The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy

[tjohnson]

Or one perceives SOME colour, and one is TOLD it is called 'green'. Also, there are colour-blind people too who may not be able to distinguish the same colours.

[merjet]

One does not perceive -greenness-. One perceives and green this or a green that. Greenness is an abstraction manufactured by the brain as a result of perceiving a lot of green thises and thats.

Technically speaking, that's correct. I unwittingly repeated Brendan Hutching's misuse. However, the point of my sentence still holds.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Since ‘similarity’ cannot be present in the perception of objects, it must be inferred or thought. In that case, in the above example, the child is not “seeing” something similar, but rather thinking “something similar”. Therefore, ‘similarity’ must already be present in the mind and brought to the experience of observing the three objects.

I did not mention innate knowledge.

How do I reconcile these two statements? (My bold in the first.)

My comments should be taken in the context of critiquing Rand’s argument. I’m saying that her argument leads to the conclusion that: “Therefore, ‘similarity’ must already be present in the mind and brought to the experience of observing the three objects.” And this, of course, is inconsistent with Rand’s claim re tabula rasa.

Perhaps I should have spelled it out, but this is a standard method of criticism: draw out the implications of a claim to show where it is mistaken on its own terms.

Brendan,

Just to nitpick, then you actually did mention innate knowledge. From reading this passage (and I did give it a fair reread to check my own understanding), there is a strong implication that this is your own view. Now that I know that it isn't, what is your own view on innate knowledge?

Incidentally, my particular view of tabula rasa is that it is another idea flawed by scope. It works in a limited meaning, but not as an all-encompassing meaning as presented.

I hold that the capacity to discern differences and similarities and to integrate them into a single mental unit is innate, but (1) this capacity develops with growth, and (2) the differences and similarities actually exist. One needs to have an organ to process light waves and light waves need to exist for it to work. If there can be an organ that perceives light waves, why can't there be a further development of that organ in the mind that perceives similarities when two sets of light waves come from two different sources, but have the same wave-length?

I also hold that there are no fully formed concepts at birth, so in this limited sense, I agree with Rand. Where I disagree is that there is some information that develops with growth naturally from instinct, just like with any animal, and this is shown by the studies of affects I mentioned (showing value judgments on an infant level where prior knowledge was impossible). That body of information is very small compared to the later concepts, but it does exist and it does become integrated with knowledge coming from experience.

Michael

[tjohnson]

If there can be an organ that perceives light waves, why can't there be a further development of that organ in the mind that perceives similarities when two sets of light waves come from two different sources, but have the same wave-length?

The nervous impulses get processed in the visual cortex, the result is associated with the word 'green'. This occurs in our BRAIN, there is no mind.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Tom,

I do not know enough about GS to know the jargon, but I find statements that try to redefine or eliminate standard words to be an exercise in futlity.

In Objectivism, there is no mind without a brain (I refer to the human mind). Yet the mind exists with its own unique identity. Parts of that identity include volition and conceptual thought—both cognitive and normative.

Some people have called the mind a product of brain activity. That's pretty close, but I find that it is more complex than that and science will ultimately uncover the connections.

One speculation, so far, is outright denial of the mind (in the sense of soul or volitional self). Another speculation is religion, which basically proposes the existence of ghosts. An even further speculation comes from Nathaniel Branden. I think you will enjoy the discussion given by Roger Bissell of this below.

This is the story of my and Bill Dwyer's discussion with Nathaniel Branden about the Mind-Body Problem and the Dual-Aspect Theory of Mind...reb

==============================================

Back in 1997 on the Objectivism-L list, there was a discussion of Nathaniel Branden's new book The Art of Living Consciously. Ken Barnes kicked off the discussion on September 13 with some brief remarks under the heading "An Underlying Reality." Ken wrote:

...beginning on page 200 Branden gets into a discussion of the ultimate 'stuff' of reality. Briefly, the mystical traditions conclude that this ultimate 'stuff' is consciousness or mind. On the other hand, materialists say that all that exists is matter and its motions, and that all phenomena of consciousness can ultimately be reduced to these motions. To reconcile these positions Branden posits an underlying reality of which both matter and consciousness are manifestations.

Then Barnes quoted this passage by Branden:

Metaphysically, mind and matter are different. But if they are different in every respect, the problem of explaining their interaction seems insuperable. How can mind influence matter and matter influence mind if they have absolutely nothing in common? And yet, that such reciprocal influence exists seems inescapable...Without going into details, I will suggest a possible way out. There is nothing inherently illogical—nothing that contradicts the rest of our knowledge—in positing some underlying reality of which both matter and consciousness are manifestations. The advantage of such a hypothesis is that it provides a means to resolve a problem that has troubled philosophers for centuries—”the mind-body problem,” the problem of accounting for the interaction of consciousness and physical reality. If they have a common source, then they do have a point of commonality that makes their ability to interact less puzzling. How we would test this hypothesis, or provide justification for it, is another question.' (Branden 1997, 201-2)

I was intrigued and posted the following comments on September 17, 1997:

I've read this excerpt several times already, and each time I do, I can't help but note how it smacks of the Lockean conception of a "substance" (entity) that is like a metaphysical pin-cushion, into which its various attributes are stuck like pins. But we don't know the pin-cushion, only the pins! The "manifestations." Of course, Branden and any other Objectivists that go this route, might reply: oh, but its "manifestations" are how we know the "underlying reality."

Maybe so, though I suspect that this is an opening big enough for Kant to drive a Mack truck through. :-) Anyway, the main problem I have with this view is that it doesn't really solve the problem of the supposed "interaction" of consciousness and matter. As I have relentlessly harped over the years, consciousness does not have causal efficacy--but neither does matter! They are just attributes of entities, by virtue of which entities have causal efficacy.

It is entities and their parts--which are characterized by material and/or conscious attributes--that interact, not the attributes. If you like, an entity's attributes may be regarded as being the causal efficacies of the entity. But they do not themselves have causal efficacy. The entity, by virtue of having them, has causal efficacies of various kinds. So, it is reification of the most misleading kind to regard matter and consciousness as doing things.

Some Objectivists (I think Rick Minto is working in this direction, but this is third-hand information, and he is welcome to clarify or object) want to talk about processes interacting, and since consciousness is regarded as a process, why not allow for interaction between conscious processes and non-conscious material processes? We should not be scared about "process-talk" in discussions of causality. Fine, so long as we acknowledge that what is really interacting is a part of the brain that is engaging in a conscious process (along with other, physical processes, I would maintain)--interacting with a part of the brain that is engaging in non-conscious physical processes only. Otherwise, we are reifying--attributes or actions, it doesn't matter. It is an inductively graspable fact that all entities (so far!) are physical in nature, and some entities are also conscious in nature, and that the existence of consciousness is dependent upon the existence of matter. This doesn't mean that consciousness is matter, however. So, there is a dualism of attributes. But this is actually irrelevant to the causality involved.

What is interacting causally is one part of the brain with another. And just as a living physical entity can interact with a non-living physical entity, but only by virtue of the physical attributes (matter) they both possess, so too can a conscious physical entity (or part) interact with a non-conscious physical entity (or part), but only by virtue of the physical attributes they both possess. Since it is always physical entities (or parts) that are interacting, it seems clear to me that any causal efficacy we attribute to consciousness is piggybacked on the causal efficacy we attribute to matter--and that it properly belongs to the entities, in any case!

So, from this, I hope it's clear why I think Branden's quasi-Leibnitzian view doesn't really explain anything. "Manifestations of an underlying reality" do not interact. It's not how entities manifest themselves to us that interacts, but the entities themselves (and their parts) that do so. The alternative is to abandon the hard-won understanding gained from the Aristotelian/Randian view that actions are caused by entities, and thus that interactions are caused by (i.e., between) entities. They indeed are caused by virtue of various attributes they have, but the attributes themselves are not the causes or the interactors. Aristotle, Rand, etc., framed their categories such that the prime foci of change are entities, and that attributes and actions (or properties and processes) are to be understood as of entities, and that causality is the (internal) relation between an entity and its actions. If this is truly metaphysically basic stuff, then no empirical observations can overturn it. On the other hand, if there can be processes and causal relations between events with no entities in evidence, then gee, I guess Aristotle and Rand are wrong, and that we can go with Hume in talking about events causing each other.

Assuming, then, that this is an open question, OK, what I have written is hypothetical and up for grabs. (Hmmm--conditional metaphysics!) But what I most want to drive home to Objectivists is the full implication of the stand they are taking with Rand and Aristotle on the Categories and the nature of causality. If this stance is ontologically solid, then talk of mind-body interaction and "causal efficacy of mind" is nonsense! Or, as Gilbert Ryle would have said, category mistakes.

Branden, whose work I admire very much, seems not to have sorted out the implications of and conflicts between the concepts he wrote about in The Psychology of Self-Esteem. He, more than anyone else, taught me the hard-headed Aristotelian-Randian approach to understanding action and causality as entity-based. Now he does a "180" and talks of "manifestations" interacting with each other. Huh???

Dr. Branden replied to me briefly on September 18:

For your information, whatever this may be worth (not much), the view I conveyed re "manifestations" is one that Rand found quite plausible when I presented it to her. I grant my presentation in the book was much too brief to adequately convey what I had in mind.

Probably what Branden was groping toward was not some kind of "proto-panpsychism" (as Diana Hsieh opined, in her characteristically over-the-top tendency to put the worst possible negative interpretation on Branden's writings), but instead a way to express what is usually referred to as the dual-aspect theory or dual-perspective theory of the mind-body relation. Kelley wrote about this in the first chapter of The Evidence of the Senses, and some time earlier, I gave a paper eventually published in 1974 in Reason Papers #1, called "A Dual-Aspect Solution to the Mind-Body Problem." Whether you call them "aspects" or "manifestations" or "forms of awareness," though, what is clear is that they are not different things, but the same thing--the conscious, living organism--as we are aware of it in different ways.

In any case, Branden's comments in The Art of Living Consciously did not, in my opinion, represent progress in our understanding of the mind-body problem. It was as if he were saying, "Well, since I believe in the 'causal efficacy of mind,' I will abandon my idea that actions are generated by entities and instead say that they can be generated by capacities or 'manifestations.'" There may be a place for "fuzzy logic," but fuzzy metaphysics???

On September 25, 1997, Bill Dwyer posted comments on Nathaniel Branden's "underlying reality" view to Objectivism-L. (His comments were similar in content to what he posted more recently on SOLO HQ website; see the Rebirth of Reason archives for SOLO.) Later that day, he received the following brief reply from Branden:

You would do well to educate yourself concerning the many philosophical criticisms that have been made against the "double=aspect" theory that you propose. Rand shared my view, as expressed in the brief passage in Living Consciously, and she called that "underlying reality" by the name of "little stuff." We did not share the implicit materialist bias that seems implicit in your remarks. We regarded consciousness as radically different from matter. The problem is not solved by calling consciousness "an attribute of matter." For more on this, see chapter 1 of The Psychology of Self-Esteem. You don't have to agree, of course, but at least you ought to understand that the view you dismiss as "nonsensical" was held by AR.

Bill shared this response with me, and the next day (September 26), I wrote the following:

Dr. Branden, what interests me most about this interchange is that not only William Dwyer and I, but also you and Ayn Rand hold some version or other of a "dual-aspect theory." And, ironically, the version of dual-aspect theory that held the most pitfalls, historically, was the kind espoused by you and Miss Rand....

Quoting Jerome Shaffer's article "Mind-Body Problem" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967):

DOUBLE ASPECT THEORIES. Some philosophers have held the view that the mental and the physical are simply different aspects of something that is itself neither mental nor physical. Spinoza is the most famous example. He held that man could be considered an extended, bodily thing and, equally well, a thinking thing, although neither characterization, nor even both taken together, exhausted the underlying substance [compare with your "underlying reality"].....

There are two crucial obscurities in the double-aspect theory. First, what is the underlying unity ["reality"] that admits of the various aspects? Spinoza called it "God or Nature"....Herbert Spencer, calling a spade a spade, referred to it simply as the Unknowable. [And Rand, as you report, had her own special term: "little stuff."] Contemporary philosophers suggest that the underlying unity is the "person." [P.F. Strawson attempted a definition: 'a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation etc. are equally applicable to a single individual of a single type.' Individuals, 1959, p. 102. This is too circular to be of much help.]

The second obscurity in the double-aspect theory is that it is not clear what an 'aspect' is. [You use another term, "manifestation," which seems identical in meaning, if my Webster's unabridged dictionary is any judge.] The point of talking about different aspects...is to suggest that the differences are not intrinsic to the thing [in other words, as Rand frequently stated, that there is no mind-body dichotomy in reality!] but only exist in relation to human purposes, outlook, conceptual scheme, frame of reference, etc. This point is even reflected in Spinoza's definition of 'attribute' (for example, extension or thought) as 'that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance.' (Ethics I, Def. 4)"

Shaffer concludes this section with a very telling point, which seems to echo the point Dwyer and I and others have made regarding your and Rand's concept of an "Underlying Reality": "In general, double-aspect theories fail to improve our understanding of the mind-body relationship."

In general, I would agree. It certainly is true of the version that you and Rand maintained (entertained?). My own version simply sees matter and consciousness as attributes, viz., as capacities for different kinds of action–and that we are aware of these capacities and their activation through different channels of awareness (perception and introspection, respectively). And what they are attributes of is not some mysterious "underlying reality," but simply a conscious, living, material entity–i.e., a human being. Further, since they are capacities, not entities, there is no need to seek after a will-o-the-wisp explanation of how they interact. They do not, because they cannot; they are not the kinds of existents that interact....

Matter is generic, in the Aristotelian sense of capacity, and it is not right to think of it as a kind of stuff that can do things, apart from the entity that does things by virtue of that capacity. There are inanimate physical capacities of entities–"inanimate" being the most common understanding of "matter;"and there are animate physical capacities ("living matter"); and there are conscious physical capacities ("conscious matter"). Thus, as Aristotle defined "matter"–i.e., as potential (to do something)–it is obvious that any attribute, including consciousness, is material. Of course, he was contrasting matter not with spirit, but with form or actualization. And as various people including you and Rand have pointed out, what a thing is (its actuality/form) determines what it can do (its potential/matter). So, again, there is no need to wrack our brains trying to figure out how mind and matter interact, for they do no such thing. Instead, ...they are both matter–i.e., they are both potentials or capacities, by virtue of which various parts of one's physical body interact with one another (or with other entities).

Thus, there are two distinct senses in which one can appropriately have what you refer to as a "materialistic bias" in one's view of consciousness, without getting into the obvious pitfall of reductive materialism:

(1) one can view consciousness as part of the (Aristotelian) matter or potency of certain living organisms to engage in certain actions, and

(2) one can view consciousness as necessarily dependent upon physical matter, but not vice versa. I would like to think that this is a view that all Objectivists, including you (and Rand, if she were still alive) would be comfortable with.

I'll conclude by quoting Dwyer's last paragraph, which I think was very good, and then restate it in terms more compatible with what I've outlined above:

...Mind is the conscious awareness characteristic of certain entities, and matter is the physical capacity for action necessarily characteristic of any entity with conscious awareness. Thus, there can be matter without consciousness–i.e., material entities that are not conscious; but there cannot be consciousness without matter–i.e., conscious entities that are not material.) Any problem in explaining their "interaction" vanishes as soon as one recognizes that they are two aspects of the same entity–and that only the parts (i.e., its cells and organs and systems) of an entity interact, not its aspects. (The aspects of an entity include its attributes– whether its length or weight or density or other material characteristics, or its being percipient or being emotional or being evaluative or being conceptual or being imaginative or other conscious characteristics–and its actions and relationships.)

As I see it, you cannot escape the logic of causality being the relationship between an entity and its actions, something drilled home to me by you and Rand and Peikoff and Kelley and a number of others who were transmitting the Aristotelian view (as against the Humean event-event view). You cited "underlying reality," "little stuff," and interactions between "manifestations" as a model of mind-body held by Ayn Rand. But so is the above model of causality, which sees interactions as being between entities, not "manifestations" or attributes or processes or events or whatever. The two models seem to be incompatible, don't you think? If you can find a way to reconcile them, I'm all ears!

Dr. Branden graciously responded the same day:

I think you gave a very nice answer to my post. When I spoke of "matter" I did so in the contemporary not the Aristotelian sense. With the latter sense I have no argument. As to the rest, I used to think as you do–that mind depends for its existence on a physical body to which it is attached. ("Attached" is obviously a very imprecise term, but I'm in a hurry.) But in the last decade or so I've come across data that puts my own past assumption in question. I am no longer certain that brain activity exhausts the possibilities of mind activity. If mind really is, in some sense, "a separate entity" (Rand's terms)–if this is not merely a figure of speech–then its absolute dependence on a physical body is not axiomatic but becomes an empirical question. I wrestle with this a good deal. I am even willing to admit that sometimes the problem drives me nuts. But something is bothering me about even the "traditional" Objectivist take on all this. I apologize for not being clearer.

That concluded my correspondence with Dr. Branden on the matter. (Bill had some further correspondence with him later in the fall. I'll let him decide whether to share it here on RoR.) I then wrote to Bill, again that same day:

Branden is right that mind's dependence on a physical body is not axiomatic but instead an empirical matter. But jeez, if science hasn't by now adequately established that point–especially for an atheist who rejects the mind/body dichotomy!–when could it ever??

The "data" Branden refers to that supposedly puts this assumption of necessary mind-body connection in question is alleged instances of people having little or no cerebral cortex nonetheless walking out among the rest of us in society, with seemingly no easy way of distinguishing them from people with intact brains. (I believe the phrase he used at lunch with me and my wife several years ago was "a thin, almost microscopic layer of cortical cells.") I have yet to hear of anything remotely like this from anyone else. Sounds more like a thought-experiment than something real! If you know anything about it, or could find out, it would really help me in laying this (I think) pseudo-objection to rest.

As I recall, this particular point was never resolved (although there have been recent reports of single neurons being associated with a particular thought or memory). What Bill and I both came away from this phase of the discussion with was a sense of how odd it was that Branden would advocate the form of dual-aspect theory he did, while claiming to be familiar and in agreement with the criticisms of that theory.

[Note to the reader: these comments were originally posted on SOLOHQ on December 8, 2005.]

Note that one thing that is not preached in Objectivism: a dichotomy between mind and body. The brain is more fundamental, of course, but both must be present in a human being for both to function. A brain without a mind is called defective. A mind without a brain is called wishful thinking.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

I don't understand all the fuss about mind and brain. The brain is the hardware, the mind is the software, that's all.

[BaalChatzaf]

I don't understand all the fuss about mind and brain. The brain is the hardware, the mind is the software, that's all.

Unfortunately, mind is often regarded or spoken of as a -substance- whose laws are not physical laws. The concept of mind as a substance or stand-alone object leads to bad linguistic habits and to reifications of bogus abstractions. Abstractions have no reality other than being neural processes. Search the world over and you will not find greeness, goodness or even the integer two outside of a human skull. There is no mind, but there are mental processes carried on in the brain.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

There is no mind, but there are mental processes carried on in the brain.

Bob,

I get amused at this kind of statement. How did you react to Galt's strike of "the men of the mind"? Ayn Rand only reapeated that phrase a gazillion times. But that's not the part that tickles me. I admit to not reading a whole lot of your posts on other forums, but I wonder how on earth you have managed to hang out with Fred Weiss so long talking the way you talk here.

Michael

[tjohnson]

You know, in physics we speak of 'electrons, bosons, quarks, neutrinos' and we will never see these. I'm surprised no one has mentioned this as an argument in favour of the existence of a 'mind'. If someone was to postulate the existence of a 'mind structure' at a subatomic level then of course it could never be shown. But subatomic particles leave evidence of themselves which CAN be seen and measured and can we say this about the 'mind'? If you postulate the existence of something absolutely NO physical evidence of it then you are being religious and I'm sure you don'y want objectivism to be thought of as a religion?

[BaalChatzaf]

You know, in physics we speak of 'electrons, bosons, quarks, neutrinos' and we will never see these. I'm surprised no one has mentioned this as an argument in favour of the existence of a 'mind'. If someone was to postulate the existence of a 'mind structure' at a subatomic level then of course it could never be shown. But subatomic particles leave evidence of themselves which CAN be seen and measured and can we say this about the 'mind'? If you postulate the existence of something absolutely NO physical evidence of it then you are being religious and I'm sure you don'y want objectivism to be thought of as a religion?

So what are the laws of "mind" and how may they be tested empirically? There is no scientific theory of mind which is a good indication that the notion of mind has no empirical content. All progress in cognitive matters is based on physical processes. That is why theories of brain work and theories of mind don't. Psychology is pretty much where it was during the time of Aristotle. Any progress in that field is grounded on the material and natural functions of the brain and nervous system. That is why we can treat people afflicted with depression and to some extent we can treat schizophrenics. It is done with chemicals, not voodoo such as Freud proposed. Psychology is a pseudo science and psychiatry to the extent it is not an application of medicine is bullshit.

By the way we have empirical evidence for the existence of sub-atomic particles. Of course, it is indirect since these things are so small they cannot be seen unaided. We have zero, zip, nada evidence for the existence of mind as a substance or stand-alone object.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Brendan Hutching]

There is no Mind (as a substance or stand-alone object). There is brain and related tissue, organs and glands.

No, not as a substance. But neither is ‘Love’ a state. Yet many people will say that they have experienced a ‘state’ they call love. I see no reason to disbelieve them, although technically I would call it a series of mental and physical events rather than a state. But if someone tells me they’re ‘in love’, I’m not going to get all technical on them.

To my mind, the term ‘mind’ is a collective term that refers to mental events.

Brendan

[Brendan Hutching]

The processing of two distinct parts - the two leaves - of the visual field is undoubtedly similar.

The same or similar physiological process is not what I mean by ‘similarity’ in this case, which is to say that this object is alike in some important way to that object. The bare perception won’t provide that sort of judgement.

If you were to describe just what you see, you would be talking about the various visual qualities of the two leaves, but not a similarity, since that is not a visual quality.

And your mention of “selective focus” seems to imply that focusing one’s attention is a deliberate act for a specific purpose, and these terms usually refer to mental events that are more than just perception.

Brendan

[BaalChatzaf]

To my mind, the term ‘mind’ is a collective term that refers to mental events.

Brendan

There are no mental events. There are events that happen with the brain, nerves and glands. Mental events are right up there with ghosts, spirits, gods and goblins. Real things are material and physical.

If X is a mental event how come it causes a change in electrical potential in the brain? How can a non-physical cause have a physical effect?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

The same or similar physiological process is not what I mean by ‘similarity’ in this case, which is to say that this object is alike in some important way to that object. The bare perception won’t provide that sort of judgement.

If you were to describe just what you see, you would be talking about the various visual qualities of the two leaves, but not a similarity, since that is not a visual quality.

And your mention of “selective focus” seems to imply that focusing one’s attention is a deliberate act for a specific purpose, and these terms usually refer to mental events that are more than just perception.

Brendan,

I have only done a preliminary skim of The Evidence of the Senses by David Kelley, so I am almost loathe to discuss much from it, but what you are talking about appears to be what Kelley calls a "perceptual judgment." The following quote is from pp. 208-209.

The perceptual judgment is the conceptual identification of what is perceived. Transforming our perceptual awareness of the world into conceptual form, it gives us a way to retain and communicate what we perceive and to express the evidence of the senses in a way that bring it to bear on abstract conclusions.

Also, there is one other matter that scratches at the back of my mind once in a while: crow epistemology. If Rand's crows are to be believed, they saw enough similarity to count up to four or so. Here is the story from ITOE (2nd expanded edition), pp. 62-63.

The story of the following experiment was told in a university classroom by a professor of psychology. I cannot vouch for the validity of the specific numerical conclusions drawn from it, since I could not check it first-hand. But I shall cite it here, because it is the most illuminating way to illustrate a certain fundamental aspect of consciousness—of any consciousness, animal or human.

The experiment was conducted to ascertain the extent of the ability of birds to deal with numbers. A hidden observer watched the behavior of a flock of crows gathered in a clearing of the woods. When a man came into the clearing and went on into the woods, the crows hid in the tree tops and would not come out until he returned and left the way he had come. When three men went into the woods and only two returned, the crows would not come out: they waited until the third one had left. But when five men went into the woods and only four returned, the crows came out of hiding. Apparently, their power of discrimination did not extend beyond three units—and their perceptual-mathematical ability consisted of a sequence such as: one-two-three-many.

Whether this particular experiment is accurate or not, the truth of the principle it illustrates can be ascertained introspectively: if we omit all conceptual knowledge, including the ability to count in terms of numbers, and attempt to see how many units (or existents of a given kind) we can discriminate, remember and deal with by purely perceptual means (e.g., visually or auditorially, but without counting), we will discover that the range of man's perceptual ability may be greater, but not much greater, than that of the crow: we may grasp and hold five or six units at most.

If this is true, this shows that crows do more thinking than simple perception.

Michael

[merjet]

Thanks to MSK for introducing "perceptual judgment" to the thread. Brendan used "mental judgment" with regard to similarity w/o making a perceptual-conceptual distinction, though I'm inclined to think he meant "conceptual judgment" since he has objected to similarity being perceived.

MSK also brought up David Kelley's Evidence of the Senses, giving Kelley's definition or description of "perceptual judgment" on pp. 208-9. Also relevant is pp. 221-2 (hb) where Kelley says:

The traditional theory failed to recognize, in other words, that any concept for a 'simple quality' like a color, is abstract and therefore assumes a range of qualitatively discriminable instances. What we perceive, however, are the individual determinate qualities of particular objects. ... To recognize an object as red is to recognize it as possessing the same quality as other red objects one has perceived. ... The recognition of it as red therefore involves the isolation of a relevant dimension of similarity; a sense of the necessary degree of similarity along that dimension; and a capacity to ignore the perceptible differences that remain within that range of similar shades. These cognitive capacities are preconditions for perceptual judgment.

Kelley thus says that the identification of any object as a particular kind of thing or having a particular quality involves a judgment -- which could be implicit -- that it or the quality is similar to other particular things or qualities one has perceived. He doesn't, however, compare adult humans to infants or other species , and Brendan chose not to respond to my introducing perception by infants and eagles.

This is a fascinating subject, at least to me. I call comparison the basic act of knowledge. I wrote a long article about similarity, now on the web here Pursuit of Similarity thanks to Stephen Boydstun. Here are a couple of quotes especially relevant to this thread. "Conceptualism comes down on the side of resemblance as being the ontological basis of general ideas" (p. 59). "Another broad distinction is between global and dimensional similarities. The former means similarity at an overall level and is dimensionally nonspecific. Linda Smith suggests that dimensionally nonspecific relations are experimentally and developmentally prior to an emerging knowledge system. Objects are originally perceived holistically, without being decomposed into separate dimensions. ... As adults we are inclined to think that similarity of parts is logically prior to overall similarity. But logical priority does not equal chronological priority" (p. 126).

I repeat my two questions to Brendan. (Anyone else is welcome to chip in.) Does an infant make a judgment that mommy now is the same person seen hours earlier? Must an eagle make some sort of judgment that the hare it sees today is similar to the hare it preyed on earlier? What sort of judgment in each case?

Edited June 11, 2007 by Merlin Jetton

[Daniel Barnes]

Merlin:

>I repeat my two questions to Brendan. Does an infant make a judgment that mommy now is the same person seen hours earlier? Must an eagle make some sort of judgment that the hare it sees today is similar to the hare it preyed on earlier? What sort of judgment in each case?

Although this is addressed to Brendan, I'll just briefly chip in. From my Popperian perspective, the problem of universals is something of a non-problem, and is better thought of as the human need (and the need of all living creatures) for similarities or regularities to survive.

First of all, we can assume that objects in reality do indeed have similarities or regularities of various sorts, and that through evolution we are hardwired with various means of trying to identify them. However, while now extremely complex and well-adapted, these hardwired means are themselves a kind of guess, and can themselves fail or err; for example, we might consistently misjudge as different the two lengths of the well-known optical illusion, even when we consciously know the lengths are the same. (this is usually by getting some kind of cross reference with a different kind of observation, like measurement using a ruler,the results of which we use to make a logical deduction).

Thus the from the assumption that there are similarities in reality, and that we have evolved ways of trying to discover them, both hard-wired (sensory), and man made "cross-references" (logic, conjecture,cultural assumptions etc) it does not necessarily follow that there is always a 1:1 correspondence between the two. Thus the infant may think mommy is the same person seen hours earlier, but may in fact be mistaken; it may be someone who is not mommy, but is similar enough to help it survive (say a wet nurse, filling in for a mother that has died of childbirth complications). That is to say, the child guesses at a regularity, sometimes correctly and sometimes not. Likewise the hawk may make just the same judgement about the hare; but this "hare" may be the farmer's decoy designed to lure the hawk to its death. The hawk's guess at the similarity may be quite wrong, and fatally so; thus selecting its fractionally not-quite-accurate enough judgement (which might have been inherited or learnt through imitation, as is often debated about the animal kingdom) out in favour of a hopefully superior fellow bird.

So the 'problem of universals' or why different things are similar, can be reasonably simplified into this form without, I think, resort to the familiar scholastic excess.

Edited June 12, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[merjet]

From my Popperian perspective, the problem of universals is something of a non-problem, and is better thought of as the human need (and the need of all living creatures) for similarities or regularities to survive.

I don't believe it's as big a problem for humankind as Rand portrayed it in "For the New Intellectual", that the fate of mankind rests upon the solution. (I'd say ethics is far more important.) Many people form concepts quite well without being able to articulate how they do it. However, I do think the problem of universals is a genuine and interesting one for philosophy (and cognitive science). Also, I don't believe Popper called it a "non-problem" (in Objective Knowledge). He rather thinks the nature of concepts less important than propositions and theories.

You say that similarities do exist in reality and we have ways of recognizing them (shaped by evolution). I don't believe that's in dispute here. The dispute is more about how we recognize them.

Much of the rest of your post is about the reliability of perception. That's an interesting topic, but not what we have discussed so far on this thread. What brought me into it was whether similarity is perceptual or conceptual or both. Of course, the line or bridge between them is not so clear and on the frontier of cognitive science.

[BaalChatzaf]

I don't believe it's as big a problem for humankind as Rand portrayed it in "For the New Intellectual", that the fate of mankind rests upon the solution. (I'd say ethics is far more important.) Many people form concepts quite well without being able to articulate how they do it. However, I do think the problem of universals is a genuine and interesting one for philosophy (and cognitive science). Also, I don't believe Popper called it a "non-problem" (in Objective Knowledge). He rather thinks the nature of concepts less important than propositions and theories.

Smarrrt as paint ye arrre!

Being able to form concepts (which is as natural to normal human beings as breathing) is like being able to ride a bike. Almost anyone can do it and one one can explain verbally how it is done. The way you learn to ride a bike is to ride a bike and take a few spills in the process. The way you learn to form concepts is to form concepts and make some mistakes in the process.

Try telling a little kid how to form a concept. In order for him to understand what you are saying he has to be able to conceptualize in the first place.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Who would ever want to tell a little kid how to form a concept?

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

Who would ever want to tell a little kid how to form a concept?

Michael

Who -could- tell a little kid how to form a concept. It can't be done. To be told one must understand. To understand one must have already formed concepts. So the precondition to concept formation is concept formation. Go figure.

Nobody really -knows- how humans do it, in a precise way. It is like gravitation. There are theories and descriptions but no one really -knows- what causes gravitation or why masses produce fields that interact with other masses.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Bob,

Dare I mention axioms? I think that's where we are with this. Conceptual consciousness is axiomatic. Objectivism 101.

You wrote, "So the precondition to concept formation is concept formation. Go figure."

Let me apply that to the other fundamental axioms.

So the precondition to exist is to exist. Go figure.

So the precondition to have identity is to have identity. Go figure.

Michael

[Brendan Hutching]

If X is a mental event how come it causes a change in electrical potential in the brain? How can a non-physical cause have a physical effect?

Ba’al: “If X is a mental event how come it causes a change in electrical potential in the brain? How can a non-physical cause have a physical effect?”

think the puzzle is due to the dissimilarity between the cause and the effect. If I decide to turn left rather than turn right, I can explain my decision in terms of ‘purposes’ and ‘desires’. However, the electrical changes in the brain and muscular contractions in my arms are explained in different terms.

But dissimilarity between cause and effect is hardly confined to mental events and physical events. Falling water is quite dissimilar to the eventual effect, the lighting of a bulb in one’s house. But we have no problem in accepting a connection between the two.

Brendan

[Brendan Hutching]

what is your own view on innate knowledge?

The phrase “innate knowledge” is misleading if it means that we are born with specific items of knowledge, for example that 1 + 1 = 2. However, apart from the obvious givens, such as perception, emotions etc, I think we do possess certain general categories by which we “order” or think about our experiences.

I don’t have any empirical evidence for this. Rather, it follows from the fact that some basic concepts seem to be pre-supposed in thought, but not given in experience.

Brendan

[Daniel Barnes]

Merlin:

>I don't believe it's as big a problem for humankind as Rand portrayed it in "For the New Intellectual", that the fate of mankind rests upon the solution.

And also in the intro to the ITOE. I agree.

>Also, I don't believe Popper called it a "non-problem" (in Objective Knowledge).

Well, he did call it a "traditional error" and suggest it be replaced by "the problem of theories" or "the problem of the theoretical content of all human language." (n13, p123 OK)

>He rather thinks the nature of concepts less important than propositions and theories.

Yes.

>>What brought me into it was whether similarity is perceptual or conceptual or both. Of course, the line or bridge between them is not so clear and on the frontier of cognitive science.

The usual argument is whether similarity is in objects or in our perceptions/concepts, so this is a perhaps finer question. I will bridge-sit here, and suggest only that there seem to be different types of similarity: for instance things we perceive sensorily as being similar, and things we know intellectually to be similar (these last we may even perceive to be different, like the length of lines in the optical illusion). There also seems to be a complex interaction between the two out there on the frontier.

Edited June 12, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Here are some scientists who are challenging the idea that nerve communication is electrical.

A Shocking Idea: Nerves Might Run on Sound, Not Electricity

Brandon Keim

Wired

June 11, 2007

Michael