NB's perspective on Objectivism over time

astuertz · June 2, 2023

Greetings,

I am new to these forums, but not new to Objectivism or Nathaniel Branden. Well, compared to some of you, I might have just got into it yesterday. Even still, I have hungrily consumed Objectivist writings, lectures, and discussions over the course of the past several years (pretty much ever since I discovered it). I have read all of Rand's major publications, except, I think, Anthem. I have read some of Peikoff's work. And, I've also read "The Psychology of Self-Esteem" by Nathaniel Branden, and am reading "The Psychology of Romantic Love."

I have noticed a scournful disdain for Branden when I bring him up on the Reddit page. People scoff at me whenever I quote Branden's lectures "The Basic Principles of Objectivism" which I pretty much know by heart. Seriously, his lectures was how I began to dive more seriously into Objectivism, and I've listened to them probably a dozen times in total. I also have the kindle book with many highlights, and I sometimes use the search feature on kindle to pull up exact quotes mid conversation.

I will say this, I was so frustrated with the anti-NB resentment that didn't seem to have any real justification that I made a post on the Reddit page saying, "Tell me one thing in NB's lectures about Objectivism that you disagree with." Not a single intelligible response. The best anyone could muster was "It was poorly presented," which is rubbish because (even as much as I respect Peikoff) NB's lectures are better than OPAR.

Getting to the point, I ended up here because I saw a quote from Branden about Rand saying "protect me from my followers." He remarked about the dogmatic (anti-Objectivist) approach that many of Rand's followers adopted, and this got me wondering how, if at all, NB's views on Objectivism changed throughout his life. I know that he still advocated Objectivism after he broke from Rand. And I know that he later criticized Rand in some respects. And there were certain narrower issues where he just outright disagreed with Rand.

But what I'm asking is, what were Branden's thoughts on Objectivism as a philosophy AND as a movement that were reflective? As he looked back, what things in his perspective changed, if anything? For example, did he end up achieving a path forward of how to wake people up from their zombie-like way of living? Or have insight as to why Objectivism is still being rejected? Or have insights about the direction of Objectivism?

I suppose I will learn much more about what Branden thought as I continue to work my way through his works. I can say this, I have incredible respect for that man. Regardless of how much love I have for Rand, I have no animosity whatever for Nathaniel Branden. He was a truly brilliant man who has offered me the greatest gift any man could offer: the products of his reasoning mind, refined to shine like the brightest gold.

tl;dr:

What are some of the major ways that Nathaniel Branden's thinking changed after he parted ways with Ayn Rand?

Michael Stuart Kelly · June 2, 2023

astuertz,

Welcome to OL.

I agree 100% with your attitude and approach.

I was more friends with Barbara than with Nathaniel (frankly, I thought she was a better writer and my thing is writing ), but I loved them both.

I have several idea to go into with your post, but no time right now. But I do want to stop by briefly and say howdy.

Once again, a warm welcome.

More coming...

Michael

Peter · June 2, 2023

Remember who he was? Here are few relics from the past. Peter

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When I first heard the term "libertarianism" in the early 1950s, I mentioned it to Ayn Rand as a possible name for our political philosophy. She was suspicious of the term and inclined to dismiss it as a neologism. "It's a mouthful," she remarked. "And it sounds too much like a made-up word."

I answered maybe so, but what alternative did we have? She said, "We're advocates of laissez-faire capitalism." I answered, sure, but that's kind of a mouthful too — it's not a one-word name — and besides, it puts the whole emphasis on economics and politics and we stand for something wider and more comprehensive: we're champions of individual rights. We're advocates of a non-coercive society.

I suggested that "libertarianism" could convey all that by means of a single word — especially if we were to define "libertarianism" as a social system that (a) barred the initiation of force from all human relationships and (b) was based on the inviolability of individual rights.

Ayn considered this suggestion briefly, then shook her head and said, "No, it sounds too much like a made-up word."

Later, when many advocates of laissez-faire took up the word, and some of them were anarchists (notably Murray Rothbard), Ayn felt vindicated at rejecting a term broad enough to include Objectivist advocates of pure capitalism, on the one hand, and "anarcho-capitalists," on the other. She did not realize that the majority of people who called themselves "libertarians" were advocates not of anarchism but of constitutionally limited government (in essence, the Objectivist model), and that she could have fought for her interpretation of the term just as she fought for her interpretation of the word "selfish." There was no good reason to surrender a much-needed word to the opposition.

Later still, when she saw that libertarians often supported their position with aspects of her philosophy, without necessarily subscribing to the total of Objectivism, she became angrier still and decided that all libertarians were "whim-worshipping subjectivists."

Being a more balanced and reality-oriented teacher of Objectivism than Leonard Peikoff, David Kelley addressed libertarian groups with the aim of persuading them that Objectivism was the best possible foundation for their political beliefs. For this he was denounced by Peikoff as a traitor to Objectivism. Poor Leonard.

In any event, today libertarianism is part of our language and is commonly understood to mean the advocacy of minimal government. Ayn Rand is commonly referred to as "a libertarian philosopher." Folks, we are all libertarians now. Might as well get used to it.

About ten years ago, I came across a saying from the Talmud that impressed me profoundly. I have not been able to stop thinking about it. I have often wondered what might have happened if I'd had the chance to discuss the idea with Ayn — if there would have been any way to break through. Who knows what might have been different in the years that followed?

The line that so impressed me was: "A hero is one who knows how to make a friend out of an enemy"

Dennis Hardin wrote: Here are some comments made by Nathaniel Branden about anarcho-capitalism in a Seminar recording from January, 1970. This is a literal, unedited transcript. I thought his remarks might be interesting from a historical perspective.

Question: What is your opinion of the trend among certain alleged defenders of free enterprise to repudiate the concept of government entirely and to advocate instead what amounts to some form of anarchy?

Branden: Well let me say at the outset that I of course am an advocate of limited constitutional government. I'm in complete agreement with Ayn Rand's essay on “The Nature of Government” which appears both in her collection of essays The Virtue of Selfishness and was then reprinted again in her later book Capitalism The Unknown Ideal. Therefore I'm not going to here review the arguments for the necessity of a constitutional form of government since I assume you're all familiar with it and in fact agree with me on that subject. I think it's a very unfortunate trend which is seducing an awful lot of somewhat careless thinkers-- this trend among alleged libertarians to advocate what you correctly call anarchism. I think the motives differ from person to person. I think the motives of those who cooked up this idea are not necessarily the same as some of those who are seduced by their arguments. I think they do a very serious disservice to the cause of free enterprise because they put forth a position which is so palpably ridiculous that they just make their own contribution to putting the advocacy of capitalism in the category of a lunatic fringe.

And that's very unfortunate because some of the people associated with the anarcho-capitalist movement are not stupid. They can be very intelligent. They can be very articulate--some of them, not many. And they do a real disservice to the cause of rational capitalism. I think this is a movement that will have a brief vogue and will die in a few years. As people have a chance to mature and think the matter over I think they are going to realize that the arguments they have accepted are very spurious and they may look back with some feeling of embarrassment about this period of their intellectual development. I don't think the whole issue is of great social or sociological significance. I think it's an unfortunate phase. I think it will pass and I really have to say I think it's all pretty stupid.

Question: Well then, Dr. Branden, how would you answer the argument of these anarchists that, since government necessarily entails a monopoly on the use of force, such a monopoly can be maintained only by force and, hence, government always involves some violation of individual rights?

Branden: This, of course, is their favorite argument and their stock argument. In briefest essentials, I would answer as follows. Let's imagine, to make it very simple, that we--this group in this room tonight-- form a society and agree on the principles to be operative in the society in a political sense. We agree upon a constitution and a government is created for the purpose of carrying out the principles laid down in this constitution. Now, let us say that somebody new is born into the society or enters it from some other country, and he says: ‘Look. I wasn't consulted, I wasn't asked my opinion about this system of government. I want to set up a competing system of government. How can you justify forbidding me from doing so and threatening me with jail if I don't go along with the present political order of things?’

And my answer is the following. And remember we are talking here about a free system, about a government which is limited in its function to the protection of individual rights. Suppose that I am the spokesman for this hypothetical government. Then I would say to this person as follows: In this society, nobody is forbidding you anything so long as you do not violate the rights of anybody else in this society. That means, more specifically, if you want to form private arbitration agencies to settle disputes among people who will become your clients, you may do so. That happens even in our present society. You can form a private club or a private organization and lay down any kind of rules you want for your members. You will not be stopped until and unless you attempt to use physical force or fraud or some derivative against some fellow member of this society. That you have no right to do.

If you ever attempt to use force, let us say, in retaliation against a criminal, which you may have to do if the police are not available, you will be obliged to justify later your use of force and to demonstrate that it was, in fact, necessary. If you can justify it, you're in no trouble, any more than any other citizen of a free country is in trouble. So that so long as you don't infringe somebody else's rights, you can form any kind of organization you want. You can have your own arbitration committee, you can have your own system of penalties and fines and so long as the people who go along with your organization voluntarily agree to pay them, you have no problem. Your problem begins when you attempt to use force to get your way.

Therefore, in conclusion, I argue that in the system we are advocating, the individual is not having his rights violated because he is not allowed to set up a competing government.

Question: Dr. Branden, a few members of this anarcho--capitalist group are advocating an alliance with the New Left. Can you offer any explanation of this rather bewildering position?

Branden: Well, when you talk about the members of the so-called anarcho groups who advocate an alliance with the New Left, there I would say they are examples of what I called “counterfeit individualism” in an article I wrote a number of years ago for The Objectivist Newsletter. I described this type in my book The Psychology of Self-Esteem when I spoke about the so-called ‘independent’ social metaphysician, the people who are against for the sake of being against, the people who are rebels for the sake of being rebels, but who are not for anything. They are primarily against and their chief intention is to destroy. The so-called anarchists – capitalists who advocate alliance with the New Left justify it on the grounds that they have in common with the New Left an animosity toward the state. Let's tear down the state, they say, that common goal is a bond between us more important than any intellectual difference.

What sort of intellectual or ideological differences are they willing to ignore? The fact that the New Left sees nothing wrong with the use of force to gain its ends. It sees violence as a perfectly valid instrument of political motion or political development. The fact that they are willing to cooperate, that is to say the anarchists, are willing to cooperate with the New Left, only tells us how little regard or respect they have for property rights or individual liberty or philosophical consistency. I think here you deal with the very lowest depths of the anarchists–capitalists---meaning those who are willing to talk about an alliance with the New Left. Maybe some of their followers are confused and have not thought the issue out very carefully. But here you deal--and I put it bluntly--with the real intellectual scum who are no more friends of capitalism or individualism or individual rights than a Hitler or a Stalin is. They are against this society or any society because they feel themselves to be outcasts and with bloody good reason because I doubt very much if they would find a place in any civilized society.

Nathaniel Branden
Academic Associates’ Seminar, January, 1970

From: Nathaniel Branden Reply-To: branden To: atlantis Subject: ATL: Rand and smoking Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2001 16:05:42 -0700 When Devers Branden visited Ayn Rand, as reported in the revised edition of my memoir, Devers still smoked (1980-81). When Devers pulled out a cigarette AR said to her, "Oh, you really should not smoke. It's very bad for your health." Devers promised to quit and she did. Nathaniel Branden

From: Nathaniel Branden Reply-To: Starship_Forum Subject: [Starship_Forum] Branden: Energy Psychology and Self-Esteem Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 05:49:57 -0000 -------- Original Message -------- Subject: [nathaniel_branden] Energy Psychology and Self-Esteem Date: Wed, 22 May 2002 16:16:28 -0400 (EDT) From: n6666b@cs.com

I have asked to discuss how I relate Energy Psychology to the kind of issues I discuss in my books, which chiefly have to do with self-esteem, autonomy, and self-development.

Let me mention that I write of "Energy Psychology" rather than "Thought Field Therapy" (TFT) because the latter is one school, although by far the most influential one, within the wider field of Energy Psychology. These days I am immersed in the study and practice of Seemorg Matrix Work, developed by Asha Clinton. Clinton uses some of work originated by Roger Callahan in TFT and I understand that TFT people use some of Clinton's workâ?¦which is all as it should be.

I think of psychotherapy as having two broad tasks: the elimination of negatives (phobias, anxiety, depression, self-destructive attitudes, etc.) -and the cultivation of positives (living consciously, self-acceptingly, self-responsibly, self-assertively, purposefully, with integrity, a positive attitude toward the challenges and opportunities of life, etc.)

Although these two tasks commonly overlap, there are distinctions here that need to be understood.

The absence of anxiety does not equal the presence of self-confidence. The absence of depression does not equal the presence of happiness. The elimination of negatives does not guarantee the establishment of positives.

The elimination of negatives opens the door to the possibility of building positives, but different processes are involved.

My writing has chiefly been concerned not with the overcoming of negatives (although indirectly my work has often proven helpful in that regard, if only by inspiring courage) but with clarifying the kind of positives essential to a fulfilling life (e.g., the six pillars of self-esteem).

I have found Energy work extraordinarily helpful in dealing with negatives-healing traumas and eliminating traumatic patterns, overcoming anxieties and insecurities, healing psychic wounds, curing phobias, lifting depression, and so forth. But I have never found any school of Energy Psychology to be a totally stand-alone therapy.

So in my work I interweave the kind of themes I write about into my practice when I am also using some form of Energy Psychology--and I interweave what I have learned from Energy Psychology into my practice when I am working with someone on issues of self-development and self-actualization.

When I am working on eliminating negatives, I am also weaving in positives-and when I am working on developing positives, I sometimes need to pause to focus on the elimination of a negative.

Does Energy Psychology offer some tools for installing positives? Yes. Some. But by my standards not enough by itself. I might be mistaken but I don't think most therapists of a basically Energy orientation would give me an argument about this.

Surely it is enough to say that in my judgment Energy Psychology has made revolutionary contributions and I am profoundly grateful to colleagues like Callahan and Clinton.

Forgive the brevity of this note, by I am being very wicked by playing hooky from the book I am writing to dash off this note. I hope it's useful. Nathaniel Branden

From: "RCR" To: "Atlantis" Subject: ATL: 8 Track NB (Context Crossing Condensor Mix) Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2003 17:15:38 -0600

1. The age of the muscle-worker is past; this is the age of the mind-worker. That your mind is your basic tool of survival is not new; what is new is that this fact has become inescapably clear. The market is rapidly diminishing for people who have nothing to contribute but physical labor. In an economy in which knowledge, information, creativity-and their translation into innovation-are the prime sources of wealth, what is needed above all is minds. What is needed are people who are able and willing to think. - Nathaniel Branden

2. What is the specter that makes self-assertiveness feel so terrifying? The image of someone frowning in disagreement or disapproval. – Nathaniel Branden

3. Out of fear, out of the desire for approval, out of misguided notions of duty, people surrender their selves-their convictions and their aspirations-every day. There is nothing noble about it. It takes far more courage to fight for your values than to relinquish them. – Nathaniel Branden

4. Blaming is a dead-end. What is needed is to focus on solutions, which entails discovering your own resources and mobilizing the will to use them. What are you willing to do to make your life better? - Nathaniel Branden

5. Taking on responsibilities that properly belong to someone else means behaving irresponsibly toward yourself. You need to know where you end and someone else begins. You need to understand boundaries. You need to know what is and is not up to you, what is and is not in your control, what is and is not your responsibility. - Nathaniel Branden

6. If you choose to move through life blindly, you have good reason to be anxious. - Nathaniel Branden

7. When you fight a block or a resistance, it grows stronger. When you acknowledge, accept, and experience it fully, it begins to melt. - Nathaniel Branden

8. In the nature of reality, sometimes there is no choice but to act instantly with no time for reflection. It is an act of consciousness to recognize such moments and take your chances-and know that you will live (or possibly die) with the consequences of your actions. – Nathaniel Branden

**9. A policy of independent thinking can bring us into conflict with the opinions of others. And then the question becomes: What matters more to you-your own perception of reality or someone else's approval? If this is not a spiritual issue, what is? - Nathaniel Branden

**bonus track

Quote Mix by RCR ;-!

In January 1963, Nathaniel Branden published this on p.3 of THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER:

"What is the Objectivist stand on capital punishment?

In considering this issue, two separate aspects must be distinguished: the ~moral~ and the ~legal~.

The moral question is: Does the man who commits willful murder, in the absence of any extenuating circumstances, ~deserve~ to have his own life forfeited? Here, the answer is unequivocally: ~Yes~. Such a man deserves to die -- not as "social revenge" or as an "example" to future potential murderers -- but as the logical and just consequence of his own act: as an expression of the moral principle that no man may take the life of another and still retain the right to his own, that no man may profit from an evil of this kind or escape the consequences of having committed it.

However, the ~legal question~: Should a legal system employ capital punishment? -- is of a different order. There are grounds for debate -- though ~not~ out of sympathy or pity for murderers.

If it were possible to be fully and irrevocably certain, beyond any possibility of error, that a man were guilty, then capital punishment for murder would be appropriate and just. But men are not infallible; juries make mistakes; ~that~ is the problem. There have been instances recorded where all the available evidence pointed overwhelmingly to a man's guilt, and the man was convicted, and then subsequently discovered to be innocent. It is the possibility of executing an ~innocent~ man that raises doubt about the legal advisability of capital punishment. It is preferable to sentence ten murderers to life imprisonment, rather than sentence one innocent man to death. If a man is unjustly imprisoned and subsequently proven to be innocent, some form of restitution is still possible: none is possible if he is dead.

The problem involved is that of establishing criteria of proof so rationally stringent as to forbid the possibility of convicting an innocent man.

It should be noted that the legal question of capital punishment is outside the sphere of philosophy proper: it is to be resolved by a special, separate discipline: the philosophy of law."

Ayn Rand's Inspirations—In Real Life and In Fiction

An Exclusive Banner Interview with Nathaniel Branden

From 1950 until the end of their association in 1968, psychologist Nathaniel Branden was the foremost spokesman for Ayn Rand and her philosophy, Objectivism. Founder of the Nathaniel Branden Institute and the organized Objectivist movement, a prolific and best-selling author, and a brilliant public speaker, Dr. Branden is also known as "the father of the self-esteem movement" in psychology. The following are excerpts from a recent exclusive interview with The Atlas Society's Robert Bidinotto, to appear in The Banner, the newsletter of The Atlas Society.

The Banner: Do you know if there were any real-life inspirations for any of Ayn Rand's fiction heroes?

Nathaniel Branden (NB): There wasn't, in any important sense.

Banner: How about composites of people—or actors and actresses whose faces she liked?

NB: No, I never heard a word from her to suggest that… Possibly Zorro—who was a fictional character, not a real person—possibly Zorro, in a very general, abstract way, played a small role in Ayn's concept of Francisco [d'Anconia, a hero in Atlas Shrugged]. I remember her talking about Zorro. Francisco is almost like a classic figure in literature of a certain kind. The Scarlet Pimpernel, that's another variation of the same idea: the man who pretends to be a fop, but who's really involved in a grimly serious mission. Zorro was obviously that.

Banner: Did the appearance of any of her heroes draw upon anyone—her husband Frank, for instance?

NB: All of her heroes grew from Cyrus, the hero of that children's story she loved about the British soldier in India [The Mysterious Valley]. That was the imprint. And Frank was of that same physical type. Gary Cooper was. And Wallace Reed, an earlier actor. But that was set was she was nine years old.

Banner: I've thought that there seems to have been two stylistic types of hero in Rand's fiction: the classical type—reserved, somewhat stoic, less expressive, like Galt or Roark—and the more expressive, flamboyant, romantic type: Francisco, Midas Mulligan. She seems to go back and forth between the Rearden and the Francisco type. Do you think that is true?

NB: I don't see that. No, she used to say that she loved Viennese operettas. And Francisco for her was tied up with the gaiety of those operettas, and came out of that music. She said she wanted to create a character who would embody the spirit of that music. It was a spirit that she wanted to capture. I can't say that I see any deep stylistic difference. I can't join you with that. But perhaps "style" isn't the word you mean?

Banner: As far as actors and actresses whom she liked…

NB: Well, she adored Greta Garbo, and she would have loved for Greta Garbo to play Dominique [in the film version of The Fountainhead]. According to what Ayn told me, Greta Garbo declined, and for what to me was the most odd reason I ever heard: she didn't think that Gary Cooper [who played Howard Roark] would have been a suitable lover for her. I gather Garbo wasn't a fan of Gary Cooper. But that's merely what Ayn was told by somebody; I have no knowledge as to whether that was true.

Banner: How about for Dagny?

NB: Well, she used to say, "the young Katherine Hepburn in physical appearance"—that's how she saw Dagny.

Banner: She said that once at a Ford Hall Forum I once attended.

NB: I know she wanted Cooper for Roark, even though he was really too old for the part. He was clearly her physical ideal.

Banner: Any other actors that she was partial to?

NB: I can no longer remember. I know she said that [in any movie version of Atlas Shrugged), Galt needed to be played by an unknown—someone with no other associations with any other movie. That makes sense dramatically.

Banner: Were there other people whom she was impressed by?

NB: Well, he was not a public person, but she very much liked the businessman William Mullendore. There were not that many people whom she really liked or admired, as I'm sure you know. Isabel Patterson—until everything went wrong. Ludwig von Mises.

Banner: Figures in history? What about Victor Hugo?

NB: Well, I'm sure she would have loved to have met him. I'll tell you a great Ayn Rand story about Victor Hugo.

I remember coming to her apartment one day, and I was raving about a Hugo novel—I think it was The Man Who Laughs. She asked me to bring down the book; she wanted to check the translation. She read a page or two and said, "Oh, oh, you don't know what you are missing. This is not a good translation. You cannot know from this what a great writer Victor Hugo was."

She went into her office and she got a notepad and she translated the first page or two of Hugo's novel. And it was like a whole new world opened up. It was dazzling, beyond my ability to communicate, because here was a great writer translating a great writer. See, you had to be an extraordinarily gifted writer to do the kind of translation that Hugo warranted. And it was a thrilling moment—I'll never forget it—because it was like I was in a murky room, and somebody turned all the lights on.

Banner: Do you recall having ever attended movies or plays that ever moved her?

NB: Yes. The English playwright Terence Rattigan wrote a script called Breaking Through the Sound Barrier, which was a fictional account of how the sound barrier was broken by a British aviation company. I didn't realize what a strange movie it was, because when I later learned how that actually happened in America, I couldn't imagine how a person could justify inventing a totally fictional portrayal that bore no relation to historical reality. Just the same, the movie was brilliant in its own terms. I saw it and raved about it, and I took Ayn and Frank to see it, and they were very enthusiastic.

Later, Frank had a birthday, and as kind of a birthday present, Barbara and I took Ayn and Frank to see My Fair Lady. I can't say that she was deeply moved, but again, they were very enthusiastic—"That was beautifully well done," etc.

We loved The Untouchables on TV, especially the first two seasons. Then it began to fall apart. But we all watched that religiously.

She rarely, rarely went to the theater, and I can never remember her coming home with a positive reaction.

Banner: Did she like musicals?

NB: No, not American ones. She liked 19th century Viennese operettas, but she didn't like musicals in general—not the American ones.

Banner: When she was dealing with [producer] Al Ruddy to do a screen version of Atlas Shrugged [in the 1970's], did she see The Godfather?

NB: She didn't know Al Ruddy. So as kind of a self-introduction, he asked her to come and see his production of The Godfather. And that sold her on him, and she entrusted him with the project. What happened later on was that she wanted final cut approval—which [they] cannot give. That means they could spend $80 million on a movie, and if she didn't like something they wouldn't agree to, she could have kept it from being released. So the deal foundered over that.

Banner: Is there anything you'd like to add about those evenings you and your friends spent at her apartment reading Atlas Shrugged and discussing her ideas?

NB: The level of intellectual excitement of those evenings is almost indescribable. There was such a passion for ideas, there was such enthusiasm, there was such intensity of interest. It kind of ruined me for social life after that part of my life came to an end. Nothing that happened later quite equaled it.

A week ago I was in Washington, D. C., and Devers (my ex-wife and best and closest friend) and I had brunch with Alan Greenspan, and he was saying the same thing—that it was just a unique experience that nothing later in life quite touched.

The May, 1962 issue of "The Objectivist Newsletter" has an article by Nathaniel Branden (Intellectual Ammunition Department) which briefly discusses the subject of "time". Here's the quote:

Just as the concept of causality applies to events and entities within the universe, but not to the universe as a whole -- so the concept of time applies to events an entities within the universe, but not to the universe as a whole. The universe did not "begin" -- it did not, at some point in time, "spring into being". Time is a measurement of motion. Motion presupposes entities that move. If nothing existed, there could be no time. Time is "in" the universe; the universe is not "in" time.

I don't know if I'd have much to contribute, but I'd certainly be interested in following a discussion of this subject.

Michael Mansberg

I have found this to be an overwhelmingly popular view within Objectivism. In fact, in a post to OWL seven months ago (6/10), not only did Nathaniel Branden advocate it, but he also claimed that Rand did too.

> Rand and I (we discussed this) emphatically come down on the side of gratuitous infliction of pain as being immoral. . . . [I]f we saw a person wantonly torturing, say, a dog or a cat, we would condemn such behavior very strongly indeed.

) Nathaniel Branden writes, "When a person understands that who I am, ultimately and essentially, is my faculty of awareness and my power to regulate its activity, the road is cleared to experience the joy of living mindfully" (The Art of Living Consciously, 75-76).

As Nathaniel Branden points out in "Mental Health versus Mysticism and Self-Sacrifice" (1963), "faith is the commitment of one's consciousness to beliefs for which one has no sensory evidence or rational proof."

To quote one Objectivist: “Egoism holds that man is an end in himself; altruism holds that man is a means to the ends of others. Egoism holds that, morally, the beneficiary of an action should be the person who acts; altruism holds that, morally the beneficiary of an action should be someone ‘other’ than the person who acts . . . . To be selfish is to be motivated by concern for one’s self-interest. That requires that one consider what constitutes one’s self-interest and how to achieve it – what values and goals to pursue, what principles and policies to adopt . . . . Selfishness entails: (a) a hierarchy of values set by the standard of one’s self-interest, and (b) the refusal to sacrifice a higher value to a lower one, or to a non-value . . . .

To make this principle fully clear, let us consider an extreme example of an action which, in fact, is selfish, but conventionally might be called self-sacrificial: a man’s willingness to die to save the life of the woman he loves. In what way would such a man be the beneficiary of his action? . . . . If a man loves a woman so much that he does not wish to survive her death, if life can have nothing more to offer him at that price, then his dying to save her is not a sacrifice.” Nathaniel Branden. (March 1963) “The Objectivist Newsletter.”

At that time, Nathaniel wrote: "Were AR alive, obviously she would have the right to say, 'Do not describe as 'Objectivism' any viewpoint I disagree with.' But when her agreement or disagreement is no longer possible, we are on our own to judge what is or is not compatible with Objectivism, and that could include even challenging some position of AR's which we believe to be in conflict with her more fundamental premises."

Determinism is the theory that all actions, including those of human beings, are necessitated by antecedent causes. To agree with this view is per force to deny free will, at least in the Objectivist sense of that term. According to Objectivism, "Free will" -- in the widest meaning of the term -- is the doctrine...that man is capable of making choices which are not necessitated by antecedent factors." [Nathaniel Branden, _The Psychology of Self-Esteem_, p. 49 HB]

From: Nathaniel Branden < To: "R. Christian Ross" CC: atlantis Subject: ATL: Re: Reason Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 07:21:38 -0800. I would say, and I am confident Rand would agree, that what is inherent in our nature is the capacity to reason, assuming we go through normal stages of development (an infant can't reason, obviously). The great student of cognitive development, Jean Piaget, maintained that if, during teen-age years, a person does not develop high level of cognitive abilities ("formal operations"), it is virtually impossible to develop them later in life. If this is true, then the world is full of people whose reasoning ability is not absent but severely limited.

Reason as a process is, of course, epistemological, but as a capacity, inherent as a potential in our nature, it is, if you wish "metaphysical."

I put the word in quotes because, strictly speaking, metaphysics addresses only the fundamental nature of reality, not such things as the attributes of man or lower animals.

And, finally, in calling man "a rational animal," Rand meant (a) that we humans have a capacity to reason that differentiates us from lower animals (genus and differentia), but also (b) that that capacity explains more about our behavior than any other trait or attribute. Nathaniel Branden

From: Nathaniel Branden To: RogerEBissell CC: atlantis Subject: Re: ATL: Re: Reason Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 21:18:50 -0800

THE REASON WHY THERE IS SOME CONFUSION ON THIS POINT, I SUSPECT, IS THAT RAND SOMETIMES USED "METAPHYSICAL" TO MEAN "PERTAINING TO REALITY (USUALLY EXTERNAL REALITY), AS CONTRASTED WITH PERTAINING TO CONSCIOUSNESS, AND YOU WILL SEE THIS USAGE AMONG SOME HER FOLLOWERS. HOWEVER, PHILOSOPHICALLY, IT IS NOT PRECISE BECAUSE "MAN'S NATURE" IS AN EMPIRICAL, SCIENTIFIC ISSUE NOT A PHILOSOPHICAL ONE, ALTHOUGH IT OBVIOUSLY HAS PROFOUND PHILOSOPHICAL RAMIFICATIONS. NATHANIEL BRANDEN

From: Nathaniel Branden To: atlantis Subject: ATL: Objectivist metaphysics Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 13:55:08 -0800 In response to my earlier post in which I explained that the definition of human nature is not part of metaphysics, I have been asked to elaborate on what is included in the domain of metaphysics. It's an important question because it touches on one of the most important and distinctive features of Objectivism.

Rand rightly dismissed "cosmology" as not part of philosophy, insisting instead that it was the province of science. She argued that metaphysics deals only with the most fundamental features of existence as such. She set forth what has been called correctly "a minimalist metaphysics"--fundamental truths that no scientific discovery could disprove and that all scientific discoveries presupposed. This came down to Aristotle's laws of logic, which (as she and others have observed) are also laws of reality (Brand Blanshard's "Reason and

Analysis" is great on this point), and also the law of causality. In other words, metaphysics is concerned with that which is true "of being qua being."

By this definition, the particular attributes of man or other animals are in the domain of science, meaning they are not "metaphysical." However, as I observed in a previous note, Rand sometimes used the term "metaphysical" more broadly to mean "pertaining to reality" as contrasted with "pertaining to consciousness"--, on other occasions, as meaning "pertaining to that which is given in nature" as contrasted with the "man-made."

I hope this clarification is helpful. Nathaniel Branden

From: Nathaniel Branden To: Michael Hardy CC: atlantis Subject: ATL: Re: Objectivist metaphysics Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 18:29:38 -0800 Michael Hardy wrote: >Nathaniel Branden <brandenn@pacbell.net> wrote that Ayn Rand set forth what has been called correctly "a minimalist metaphysics" --fundamental truths that no scientific discovery could disprove and that all scientific discoveries presupposed. This came down to Aristotle's laws of logic, which (as she and others have observed) are also laws of reality (Brand Blanshard's "Reason and Analysis" is great on this point), and also the law of causality.

>I for one would have said the laws of logic belong to epistemology rather than metaphysics. Can anyone explain this classification? Shouldn't the nature of free will also belong to metaphysics? Mike Hardy

THE LAWS OF LOGIC ARE, QUA LAWS OF THOUGHT, EPISTEMOLOGICAL, AND, QUA

LAWS OF REALITY, METAPHYSICAL. NATHANIEL BRANDEN

From: Nathaniel Branden To: ATLANTIS Subject: ATL: ONE MORE THOUGHT Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 18:33:38 -0800 If one accepts that metaphysics is concerned only with being qua being, then one sees that volition is not "metaphysical." Such at any rate was Rand's position, which I share. Nathaniel Branden

From: Nathaniel Branden To: Michael Hardy <hardy CC: atlantis Subject: ATL: Re: free will & epistemology Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2001 15:51:10 -0800 Michael Hardy wrote:

> Nathaniel Branden <brandenn@pacbell.net> wrote:

> > If volition does not belong in metaphysics, where does it belong among the branches of philosophy? Good question. I would venture to say...epistemology.

>

> The argument you wrote that appeared in _The_Objectivist_, and which was also put forth by miscellaneous philosophers before that, and by me when I was in 12th grade, could be summarized by saying "epistemology presupposes free will", and Leonard Peikoff did put it in those words in his 12-lecture course he delivered under Ayn Rand's supervision in 1976. It has also been observed, by a much larger number of philosophers and others, that *ethics* also presupposes free will. To say that ethics presupposes free will does not mean that ethics is the branch of philosophy in which the nature of free will belongs, and the same is true of epistemology.

>

> Nathaniel, in your 20-lecture basic course at NBI you said philosophy is the attempt to answer three questions: (1) What exists? (2) How do you know? (3) So what? Epistemology deals with the second question. Why is free will a part of the answer to the second question? Saying only that epistemology presupposes free will fails to answer this unless you also want to say epistemology is a part of ethics. -- Mike Hardy

IF SOMEONE WANTS TO EXPAND THE MEANING OF METAPHYSICS TO INCLUDE "THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF MAN," SO BE IT, NO ONE IS GOING TO ARREST HIM (OR HER); NO ONE IS EVEN LIKELY TO GET EXCITED ABOUT THE QUESTION, ONE WAY

OR THE OTHER. I SUGGESTED THAT VOLITION BELONGS AS PART OF THE FOUNDATION OF EPISTEMOLOGY, IN THE OBJECTIVIST SYSTEM, BECAUSE THAT FOUNDATION HAS ALWAYS STRESSED THE NON-INFALLIBLE, NON-OMNISCIENT NATURE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VOLITION IN THIS CONTEXT. I DON'T KNOW HOW TO MAKE MY VIEWPOINT ANY CLEARER, SO I AM GOING TO STOP AT THIS POINT. GO IN PEACE, EVERYONE. NATHANIEL BRANDEN

From: Nathaniel Branden To: "R. Christian Ross" <reason_on CC: atlantis Subject: ATL: Re: Reason Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 07:21:38 -0800 I would say, and I am confident Rand would agree, that what is inherent in our nature is the capacity to reason, assuming we go through normal stages of development (an infant can't reason, obviously). The great student of cognitive development, Jean Piaget, maintained that if, during teen-age years, a person does not develop high level of cognitive abilities ("formal operations"), it is virtually impossible to develop them later in life. If this is true, then the world is full of people whose reasoning ability is not absent but severely limited.

Reason as a process is, of course, epistemological, but as a capacity, inherent as a potential in our nature, it is, if you wish "metaphysical."

I put the word in quotes because, strictly speaking, metaphysics addresses only the fundamental nature of reality, not such things as the attributes of man or lower animals.

And, finally, in calling man "a rational animal," Rand meant (a) that we humans have a capacity to reason that differentiates us from lower animals (genus and differentia), but also (b) that that capacity explains more about our behavior than any other trait or attribute. Nathaniel Branden

From: Nathaniel Branden To: ATLANTIS Subject: ATL: ONE MORE THOUGHT Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 18:33:38 -0800 If one accepts that metaphysics is concerned only with being qua being, then one sees that volition is not "metaphysical."

Such at any rate was Rand's position, which I share. Nathaniel Branden

From: Nathaniel Branden <brandenn@pacbell.net> Reply-To: brandenn@pacbell.net To: Michael Hardy <hardy@math.mit.edu>CC: atlantis Subject: ATL: Re: free will & epistemology Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2001 15:51:10 -0800

Michael Hardy wrote: > Nathaniel Branden <brandenn@pacbell.net> wrote:

> > If volition does not belong in metaphysics, where does it belong among the branches of philosophy? Good question. I would venture to say...epistemology.

>

> The argument you wrote that appeared in _The_Objectivist_, and which was also put forth by miscellaneous philosophers before that, and by me when I was in 12th grade, could be summarized by saying "epistemology presupposes free will", and Leonard Peikoff did put it in those words in his 12-lecture course he delivered under Ayn Rand's supervision in 1976. It has also been observed, by a much larger number of philosophers and others, that *ethics* also presupposes free will. To say that ethics presupposes free will does not mean that ethics is the branch of philosophy in which the nature of free will belongs, and the same is true of epistemology.

>

> Nathaniel, in your 20-lecture basic course at NBI you said philosophy is the attempt to answer three questions: (1) What exists? (2) How do you know? (3) So what? Epistemology deals with the second question. Why is free will a part of the answer to the second question? Saying only that epistemology presupposes free will fails to answer this unless you also want to say epistemology is a part of ethics. -- Mike Hardy

IF SOMEONE WANTS TO EXPAND THE MEANING OF METAPHYSICS TO INCLUDE "THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF MAN," SO BE IT, NO ONE IS GOING TO ARREST HIM (OR HER); NO ONE IS EVEN LIKELY TO GET EXCITED ABOUT THE QUESTION, ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.

I SUGGESTED THAT VOLITION BELONGS AS PART OF THE FOUNDATION OF EPISTEMOLOGY, IN THE OBJECTIVIST SYSTEM, BECAUSE THAT FOUNDATION HAS ALWAYS STRESSED THE NON-INFALLIBLE, NON-OMNISCIENT NATURE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VOLITION IN THIS CONTEXT.

I DON'T KNOW HOW TO MAKE MY VIEWPOINT ANY CLEARER, SO I AM GOING TO STOP AT THIS POINT. GO IN PEACE, EVERYONE.

From: Nathaniel Branden To: RogerEBissell atlantis Subject: Re: ATL: Re: Reason Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 21:18:50 -0800 THE REASON WHY THERE IS SOME CONFUSION ON THIS POINT, I SUSPECT, IS THAT RAND SOMETIMES USED "METAPHYSICAL" TO MEAN "PERTAINING TO REALITY (USUALLY EXTERNAL REALITY), AS CONTRASTED WITH PERTAINING TO CONSCIOUSNESS, AND YOU WILL SEE THIS USAGE AMONG SOME HER FOLLOWERS. HOWEVER, PHILOSOPHICALLY, IT IS NOT PRECISE BECAUSE "MAN'S NATURE" IS AN EMPIRICAL, SCIENTIFIC ISSUE NOT A PHILOSOPHICAL ONE, ALTHOUGH IT OBVIOUSLY HAS PROFOUND PHILOSOPHICAL RAMIFICATIONS. NATHANIEL BRANDEN

From: Nathaniel Branden To: atlantis Subject: ATL: Objectivist metaphysics Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 13:55:08 -0800 In response to my earlier post in which I explained that the definition of human nature is not part of metaphysics, I have been asked to elaborate on what is included in the domain of metaphysics. It's an important question because it touches on one of the most important and distinctive features of Objectivism.

Rand rightly dismissed "cosmology" as not part of philosophy, insisting instead that it was the province of science. She argued that metaphysics deals only with the most fundamental features of existence as such. She set forth what has been called correctly "a minimalist metaphysics"--fundamental truths that no scientific discovery could disprove and that all scientific discoveries presupposed. This came down to Aristotle's laws of logic, which (as she and others have observed) are also laws of reality (Brand Blanshard's "Reason and Analysis" is great on this point), and also the law of causality. In other words, metaphysics is concerned with that which is true "of being qua being."

By this definition, the particular attributes of man or other animals are in the domain of science, meaning they are not "metaphysical." However, as I observed in a previous note, Rand sometimes used the term "metaphysical" more broadly to mean "pertaining to reality" as contrasted with "pertaining to consciousness"--, on other occasions, as meaning "pertaining to that which is given in nature" as contrasted with the "man-made." I hope this clarification is helpful. Nathaniel Branden

From: Nathaniel Branden To: atlantis Subject: ATL: one more Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 13:27:05 -0800 Oh, yes, one more.

Anyone who thinks AR provided rational grounds for her assertion that no rational woman would want to be President of the U.S.--doesn't understand Objectivist epistemology. Nathaniel Branden

From: BBfromM To: atlantis SOLO_forum Subject: ATL: Man-woman relationships Date: Sun, 2 Dec 2001 19:11:10 EST I once read something that still has me laughing helplessly whenever I think of it. It was a book written by a raging feminist, and nowhere was there a hint of the possibility that any woman might react differently than she did -- except once. One turned a page to see another page that was blank except for one bold-faced line: EVERY WOMAN LOVES A FASCIST. There was no explanation and no reference to the line in the rest of the book.

I thought it hysterically funny, and I knew exactly what she meant. Barbara

From: Nathaniel Branden To: Starship_Forum Subject: [Starship_Forum] Branden: Energy Psychology and Self-Esteem Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 05:49:57 -0000

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: [nathaniel_branden] Energy Psychology and Self-Esteem Date: Wed, 22 May 2002 16:16:28 -0400 (EDT) From: n6666b@cs.com