, watching apples falling induced him to think about gravity as a general case, and he came up with his law that the attraction of two masses is proportional to their distance. Of course for very high velocities you need Einstein, but that was also a deductive case. Science doesn't just look at a large number of x's and state that all x is y.

[Michelle]

Thomas, forgive me, but you sound a bit like

here. What word are you talking about?

Ugh. British 'comedy.'

See, Michelle, I told you liking Python, Doctor Who and LotR was all of a kind. You have to realize this sort of satire is often much better than a serious reply. I am glad Thomas took it as kiddingly as it was meant in this context.

I'll get back to you on that once I manage to watch Doctor Who.

Edited June 15, 2009 by Michelle R

[Brant Gaede]

I believe that science progresses from induction (All the swans I've ever seen are white) to a more deductive model with increased knowledge; for example a knowledge of the chromosomes and dna of swans might (some day) prove that all swans are either black or white, there isn't a chromosome for any other color let us say. The point is (whether this example is true of false) that you've gone from making an inductive case to a more detailed and deductive case, and the knowledge becomes more certain. This is the way Newton discovered his laws of gravity, watching apples falling induced him to think about gravity as a general case, and he came up with his law that the attraction of two masses is proportional to their distance. Of course for very high velocities you need Einstein, but that was also a deductive case. Science doesn't just look at a large number of x's and state that all x is y.

Science can proceed from anything impacting a human mind.

--Brant

[thomtg]

Thomas, if "this" is not a concept, then what is it? A percept? A phrase? A proper noun? There seems little point to me in denying that it is a concept, just a member of a special class of concepts, one based not on the expression of natural kinds (which suffer definition by genus and species) but of deixis. Rand touched very briefly on concepts of conjunctions like "but" and "and" in ItOE. She calls these words concepts, and I take it from your attitude here that you would not. But that seems a matter of terminology, and if you wish to deny that deictic words are concepts it is up to you to say what they are.

Meanwhile, keep in mind that not all concepts are definable by genus and differentia. (E.g. existence.) Also, the fact that we use the word "the" or "a" obligatorily in English is not a proof of circularity of definition. Russian has the word "this" but it does not have the word "the" and you can define "this" easily enough in a grammitical sentence of Russian. I am not really interested in picking such nits. It is quite obvious that you can define the word this, and that it is a concept, just not a concept of kind.

Isn't concepts of kind the only kind of concepts? "The," "a," "if," "and," and "but" are syncategorematic words. Yes, Rand thinks conjunctions are "special concepts," but she admits that they don't correspond to anything in reality. (ITOE 37d) So I would say that Rand here is alluding to something entirely new. That is, whether syncategoremata are concepts is an open question. "This" in my view counts as a syncategorema. Syncategorematic words are certainly needed "in a conceptual method of cognition." (ITOE 11a)

[kiaer.ts]

Thomas, if "this" is not a concept, then what is it? A percept? A phrase? A proper noun? There seems little point to me in denying that it is a concept, just a member of a special class of concepts, one based not on the expression of natural kinds (which suffer definition by genus and species) but of deixis. Rand touched very briefly on concepts of conjunctions like "but" and "and" in ItOE. She calls these words concepts, and I take it from your attitude here that you would not. But that seems a matter of terminology, and if you wish to deny that deictic words are concepts it is up to you to say what they are.

Meanwhile, keep in mind that not all concepts are definable by genus and differentia. (E.g. existence.) Also, the fact that we use the word "the" or "a" obligatorily in English is not a proof of circularity of definition. Russian has the word "this" but it does not have the word "the" and you can define "this" easily enough in a grammitical sentence of Russian. I am not really interested in picking such nits. It is quite obvious that you can define the word this, and that it is a concept, just not a concept of kind.

Isn't concepts of kind the only kind of concepts? "The," "a," "if," "and," and "but" are syncategorematic words. Yes, Rand thinks conjunctions are "special concepts," but she admits that they don't correspond to anything in reality. (ITOE 37d) So I would say that Rand here is alluding to something entirely new. That is, whether syncategoremata are concepts is an open question. "This" in my view counts as a syncategorema. Syncategorematic words are certainly needed "in a conceptual method of cognition." (ITOE 11a)

"This/these" still does express a kind, an item or items close to the speakers, or close in the speech context. Numerator and denominator are similar concepts, they apply in the context of an expression of a fraction, but there is no natural class of denominators such that one can go purchase one at walmart or find one in a drawer at the smithsonian. Neither "this" nor "denominator" expresses a natural kind, such as spider or noble gas. Deictics require extant conscious minds for their existence in a way that amniote vertebtrates do not. Deictics are concepts of consciousness in Rand's terms. Again, a concept, but just a different kind of concept.

Rand emphatically does not say that conjunctions or prepositions don't correspond to anything in reality. They just don't correspond to entities as entities. "With oxygen and fuel and a source of ignition one gets combustion, but without oxygen there is none" is a statement with very real reference. You can't just omit or arbitrarily change the conjunctions there, they have real import.

Since you haven't defined syncategoremata (I understand the implications of the greek, but have not used the word myself before) I can't say whether you have or haven't answered my question; If deictics are not concepts, what are they. So please be more explicit.

[BaalChatzaf]

Since you haven't defined syncategoremata (I understand the implications of the greek, but have not used the word myself before) I can't say whether you have or haven't answered my question; If deictics are not concepts, what are they. So please be more explicit.

They are words or phrases either written or spoken.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[thomtg]

[...]

"This/these" still does express a kind, an item or items close to the speakers, or close in the speech context. Numerator and denominator are similar concepts, they apply in the context of an expression of a fraction, but there is no natural class of denominators such that one can go purchase one at walmart or find one in a drawer at the smithsonian. Neither "this" nor "denominator" expresses a natural kind, such as spider or noble gas. Deictics require extant conscious minds for their existence in a way that amniote vertebtrates do not. Deictics are concepts of consciousness in Rand's terms. Again, a concept, but just a different kind of concept.

Rand emphatically does not say that conjunctions or prepositions don't correspond to anything in reality. They just don't correspond to entities as entities. "With oxygen and fuel and a source of ignition one gets combustion, but without oxygen there is none" is a statement with very real reference. You can't just omit or arbitrarily change the conjunctions there, they have real import.

Since you haven't defined syncategoremata (I understand the implications of the greek, but have not used the word myself before) I can't say whether you have or haven't answered my question; If deictics are not concepts, what are they. So please be more explicit.

A symbol is either a sign or a signal. If a word, being a visual-auditory symbol, does not denote a concept, then it must denote a concrete. Since syncategoremata are words that don't denote concepts, therefore they denote concretes in a conceptual method of cognition. Deictics like "this" and "these" denote concretes in such a method to form certain propositions.

Your comparison of "this" to "denominator" relies on their being in relationships. To that extent, "denominator" is indeed a natural concept; it is a concept of quantities in a ratio relationship. A comparable concept is "husband." By your analysis, husbands don't exist as "natural" kind. Yet, when we consider human beings in marriage relationships, husbands can be found to be the men in these relationships.

"This," on the other hand, is different. In every instance of the use of the word "denominator," the same set of referents are meant. This is not the case with "this." Each instance of "this" refers to a different "item or items close to the speakers, or close in the speech context." We can generalize from an introspective perspective that "this" appears to be relational to the speaker or speech context, but this generalization is once-removed from actual speech. This is second-intention generalization. Rand's concepts of consciousness arise from this sort of introspective generalization.

Every time I use "swan" and "white," I mean all instances of swans and all instances of whiteness, and I mean them the same way each time. I cannot do that with "this." There isn't any universal reference to it. If I use "this" in a sentence, I don't mean all instances of whatever items close to me or to the context for all times and places, past, present, and future. I only mean this item one time, here, in this context, and nothing else. Each evocation of "this" stands for and corresponds one-to-one to a concrete.

So, "this" cannot be a concept. It symbolically denotes a concrete that somehow enables the speaker to form a thought about a concrete. Similarly, all other syncategorematic words denote concretes that enable a conceptual being to form rational thoughts. Because "with" is a preposition, a concept denoting relations, it is not a syncategorematic word in your example. "And," on the other hand, is a syncategorema. "A boy and a girl went up the hill to fetch a pail of water." The three propositions formed are about a boy, a girl, and their action together. "And" has no category of its own; instead, it enables the speaker and reader to form a complete thought comprising the three propositions. Its effect is in the use of thoughtmaking, not in the content of the thought.

[merjet]

They [syncategoremata] are words or phrases either written or spoken.

That could be said about any word.

So, "this" cannot be a concept.

Why not? When "this" is used, there is something more specific it refers to. The referent could be a concrete, such as "this tree", or it could be a concept, such as "this theory."

[thomtg]

[...]

So, "this" cannot be a concept.

Why not? When "this" is used, there is something more specific it refers to. The referent could be a concrete, such as "this tree", or it could be a concept, such as "this theory."

When so referred as this concept of "swan" or that concept of "whiteness" or the theory of induction, the concepts and theory referred are actually mental concretes. The words "this," "that," and "the" may be considered adjectives from a grammatical perspective, but they themselves contribute no content to the thought fragment. That is, although the phrases "these swans" and "black swans" have the same grammatical structure, "these" doesn't modify "swans" in the same way as "black" does. The difference can be seen when regimented thusly: "So and so are swans and are black" vs. "So and so are swans and are the (or these or this)." Swans can be instances of blackness or whiteness, but they cannot be instances of the-ness or these-ness or this-ness.