Greg Nyquist replies to Seddon

[Daniel Barnes]

Fred Seddon's JARS review of Greg Nyquist's book "Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature" is IMHO a rather embarrassing piece of work. While I analyse its various confusions in detail here, its worst feature is that Seddon studiously avoids Nyquist's central criticism of Rand: that while she talked incessantly about basing knowledge in reality, in practice she did nothing of the sort.

Now Nyquist's official JARS reply to Seddon, "Rand and Empirical Responsibility" is also available online. Nyquist argues that intellectuals in general prefer to avoid the ugly facts of reality that might ruin their beautiful theories, and that Rand, despite her protestations, is yet another in this tradition. She talks the talk, but doesn't even try to walk the walk. There is almost nil empirical evidence accompanying her various theories; in fact, as Nyquist's book rather devastatingly demonstrates, when compared with the evidence, many of Rand's theories turn out to have no basis in reality; they are little more than rationalisations of her personal prejudices. As she is claiming that these theories are true - and even vitally important for the survival of the human race (!) - and strongly encouraging people to live their lives by them, it is very important to realise how little real evidence she has for them. In fact what evidence there is strongly contradicts her.

The latest JARS also contains Seddon's reply to Nyquist's reply, which is not online as yet. JARS subscribers, however, will be able to follow the debate, as Nyquist's reply to Seddon's latest is now up too. Click here.

Edited April 25, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

I just finished rereading Fred's review and ALL of the material in the links you provided. Unfortunately I let my subscription to JARS expire and did not receive the latest issue, so I have not read Fred's rebuttal.

I think Nyquist was correct in trying to present anew his core arguments against Rand. Too much that ensued online seemed more like verbal dueling than actual discussion or critique.

But before even getting to Rand, I think it should be clear that, from what I understand, Nyquist views philosophy in general to be silly, or at least disconnected from reality. He wrote:

Philosophy, if we define it by the example of the great philosophers, is primarily concerned with providing rationalizations for the idols of human sentiment. So if, as I contended in my book, Objectivism is largely a rationalization of Rand’s peculiar vision of man and society, that does not necessarily make Rand a bad philosopher. After all, isn’t she merely following in the footsteps of Plato, Hegel, Marx and other great philosophers, who also rationalized preconceived notions?

His attitude toward philosophy (as I have perceived it) is actually is summed up very nicely by a recent anonymous poster on your blog here.

From Aristotle (the King of Arguing from First Principles) to Bacon (Father of the Scientific Method), how much scientific advancement was made? How many major discoveries? Major truths about the nature of mankind and the universe in which he dwells? How about political developments? The advancements of human freedom? The spread of democratic forms of government?

And from Bacon to present day, how many scientific discoveries have there been? How many breakthroughs in medicine, physics, chemisty, geology, biology, etc.? How much better do we understand the universe and mankind?

This makes me wonder why Nyquist bothers with a critique of philosophy at all. I was unable to discern why (but maybe there is a reason given in the part of his book I have not read yet), other than discomfort that the works of great artists will somehow be diminished if Rand is right (although I am unable to see this point very clearly) and his statement that it is dangerous to implement political theories based on an incorrect view of human nature (and I am in 100% agreement with this).

My own main difference with Nyquist up to now (in my reading) as regards his basic appraisal of Rand is in interpreting her insights. He claims she is flat out wrong on everything within a particular point if he can find she is wrong about one thing. (I think this is due to his applying the falsifiability principle to philosophy.) I have found that when one limits the scope of what Rand wrote in places where some point obviously clashes with reality (the tabula rasa concept for instance), her insights are quite profound.

As a good example, in considering one of Rand's extensions of the tabula rasa premise (programming the subconscious), using Nyquist's method, he claims that science shows this theory to be false (for a number of reasons he mentions). Period. End of question. If the scope delimiting lens is applied, however, the following statement bears up: Although one cannot consciously program all of one's emotions, one can rationally program a great many of them. Then this becomes not only true, but a useful observation that can serve as grounds for developing techniques.

Speaking of the falsifiability method, I have yet to encounter a decent refutation of the certainty criticism of falsifiability: How can one be certain that something is false if one cannot be certain that something is true? Maybe a reason exists that has been given. I have yet to encounter it.

As I was reading, a word kept jumping out at me even when it was not in the text: induction. A more thorough discussion of this is needed before addressing Nyquist's complaint that nobody is discussing Rand's lack of evidence—and I believe he is correct to keep harping on this point. Ignoring it will not make it go away. I too have been uncomfortable at times with some of Rand's statements when she engages in what I call "argument by proclamation"

Nyquist gives some good examples of this such as: “Emotions are the automatic results of man’s value judgments integrated by the subconscious.” Some evidence certainly would have been useful. Still, in this case, he dismisses her claim outright whereas I apply the scope filter. If read “Many emotions are the automatic results of man’s value judgments integrated by the subconscious,” this is a strong insight and I am sure it is easy for any reader to find evidence of it from his own experiences in life.

More later. It is too late to continue.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael K:

>I think it should be clear that, from what I understand, Nyquist views philosophy in general to be silly, or at least disconnected from reality....This makes me wonder why Nyquist bothers with a critique of philosophy at all.

Because as we see from history, ideas that are basically silly can still be powerful and be taken very seriously by people. If they become widespread they can be harmful. Hence the need for serious criticism, no matter what field the ideas come from. Besides, Nyquist critiques not just her philsophical ideas but her political, historical, and aesthetic ones too.

>My own main difference with Nyquist up to now (in my reading) as regards his basic appraisal of Rand is in interpreting her insights. He claims she is flat out wrong on everything within a particular point if he can find she is wrong about one thing. (I think this is due to his applying the falsifiability principle to philosophy.) I have found that when one limits the scope of what Rand wrote in places where some point obviously clashes with reality (the tabula rasa concept for instance), her insights are quite profound.

Actually Nyquist says that there is a quite a bit of truth in Rand's theories. This is because there is a grain of truth in most philosophies, and this leads to what is known as the irrefutability of philosophical systems. That is, if someone really wants to believe something, you never finally prove them wrong - they will always come up with reasons to cling to their beliefs, even in the teeth of the evidence. Thus we Popperians place a great deal of emphasis on the critical attitude - on not clinging to beliefs to strongly, and testing your own beliefs through criticism. If you read a book like "The Logic Of Scientific Discovery" you will see how painstakingly Popper outlines the many potential criticisms of his theories, and provides comprehensive answers to them.

So one can always find things that Rand is right about. It is simply impossible to be completely wrong about everything! Even Ptolemy's theory of epicycles can be made to be roughly fit the phenomena if a diehard Ptolemy fan is prepared to work hard enough at it. But at a certain point isn't it better to just say: it's wrong?

As Nyquist noted over at the ARCHN blog, using Rand in a filtered way - "scope filtered" if you like - as a vague sort of inspiration, could of course be quite positive. If one tried to follow her actual teachings, however, you will run into serious difficulties, because despite these grains of truth they are for the most part demonstrably false.

>Speaking of the falsifiability method, I have yet to encounter a decent refutation of the certainty criticism of falsifiability: How can one be certain that something is false if one cannot be certain that something is true?

But Popper didn't say falsifiability gave certainty, only logical validity. This can hardly be a criticism, however, as competing theories, including Rand's, don't have any better sources of certainty themselves! Popper calls the quest for certainty as "the central mistake". As I've noted, her "contextual certainty" etc is a mere oxymoron, and as such no more solves an epistemological problem than saying something is "free, except you have to pay for it" solves an economic problem.

Edited April 26, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

Please excuse the nitpicking below, but I have a thing for precision and I want to make sure we are talking about the same thing.

Besides, Nyquist critiques not just her philsophical ideas but her political, historical, and aesthetic ones too.

Do you exclude politics, history and aesthetics from philosophy, or was this a slip? One of the most useful things I learned from my reading of Nyquist was that history and human nature should be included in the categories of philosophy.

Actually Nyquist says that there is a quite a bit of truth in Rand's theories. This is because there is a grain of truth in most philosophies, and this leads to what is known as the irrefutability of philosophical systems. That is, if someone really wants to believe something, you never finally prove them wrong - they will always come up with reasons to cling to their beliefs, even in the teeth of the evidence.

I am confused by what you mean by truth here. Stubbornness can constitute truth for Popperians?

Objectivism holds that truth means correspondence of knowledge to fact. Facts are absolute and knowledge of them is contextual. Thus you can have degrees of truth but not degrees of fact. The closer knowledge approaches fact, the truer it is. I don't know how to reconcile this meaning with what you are saying.

Thus we Popperians place a great deal of emphasis on the critical attitude - on not clinging to beliefs to strongly, and testing your own beliefs through criticism. If you read a book like "The Logic Of Scientific Discovery" you will see how painstakingly Popper outlines the many potential criticisms of his theories, and provides comprehensive answers to them.

I need time, but I fully intend to read Popper. It is premature for me to discuss or critiques his views, but I can discuss your presentation of his views (and Nyquist's).

As Nyquist noted over at the ARCHN blog, using Rand in a filtered way - "scope filtered" if you like - as a vague sort of inspiration, could of course be quite positive. If one tried to follow her actual teachings, however, you will run into serious difficulties, because despite these grains of truth they are for the most part demonstrably false.

So you are saying that it is better to claim that Rand was wrong and NO emotions can be programmed by conscious thought because some cannot be and she claimed all can be (and even elaborated on several)?

But Popper didn't say falsifiability gave certainty, only logical validity.

Good point. The error in my question stemmed from my lack of familiarity with Popper's writings (except one essay and a few articles on him, none of which I have read in full critical/open minded focus yes). One thing should be made clear, and I will quote Leonard Peikoff because he was exceptionally lucid on this point. From OPAR, p. 8):

Proof is the derivation of a conclusion from antecedent knowledge...

. . .

"Validation" I take to be a broader term than "proof," one that subsumes any process of establishing an idea's relationship to reality, whether deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, or perceptual self-evidence.

Thus for Objectivists, there are 3 forms for validating knowledge and which one is used/needed is part of the context (in addition to time and previous knowledge). Please keep this in mind when you criticize "contextual certainty."

I am aware that Popperians claim that induction is not valid (Nyquist in ARCHN claimed that he does not believe it even exists, if I remember correctly.) I am not clear on where Popperians connect logical validity to reality. Objectivists connect deduction and induction through "perceptual self-evidence" of fundamental axioms as the starting point.

I have seen the meaning of this distorted by those arguing against Rand. They take reliance on sensory evidence as starting point to mean that the sense organs are infallible, when no Objectivist I know of claims that. The Objectivist position, as I understand it, holds that the senses are proper organs for interacting with external reality. This means that when they are in proper working order, they provide correct and reliable input.

Even Popperians need eyes to see (and observe experiments and read), so at some level, they must allow that sensory evidence is needed to form knowledge.

Michael

[Martin Radwin]

I am aware that Popperians claim that induction is not valid (Nyquist in ARCHN claimed that he does not believe it even exists, if I remember correctly.) I am not clear on where Popperians connect logical validity to reality. Objectivists connect deduction and induction through "perceptual self-evidence" of fundamental axioms as the starting point.

What exactly does it mean to claim that induction is not valid?

Martin

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael:

>Do you exclude politics, history and aesthetics from philosophy, or was this a slip?

If you want to include everything under the rubric "philosophy" be my guest. I tend to differentiate philosophy from say history, just as a philosophy professor is different from a history professor. But I don't insist that everyone else does.

>Objectivism holds that truth means correspondence of knowledge to fact. Facts are absolute and knowledge of them is contextual. Thus you can have degrees of truth but not degrees of fact. The closer knowledge approaches fact, the truer it is. I don't know how to reconcile this meaning with what you are saying.

This is what I am saying. What you outline here is pretty much the Popperian position. Thus, Objectivism can have some correspondence with the facts, thus a grain of truth. But as it does not correspond with the facts as well as other theories, it is a weaker approximation of the truth than other theories, just as Ptolemy is a weaker approximation than Newton.

>So you are saying that it is better to claim that Rand was wrong and NO emotions can be programmed by conscious thought because some cannot be and she claimed all can be (and even elaborated on several)?

If Rand says "all emotions are programmable by conscious thought" and it turns out only some are, then her theory is false. (It simply does not follow that if her theory is false, "no" emotions are programmable, BTW)

Look, if Rand had a theory that said "All Texans are called George" would you consider that the fact some were called George therefore made this theory true???

>"Validation" I take to be a broader term than "proof," one that subsumes any process of establishing an idea's relationship to reality, whether deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, or perceptual self-evidence....Thus for Objectivists, there are 3 forms for validating knowledge and which one is used/needed is part of the context (in addition to time and previous knowledge). Please keep this in mind when you criticize "contextual certainty."

The fact that these forms of "validation" fundamentally clash is the whole problem with your position! How can you say these are forms of "validation" when induction is deductively invalid? It's like a man with two watches whose times contradict each other. Doesn't matter how you dress it up, and talk about how individually reliable these watches supposedly are. Fact is, you can't have both.

>I am not clear on where Popperians connect logical validity to reality.

There is an essay in Popper's "Conjectures and Refutations" which will give you a good handle on this. It's called "Why Are The Laws Of Logic Applicable to Reality?" or similar.

>I have seen the meaning of this distorted by those arguing against Rand...Even Popperians need eyes to see (and observe experiments and read), so at some level, they must allow that sensory evidence is needed to form knowledge.

Who denies this? Popperians only say that the senses are not absolutely reliable sources of truth. Even Aristotle agreed with this.

To repeat: the main criticism of what you write above is that induction and deduction clash. I recommend you take some time to get your head around this problem, as it is the truth of the situation.

Edited April 26, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Brant Gaede]

History is not a part of philosophy. It is the past rendered unto the present by various means and is generally understood to go back as far as written language. If no written language it is archeology or even paleontology regarding humans and their ancestors. Anthropology is generally present day though extrapolation can be used to infer some of the past.

An Objectivist philosophy would only want as objective history as possible, but will not tell about that content.

Aesthetics is not a part of philosophy except out of the desire to objectify too.

Politics is not ...

Ethics is not ...

Reason is not a part of philosophy except out of the desire to objectify reality hence the laws of logic.

What then is Objectivism qua philosophy? The objectification--the objective understanding--of reality. Putting reality into one's own mind using the art of non-contradictory identification and telling oneself and others the best courses of conduct all considered along with the particular reasons. It is human understanding and human action. It is a process of processes. It is objectification.

What then is philosophy qua philosophy? Nothing if not Objectivism. A bunch of opinions, digested and undigested, is not a philosophy only the mind's screwed up operating software.

Objectivism, "the philosophy of Ayn Rand" is not Objectivism, it is mostly her opinions about whatever she thought was Objectivism, cast in stone. She had a right to claim it as hers for she formulated it. We have the right now to claim it as ours properly formulated. No one has an exclusive claim to reality or the means of apprehending it, hence an exclusive claim to Objectivism, the philosophy of objectifiers.

Teach that.

--Brant

Edited April 26, 2007 by Brant Gaede

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Brant,

In terms of history being part of philosophy, I have seen this called several things by Objectivists: historiology, philosophy of history, philosophical anthropology, etc.

The fact is that the very first nonfiction book on Objectivism, For the New Intellectual, opened with an essay by Rand on the philosophy of history. And the very first book Rand credited to be by an Objectivist scholar other than herself, The Ominous Parallels by Peikoff, is a book on the philosophy of history.

History is not mentioned as a separate category of philosophy in Objectivist literature, however it is present in Objectivist publications right at the outset.

Also, I have seen that Human Nature is covered in OPAR in Chapter 6, "Man." Unfortunately, Peikoff implies that he is deriving the nature of man from metaphysics and epistemology.

These two branches make possible a view of the nature of man (chapter 6).

I personally think that human nature should be the starting point of philosophy.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

If you want to include everything under the rubric "philosophy" be my guest. I tend to differentiate philosophy from say history, just as a philosophy professor is different from a history professor.

I presume then that you disagree with Nyquist on this. ARCHN is predicated on philosophy of history being one of the branches of philosophy. Incidentally, it is perfectly possible to have a philosophy of history and a more specialized field of history. I don't see one canceling the other.

>Objectivism holds that truth means correspondence of knowledge to fact. Facts are absolute and knowledge of them is contextual. Thus you can have degrees of truth but not degrees of fact. The closer knowledge approaches fact, the truer it is. I don't know how to reconcile this meaning with what you are saying.

This is what I am saying. What you outline here is pretty much the Popperian position.

Since Objectivism and Popperism are identical on this point, what's the beef?

Thus, Objectivism can have some correspondence with the facts, thus a grain of truth. But as it does not correspond with the facts as well as other theories, it is a weaker approximation of the truth than other theories, just as Ptolemy is a weaker approximation than Newton.

I don't follow this at all. We are basically discussing the theory of knowledge here, where the Objectivist position is the same as the Popperian one (going by what you just wrote). Where in the Objectivist theory of knowledge is there only "some correspondence with the facts, thus a grain of truth"? I have some criticisms on limitations in Objectivism, as you know, but not on this point.

If Rand says "all emotions are programmable by conscious thought" and it turns out only some are, then her theory is false. (It simply does not follow that if her theory is false, "no" emotions are programmable, BTW)

Look, if Rand had a theory that said "All Texans are called George" would you consider that the fact some were called George therefore made this theory true???

I would agree with wholesale dismissal of the theory if the theory as stated were ALL Rand wrote about it. However, she delved deeply into some of the emotions that are programmable. By wholesale dismissal, you throw the baby out with the bathwater. I don't agree with the correspondence of your George example here because of this. Georges and other people are different entities. The emotional faculty is one part of the human organism and Rand was discussing the nature of it. Apples and chickens.

>"Validation" I take to be a broader term than "proof," one that subsumes any process of establishing an idea's relationship to reality, whether deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, or perceptual self-evidence....Thus for Objectivists, there are 3 forms for validating knowledge and which one is used/needed is part of the context (in addition to time and previous knowledge). Please keep this in mind when you criticize "contextual certainty."

The fact that these forms of "validation" fundamentally clash is the whole problem with your position! How can you say these are forms of "validation" when induction is deductively invalid? It's like a man with two watches whose times contradict each other. Doesn't matter how you dress it up, and talk about how individually reliable these watches supposedly are. Fact is, you can't have both.

>I am not clear on where Popperians connect logical validity to reality.

There is an essay in Popper's "Conjectures and Refutations" which will give you a good handle on this. It's called "Why Are The Laws Of Logic Applicable to Reality?" or similar.

I don't understand what you mean by clash. I suspect you mean that induction is not deduction, but we will have to wait until I read the essay for me to be able to talk about this with better understanding of the Popperian view. Thank you for the indication.

>I have seen the meaning of this distorted by those arguing against Rand...Even Popperians need eyes to see (and observe experiments and read), so at some level, they must allow that sensory evidence is needed to form knowledge.

Who denies this? Popperians only say that the senses are not absolutely reliable sources of truth. Even Aristotle agreed with this.

We might have a problem with the concept of truth here. If you are talking about conceptual truth, we agree (and so does Objectivism from my understanding). The senses are not conceptually reliable. But this is because identification (differentiation and integration) is done by the brain, not the senses. Accusing the senses of unreliability for not being a brain is kind of strange in my view.

Here is an example: the famous pencil in a glass of water appearing to be bent. The pencil only appears to be bent because an image of a straight pencil was formed beforehand (integrated) from other experiences and the element of light refraction in water now needs to be added to the mix (new integration). This is a conceptual problem (or perceptual one).

On the sensory level, the light waves are transformed into nerve impulses and transmitted to the brain in both cases. This is done in a completely reliable and perfect manner. This is "truth" on a sensory level: raw factual data is fed into the organism. Note that the raw factual data itself has an absolute nature and the faculty of sight as a fact considered separately from the agent's use of it has an absolute nature. There are two facts operating here and both have absolute natures. Note also that this process is always done in a completely reliable and perfect manner unless the faculty of sight is damaged or diseased. This is the interface between the organism and external reality. Our senses are perfectly reliable faculties of raw data input.

If you deny this, you make sight an arbitrary experience without a definable nature.

How entities, colors, shapes, backgrounds and so forth are integrated and differentiated (identified) by the brain after sensory input occurs is another matter. As knowledge gets mixed with other knowledge in the brain, context is formed.

Thus we have two levels of truth—two meanings—not just one. If you want to look at this from a deductive point of view, using the same word with two different meanings to falsify the same proposition is a logical fallacy.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

On the sensory level, the light waves are transformed into nerve impulses and transmitted to the brain in both cases. This is done in a completely reliable and perfect manner. This is "truth" on a sensory level: raw factual data is fed into the organism. Note that the raw factual data itself has an absolute nature and the faculty of sight as a fact considered separately from the agent's use of it has an absolute nature. There are two facts operating here and both have absolute natures. Note also that this process is always done in a completely reliable and perfect manner unless the faculty of sight is damaged or diseased. This is the interface between the organism and external reality. Our senses are perfectly reliable faculties of raw data input.

Sorry, but that is nonsense. What do you mean by "reliable"? The term "reliable" presupposes a norm, the possibility of being not reliable. If I were a randroid I would say that you're using a stolen concept, but as I'm not a randroid, I won't say that. If you want to talk about the reliability of a process, you should be able to make a comparison between the input and the output of that process. Merely saying that the input is the input (A is A, yeah sure) is meaningless. The question is: what should we compare in that process to make the statement about the realibility of the senses meaningful? We might say that we should compare the sensory data with the external reality. The next question is then: how do we know what the external reality is? Many Objectivists will probably answer: that what you perceive with your senses. But that is of course a circular argument.

What we in fact do is to compare the sensory data with a model of what we call the external world. I can already hear the next question: how can you compare a model with reality if you only have access to the model and not to "reality itself"? The answer is that our general experience is that the model is consistent and convergent. It shows regularities, predictable behavior of the world around us. Different people in general arrive at the same conclusions about the physical world (if A sees a rock lying somewhere, B who is with him also sees that rock lying there). We can enhance our information by using science and instruments, and this shows the convergence: the information thus gained is also consistent and more accurate than that which we perceive without such tools (problems arise when you're probing at atomic scales, but that is a different story which we'll ignore here). The fact that our model is so consistent and can be made more and more accurate without losing consistency, that we can derive scientific laws which enable us to make accurate predictions, induces us to suppose that there is something invariant, that what we call an external reality. It is like an asymptote for our model: we can come closer and closer but we'll never get the thing itself. But with the accurate model we have we can make comparisons, and that's why we can conclude that our senses are not infallible (one of the weirdest Objectivist dogmas I've heard).

Optical illusions are a good example of how our senses can be led astray, as we have the means to check in an independent way, for example by using measuring sticks, light meters, etc. our incorrect model with the more consistent, scientifically validated model, so that we can conclude that the latter is a more correct rendering of that elusive reality than the model we create when we're fooled by our senses. I'd call the model that is based on the accumulated knowledge of a large number of independent scientists, the "Big Model" and the knowledge of one person at a certain moment the "Small Model". When you observe that your small model is in conflict with the big model, it is in general a good strategy to adapt the small model to the big model (for example to accept that the optical illusion is indeed an illusion). That is not to say that the big model is perfect, far from it! It might even be the case that some aspect in the small model turns out to work better than the big model, in other words that you've falsified a certain scientific theory. But experience has taught us that you'd better not bet on it.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Sorry, but that is nonsense. What do you mean by "reliable"? The term "reliable" presupposes a norm, the possibility of being not reliable.

Dragonfly,

Actually it is not nonsense. If you wish to see unreliability on the level of sight for comparison, use a blind person or partially blind (or otherwise optically impaired) person. That person's sight is not reliable. I also explained that reliable—in the sense I was using it (and Objectivism from what I am able to gather)—means a sense organ restricted to its function as a gatherer of data input. I'm sorry if this doesn't fit your meaning so as to become nonsense. If I were talking about comparing sense input to already integrated data, I agree that I would be talking nonsense, but I think I already demonstrated that I was not talking about that.

If I were a randroid I would say that you're using a stolen concept, but as I'm not a randroid, I won't say that. If you want to talk about the reliability of a process, you should be able to make a comparison between the input and the output of that process. Merely saying that the input is the input (A is A, yeah sure) is meaningless.

I simply don't follow this reasoning. Where are the conceptual referents I have omitted? A person is said to have 20-20 vision when his sight is in perfect working order. Any other numerical measure result shows that data is being inputted imperfectly. This is a test of reliability. What does the law of identity have to do with this (except underlie it) and how is the law of identity somehow a negative aspect anyway? I didn't catch your meaning.

The question is: what should we compare in that process to make the statement about the realibility of the senses meaningful? We might say that we should compare the sensory data with the external reality.

Actually we do. With sight, we test with lenses and lights and we use already known figures or letters for the tested person to identify to delimit the influence of the integrative part and focus instead on sensory performance.

The next question is then: how do we know what the external reality is? Many Objectivists will probably answer: that what you perceive with your senses. But that is of course a circular argument.

Well, when we sit in a opticians chair, we are perceiving the tests with our sight. I don't see how you can prove the functioning of sight deductively. Anyway, on the sensory level, there is no such thing as an argument. There is only data input. You either input it (one sees) or you don't (one is blind).

What we in fact do is to compare the sensory data with a model of what we call the external world. I can already hear the next question: how can you compare a model with reality if you only have access to the model and not to "reality itself"? The answer is that our general experience is that the model is consistent and convergent. It shows regularities, predictable behavior of the world around us. Different people in general arrive at the same conclusions about the physical world (if A sees a rock lying somewhere, B who is with him also sees that rock lying there). We can enhance our information by using science and instruments, and this shows the convergence: the information thus gained is also consistent and more accurate than that which we perceive without such tools (problems arise when you're probing at atomic scales, but that is a different story which we'll ignore here). The fact that our model is so consistent and can be made more and more accurate without losing consistency, that we can derive scientific laws which enable us to make accurate predictions, induces us to suppose that there is something invariant, that what we call an external reality. It is like an asymptote for our model: we can come closer and closer but we'll never get the thing itself. But with the accurate model we have we can make comparisons, and that's why we can conclude that our senses are not infallible (one of the weirdest Objectivist dogmas I've heard).

Here we have a problem of you not accepting my meanings. What you are calling models is exactly what Objectivism calls percepts and concepts. You have jumped to the perceptual/conceptual level and now fault the sense input for not being "reliable" to previously formed percepts/concepts.

Also, I am surprised to see you use the strawman approach ("I can already hear the next question..."), and I certainly would not have asked the question you proposed ("how can you compare a model with reality if you only have access to the model and not to 'reality itself'?") because the actual fact is the contrary. And that is very clear to me. A sense organ does not have access to a model (concept). (I include "sense of sight" as part of "me.") It only has access to "reality itself." The sense of sight transforms physical light waves into nerve impulses. The sense of sight does not access our concepts. It merely feeds data gathered from external reality to the brain. It's function stops there and turns over the work of identification to the brain.

The rest of your argument deals with how to interpret data that was perfectly inputted. If the light waves were not transformed into nerve impulses, there would be no comparisons to make. The fact that consistency is seen between so many people and the fact that sight can be corrected by lenses and surgery proves the reliability of the organ to work perfectly for what it was developed by evolution to perform.

Extending this reasoning further, the fact of sight is an absolute. The fact of the faculty of sight is an absolute. The fact of the nature of that faculty is an absolute. Our knowledge of all this is contextual.

Optical illusions are a good example of how our senses can be led astray, as we have the means to check in an independent way, for example by using measuring sticks, light meters, etc. our incorrect model with the more consistent, scientifically validated model, so that we can conclude that the latter is a more correct rendering of that elusive reality than the model we create when we're fooled by our senses.

You are already on a perceptual/conceptual level here and not on a sensory one. There can be no optical illusion without memory of a previous shape or color which was integrated from raw sensory input. The very fact that there is an illusion (and that illusion is repeatable) is proof that optical data is being perfectly inputted. If the illusion were different each time under identical circumstances, I would then say that there is a problem with the data being inputted. In an optical illusion, perfectly inputted data is merely being organized (integrated) against a previous standard of integration in order to identify an external referent where such referent, or a similar one, has already been identified in past experience. The data itself (the nerve impulses which used to be light waves) is perfect. What this data means is the point where illusions arise, but then that point is no longer the sensory level.

I'd call the model that is based on the accumulated knowledge of a large number of independent scientists, the "Big Model" and the knowledge of one person at a certain moment the "Small Model". When you observe that your small model is in conflict with the big model, it is in general a good strategy to adapt the small model to the big model (for example to accept that the optical illusion is indeed an illusion). That is not to say that the big model is perfect, far from it! It might even be the case that some aspect in the small model turns out to work better than the big model, in other words that you've falsified a certain scientific theory. But experience has taught us that you'd better not bet on it.

I like the Big Model and Small Model approach for testing percepts/concepts and how data is integrated. This allows for restricting the impact of context. But this is not a method for dealing with the data input itself (transforming light waves into nerve impulses). This approach is only valid when you sit in the optician's chair and test your individual sense organ (sight) against a standard of functioning that was derived from measuring features of the sense of sight of countless other human beings and animals and finally decided on and fixed. But this is not Small Model and Big Model per se because the functioning itself is not a model (concept) but actual performance. You are testing the reliability of your sense organ. It is either perfectly reliable to function at inputting data or impaired or not functioning at all.

What is it in this idea that leads to it being resisted so strongly?

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael:

>I presume then that you disagree with Nyquist on this. ARCHN is predicated on philosophy of history being one of the branches of philosophy.

If you and Greg want to do that, you're both welcome to!

>Incidentally, it is perfectly possible to have a philosophy of history and a more specialized field of history. I don't see one canceling the other.

Who said anything about one "cancelling the other"?

>Since Objectivism and Popperism are identical on this point, what's the beef?

Right here. You write:

"Facts are absolute and knowledge of them is contextual."

Let's step through this so we're crystal clear on it. This means:

1) Facts, and knowledge of them, are two different things. The difference is that

2) Facts are absolute and not contextual

3) Knowledge, in contrast, is contextual and not absolute.

Thus, following the bouncing ball here, we arrive at the finding that knowledge is not absolute. And guess what: you're right! This is called skepticism 101. Welcome to the club.

Now, you'll find Fred Seddon also puts forward a similarly skeptical theory of knowledge ("We may know P, but P may not be true") as being Rand's true view in his original review of Nyquist (see the last few paras of my "The Absent Minded Professor" linked above).

The problem for both of you is that Rand disagreed violently with skepticism, and heaped scorn and abuse on anyone who suggested it!

This is because Rand's theory of knowledge is highly confused. Some elements do end up strongly agreeing with skepticism (as I have said many times, "contextual certainty" or is just ordinary skeptical uncertainty in Objectivist drag). Others - particularly Rand's rhetoric - fly in the face of it. Her epistemology is easily the most incoherent part of her philosophy.

>I don't understand what you mean by clash. I suspect you mean that induction is not deduction,

By clash, I mean that by holding both to be valid means of finding the truth, you end up in contradiction.

Let's step through it. You claim:

P1: Induction is a valid means of discovering truth

P2: Deduction is a valid means of discovering truth

However:

P3: Induction is not deductively valid.

C: Therefore you cannot hold that P1 and P2 are both valid without contradiction.

You got problems.

>On the sensory level, the light waves are transformed into nerve impulses and transmitted to the brain in both cases. This is done in a completely reliable and perfect manner....If you deny this, you make sight an arbitrary experience without a definable nature.

No, no, no! This does not follow in the least. There is no such thing as "completely reliable or perfect" senses, and denying this does not mean that the senses are "arbitrary." Actually, our senses give us an excellent and highly reliable model of the world, having been honed by millions of years of evolution in our particular niche. But this does not mean they are "completely reliable and perfect". They are fallible, just like anything else. There are hundreds of examples, starting with Aristotle putting his finger on his eye and seeing double, and not just optical illusions, phantom pain in limbs, etc.

Read what Dragonfly wrote.

Edited April 26, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael:

>It is either perfectly reliable to function at inputting data or impaired or not functioning at all.

This is simply wrong. Consider the lens of the human eye. While broadly similar across the species, it actually varies in a small degree between each human being - and even changes as you age.

Thus it simply cannot be "perfectly reliable"! Very good, yes. But not perfect.

[Dragonfly]

Actually it is not nonsense. If you wish to see unreliability on the level of sight for comparison, use a blind person or partially blind (or otherwise optically impaired) person. That person's sight is not reliable.

And how do you know that that is not reliable? (I'm speaking of the "optically impaired" person, the blind person is of course not relevant, if vision doesn't function at all the term "reliable" has little meaning). You can only arrive at that conclusion by comparing that what he claims to see with that what we (others, instruments) can see, in other words by comparing percepts and/or concepts, not by comparing raw sense data. You admit the possibility of "optically impaired" persons, I suppose you mean people with serious defects in their vision, which may be a handicap. But why should there only be either perfection (total reliability) or serious impairment (very unreliable) or total blindness and nothing in between? This really doesn't make sense to me.

I also explained that reliable—in the sense I was using it (and Objectivism from what I am able to gather)—means a sense organ restricted to its function as a gatherer of data input. I'm sorry if this doesn't fit your meaning so as to become nonsense. If I were talking about comparing sense input to already integrated data, I agree that I would be talking nonsense, but I think I already demonstrated that I was not talking about that.

If you restrict the sense organ to its function as gatherer of data input the term "reliable" becomes meaningless, it always presumes a comparison between some input and some output. The output doesn't have to be the conscious percepts, it can also be the nerve pulses coming from the retina as a function of the photons that fall on that retina. You'd expect that there is some relation between the number of photons and their energy and the kind of nerve pulses going to the brain. I'm no physiologist, so I don't know what kind of relations that are, but I can for example imagine that more nerve pulses in a certain channel corresponds to more photons falling on a particular spot of the retina, and that the brain translates the larger number of pulses into a brighter spot. Now you have something you can compare, but how can you ever state categorically that this (sub)process is perfectly reliable? We only can conclude that in general the system doesn't work too badly (good enough for us to survive), but that certainly doesn't imply that it is totally reliable! In fact we know that it can't be totally reliable, due to physical and physiological limitations.

I simply don't follow this reasoning. Where are the conceptual referents I have omitted? A person is said to have 20-20 vision when his sight is in perfect working order. Any other numerical measure result shows that data is being inputted imperfectly. This is a test of reliability. What does the law of identity have to do with this (except underlie it) and how is the law of identity somehow a negative aspect anyway? I didn't catch your meaning.

So now you admit that the senses are not always reliable? That's not what you said before, except in the dichotomy "totally reliable vision" and "blindness". Apart from that: 20-20 vision is certainly not perfect, it is at most the best we can do with our visual system, it is a relative measure.

Well, when we sit in a opticians chair, we are perceiving the tests with our sight. I don't see how you can prove the functioning of sight deductively. Anyway, on the sensory level, there is no such thing as an argument. There is only data input. You either input it (one sees) or you don't (one is blind).

Again that weird dichotomy: you see perfectly or you are blind. Now you didn't use the word "perfectly" here, but I suppose it is implied, otherwise you would admit that the senses are not 100% reliable. I wonder what the use is of that strange contraption resting on your nose. And I've no idea why you think that I should prove the functioning of sight deductively.

Here we have a problem of you not accepting my meanings. What you are calling models is exactly what Objectivism calls percepts and concepts. You have jumped to the perceptual/conceptual level and now fault the sense input for not being "reliable" to previously formed percepts/concepts.

And what do you think you are testing when you're sitting in the opticians chair? Anyway, my argument can also be extended to the purely physical/physiological level, as I've done above in the example of the nerve pulses as function of incoming photons.

Also, I am surprised to see you use the strawman approach ("I can already hear the next question..."),

Not a straw man, but it is the usual reply I get from Objectivists in this kind of discussions. Sorry, I'd forgotten that you are more original than the average Objectivist...

and I certainly would not have asked the question you proposed ("how can you compare a model with reality if you only have access to the model and not to 'reality itself'?") because the actual fact is the contrary. And that is very clear to me. A sense organ does not have access to a model (concept). (I include "sense of sight" as part of "me.") It only has access to "reality itself." The sense of sight transforms physical light waves into nerve impulses. The sense of sight does not access our concepts. It merely feeds data gathered from external reality to the brain. It's function stops there and turns over the work of identification to the brain.

I don't say that the sense organ has access to a model, the model is formed by the brain on the basis of the input by the sense organ. A sense organ may get its input from the real world, but that doesn't mean it has access to reality itself if we mean by access knowledge about the world. And knowledge can only come from the model we build, be it the "small model" of our personal experience or the "big model" of our accumulated scientific knowledge. We can only compare models, where we for convenience may call the more accurate big model "reality", as long as we keep in mind that it is at most an approximation to the abstract notion "reality" (that may sound paradoxical, but it isn't, reality is the extrapolation of that what we can experience, the asymptote of the curve).

The rest of your argument deals with how to interpret data that was perfectly inputted.

"perfectly inputted" is a meaningless phrase, perfect compared to what? When we make comparisons, whether on the perceptual level or on the physiological level, we see that there is nothing perfect in the transformation process.

If the light waves were not transformed into nerve impulses, there would be no comparisons to make. The fact that consistency is seen between so many people and the fact that sight can be corrected by lenses and surgery proves the reliability of the organ to work perfectly for what it was developed by evolution to perform.

On the contrary, the fact that we need lenses and surgery proves that the organ does not work perfectly. Even a completely sound organ (20-20 vision) is not perfect. There is always some distortion and loss of information.

You are already on a perceptual/conceptual level here and not on a sensory one. There can be no optical illusion without memory of a previous shape or color which was integrated from raw sensory input. The very fact that there is an illusion (and that illusion is repeatable) is proof that optical data is being perfectly inputted.

Again that meaningless phrase "perfectly inputted". What is perfectly inputted? Perfect compared to what?

If the illusion were different each time under identical circumstances, I would then say that there is a problem with the data being inputted. In an optical illusion, perfectly inputted data is merely being organized (integrated) against a previous standard of integration in order to identify an external referent where such referent, or a similar one, has already been identified in past experience. The data itself (the nerve impulses which used to be light waves) is perfect. What this data means is the point where illusions arise, but then that point is no longer the sensory level.

There is nothing perfect about the nerve impulses resulting from the photons. Take for example the rotating green dot illusion. That we perceive this green dot is already an error on the physiological system, as it is automatically correcting for the large amount of "purple" photons (like the automatic white-balance in your camera) sending an incorrect signal to the brain. In itself this automatic correction is a useful feature, but in some circumstances useful features can give wrong results, just like the automatic camera doesn't always give the best pictures.

You are testing the reliability of your sense organ. It is either perfectly reliable to function at inputting data or impaired or not functioning at all.

You couldn't be more wrong. I really don't understand where you got that idea.

What is it in this idea that leads to it being resisted so strongly?

Well, I do have some curious aversion to absurd ideas...

[Daniel Barnes]

Dragonfly:

>What is perfectly inputted? Perfect compared to what?

Hey DF, to digress for a moment, have you noticed how as well as ending up in skepticism, Rand's theory of knowledge, with its rejection of abstract standards as "omniscient" and "Platonic" unwittingly ends up in epistemological relativism too? Oh the irony

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dragonfly,

I think we talk past each other because we use the same word with different meanings.

When I say "perfect" or "reliable," I am not referring to the perfection or reliability of reducing down to the lowest subparticle and giving an exact count. That would be a task for a device and even then, I do not believe that level of perfection will ever be attained because there are too many variables and motions at the subparticle level.

I am referring to something we discussed before: the midrange. Our senses do not allow us to perceive directly anything micro or macro level anyway. It is true that we can perceive macro at a distance, but only at a distance. We can't perceive micro at all without an amplification instrument. And what we perceive are entities, not sensations. The function of our sight is not merely to transform light waves into nerve impulses, although that is the process it uses. It exists to provide information about entities.

In Objectivist epistemology, the existence of entities is axiomatic, although this is not as commented as the big three by the Internet gladiators you object to. Rand calls entities " the only primary existents" (ITOE, 2nd Expanded Edition, p. 14), and Peikoff calls entity a "specification or narrowing of 'existent'" (OPAR, p. 463, fn. 12).

So to this effect—to provide information about entities—sight works perfectly. But notice that for this to happen, a certain amount of flexibility is needed in precision. This is because we cannot divorce information or knowledge from life. We can only divorce the facts from life, but then there is no knowledge.

I recently read an excerpt from The Problems of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell (Chapter 1 to be exact) which I will quote partially here since it is in the public domain. The link from where I obtained the quote is here. I did not continue it for the entire chapter because, although Russell presents the situation very nicely, some of where he then took the implications are confusing to me. For instance he seriously entertains whether the table exists at all and I have a hard time analyzing visual sense data reflecting off of a table that does not exit. Still, I found the initial part below very well put.

APPEARANCE AND REALITY

IS there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it? This question, which at first sight might not seem difficult, is really one of the most difficult that can be asked. When we have realized the obstacles in the way of a straightforward and confident answer, we shall be well launched on the study of philosophy -- for philosophy is merely the attempt to answer such ultimate questions, not carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in ordinary life and even in the sciences, but critically after exploring all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realizing all the vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas.

In daily life, we assume as certain many things which, on a closer scrutiny, are found to be so full of apparent contradictions that only a great amount of thought enables us to know what it is that we really may believe. In the search for certainty, it is natural to begin with our present experiences, and in some sense, no doubt, knowledge is to be derived from them. But any statement as to what it is that our immediate experiences make us know is very likely to be wrong. It seems to me that I am now sitting in a chair, at a table of a certain shape, on which I see sheets of paper with writing or print. By turning my head I see out of the window buildings and clouds and the sun. I believe that the sun is about ninety-three million miles from the earth; that it is a hot globe many times bigger than the earth; that, owing to the earth's rotation, it rises every morning, and will continue to do so for an indefinite time in the future. I believe that, if any other normal person comes into my room, he will see the same chairs and tables and books and papers as I see, and that the table which I see is the same as the table which I feel pressing against my arm. All this seems to be so evident as to be hardly worth stating, except in answer to a man who doubts whether I know anything. Yet all this may be reasonably doubted, and all of it requires much careful discussion before we can be sure that we have stated it in a form that is wholly true.

To make our difficulties plain, let us concentrate attention on the table. To the eye it is oblong, brown and shiny, to the touch it is smooth and cool and hard; when I tap it, it gives out a wooden sound. Any one else who sees and feels and hears the table will agree with this description, so that it might seem as if no difficulty would arise; but as soon as we try to be more precise our troubles begin. Although I believe that the table is 'really' of the same colour all over, the parts that reflect the light look much brighter than the other parts, and some parts look white because of reflected light. I know that, if I move, the parts that reflect the light will be different, so that the apparent distribution of colours on the table will change. It follows that if several people are looking at the table at the same moment, no two of them will see exactly the same distribution of colours, because no two can see it from exactly the same point of view, and any change in the point of view makes some change in the way the light is reflected.

For most practical purposes these differences are unimportant, but to the painter they are all-important: the painter has to unlearn the habit of thinking that things seem to have the colour which common sense says they 'really' have, and to learn the habit of seeing things as they appear. Here we have already the beginning of one of the distinctions that cause most trouble in philosophy -- the distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality', between what things seem to be and what they are. The painter wants to know what things seem to be, the practical man and the philosopher want to know what they are; but the philosopher's wish to know this is stronger than the practical man's, and is more troubled by knowledge as to the difficulties of answering the question.

To return to the table. It is evident from what we have found, that there is no colour which preeminently appears to be the colour of the table, or even of any one particular part of the table -- it appears to be of different colours from different points of view, and there is no reason for regarding some of these as more really its colour than others. And we know that even from a given point of view the colour will seem different by artificial light, or to a colour-blind man, or to a man wearing blue spectacles, while in the dark there will be no colour at all, though to touch and hearing the table will be unchanged. This colour is not something which is inherent in the table, but something depending upon the table and the spectator and the way the light falls on the table. When, in ordinary life, we speak of the colour of the table, we only mean the sort of colour which it will seem to have to a normal spectator from an ordinary point of view under usual conditions of light. But the other colours which appear under other conditions have just as good a right to be considered real; and therefore, to avoid favouritism, we are compelled to deny that, in itself, the table has any one particular colour.

The same thing applies to the texture. With the naked eye one can see the gram, but otherwise the table looks smooth and even. If we looked at it through a microscope, we should see roughnesses and hills and valleys, and all sorts of differences that are imperceptible to the naked eye. Which of these is the 'real' table? We are naturally tempted to say that what we see through the microscope is more real, but that in turn would be changed by a still more powerful microscope. If, then, we cannot trust what we see with the naked eye, why should we trust what we see through a microscope? Thus, again, the confidence in our senses with which we began deserts us.

The shape of the table is no better. We are all in the habit of judging as to the 'real' shapes of things, and we do this so unreflectingly that we come to think we actually see the real shapes. But, in fact, as we all have to learn if we try to draw, a given thing looks different in shape from every different point of view. If our table is 'really' rectangular, it will look, from almost all points of view, as if it had two acute angles and two obtuse angles. If opposite sides are parallel, they will look as if they converged to a point away from the spectator; if they are of equal length, they will look as if the nearer side were longer. All these things are not commonly noticed in looking at a table, because experience has taught us to construct the 'real' shape from the apparent shape, and the 'real' shape is what interests us as practical men. But the 'real' shape is not what we see; it is something inferred from what we see. And what we see is constantly changing in shape as we, move about the room; so that here again the senses seem not to give us the truth about the table itself, but only about the appearance of the table.

Similar difficulties arise when we consider the sense of touch. It is true that the table always gives us a sensation of hardness, and we feel that it resists pressure. But the sensation we obtain depends upon how hard we press the table and also upon what part of the body we press with; thus the various sensations due to various pressures or various parts of the body cannot be supposed to reveal directly any definite property of the table, but at most to be signs of some property which perhaps causes all the sensations, but is not actually apparent in any of them. And the same applies still more obviously to the sounds which can be elicited by rapping the table.

Thus it becomes evident that the real table, if there is one, is not the same as what we immediately experience by sight or touch or hearing. The real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known.

Now this would seem like proof that our senses are not reliable if we use your definition (meaning functioning like a precision instrument). However, if we use mine, we see that the senses capture, transform and transmit enough data for the brain to differentiate and integrate, thus identify an entity correctly. In this sense, it works perfectly.

You mentioned that 20-20 eyesight is a comparative term, and this is precisely where we start to diverge in our definitions of "perfect" and "reliable." The sense you mean is more akin to cardinal measurements and the one I mean is more akin to ordinal measurements. This example is almost a metaphor, but it serves as a beautiful example. In cardinal terms, something can never be exactly (or perfectly) 6 inches long because of the movements of subparticles. But something approximately 6 inches long can fall perfectly between 5 and 7. In that sense, if you are looking for something to fall between 5 and 7, it is perfect. Not only is 6 inches perfect, but so is a flexible range (for instance, 5.5 inches, 6.5 inches, etc.).

This kind of information is information and it is precise. But it is not cardinal-type perfect. Not even the most precise instrument is perfect in cardinal terms. But it is ordinal-type perfect. (Color X on Shape Y belongs to the table and not to the door, etc.) Notice that with this kind of "perfect" or "reliable" information, if a new factor is involved and an older percept becomes distorted, the new form of the percept can be learned. This is because the sensory information is reliable.

It is in this meaning that our senses are reliable. Also, they as faculties are facts, not knowledge of facts, thus they are absolute (at least so long as they are healthy). They provide us with enough data for us to integrate a percept or concept of an entity (or aspect of one). They work perfectly for this, time and time again, and they are perfectly reliable. The only times they are not reliable are when new factors are added or they become impaired (to whatever degree).

(btw - You completely misunderstood about seeing and being blind. I was not postulating that only perfect vision or blindness are possible. There is a range of impairment—and, of course, I am using perfect in my sense, nor yours.)

This is a long discussion and I fear that I have only touched on a few key points. Once we get to induction, all hell should break loose.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael K:

>But something approximately 6 inches long can fall perfectly between 5 and 7.

Michael, in addition to the usual oxymorons like the above (approximately perfect!) one of the problems you have is that "perfect" means something that cannot possibly be improved upon.

Trouble is, our senses have evolved. If the theory of evolution is correct, they will also continue to evolve. Yet by calling them "perfect" you're saying that we've reached the end-point of evolution, and no further improvements in our senses are possible. If this is not what you mean, then you should really stop calling them "perfect" in any serious sense.

Words have meanings!! :devil:

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/perfect

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Michael K:

>But something approximately 6 inches long can fall perfectly between 5 and 7.

Michael, in addition to the usual oxymorons like the above (approximately perfect!) one of the problems you have is that "perfect" means something that cannot possibly be improved upon.

Trouble is, our senses have evolved. If the theory of evolution is correct, they will also continue to evolve. Yet by calling them "perfect" you're saying that we've reached the end-point of evolution, and no further improvements in our senses are possible. If this is not what you mean, then you should really stop calling them "perfect" in any serious sense.

Words have meanings!! :devil:

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/perfect

Daniel,

I am going to hire you to prove my case for me. I went to your link and there are not only 2 definitions of "perfect," there are 22 for the first dictionary alone! Look:

per·fect

–adjective

1. conforming absolutely to the description or definition of an ideal type: a perfect sphere; a perfect gentleman.

2. excellent or complete beyond practical or theoretical improvement: There is no perfect legal code. The proportions of this temple are almost perfect.

3. exactly fitting the need in a certain situation or for a certain purpose: a perfect actor to play Mr. Micawber; a perfect saw for cutting out keyholes.

4. entirely without any flaws, defects, or shortcomings: a perfect apple; the perfect crime.

5. accurate, exact, or correct in every detail: a perfect copy.

6. thorough; complete; utter: perfect strangers.

7. pure or unmixed: perfect yellow.

8. unqualified; absolute: He has perfect control over his followers.

9. expert; accomplished; proficient.

10. unmitigated; out-and-out; of an extreme degree: He made a perfect fool of himself.

11. Botany.

a. having all parts or members present.

b. monoclinous.

12. Grammar.

a. noting an action or state brought to a close prior to some temporal point of reference, in contrast to imperfect or incomplete action.

b. designating a tense or other verb formation or construction with such meaning.

13. Music.

a. applied to the consonances of unison, octave, and fifth, as distinguished from those of the third and sixth, which are called imperfect.

b. applied to the intervals, harmonic or melodic, of an octave, fifth, and fourth in their normal form, as opposed to augmented and diminished.

14. Mathematics. (of a set) equal to its set of accumulation points.

15. Obsolete. assured or certain.

–noun Grammar.

16. the perfect tense.

17. a verb form or construction in the perfect tense. Compare future perfect, pluperfect, present perfect.

–verb (used with object)

18. to bring to completion; finish.

19. to bring to perfection; make flawless or faultless.

20. to bring nearer to perfection; improve.

21. to make fully skilled.

22. Printing. to print the reverse of (a printed sheet).

I didn't format it, sorry. It was too much work for this point alone. Please go to the link here to see the original formatting, definitions by other dictionaries, usage notes, etc.

I would agree about the semantics (oxymoron, etc.), but unfortunately, we have to arrive at what each other means in order to have a meaningful discussion. I have no other way except by defining my terms. Definitions 3, 6 and 8 above fit my meaning quite well.

On your evolution thing, this is a perfect (see definition 3 above) example of transposing your meaning of "perfect" on my usage of it, then drawing an erroneous conclusion and attributing it to me. This is a logical fallacy.

Back to my meaning.

Can you tell me how something can fall more perfectly between 5 and 7 than by falling between them?

Words do have meanings. Thank you for the link. :devil:

(Where do I send the check? )

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael K:

>Back to my meaning. Can you tell me how something can fall more perfectly between 5 and 7 than by falling between them?

Now it seems you're being "perfectly" redundant!

How something can fall "more perfectly" between something two things than by falling between them is surely a profound philosophical problem that I will have to leave to greater minds than mine.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

Come on. That was lame by your standards. You can do a whole lot better.

So no, no, no. I am not going to let you off the hook. I hardly ever play Objectivist/Anti-Objectivist Duel. Please excuse me this time, as I cannot resist the temptation, while I say:

GOTCHA!!!

(Actually, that felt pretty good...)

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

What exactly does it mean to claim that induction is not valid?

Martin

A finite or limited set of instances for which a general proposition holds, does not imply the general proposition is true over the entire domain of applicable entities. Example: I show you a billion black crows. This is not sufficient to prove that all crows which, were or every will be are black. It could be I have not yet found the exceptional crow, say a crow with the gene for albinism.

So induction cannot prove the truth of a universally quantified proposition -unless- the applicable domain of the proposition happens to be finite and the inducer has exhausted this domain. For example I can prove that all the coins in my pocket are quarters by emptying my pockets and showing each and ever coin from my pockets were quarters

On the other hand induction can prove that a universally quantified proposition is false. All one needs is a single instance for which the general proposition does not hold.

One can also establish an existentially quantified proposition by producing an instance for which it holds.

Bob Kolker

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael:

>GOTCHA!!!

Dear oh dear, I am honestly laughing and scratching my head as to how you can consider the following to be even worth discussing, let alone a "gotcha".

Michael:

>"Can you tell me how something can fall more perfectly between 5 and 7 than by falling between them?"

Have you gone all Zen or something on us Michael? Are you going to ask me about the sound of one hand clapping next?

What's wrong is kinda obvious, but let's break it down anyway.

All you are saying here is that if something falls between 5 and 7, then - incredible as this might sound to those not trained in the profundities of philosophy - it falls between them!

Now, let's add the word "beautifully" to the above sentence.

"If something falls between 5 and 7, then it falls beautifully between them."

Does this addition alter the factual situation described at all? No, it does not. It is a mere redundancy, adding nothing.

Now, let's take out "beautifully", and replace it with "perfectly".

"If something falls between 5 and 7, then it falls perfectly between them."

Does this addition alter the factual situation described at all? No it does not either. Thus your use of "perfectly" is not a philosophical profundity, but a rhetorical redundancy - in other words, merely poor English!

Mr Kelly, it appears you are suffering from a mild case of logorrhoea, very common in Objectivism. I prescribe 1 x volume of Orwell's essays, taken regularly, and stay away from scholastic philosophising for at least a week.

Edited April 27, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

That's a little better. Still, not quite the Barnes I was expecting, but better.

Using a word with a definition right out of the dictionary is not really poor English, but here we get into normative concepts and questions of style, not truth. Before you were criticizing the correctness of what I wrote. Now you think it is merely poor style. I'm coming up in the world.

(And come on. Indulge a quirkiness in your friend. I never play Gotcha. It gave me small rush like I imagine paintball does. Amusing, but not really something you want to do all the time.)

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael:

>Before you were criticizing the correctness of what I wrote. Now you think it is merely poor style. I'm coming up in the world.

As it happens I think it's poor style, and incorrect.

Taking one of your chosen definitions of perfect :

3:"exactly fitting the need in a certain situation or for a certain purpose"

Well, I may need reading glasses as I get older. How can you argue the lens of my eye is "exactly fitting the need" in this situation? You can't. Or, if you do, you end up in the type of argument Voltaire parodied with his Dr Pangloss - whatever is, as far as our senses are concerned, is perfect!

None of the other definitions make your case any better.

Now, shall we move on out of these merely verbal discussions to the vastly more important logical difficulties I've outlined?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

None of the other definitions make your case any better.

Daniel,

This is not precise. None of the other definitions make YOUR case, not mine, any better. They work well for mine. You keep putting your case in my mouth and saying I have been contradicted. But all you are doing is covering over my case and pretending it is something else, not refuting it.

I have been able to articulate my case well, but I don't seem to be able to communicate it to people of a Popperian bent, not even as a hypothetical consideration. And you are not the only one.

I find this curious...

Michael