Perception, Logic, and Language

[Paul Mawdsley]

1. Well, it depends on what the orthodox view of existence is. How is it defined? If you give me a definition, I can work off it. I didn't know there was an "orthodox view" versus all other views.

Jenna, I wanted to at least give you something to start with. By "orthodox view," I mean the view that has a large degree of acceptance by the majority of "in power" members of the community, otherwise known as the establishment. The " orthodox view" is so deeply accepted, and its truth so certain that it begins to be referred to as knowledge rather than as theory. Two examples would be the Copenhagen interpretation in quantum physics and the Big Bang theory in cosmology. The elevation of an idea, from theory to knowledge, stops the process of reevaluation and stops the consideration of other perspectives.

I happen to think David Bohm's causal approach to quantum physics deserves some serious consideration. It just happens to be perfectly in alignment with my own views on causation so I'm more than a little biassed. The Big Bang theory does not consider any of the evidence explored and integrated by plasma physics. I think both orthodoxies are on shaky causal ground and bare some reevaluation and reinterpretation of the evidence. This definitely puts me in the minority in any community.

Paul

[Paul Mawdsley]

Here are some links if you are interested. For the record, I am not saying that plasma cosmology should replace Big Bang. I do, however, think new integrations are in order.

Links

Bohmian Mechanics: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/

Plasma Physics: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plasma_(physics)

Plasma Cosmology: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plasma_cosmology

[Rich Engle]

Nick got temporarily hijacked onto the Bitter Bus:

Delete serious posts that hit too hard and may offend someone. Leave the frivolous ones. Yes, that's what we can do.

NIck, wasn't that a bit catty, stretchy, and off-thread? Sheesh!

[NickOtani]

NIck, wasn't that a bit catty, stretchy, and off-thread? Sheesh!

Sorry, I can't comment on that here.

You can protest our posting policy in public anywhere you wish. But not on OL.

bis bald,

Nick

[Rich Engle]

I think you already were commenting on it when you said that!

But right you are in any case...

[NickOtani]

I think you already were commenting on it when you said that!

Check the dates. I made the comment before agreeing to the prohibition. I can't comment on it now.

Please feel free to come to my messageboard:

http://p081.ezboard.com/bnickotanisneoobjectivism

bis bald,

Nick

[Paul Mawdsley]

4. What capacities of consciousness have been deemed unimportant?

5. What difference has it made to assume the existence of a method that connects one's perspective to the absolute?

4. So far in my science journey, whatever we know of consciousness is important. If we lacked memory, it would put a huge dent in the concept of self. But I'm not sure what you mean by "capacities", though-- for me, capacities of consciousness include volition, emotion, cognition, memory, etc. Or, they could mean what we are capable of. I'm not sure how you're using the word "capacities"...

5. I'm thinking absolute here means objective, that which exists independently of me. Scientifically, to assume a connection with reality, the difference has been scientific progress over the years to the extent that I opened a Gateway (computer) catalog and they were selling laptops with touch-sensitive screens, on which you could directly take notes on using a stylus, and save the notes into the computer.

What was running through my mind when I wrote about "capacities" of consciousness was the general tendency, throughout history, of thinkers aligning with some orientations of consciousness and dismissing others. Another thing that was playing on my mind was the idea that some objects of consciousness are, quite arbitrarily, deemed illusory, while others are held up as representing reality. These two things are interrelated. Certain orientations of consciousness bring to light specific types of objects of consciousness. I guess what I meant by capacities was the different orientations of consciousness we are able to generate, along with their associated different objects and ways of processing information.

On epistemological and metaphysical grounds, Platonic orientations tend to dismiss Aristotelean orientations and vice versa. Empiricist orientations tend to dismiss rationalists, as do the reverse. Objectivist orientations tend to dismiss other orientations, as I am sure also happens the other way around. Determinists and free will-ists also tend to dismiss each other. Everyone seems to have some parts of themselves they own and some they disown. In disowning an orientation of consciousness within ourselves we devalue the processes and the information it contains and we devalue those who value it. We deem anything associated with a disowned orientation of consciousness as unimportant and not worthy of our attention.

I don"t really see "the absolute" as being the same as "objective." "Objective" is an orientation of consciousness that assumes the evidence of the senses and reason to be the standard of value of an idea. As such, "objective" is an epistemological orientation. "The absolute," in this context, is a metaphysical concept. It is the nature of existence as it exists separate to any particular perception of it. It is existence as only an omniscient being could know it. As an epistemological tool, sometimes the objective orientation is imagined to have the power of creating a direct connection to the truth, to the absoluteness of reality. The point that this orientation misses is that we only have access to phenomena. The underlying nature of the patterns that make up our experience of phenomena, the underlying nature of entities we assume to exist, and the underlying nature of causation we believe to be real, cannot be observed directly or with the aid of technology. These concepts must be abstracted and integrated from the evidence. These concepts must be constructed in the imagination and used to guide the building of models of existence. And these models of existence must be tested against the evidence for precision and inclusiveness.

My basic problem with orthodox views of existence is that they lack inclusiveness. Even in principle, they cannot integrate all the available evidence. I believe this is due to them being based on a view of identity and causality that is incomplete. The solution to the lack of inclusiveness has been to deem as unimportant and not worthy of attention any evidence that does not fit the prevailing concept of causation.

Dragonfly's post citing Darwin seems pertinent here. If one focusses on the evidence that does not fit the theories and if one focuses on the issues that are central to conflicts that have arisen in each of the sciences, at the core of the traditional debates is causality stirring up trouble. In physics, in biology, in evolution theory, in psychology, in epistemology, in metaphysics, in ethics, in politics, causality is quietly at the centre of many traditional debates. Today there is the appearance that many of these debates have been resolved. However, for the most part, things remain divided between human actions, on the one hand, and non-human animate and inanimate objects, on the other. Wherever things are human we tend to assume an element that is causally proactive in nature (eg: free will): in psychology, epistemology, ethics and politics, for example. Wherever things are not human we tend to assume a nature that is completely causally reactive.

The causally proactive agent-to-action perspective of human nature tends to ignore the fact that it is based on a view of causation that is completely incompatible with the reactive causation that has been used to explain the rest of the universe. The causally reactive action-to-action perspective of existence tends to ignore the evidence that some parts of existence seem to act spontaneously without prior necessitating cause. The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory can be considered a rationalization for ignoring the fact that quantum events appear to exhibit spontaneous proactive behaviour. Viewing "free will" to be an illusion can be considered a rationalization for ignoring the fact that we have introspective evidence of spontaneous proactive behaviour.

The proactive agent-to-action and the reactive action-to-action concepts of causation cannot be integrated. They form a causal dualism that parallels the well known substance dualism exposed by Descartes. The solution is to create a deeper, more precise, concept of causation that can account for all these phenomena without contradiction, disowning, ignoring, or deeming any evidence as unimportant and not worthy of attention. I think the view of causation that started with Aristotle, and evolved through AR and NB, is a step in the right direction but still needs to be made more precise and inclusive.

Paul

Edited August 12, 2006 by Paul Mawdsley