The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy

[Wolf DeVoon]

I have a few minutues before I get on a plane, and I'd like to take another stab at explaining what a CCD is, using the metaphor of holography again. It's interesting to note that most holograms are monochrome. If you physically chop a piece off, you still see the whole holographic image, because every bit contains all of the information. Human memory is analogous. It exists diffusely in the brain -- not in a discrete place like a magnetic disc or DVD. I remember seeing a Soviet hologram in 1979 that was very dark. Nice image but obscure and a little fuzzy. I suspect many human concepts are dark and fuzzy, too.

Anyway, the way you make a hologram is to paint the subject with a coherent beam and use the same beam as a reference to record the resulting interference pattern. Let's say one is painting the ostensible world with shape as a CCD. Triangles, squares, circles, rounded objects etc jump out, omitting their color, function, relative size and whatnot. This is how semiology works. An octagon means stop. An arrow means proceed that way. The CCD of shape also helps us form memorable and meaningful concepts about animals, plants, interior design, architecture, and fat/skinny people.

Applied to abstract thought, we paint with CCDs, especially predicate logic and the illuminating reference known as context. I don't have time to do a good job of explicating this today. But imagine what happens to a man who routinely paints his mental world with Jesus or Allah or snarky skepticism.

Over and out for a while. Goin' home to the jungle, where bandwidth is like a leaky garden hose.

W.

[Daniel Barnes]

>I must have missed this. Could you please refer me to where you made such a straightforward demonstration?

Sorry, it's here.

>I think I am starting to understand, too. It is just a glimmer right now, but I think knowledge for CR (at least in the manner you are presenting it) is a series of virtual entities. Each virtual entity is made up of parts and features, like all entities are, but those parts and features cannot be examined too closely. They are more felt than identified.

It's much simpler than that. Basically, in the search for truth, you don't need to analyse human knowledge down to its constituent units, as it gets vaguer and less and less meaningful as you do - disappearing off into a near infinite horizon. In practical terms, think of your analysis going from sentences to words to letters...see what I mean? Whereas if you work the other way, and focus on sentences, proposals, plans, theories etc you can get to logically decideability, and even if you're lucky, empirical testability, in the real world. While we can't entirely eliminate vagueness, tautology etc from language, we can try to minimise these problems, and not make them worse. We can do this by avoiding the habit (and prejudice) of turning all problems into discussions about the meanings of words.

[Gregory Browne]

Thank you.

Something is wrong here.  My [quote name]s and [/quote]s come out even, but still I cannot get the white and blue right.

Greg,

I fixed it. You had a dangling end code ("/quote" in brackets) after the phrase: "that's a bad Objectivist habit." I had to put your initial statement in a code box, too, in order to keep the command from executing (it eliminated text as written).

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

It's much simpler than that. Basically, in the search for truth, you don't need to analyse human knowledge down to its constituent units, as it gets vaguer and less and less meaningful as you do - disappearing off into a near infinite horizon.

Daniel,

Thanks for the link. I will read it carefully and get back to you.

As to the quote above, are you saying that on the constituent unit level, knowledge has a decreasing relationship to reality until it reaches the point of no relationship at all to reality?

So I can conclude that according to this theory, the method of correspondence between reality and knowledge is based on quantity of units and not kind?

Michael

[Gregory Browne]

Just because we use some form of unit economy, however, does not mean that Rand's particular theory of concept formation is correct, or even close to the truth. I personally think there is not much to it. As you know, I can give a straightforward demonstration that her theory of the formation of "units" is merely a violation of the Law of Identity, followed by a couple of confused, verbalist restatements of the LOI that, on examination, add nothing to it. ....Further, this empty verbalism of her description of "unit" formation is a quite predictable result, as it is the standard consequence of the Aristotelian method.

Daniel,

Regarding verbalism: this is 180 degrees from the truth regarding Aristotle and Rand. Aristotle and Rand are Realists on the issues discussed in the ASD: they see necessity as something in the world, independent of our minds and language, whereas philosophy from the 17th and 18th centuries moved toward Idealism in the issue, culminating in Hume'r doctrine that necessary truths are just relations of ideas, which view was later replaced by its close kin, which Rorty called "Linguistic Idealism" and which I will call "Linguisticism" (this is what Rorty called "the Linguistic Turn"), which said that necessity is just a product of our languistic convention--in other words, verbalism. This was the was the view of the Logical Positivists and early Ordinary Language philosophers, whose logicians treat logic as about language, whereas Aristotle and Scholastic realized that logic is about reality, as does Rand. Compare Aristotle's 3 laws of logic as formulated by him and then as formulated by modern logicians.

Aristotle:

1. Everything is identical to itself

2. A thing cannot have and not have an attribute at the same time.

3. A thing either has or does not have an attribute at any given time.

Modern Logicians

1. p <--> p (p is true if and only if p is true)

2. ~(p & ~p) (p and not p are not both true)

3. p V ~p (Either p or not p is true)

Now which do you think is verbalist?

Greg

Edited June 5, 2007 by Greg Browne

[Dragonfly]

Something is wrong here.  My [quote name]s and [/quote]s come out even, but still I cannot get the white and blue right.

Just using a little logic will set it straight...

Where was the unclarity there? Peikoff believes that the definition of 'ice' is solid water, and you don't deny that, do you? Your disagreement was whether ice's floating on water is part of the concept of ice.

No, my example was to show that even Peikoff unwittingly used an example that perfectly illustrated the difference between an analytic truth and a synthetic truth, where "ice is a solid" follows from the definition of ice and can therefore never be wrong, while "ice floats on water" does not follow from the definition "ice is the solid form of water" and therefore could be falsified in principle, and lo and behold, it was falsified! I argued that you could remedy this by adapting the definition, and the variability of the definition is what I referred to as the unclarity.

All statements about Deep Kinds are analytic, and indeed all statements are.

No, they are not. What you are doing is redefining analytic statements and then proclaim that with your new definition all statements are analytic. But that is of course just defining the distinction away. I gave several versions I found of the definition of analytic statements, for example: "analytic truth is a priori, necessarily true, independent of reality", "a proposition that is true by definition". "Independent of reality" does not mean that it can't refer to real objects, but that the truth of the statement does not depend on reality, which is not the same! The classic example is of course "a bachelor is not married": "bachelor" and "married" may be concepts referring to the real world, but the truth of the statement is independent of reality as it logically follows from the definition, it is necessarily true and cannot be falsified.

so depending on the use of different definitions, the same proposition may be analytic or not.

Yes. So I ask again: what good is the analytic-synthetic distinction then?

Within such definition games it is not useful, but that doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. Where it is useful is in the distinction between mathematical theories and physical theories that use the results of the mathematical theories.

Of course this is a rather useless exercise, as it doesn't give us any new information, in contrast to the analytical statements of mathematics, which can be extremely useful (I won't repeat here my earlier arguments about that).

Why is this true only about statements of math and not about statements about Deep Kinds?

While those statements (if construed analytically) are trivial tautologies. Mathematical statements are also tautologies, but they are often far from obvious, and therefore once they have been proved, they can be useful in scientific theories by applying them to empirical findings without having to reinvent the wheel every time.

No. Both are self-contradictory, if false. If he first statement is false then it is true that Brutus killed Caesar, and killing Caesar is one of the predicates which is true of Brutus and so the predicate expresses an attribute of Brutus, and therefore it is part of the meaning of 'Brutus' (even though it is only contingently part of the meaning) and therefore it contradicts the meaning of 'Brutus' (even though only contingently). As Peikoff would say, the meaning of 'Brutus killed Caesar' is 'Brutus (with all of his attributes, including--if the sentence is true--being a killer of Caesar) has the attribute of having killed Caesar', whereas to say that 'Brutus did not kill Caesar' is to say 'Brutus (with all of his attributes, including--if the sentence is true--being a killer of Caesar) does not have the attribute of having killed Caesar', which is self-contradictory.

It can't be self-contradictory if you cannot be sure if it is true or false. By the same reasoning Peikoff would also have said that "ice can sink in water" is self-contradictory as he thought that one of the attributes of ice is that it cannot sink in water. But of course it wasn't self-contradictory, in that case it would have been impossible to find ice that sinks in water, just as it is impossible to find a married bachelor. You cannot draw logical conclusions from not (yet) existing knowledge (which "all future knowledge" is).

You shouldn't jump to conclusions. When I use the metaphor "Platonic realm" you shouldn't try to pigeonhole me immediately as a Platonist, that's a bad Objectivist habit.

It is not exclusively Objectivist and it is not bad: if you claim to believe in something you call "Platonic" your reader has a right to call you are a "Platonist" on that issue.

That's nonsense, if I say "thank God" that doesn't mean that I'm a Christian, then Rand would have been a Christian too.

In any case that ignores my point: if you think that there is a Platonic realm or purely abstract entities you must argue for them, since they are not believed in by me, nor by Peikoff or Rand, nor by most philosophers since the 1200s, nor by most scientists (whom you quote as authorities for believing in the analytic-synthetic dichotomy).

I don't have to argue anything, every scientist and mathematician that I know agree that mathematical theories (for example the value of pi) are independent of the real world (that we use physical means to express them is of course not relevant). That's all I mean by Platonic realm (and I don't bother about capital or lower case letters, that is really a waste of time). I don't know where you got the opinion of your "most scientists", in your terms: you must argue for it.

I just mean that the content of mathematical statements is independent of the physical world, that you can consider it as an abstract world with its own truths that cannot be falsified by empirical evidence. The value of pi will always be the same, independent of the universe we live in.

It is still saying something about this universe (as well as every other possible universe), and so it is factual.

That we may apply it to this world doesn't mean that it is dependent of this world. There is water in the ocean, but that doesn't mean that the existence of water is dependent of the ocean.

In that case then of course it is not possible.

And I am very glad to see that you admit that the laws of physics can make something impossible, because this entails that they are necessary, which is something those who hold you position deny.

Why are they necessary? Perhaps our universe is only one of a multitude of universes with different physical laws. And I don't see how the fact that a certain geometry could not be realized in the space of the universe we know would imply that the physical laws of that universe are necessary. That is a big non sequitur.

Some, such as Ayer, say that the denial of a law of physics is only physically possible, but not logically possible, as logic and math are. But you say that they can make a geometry impossible--not merely false, but impossible--and so you are implying that the laws of physics are logically necessary. This is great concession!

Where do you get those weird ideas? Such a geometry is not false or impossible in the abstract sense, it can be a perfectly valid theory, it would only be impossible to realize it as the geometry of physical space in the existing universe as we know it, but that is merely an empirical finding which doesn't in any way invalidate that geometry as a theory.

[Daniel Barnes]

Greg:

>Regarding verbalism: this is 180 degrees from the truth regarding Aristotle and Rand. Aristotle and Rand are Realists on the issues discussed in the ASD...

I agree with Popper's arguments against the Aristotelian method in the essay I have already linked to - that is, it leads to verbalism. I agree with Greg Nyquist's basic criticism of Rand - that while her philosophy purports to be realistic (in the usual sense) in practice it is almost entirely rationalistic. I would also argue while Objectivism purports to be completely different from most philosophies, especially 20th century ones, this difference is itself mostly verbal; for in practice there is little to distinguish it from these. For example:

From Popper's essay: "From this point of view, we may criticize a doctrine like that of Wittgenstein, who holds that while science investigates matters of fact, it is the business of philosophy to clarify the meaning of terms..."

Now let's see what Rand describes as the proper function of of philosophy:

Rand: "In asking what's the relationship between "mind" and "brain," scientists have to know what they mean by the two concepts. It's philosophy that would have to tell them the [general] definitions of those concepts."

This puts the situation quite simply, and illustrates what I consider is a striking similarity. I would argue that despite some superficial differences and much huffing and puffing about its uniqueness, that Rand's philosophy is in practice little different from most philosophy, old and new. That is, the emphasis on definitions and the meanings of terms, which the natural result of is verbalism.

Edited June 5, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

>As to the quote above, are you saying that on the constituent unit level, knowledge has a decreasing relationship to reality until it reaches the point of no relationship at all to reality?

It's more like our discussion about that knowledge gets less articulate as we try to break it down - just as analysis of a sentence heads increasingly towards vacuousness as we move from analysing sentences to words to letters...

I prefer my discussions to be more articulate than less articulate, so as a result I heavily prefer discussing theories or statements or whatever than the meanings of words; just as in turn, if I had to choose only between the two, I would vastly prefer discussions over words than over letters!

>So I can conclude that according to this theory, the method of correspondence between reality and knowledge is based on quantity of units and not kind?

No, but you can conclude that there are more productive and less productive types (or, more and less verbalistic types) of discussion, and that I prefer the more productive and less verbalistic types, and try to avoid the others. And although my interlocutor may strongly disagree with me about this, I can at least hope to explain my point of view, and possibly even change his mind on the subject...;-)

[Gregory Browne]

Something is wrong here.  My [quote name]s and [/quote]s come out even, but still I cannot get the white and blue right.

Just using a little logic will set it straight...

No, that wasn't the problem: I understood some ago that the quote openings must be paired with quote closings, but there was unpaired closing I kept missing because it was nestled among some other text.

...my example was to show that even Peikoff unwittingly used an example that perfectly illustrated the difference between an analytic truth and a synthetic truth, where "ice is a solid" follows from the definition of ice and can therefore never be wrong,

No: he does not believe that solidity is part of the definition of ice and he he does not say it is certain. You are assuming that he thinks that the concept is the same as the definition, when he denies this (and this denial is perhaps his most important).

That's why he selected 'Ice is solid' as an example of an alleged synthetic truth: because it is not part of the definition.

while "ice floats on water" does not follow from the definition "ice is the solid form of water"

and therefore could be falsified in principle, and lo and behold, it was falsified! I argued that you could remedy this by adapting the definition, and the variability of the definition is what I referred to as the unclarity.

It was falsifiable because a necessary connection between the solidity and the floating on water was not demonstrated.

All statements about Deep Kinds are analytic, and indeed all statements are.

No, they are not. What you are doing is redefining analytic statements and then proclaim that with your new definition all statements are analytic. But that is of course just defining the distinction away.

This is 180 degrees from the truth. I am using the standard definitions of 'analytic truth'; you are redefining it. There are 3 standard definitions of it.

2 of them come from Kant, and he was inventor of the distinction, so I think we ought to pay attention to his definitions. His definitions of 'analytic truth':

1. a truth whose predicate is contained in its subject

2. a truth whose denial is self-contradictory

The 3rd standard definition is that of the Logical Positivists. They are the biggest defenders of the distinctions you believe in within the last century, they had, and still have, a great influence on philosophy of science, and they are the people you views are closest to, so again I think we ought to pay attention to their definition. It is usually formulated as something like this:

3. a truth that is true in virtue of the meaning of the words in it.

Part of the confusion is, as I said, the result of the fact that Logical Positivists said that his is what they meant by 'analytic truth', when what they really had in mind was something 'definitional truth'---where by 'definition' they meant what is called "the nominal definition" (see my post, above, on 2 kinds of definition).

Now if you want to adopt the definition "analytic truth" equals "definitional truth", we can do that, but don't say that I am changing the meaning of the term.

Now, as I have said before, if you adopt that definition, then you have to say what a definitional truth is--specifically, you have to say what you mean by definition. But then you get to the problem I pointed out: the fact that one can put anything into the definition, as you yourself have said many times. Now you address this several paragraphs below, where I will take up your reply.

I gave several versions I found of the definition of analytic statements, for example: "analytic truth is a priori, necessarily true, independent of reality", "a proposition that is true by definition".

Which one do you want to argue for? You will claim that they are all the same, but that claim needs to be argued for.

I gave several versions I found of the "Independent of reality" does not mean that it can't refer to real objects, but that the truth of the statement does not depend on reality, which is not the same! The classic example is of course "a bachelor is not married": "bachelor" and "married" may be concepts referring to the real world, but the truth of the statement is independent of reality as it logically follows from the definition, it is necessarily true and cannot be falsified.

Again, 'does not depend on reality' is a little vague, but I will assume it means 'true in all possible worlds, i.e., necessary'. This then is the classic argument of some Logical Positivists such as Wittgenstein, who said that necessary truths are not factual (i.e., not about the world) because they are true no matter how the world is. However, being true no matter how the world is, i.e., being true in all possible worlds, does not mean that it does not say anything about the actual world---on the contrary, it means that it says something about each and every possible world, including the actual world.

so depending on the use of different definitions, the same proposition may be analytic or not.

Yes. So I ask again: what good is the analytic-synthetic distinction then?

Within such definition games it is not useful, but that doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. Where it is useful is in the distinction between mathematical theories and physical theories that use the results of the mathematical theories.

I am certainly not playing any game.

You need to give some definition of 'definitional truth', or, better, a definition simply of 'definition', that allows us to sort definitional from non-definitional truth.

You need to elaborate the distinction you make. Otherwise it will just sound like you are saying that physics and math are obviously different, and the truths of former are synthethic and truths of the latter are analytic, which needs a lot of arguing for.

Of course this is a rather useless exercise, as it doesn't give us any new information, in contrast to the analytical statements of mathematics, which can be extremely useful (I won't repeat here my earlier arguments about that).

Why is this true only about statements of math and not about statements about Deep Kinds?

While those statements (if construed analytically) are trivial tautologies. Mathematical statements are also tautologies, but they are often far from obvious, and therefore once they have been proved, they can be useful in scientific theories by applying them to empirical findings without having to reinvent the wheel every time.

So why do you assume that tautologies about Deep Kinds (such biological and chemical kinds) will always be trivial, while tautologies in math will not always be?

No. Both are self-contradictory, if false. If he first statement is false then it is true that Brutus killed Caesar, and killing Caesar is one of the predicates which is true of Brutus and so the predicate expresses an attribute of Brutus, and therefore it is part of the meaning of 'Brutus' (even though it is only contingently part of the meaning) and therefore it contradicts the meaning of 'Brutus' (even though only contingently). As Peikoff would say, the meaning of 'Brutus killed Caesar' is 'Brutus (with all of his attributes, including--if the sentence is true--being a killer of Caesar) has the attribute of having killed Caesar', whereas to say that 'Brutus did not kill Caesar' is to say 'Brutus (with all of his attributes, including--if the sentence is true--being a killer of Caesar) does not have the attribute of having killed Caesar', which is self-contradictory.

It can't be self-contradictory if you cannot be sure if it is true or false. By the same reasoning Peikoff would also have said that "ice can sink in water" is self-contradictory as he thought that one of the attributes of ice is that it cannot sink in water. But of course it wasn't self-contradictory, in that case it would have been impossible to find ice that sinks in water, just as it is impossible to find a married bachelor. You cannot draw logical conclusions from not (yet) existing knowledge (which "all future knowledge" is).

It can be self-contradictory even if you cannot be sure of its truth. Self-contradictoriness and truth are independent of knowledge: something can be true and yet not be known to be true (i.e. some mathematical theorems), and even be believed to be false (i.e., that some ice does not float on water), and similarly something false and yet be believed to be true (i.e., that all ice floats on water).

You are right, Peikoff believed that 'Ice can sink in water' is self-contradictory, because he believed it was that 'All ice floats on water' is true (and so did everyone else before this unusual ice was discovered, and so does everyone who hasn't heard of it yet). He was wrong, but he didn't say that the truth of that sentence was certain. And if he was told that it was false, and given enough reason to persuade him of this, such as telling him about this unusual ice and its attributes and how they work, then he would say it was false. Remember, he says that it is analytic only if it is true. And neither analyticity nor truth, by itself, entails certainty.

You shouldn't jump to conclusions. When I use the metaphor "Platonic realm" you shouldn't try to pigeonhole me immediately as a Platonist, that's a bad Objectivist habit.

It is not exclusively Objectivist and it is not bad: if you claim to believe in something you call "Platonic" your reader has a right to call you are a "Platonist" on that issue.

That's nonsense, if I say "thank God" that doesn't mean that I'm a Christian, then Rand would have been a Christian too.

First, you don't have to be a Christian to believe in God; don't jump to conclusions. Secondly, "thank God" is an exclamation that need not be taken literally anyway. Third, if Rand talked about the existence of "divine entities" we would be justified in assuming that she believed in some god until she said something to the contrary, which is analogous to your saying that you believe in Platonic realm but not wanting us to assume that you are a Platonist.

Also, you said that you meant it metaphorically. But you can't expect your readers to know that that is what you meant if you did not say so in the passage? Is it because you think few if any people believe in it literally? But a number of people have believed in it literally, though they are a minority today.

In any case that ignores my point: if you think that there is a Platonic realm or purely abstract entities you must argue for them, since they are not believed in by me, nor by Peikoff or Rand, nor by most philosophers since the 1200s, nor by most scientists (whom you quote as authorities for believing in the analytic-synthetic dichotomy).

I don't have to argue anything,

You certainly do, whenever you want to debate something, unless your claim is self-evident or at least already accepted by your opponent. Most of your claims are neither, and so themselves require argument. If the premises of those argument are not accepted by your opponent, then you must argue for them, and so on, until you reach premises that both you and your opponent accept---common ground.

every scientist and mathematician that I know

We should not take their word for anything, because they are not authorities in these matters---there are no authorities in this field, or at least no agreed-upon ones. This is not science, but philosophy (philosophy of science) we are discussing. It's just up to people such as you and I to do our best to find the answer to these questions.

(I recently read Stephen Hawking. He was talking about Einstein. Some intellectuals wrote a book attacking Relativity Theory called "100 Writers Against Einstein". According to Hawking, Einstein replied "If I had been wrong, 1 would have been enough!".)

And in any case the claims Peikoff and I attack, and you defend, were made by philosophers---the Logical Positivists---and the scientists were sold on them. Most still seem to believe in them. But even most philosophers think that most of these assumptions are highly questionable. Scientists, unfortunately, have not gotten the news.

agree that mathematical theories (for example the value of pi) are independent of the real world (that we use physical means to express them is of course not relevant). That's all I mean by Platonic realm (and I don't bother about capital or lower case letters, that is really a waste of time). I don't know where you got the opinion of your "most scientists", in your terms: you must argue for it.

Probably most scientists dont' have views on philosophic topics such as the existence of abstract entities, but most of those that do, the last I heard, are Nominalists rather than Realists (Platonism).

But this matters little to me, because, as I have said, scientists are not authorities in this field. It is you who have been invoking their authority. Let's use our own arguments for our claims.

I just mean that the content of mathematical statements is independent of the physical world, that you can consider it as an abstract world with its own truths that cannot be falsified by empirical evidence. The value of pi will always be the same, independent of the universe we live in.

It is still saying something about this universe (as well as every other possible universe), and so it is factual.

That we may apply it to this world doesn't mean that it is dependent of this world. There is water in the ocean, but that doesn't mean that the existence of water is dependent of the ocean.

As I said above, if 'independent of the world" means true in all possible worlds, i.e., necessary, then I certainly do believe math is independent of the world, and so non-falsifiable.

But I deny that this entails that math says nothing about the world: rather, it says something about every possible world.

In that case then of course it is not possible.

And I am very glad to see that you admit that the laws of physics can make something impossible, because this entails that they are necessary, which is something those who hold you position deny.

Why are they necessary? Perhaps our universe is only one of a multitude of universes with different physical laws. And I don't see how the fact that a certain geometry could not be realized in the space of the universe we know would imply that the physical laws of that universe are necessary. That is a big non sequitur.

To say that something could not be is to say that its non-existence is a necessary truth. But presumably you are making the distinction between physical necessity and logical necessity (along with the one between physical possibility and logical possibility) that I mentioned earlier.

Some, such as Ayer, say that the denial of a law of physics is only physically possible, but not logically possible, as logic and math are. But you say that they can make a geometry impossible--not merely false, but impossible--and so you are implying that the laws of physics are logically necessary. This is great concession!

Where do you get those weird ideas?

Such a geometry is not false or impossible in the abstract sense, it can be a perfectly valid theory, it would only be impossible to realize it as the geometry of physical space in the existing universe as we know it, but that is merely an empirical finding which doesn't in any way invalidate that geometry as a theory.

I got the idea from you: you said that the physics of this world can make an geometry impossible--not merely false, but impossible---which is usually taken to mean 'necessarily false'.

But it looks like you are invoking the distinction between physical impossibility and logical impossibility (along with distinction between physical necessity and logical necessity). However, not everyone defines these terms in the same way. So give us your definition. Then give us your argument for the distinction, since Peikoff argues against it.

Edited June 6, 2007 by Greg Browne

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

It's more like our discussion about that knowledge gets less articulate as we try to break it down - just as analysis of a sentence heads increasingly towards vacuousness as we move from analysing sentences to words to letters...

I prefer my discussions to be more articulate than less articulate, so as a result I heavily prefer discussing theories or statements or whatever than the meanings of words; just as in turn, if I had to choose only between the two, I would vastly prefer discussions over words than over letters!

>So I can conclude that according to this theory, the method of correspondence between reality and knowledge is based on quantity of units and not kind?

No, but you can conclude that there are more productive and less productive types (or, more and less verbalistic types) of discussion, and that I prefer the more productive and less verbalistic types, and try to avoid the others. And although my interlocutor may strongly disagree with me about this, I can at least hope to explain my point of view, and possibly even change his mind on the subject...;-)

Daniel,

I thought we were discussing knowledge (and with Popper, that would be scientific knowledge), not discussions per se. In other words, I thought the topic under consideration was knowledge, not what Daniel prefers to discuss (or me, for that matter).

I find your comparison to letters of the alphabet a good one. If I were to examine the building blocks of written words from a syntax level only, I would have to start with the alphabet. Without letters there are no words. Letters are facts. They are both tangible and clear.

In terms of knowledge, so far I am encountering with Popper a problem of the constituent units being neither understandable (much less tangible) nor clear.

Incidentally, what does the following mean if not less and less correspondence to reality?

It's much simpler than that. Basically, in the search for truth, you don't need to analyse human knowledge down to its constituent units, as it gets vaguer and less and less meaningful as you do - disappearing off into a near infinite horizon.

You say "less meaningful" and "more verbalistic" and "less productive" and so forth. Doesn't all this mean "words with less correspondence to reality?"

This leads me to think that maybe scientists use Popper's system to good effect because they only use one part, the falsifiability theory, as a method parameter for experiments, not as an actual standard for determining knowledge. They just simply take normal knowledge as some kind of metaphysical given (like reality is) and add the theory on top of it..

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

>This leads me to think that maybe scientists use Popper's system to good effect because they only use one part, the falsifiability theory, as a method parameter for experiments, not as an actual standard for determining knowledge. They just simply take normal knowledge as some kind of metaphysical given (like reality is) and add the theory on top of it..

Tell you what: if you're that interested in his theory of knowledge, why don't you just read a Popper book for yourself - instead of you making a lengthy succession of wild guesses like the above and me having work through them - and then come back to me with some comments? It's about at that point now, I think. You're going to have to do a little grunt work on your own. Clearly my explanations are not clicking with you.

I recommend something like Bryan Magee's little introduction to Popper. You can read it in an evening. Or crack a copy of "Popper Selections" compiled and with a beautifully written introduction by his student David Miller. If not, I'll assume you're interested, but not really that interested, and thus likewise.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

Of course I will read some. I already did (and even critiqued it). That still doesn't alter the fact that you are not answering the questions I raise. More precisely put, I ask one thing and you have usually responded as if the question were not what it was, or responded saying that it should not be answered (for a variety of reasons).

I am in no hurry. So we can continue this after I read more.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

>That still doesn't alter the fact that you are not answering the questions I raise.

I make a habit of not trying to answer the unanswerable...;-)

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

When I look at the following, I begin to wonder.

So from this angle, I repeat my question: "What is your view of the nature of concepts (or ideas)?"

What is knowledge to you?

Let's do it another way. Is knowledge only something in the head or is there a correlation between what is in the head and facts? If a correlation exists, what is it in CR?

With Popper's theory of knowledge, do composites exist without units?

Mike:

>That still doesn't alter the fact that you are not answering the questions I raise.

I make a habit of not trying to answer the unanswerable...;-)

I have no problem that you don't answer these questions, but I do think this is awfully strange coming from a person who declares flat-out that Rand's theory of knowledge is flawed. Even a simple "I don't know" to my questions would have been some kind of answer, instead of sidestepping or ignoring them. (A sidestep, for example, is where you responded to the first question with a list of propositions and art. This is like asking "what is a building material" and answering "a house." In other words, no answer to the question. Another example is you saying "no" to the third question, but not backing it in light of your own examples, letting stand the composites you provided as having no units. Instead you tried to compare the question of units to an unrelated issue: syntax. Sidestep.)

My old mentor, Maestro Eleazar de Carvalho, used to say to weak musicians during a rehearsal, "Either you can't play it right or you don't want to, and neither does the job."

But for the record, let's look at your allegation that the questions are "unanswerable."

Q. What is your view of the nature of concepts (or ideas)? What is knowledge to you?

A. Unanswerable.

Q. Is knowledge only something in the head or is there a correlation between what is in the head and facts? If a correlation exists, what is it in CR?

A. Unanswerable.

Q. With Popper's theory of knowledge, do composites exist without units?

A. Unanswerable.

I will let readers draw their own conclusions, although I will note that there are three possibilities for why a question is unanswerable.

1. The question is logically flawed and makes no sense.

2. You don't know.

3. The theory you use as a foundation does not cover these issues.

Of course, if you don't want to answer the questions, that has nothing to do with whether the question is unanswerable, but instead with your unwillingness.

I will take a look at your essay a little later where you claimed to prove that Rand's theory of concepts contradicts the Law of Identity and see if you fared any better there, i.e., see whether you can or will discuss what knowledge is. Without having a standard for comparison ("This is knowledge, thus that isn't"), I am not optimistic that you can make your case with logical consistency. But I will look at it with an open mind. I will get back to you on this.

Michael

[Rodney]

I will let readers draw their own conclusions, although I will note that there are three possibilities for why a question is unanswerable.

1. The question is logically flawed and makes no sense.

2. You don't know.

3. The theory you use as a foundation does not cover these issues.

I think there is another possibility, that the theory used as a foundation implies that the question is logically flawed and makes no sense.

Edited June 6, 2007 by ashleyparkerangel

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Rodney,

I had not considered this possibility. If a theory of knowledge implies that a question like "What is knowledge to you" is logically flawed, that does not bode well for the theory.

Underneath all this, I am basically trying to figure out which parts of CR works (and why) and which are window dressing. On a basic theoretical level, I am seeing some serious gaps, but I have only read one Popper essay so far. I concluded from the essay that one base was solid (reality exists as absolute independently of awareness) and I saw much different jargon.

Michael

[Rodney]

Rodney,

I had not considered this possibility. If a theory of knowledge implies that a question like "What is knowledge to you" is logically flawed, that does not bode well for the theory.

Underneath all this, I am basically trying to figure out which parts of CR works (and why) and which are window dressing. On a basic theoretical level, I am seeing some serious gaps, but I have only read one Popper essay so far. I concluded from the essay that one base was solid (reality exists as absolute independently of awareness) and I saw much different jargon.

Michael

I've decided it's an issue of psychoepistemology--the deeply ingrained method of using one's consciousness that is formed early in life (involving the issue of independence). I may write an essay on what I call "verbal metaphysics" one day, which would be the philosophic expression of this flawed method.

[Dragonfly]

That's why he selected 'Ice is solid' as an example of an alleged synthetic truth: because it is not part of the definition.

Indeed, therefore it is a synthetic truth.

It was falsifiable because a necessary connection between the solidity and the floating on water was not demonstrated.

Hindsight is always 20/20. When he wrote that article, Peikoff was no doubt absolutely convinced that such a necessary connection was sufficiently demonstrated, and that the statement therefore in his terms was an analytic statement. He was proven wrong.

I gave several versions I found of the definition of analytic statements, for example: "analytic truth is a priori, necessarily true, independent of reality", "a proposition that is true by definition".

Which one do you want to argue for? You will claim that they are all the same, but that claim needs to be argued for.

I don't have to argue for anything. Both will do for me. If you think there are essential differences then you'll have to argue for that.

Again, 'does not depend on reality' is a little vague, but I will assume it means 'true in all possible worlds, i.e., necessary'. This then is the classic argument of some Logical Positivists such as Wittgenstein, who said that necessary truths are not factual (i.e., not about the world) because they are true no matter how the world is. However, being true no matter how the world is, i.e., being true in all possible worlds, does not mean that it does not say anything about the actual world---on the contrary, it means that it says something about each and every possible world, including the actual world.

No. Its referents may refer to things in the actual world, but not necessarily. With the usual definition of unicorn the statement "a unicorn has a horn on its head" is an analytical statement, or in your words, it's true in each and every possible world. But does it say anything about the actual world? We can calculate the volume of a 254306-dimensional sphere embedded in 254307-dimensional Euclidean space, which also forms an analytic statement. Does it refer to anything in the actual world?

You need to give some definition of 'definitional truth', or, better, a definition simply of 'definition', that allows us to sort definitional from non-definitional truth.

You need to elaborate the distinction you make. Otherwise it will just sound like you are saying that physics and math are obviously different, and the truths of former are synthethic and truths of the latter are analytic, which needs a lot of arguing for.

No, that ploy will no longer work. I have always to argue for this and to argue for that, while you think it's sufficient to state "which Peikoff and I deny". Merely denying is no argument. I've given examples to illustrate my point, which you ignore, so perhaps it's now time that you give a refutation of my examples.

So why do you assume that tautologies about Deep Kinds (such biological and chemical kinds) will always be trivial, while tautologies in math will not always be?

While the first are only a question of definitions and semantics, the logical conclusion then follows in most cases in one step from the definitions. And if you think that the tautologies in mathematics are all trivial, perhaps you can find a simpler proof for Fermat's last theorem than that by Wiles. Or a simple proof of the four-color theorem. And if you're going to study math, you'll discover that mathematicians like to say that some argument or conclusion is trivial, but that it doesn't seem at all so trivial to you. There is a joke about that on Wikipedia: Another joke concerns two mathematicians who are discussing a theorem; the first mathematician says that the theorem is "trivial". In response to the other's request for an explanation, he then proceeds with twenty minutes of exposition. At the end of the explanation, the second mathematician agrees that the theorem is trivial.

It can be self-contradictory even if you cannot be sure of its truth.

But in that case you don't know that it is self-contradictory, so you can't say that the statement is self-contradictory, in contrast to self-contradictory analytical statements, where you can categorically say that they are self-contradictory, they don't need any empirical evidence for that. That is the essential difference that Peikoff and you can't argue away.

We should not take their word for anything

Uh-huh, you came up with "most scientists" who supported your view, and when I told you that my experience was different, you tell me that we shouldn't take their word for anything.

But this matters little to me, because, as I have said, scientists are not authorities in this field. It is you who have been invoking their authority. Let's use our own arguments for our claims.

Of course scientists are authorities in this field, perhaps not in all the linguistic niceties, but certainly in the foundations of physics and mathematics, of which most philosophers don't know anything (Rand and Peikoff included). Only philosophers with a solid scientific background like for example Bernard d'Espagnat can be taken seriously in this regard.

I got the idea from you: you said that the physics of this world can make an geometry impossible--not merely false, but impossible---which is usually taken to mean 'necessarily false'.

No, I meant with impossible that it would not describe physical space correctly. You continue to confuse the applicability of a certain mathematical theory to a certain physical phenomenon with its validity. A physical theory that used that particular mathematical model would not be valid, but that doesn't invalidate the mathematical theory, it merely says that this isn't the appropriate theory for that particular phenomenon. Really, it isn't that difficult!

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

>My old mentor, Maestro Eleazar de Carvalho, used to say to weak musicians during a rehearsal, "Either you can't play it right or you don't want to, and neither does the job."

;-)

We all have our little stories. In reply, let me tell you one I may have told you before about a friend of mine. He was hopelessly in love with this girl. Unfortunately it was unrequited. Nevertheless he hounded her: "Give me a straight answer - what really is it that you don't love about me?" She would say:"Well, you've got no personality, you're clingy, you're foolish, you're hardly attractive, you dress badly, you're boring, you're pompous, I don't like your friends, and I find you just generally painful to be around."

To which my deluded friend would patiently reply:" Yes, I know all that...but what really is it?"

Thus the poor lady found herself faced with a questioner who was, ultimately really only satisfied with hearing what he wanted to hear, even though that answer he wanted would be of no help to either of them! In other words, he was posing the question so it could not be sensibly answered.

Now, I submit that you are asking me "what is knowledge?" in exactly the same way.

I reply: an incredibly large and complex topic, covering everything from myths and folklore to science and art, theories, arguments, skills, institutions etc etc etc; everything that humans know how to do or make.

But like our deluded suitor, this not good enough for you. You insist, oddly, that they are "plural" and for some reason this means they don't count as a reply.

I then reply in the singular: well obviously a theory, a myth, an argument, a work of art etc.

But this isn't good enough either. You demand that these types, which are constituents of the broader term knowledge themselves, be broken down into further constituent "units". At this point I go: whoah. How far do you want to go with this? Human knowledge is a tangled web with threads that lead in all directions - off towards physics on one horizon, in the electric and chemical composition of the brain, off into culture with the creation of language, art, and instituitions etc over another horizon, off into biology for our innate evolutionary drives and abilities. It seems to me you are actually hoping to find some kind of ultimate reduction of knowledge to some basic constituent. This is a reductionist approach to human knowledge, and a rather naiive one at that. It is naiive in that, as I also point out, pursuing this ever-reductive questioning beyond a certain point you end up bumping into the limits of language itself, and end up in increasingly vague and timewasting waffle.

Don't just take my word for it. Look at what happens when a far cleverer mind than yours or mine tries to explain even the "simplest concept, the concept of a single attribute...'length'"

"I shall identify as ‘length’ that attribute of any existent possessing it which can be quantitatively related to a unit of length, without specifying the quantity." - Ayn Rand, ITOE

This is sheer vacuous verbiage - drivel, even. Now if even someone as smart as Ayn Rand is reduced to uttering drivel in the attempt to express the ultimate reduction of knowledge - that is, down to "the simplest concept "- then clearly you and I are not going to get much further. (For the logical reasons why this result is predictable see, once again, Popper's essay)

Thus when you say I am "sidestepping" the question, you are quite right! Who wants to end up talking drivel all day?

So it is quite clear by now, hopefully, that regarding your two questions below, it is doubful I could give any answer that would satisfy you.

Just "for the record", by the way:

>1)Q. What is your view of the nature of concepts (or ideas)? What is knowledge to you?

I have already answered this, as far as it reasonably can be (#183).

>2)Q. Is knowledge only something in the head or is there a correlation between what is in the head and facts? If a correlation exists, what is it in CR?

I also answered this (#187) in that there are two types of knowledge: knowledge "in the head", and knowledge taken "out of the head" and into a physical expression, such as language, writing, art, etc. As far as the "correlation" goes, our knowledge never has a 1:1 correlation with reality. It is always approximate, and prone to error, but fortunately we can get closer to the truth through better and better approximations.

>3). With Popper's theory of knowledge, do composites exist without units?

This was a rather silly question, as obviously a composite is by definition made up of other things. In fact I pointed out that in Popper's theory, human knowledge is indeed a composite of many diverse things - a jackdaw's nest, if you like. This is fine, as far as it goes. The problem lies in the attempt to take a naiive reductionist theory of knowledge too far, to where it descends into timewasting verbal drivel.

>I will let readers draw their own conclusions, although I will note that there are three possibilities for why a question is unanswerable.

1. The question is logically flawed and makes no sense.

2. You don't know.

3. The theory you use as a foundation does not cover these issues.

Thus, as I have now explained above, and tirelessly reiterated the logical reasons for it, of your three possibilities, 1. is the right answer.

>I will take a look at your essay a little later where you claimed to prove that Rand's theory of concepts contradicts the Law of Identity and see if you fared any better there, i.e., see whether you can or will discuss what knowledge is. Without having a standard for comparison ("This is knowledge, thus that isn't"), I am not optimistic that you can make your case with logical consistency. But I will look at it with an open mind. I will get back to you on this.

Well, I would be most interested in your comments and questions, so long as they are not in the mode of my deluded friend!

Edited June 6, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Rodney]

"I shall identify as 'length' that attribute of any existent possessing it which can be quantitatively related to a unit of length, without specifying the quantity." --Ayn Rand, ITOE, Expanded Second Edition, p. 11

If anyone brought context-dropping to the extreme needed to interpret this passage as "the attempt to express the ultimate reduction of knowledge - that is, down to 'the simplest concept,'" I could well understand that he would find the book confusing as a whole. (By the way, in my math paper I also touch on how such concepts are wordlessly formed, but I add one more detail.)

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Don't just take my word for it. Look at what happens when a far cleverer mind than yours or mine tries to explain even the "simplest concept, the concept of a single attribute...'length'"

"I shall identify as ‘length’ that attribute of any existent possessing it which can be quantitatively related to a unit of length, without specifying the quantity." - Ayn Rand, ITOE

This is sheer vacuous verbiage - drivel, even. Now if even someone as smart as Ayn Rand is reduced to uttering drivel in the attempt to express the ultimate reduction of knowledge - that is, down to "the simplest concept "- then clearly you and I are not going to get much further. (For the logical reasons why this result is predictable see, once again, Popper's essay)

Daniel,

I can't believe that you just tried to take a Rand quote completely out of context and present it as something it is not in order to "win and argument." You knew I would look it up.

Did you notice that Rand was NOT trying to explain the concept of length? She was explaining what she imagined went on in a child's mind during the formation of the concept. We are not talking about any stage of development, either. We are talking specifically about a preverbal one. Here is the quote in context. From ITOE, Ch. 2 - "Concept Formation," p. 10.

Let us now examine the process of forming the simplest concept, the concept of a single attribute (chronologically, this is not the first concept that a child would grasp; but it is the simplest one epistemologically)—for instance, the concept "length." If a child considers a match, a pencil and a stick, he observes that length is the attribute they have in common, but their specific lengths differ. The difference is one of measurement. In order to form the concept "length," the child's mind retains the attribute and omits its particular measurements. Or, more precisely, if the process were identified in words, it would consist of the following: "Length must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity. I shall identify as 'length' that attribute of any existent possessing it which can be quantitatively related to a unit of length, without specifying the quantity."

The child does not think in such words (he has, as yet, no knowledge of words), but that is the nature of the process which his mind performs wordlessly. And that is the principle which his mind follows, when, having grasped the concept "length" by observing the three objects, he uses it to identify the attribute of length in a piece of string, a ribbon, a belt, a corridor or a street.

Maybe you skimmed the passage and missed:

"... if the process were identified in words, it would consist of the following..."

and

"The child does not think in such words (he has, as yet, no knowledge of words), but that is the nature of the process which his mind performs wordlessly."

She is trying to describe in words a wordless process in a baby's mind and you present it as if it were an explanation of the actual attribute.

Dayaamm!

I thought you had a real argument against Rand instead of having to take recourse to misrepresenting her words.

Do you want me to analyze Popper that way? I am sure he has innumerable quotes that could be debunked when taken out of context and presented with a new meaning.

btw - In fact, I finally read the part of the Dykes essay yesterday (Debunking Popper: A Critique of Karl Popper's Critical Rationalism). I am going slow and thinking over each paragraph from different angles. I should finish it today or tomorrow. So far, there is much to agree with in that essay (some of it even irrespective of Popper), but I do have one criticism. On several points, I have to disregard Dykes's conclusions because he seems to be guilty of doing precisely what you just did with Rand, i.e., he is taking some of Popper's comments out of context and forcing a different meaning on them. (I will comment at length later.)

I find this process a particularly poor and weak one to use because the gain is so short-term and it tends to backfire into discrediting the critic. Once a reader looks up the excerpt and discovers the real meaning of the quote, he tends to imagine that the critic did that with other points and disregards the entire argument.

I will not do that with your criticism so far (isn't it wonderful that knowledge can be divided up into parts, so the inaccurate and be discarded and the accurate retained?), but I am a bit surprised to see that kind of lame procedure out of you.

I liked your story about the girl, but I am not dealing with normative abstractions here ("I don't like the guy"). I am discussing cognitive ones ("What knowledge is"). You are the one who claims that Rand's theory of knowledge is flawed, not me. I am merely asking you to explain why on a technical level instead of issuing opinions or talking around the point (or worse, misrepresenting her words).

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Rodney:

>If anyone brought context-dropping to the extreme needed to interpret this passage as "the attempt to express the ultimate reduction of knowledge - that is, down to 'the simplest concept,'" I could well understand that he would find the book confusing as a whole.

I know this silly statement about length is a rather embarrassing one for an intelligent woman like Rand to have made, but surely it would be better for you just to face up to this fact - after all, even highly intelligent people say stupid things sometimes. Why try to pretend otherwise?

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

>I thought you had a real argument against Rand instead of having to take recourse to misrepresenting her words.

Now you are talking nonsense Michael. I didn't touch her words. Further, you adding the further context changes nothing - I can't believe you think it does. The sentence is still drivel even when you quote the passage in full.

>Do you want me to analyze Popper that way? I am sure he has innumerable quotes that could be debunked when taken out of context and presented with a new meaning.

I did not present Rand's words with "a new meaning." Her words have almost no meaning. On analysis, all she is saying is that "length" is..."length"! That is the whole problem! Whether the sentence is a description of a child's mind, or her own, or whatever, it is still drivel.

Michael, this accusation of "misrepresentation" is groundless.

With that in mind, once again, I challenge you: let's take this sentence, and the whole passage around it, to a non-Objectivist forum. We'll present it as-is, and the people there can rate it on a scale from 1 (drivel) to 5 (profound insight).

Then we'll see if I'm blatantly "misrepresenting" Rand as you claim, or whether in fact quite reasonable to suggest she is talking nonsense.

Let's do this right now. I personally don't like being falsely accused of quote clipping so I think we should get a second opinion asap, and clear this up.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

I am willing, but I have a time problem. Maybe a little later. And I did not claim that Rnad's statement represented "profound insight." I claimed that you misrepresented her meaning by taking it out of context.

Here is the summary: Rand was presenting a description of a process in a preverbal child's mind. You presented this as if it were an already formed explanation or observation.

This isn't rocket science and second opinions are not really needed to understand that.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

>This isn't rocket science and second opinions are not really needed to understand that.

Actually, you're accusing me of dishonesty, Michael. Here's what you said:

"I can't believe that you just tried to take a Rand quote completely out of context and present it as something it is not..."

I did no such thing and I won't let your false accusation stand. Now, are you going to come with me and get an independent opinion on this or not? Yes or no?

Edited June 7, 2007 by Daniel Barnes