Anarcho-Capitalism: A Branden ‘Blast from the Past’

[George H. Smith]

I think these posts-counter posts between George and Dennis are extremely important and basically address what I have always considered wrong with libertarianism--the severing of politics from the rest of philosophy, especially ethics. The ethics that are in politics are not integrated with the ethics that are not and cannot be considered basic even though the NIOF principle is extremely important. NIOF works, sort of, in cases of gross and obvious criminality--rape, kidnapping, murder, etc.--but is no substitute for general philosophical investigation and reasoning or a complete politics of governance. I so far don't see even George with all his knowledge and brain power over-coming this essential libertarian problem of using "anarchy" as its philosophical default.

All that you say here is false. Libertarians (with one exception that I can think of, i.e., Walter Block) do not sever the NIOF principle from ethics. I have no idea why you would say such a thing.

As for my own views, what do you expect me to do -- write a book-length treatment on this thread? I have some disagreements with Rand here and there, but I think her approach to ethics and rights is basically sound, so I have been using that as common ground.

And I certainly don't view "anarchy" as a "philosophical default." In fact, I don't even defend "anarchy" per se. Rather, I defend a particular theory of anarchism. As I wrote at: http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8257&view=findpost&p=90331

The word "anarchy" refers to a kind of society: a society without government, or State. (I discuss various distinctions between "government" and "State" below; for now I use them interchangeably.) This is a description, not an evaluation. To describe a society as "anarchistic" means that social order exists in some fashion and to some degree without government, for this is implicit in the meaning of "society," but it does not tell us anything more specific. An anarchistic society may be primitive or advanced, violent or peaceful, just or unjust, desirable or undesirable. The anarchist does not endorse every manifestation of Anarchy, just as the governmentalist does not endorse every kind of government.

To determine the nature of a good anarchistic society is the business of Anarchism, which is a theory of social order without government. This distinction between anarchy and anarchism is crucial. The former denotes a society, any society, without a State, whether good or bad. The latter denotes a particular point of view - a defense and justification of the good society which includes, as a fundamental precondition, the absence of a State. As stated previously, not every form of anarchy is acceptable to the advocate of Anarchism, any more than every kind of government is acceptable to the advocate of government. To eliminate government may remove a major source of injustice and violence in society, but this does not mean that justice and social order will automatically fill the void. In other words, anarchism regards the absence of government as a necessary condition for a good society, but not as a sufficient condition.

To summarize: "anarchy" is a negative term that refers to a social condition - the absence of government. "Anarchism," in contrast, is a positive term - a theory of justice and social order that rejects government for moral, economic, religious and/or social reasons. Anarchism is a theory about what ought to be, not merely a statement about what is.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

Government cannot be rejected, only fought, save, perhaps, psychologically. That's simply because what is rejected will continue to exist.

--Brant

thank you for the lucid anarchy-anarchism exposition

[George H. Smith]

Government cannot be rejected, only fought, save, perhaps, psychologically. That's simply because what is rejected will continue to exist. --Brant thank you for the lucid anarchy-anarchism exposition

My method of arguing on this thread is how philosophers have discussed such matters for many centuries. Philosophy, in whatever field, addresses highly abstract problems in an effort to fomulate fundamental principles. For Rand, the NIOF is a fundamental principle in the social/political realm, and she was absolutely right to stress the importance of this principle as a limitation on governments. As Rand warned in "The Nature of Government" (my boldface):

Now consider the extent of the moral and political inversion in today's prevalent view of government. Instead of being a protector of man's rights, the government is becoming their most dangerous violator; instead of guarding freedom, the government is establishing slavery; instead of protecting men from the initiators of physical force, the government is initiating physical force and coercion in any manner and issue it pleases....

One also begins to see more clearly the nature of the political principles that have to be accepted and advocated, as part of the battle for man's intellectual Renaissance.

Here as elsewhere, Rand stresses the NIOF principle as an essential limitation on government. If we concede, as Dennis has, that a government may legitimately initiate force, then we have conceded the principle of statism, and the rest is just a matter of time. (I devote nearly an entire chapter to this issue in Themes in the History of Classical Liberalism, forthcoming from Cambridge University Press later this year, or perhaps early next year.)

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

The following passage is from "What is Capitalism?" (My boldface.) It succintly expresses the views I have attributed to Rand thus far:

The recognition of individual rights entails the banishment of physical force from human relationships: basically, rights can be violated only by means of force. In a capitalist society, no man or group may initiate the use of physical force against others. The only function of the government, in such a society, is the task of protecting man's rights, i.e.., the task of protecting him from physical force; the government acts as the agent of man's right of self-defense, and may use force only in retaliation and only against those who initiate its use; thus the government is the means of placing the retaliatory use of force under objective control.

The need to quote passages like this is depressing in a way, since Rand said the same thing many times, without equivocation. But Dennis's bizarre reading of Rand, according to which she defended the initation of force by government, has made this necessary.

As I said earlier, Dennis, having drilled holes in the Randian boat with many supposed exceptions to the NIOF principle, is now attempting to patch up his own holes by distinguishing between cases of the "existential" initiation of force that Rand supposedly approved of, but did not regard as "technical" cases of the initiation of force.

The problem here is that Dennis does not understand Rand, or he does not take what she said seriously. Rand meant exactly what she said, over and over again, viz., that a proper government "may use force only in retaliation and only against those who initiate its use."

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

In this excerpt from "What is Capitalism?" we find one of Rand's clearest statements about the relationship between the NIOF principle and rights.

A rational mind does not work under compulsion; it does not subordinate its grasp of reality to anyone's orders, directives, or controls; it does not sacrifice its knowledge, its view of the truth, to anyone's opinions, threats, wishes, plans, or "welfare." Such a mind may be hampered by others, it may be silenced, proscribed, imprisoned, or destroyed; it cannot be forced; a gun is not an argument. (An example and symbol of this attitude is Galileo.)

It is from the work and the inviolate integrity of such minds—from the intransigent innovators—that all of mankind's knowledge and achievements have come. (See The Fountainhead.) It is to such minds that mankind owes its survival. (See Atlas Shrugged.)

The same principle applies to all men, on every level of ability and ambition. To the extent that a man is guided by his rational judgment, he acts in accordance with the requirements of his nature and, to that extent, succeeds in achieving a human form of survival and well-being; to the extent that he acts irrationally, he acts as his own destroyer.

The social recognition of man's rational nature—of the connection between his survival and his use of reason—is the concept of individual rights.

I shall remind you that "rights" are a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context, that they are derived from man's nature as a rational being and represent a necessary condition of his particular mode of survival.

Notice how Rand begins. She doesn't begin with the concept of rights and then deduce the immorality of physical force from this concept. Rather, she begins with the harmful effects of force on human beings -- specifically, how force prevents man from using his reason for his own purposes -- and then uses this observation as a premise on which to base her rights theory. Rights, she says, are a social recognition of this premise.

Rand goes on to repeat her definition of rights, i.e., "a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context." The words "defining" and "sanctioning" are very significant.

Rights define freedom of action in the sense that they enable us to distinguish between the initiatory and retalitory uses of force. This is a key point, one that I have emphasized before. We need a theory of property rights in various areas -- e.g., contract law, fraud, etc. -- in order to determine when force has been initiated and when it has not. Hence the importance of Rand's various discussions of the "indirect" uses of force.

Rights sanction freedom of action in the sense that they give a moral justification for freedom of action, thereby moving beyond what man needs to what he ought to have. And in doing this, rights also give a moral warrant to the retaliatory use of force, i.e., force that is used in response to the initiation of force.

I agree with all this, jot and tittle -- as do many libertarian anarchists. It is scarcely coincidental that the modern anarchist movement arose from within the ranks of philosophers who were heavily influenced by Rand.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

In my judgment, the following passage from "What is Capitalism?" is the most significant single paragraph that Rand ever wrote on the relationship between values and force.

If one knows that the good is objective—i.e., determined by the nature of reality, but to be discovered by man's mind—one knows that an attempt to achieve the good by physical force is a monstrous contradiction which negates morality at its root by destroying man's capacity to recognize the good, i.e.., his capacity to value. Force invalidates and paralyzes a man's judgment, demanding that he act against it, thus rendering him morally impotent. A value which one is forced to accept at the price of surrendering one's mind, is not a value to anyone; the forcibly mindless can neither judge nor choose nor value. An attempt to achieve the good by force is like an attempt to provide a man with a picture gallery at the price of cutting out his eyes. Values cannot exist (cannot be valued) outside the full context of a man's life, needs, goals, and knowledge.

As with the passages I quoted previously, this shows the fundamental role that freedom and physical force play in Rand's ethics, and not merely in her political theory. The pursuit of objective values, according to Rand, presupposes freedom of choice and action. And rights (as I explained earlier) then become the conceptual method by which we define and sanction this freedom of action.

On at least two occasions that I can recall, Dennis said that rights make a "moral existence" possible for man. (I believe this is the term he used.) I checked my "Objectivism Research CD-ROM." Rand only used "moral existence" twice in her published writings -- and in neither case did she use this expression in the same context that Dennis did.

Nevertheless, I don't especially object to Dennis's use of "moral existence," provided we understand this term properly. "Moral," in this context, should be understood in contrast to "nonmoral," not to "immoral." As indicated in the passage quoted above, objective values themselves cannot even exist outside the context of uncoerced choices, so freedom (as defined by rights) is an essential precondition of a moral, as opposed to a nonmoral, existence.

But we cannot slide from this reasonable assertion, as Dennis is prone to do (e.g., in his comments about abortion), into the false assertion that rights do not apply to actions that are manifestly immoral. One has the perfect right to commit immoral actions, so long as one's actions do not violate the rights of other people.

Yes, rights have a moral foundation, but this doesn't preclude us from distinguishing between immoral actions that violate the rights of other people and immoral actions that do not violate rights. When I distinguish between morality and justice, I mean by "morality" what every philosopher has meant by this distinction, i.e., personal moral judgments that do not violate the rights of other people.

I am almost embarrassed to call attention to this elementary distinction, but, again and unfortunately, it is necessary when discussing these matters with Dennis.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

There has been a little too much chop up in this discussion between the theorectical, or formal philosophical breaks in principles (ethics, politics), and practical. George needs to refer to his libertarian anarchist philosophy to justify his positions, not Objectivism, unless he's a closet Objectivist. If he is he should come out to us. Rand has one foot in ethics and one in politics, as she should. George seems to have one foot in politics but where is the other one respecting libertarian philosophy? Or, was Rand a closet libertarian? (In many ways I think she was and a closet conservative too.) I'm beginning to suspect she and Branden shouldn't have called the philosophy Objectivism or any thing at all except the philosophy of Ayn Rand. That would have been more inviting of give and take back in the day. Instead we got this whole ball of wax thing with guardians at the gate.

--Brant

I know George is going to come back to me on this and rightfully acuse me of not reading him closely enough--I don't quite have the time, I wish I did, sorry

[George H. Smith]

According to this approach, to have "property in" something (or "propriety in" something) is to have legitimate moral jurisdiction over something. It is to have a moral claim of ownership -- hence the term "self-ownership" that became popular among 19th century libertarians. Property rights are the conceptual method by which we distinguish mine from thine.

Objectivism rejects the entire notion of "self-ownership" as the basis of the right to life. The acceptance of this idea is one more example of the failure to appreciate the underlying philosophical basis of rights.

Q: Is there a difference between saying that someone is the owner of his own life and saying that someone has a right to his own life?

Peikoff: Ownership is a concept which implies a relationship between you and an external object. There's the owner and the external object you possess. How can you own yourself? Who is the owner that is doing the owning of the owner? This is nonsensical. There is someone over and above me who is me that's owning my body and soul. Ownership is a concept that only applies to external property. You own physical objects that you can use and dispose of. You don't own your own freedom.

Oh, really? So why did Rand write the following (in "What is Capitlaism?"):

Is man a sovereign individual who owns his person, his mind, his life, his work and its products—or is he the property of the tribe (the state, the society, the collective) that may dispose of him in any way it pleases, that may dictate his convictions, prescribe the course of his life, control his work and expropriate his products?

Since according to you and Peikoff, "ownership is a concept which implies a relationship between you and an external object," Rand could not possibly have defended the absurd position that "man is a sovereign individual who owns his own person, his mind, his life," etc. Since this is not even possible, I guess Rand wanted to defend the only alternative, i.e., that man is "the property of the tribe (the state, the society, the collective) that may dispose of him in any way it pleases...."

Or maybe Rand, unlike you, didn't understand that "Objectivism rejects the entire notion of 'self-ownership'." Too bad that Rand is no longer around so you could correct her on this matter.

Btw, I never said that "self-ownership" is the "basis of the right to life." It is merely another formulation of the right to life, as Rand -- but not you and Peikoff -- clearly understood.

Quote Peikoff all you like. I will stick with Rand.

Ghs

Addendum: In a letter to Dr. Larson (July 15, 1960), Rand wrote: "Ownership is the right of use and disposal."

This is perfectly consistent with the individualist tradition that I discussed earlier. To be a "self-owner" is to have the right to use and dispose of one's body as one sees fit, so long as one respects the equal rights of others.

Peikoff was blowing hot air. I would strongly recommend that you do not fly in his jet stream.

[Brant Gaede]

I can see quoting 1960s' Branden, not Peikoff respecting Objectivism.

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I think there's another element about NIOF that can be dragged out into the middle of the floor and let the cat smell it.

Is NIOF a principle or a purpose? If it is a principle, it is a standard. If it is a purpose, it is a goal. Nathaniel Branden made this principle/purpose distinction very clear in a discussion of self-interest. I quoted it elsewhere.

Egoism & Benevolence by Nathaniel Branden (dated August 18, 2011).

Here's the pertinent quote.

... the Objectivist ethics is a set of abstract principles, of which the purpose is the life and well being of the individual – here is where egoism comes in – but of which the standard is that which serves man's life as a rational being. To quote Ayn Rand: "The difference between a 'standard' and a 'purpose'... is as follows: a 'standard' is an abstract principle that serves as a measurement or gauge to guide a man's choices in the achievement of a concrete, specific purpose. 'That which is required for the survival of man qua man' is an abstract principle that applies to every individual man. The task of applying this principle to a concrete, specific purpose – the purpose of living a life proper to a rational being – belongs to every individual man, and the life he has to live is his own." (The Objectivist Ethics) What I want you to note here is that Objectivism says, in effect, that which is rational, in a given context, will serve your self-interest. It does not say that which you decide serves your self-interest is the rational. Self-interest, or happiness, is the purpose, not the standard. People destroy themselves every day by pursuing paths that they feel are to their self-interest. Self-interest, per se, is not and cannot be the standard; it can only be the purpose. Otherwise, the question is left open: By what standard do you determine what is to your self-interest?

In the Objectivist Ethics, reason has the last word, not "self-interest" – where "self-interest," in effect, hangs in a void.

A principle is to be used for measurement, as a gauge, not as enforcement. We enforce laws, not principles. Laws might be based on principles, but they are also based on context.

Using this formulation, it would be very easy to redo Branden's words (with some minor modifications) and work in NIOF in the place of self-interest. In other words, to paraphrase him, one could say that reason, not NIOF, has the last word.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

There has been a little too much chop up in this discussion between the theorectical, or formal philosophical breaks in principles (ethics, politics), and practical. George needs to refer to his libertarian anarchist philosophy to justify his positions, not Objectivism, unless he's a closet Objectivist. If he is he should come out to us. Rand has one foot in ethics and one in politics, as she should. George seems to have one foot in politics but where is the other one respecting libertarian philosophy? Or, was Rand a closet libertarian? (In many ways I think she was and a closet conservative too.) I'm beginning to suspect she and Branden shouldn't have called the philosophy Objectivism or any thing at all except the philosophy of Ayn Rand. That would have been more inviting of give and take back in the day. Instead we got this whole ball of wax thing with guardians at the gate. --Brant I know George is going to come back to me on this and rightfully acuse me of not reading him closely enough--I don't quite have the time, I wish I did, sorry

At this point I am merely attempting to correct Dennis's multitudinous errors about Rand's theory of rights and the NIOF principle. In his effort to rebut anarchism, Dennis has attributed positions to Rand that she never held, indeed, that she explicitly repudiated. This has left me no option except to teach some Objectivism 101.

The sad thing about all this is that Dennis's peculiar twists and turns -- which are original with him and that no other O'ist that I know of would ever endorse -- are completely unncessary to mount a credible defense of minarchism. But once Dennis started to dig himself into a hole, he just kept digging, instead of climbing out and starting fresh.

As I have said before, if Dennis concedes that a Randian government will and must initiate force to maintain its monopoly, then this debate is over. The anarchists have won, because this has always been their key claim.

If Dennis, in addition, wishes to argue that it is fine and dandy for governments to initiate force in many instances, then the argument is no longer between anarchists and minarchists. Rather, it is now between statists and the advocates of a free society, whether anarchist or minarchist.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

I think there's another element about NIOF that can be dragged out into the middle of the floor and let the cat smell it.

Is NIOF a principle or a purpose? If it is a principle, it is a standard. If it is a purpose, it is a goal. Nathaniel Branden made this principle/purpose distinction very clear in a discussion of self-interest. I quoted it elsewhere.

Egoism & Benevolence by Nathaniel Branden (dated August 18, 2011).

Here's the pertinent quote.

... the Objectivist ethics is a set of abstract principles, of which the purpose is the life and well being of the individual – here is where egoism comes in – but of which the standard is that which serves man's life as a rational being. To quote Ayn Rand: "The difference between a 'standard' and a 'purpose'... is as follows: a 'standard' is an abstract principle that serves as a measurement or gauge to guide a man's choices in the achievement of a concrete, specific purpose. 'That which is required for the survival of man qua man' is an abstract principle that applies to every individual man. The task of applying this principle to a concrete, specific purpose – the purpose of living a life proper to a rational being – belongs to every individual man, and the life he has to live is his own." (The Objectivist Ethics) What I want you to note here is that Objectivism says, in effect, that which is rational, in a given context, will serve your self-interest. It does not say that which you decide serves your self-interest is the rational. Self-interest, or happiness, is the purpose, not the standard. People destroy themselves every day by pursuing paths that they feel are to their self-interest. Self-interest, per se, is not and cannot be the standard; it can only be the purpose. Otherwise, the question is left open: By what standard do you determine what is to your self-interest?

In the Objectivist Ethics, reason has the last word, not "self-interest" – where "self-interest," in effect, hangs in a void.

A principle is to be used for measurement, as a gauge, not as enforcement. We enforce laws, not principles. Laws might be based on principles, but they are also based on context.

Using this formulation, it would be very easy to redo Branden's words (with some minor modifications) and work in NIOF in the place of self-interest. In other words, to paraphrase him, one could say that reason, not NIOF, has the last word.

Michael

The NIOF principle can be either a principle or a purpose, or both, depending on the context.

As a principle, the NIOF gives us a standard by which we can assess the legitimacy of governments. As a purpose, the NIOF gives a goal that we should strive to attain.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

George,

I agree with that.

But NIOF only removes legitimacy from the institution of government if the goal is used in the place of a standard.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

George,

I agree with that.

But NIOF only removes legitimacy from the institution of government if the goal is used in the place of a standard.

Michael

Nope. If a government systematically violates the NIOF standard, then it is illegitimate, to that extent. Even Dennis agrees with me about this.

This is simply another way of using a rights-standard to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate actions by a government. A government has no "right" to violate the rights of its citizens. Nor can a government possibly possess this right, because all rights are ultimately individual rights, and there is no such thing as an individual "right" to violate the rights of others. The very notion is self-contradictory and ultimately incoherent.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Michael,

Here is a key passage from Rand's essay "Collectivized 'Rights'":

Any group or "collective," large or small, is only a number of individuals. A group can have no rights other than the rights of its individual members. In a free society, the "rights" of any group are derived from the rights of its members through their voluntary, individual choice and contractual agreement, and are merely the application of these individual rights to a specific undertaking. Every legitimate group undertaking is based on the participants' right of free association and free trade. (By "legitimate," I mean: noncriminal and freely formed, that is, a group which no one was forced to join.)

...A group, as such, has no rights. A man can neither acquire new rights by joining a group nor lose the rights which he does possess. The principle of individual rights is the only moral base of all groups or associations.

Any group that does not recognize this principle is not an association, but a gang or a mob.

Given these and similar statements by Rand, is it any wonder that Randian anarchists have been led to ask: So how can a monopolistic government that one is "forced to join," an association of men that is not based on "voluntary, individual choice and contractual agreement," be regarded as anything other than "a gang or mob"?

O'ists have twisted themselves into philosophical pretzels in their efforts to deal with this problem. If Rand had not dismissed anarchism so bluntly and vehemently -- this probably had a lot to do with her personal dislike of Rothbard -- I doubt if this would have been such a hot-button controversy.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

There has been a little too much chop up in this discussion between the theorectical, or formal philosophical breaks in principles (ethics, politics), and practical. George needs to refer to his libertarian anarchist philosophy to justify his positions, not Objectivism, unless he's a closet Objectivist. If he is he should come out to us. Rand has one foot in ethics and one in politics, as she should. George seems to have one foot in politics but where is the other one respecting libertarian philosophy? Or, was Rand a closet libertarian? (In many ways I think she was and a closet conservative too.) I'm beginning to suspect she and Branden shouldn't have called the philosophy Objectivism or any thing at all except the philosophy of Ayn Rand. That would have been more inviting of give and take back in the day. Instead we got this whole ball of wax thing with guardians at the gate. --Brant I know George is going to come back to me on this and rightfully acuse me of not reading him closely enough--I don't quite have the time, I wish I did, sorry

At this point I am merely attempting to correct Dennis's multitudinous errors about Rand's theory of rights and the NIOF principle. In his effort to rebut anarchism, Dennis has attributed positions to Rand that she never held, indeed, that she explicitly repudiated. This has left me no option except to teach some Objectivism 101.

The sad thing about all this is that Dennis's peculiar twists and turns -- which are original with him and that no other O'ist that I know of would ever endorse -- are completely unncessary to mount a credible defense of minarchism. But once Dennis started to dig himself into a hole, he just kept digging, instead of climbing out and starting fresh.

As I have said before, if Dennis concedes that a Randian government will and must initiate force to maintain its monopoly, then this debate is over. The anarchists have won, because this has always been their key claim.

If Dennis, in addition, wishes to argue that it is fine and dandy for governments to initiate force in many instances, then the argument is no longer between anarchists and minarchists. Rather, it is now between statists and the advocates of a free society, whether anarchist or minarchist.

Ghs

Let's say it's so. A Randian government must initiate force to maintain its monopoly. Now let us say it says no to that as particular after particular presents itself biting away at that monopoly. What do those bites actually consist of? What is being bit off? When therefore does it cease being a Randian government? What is left? The biters?

--Brant

[Brant Gaede]

Michael,

Here is a key passage from Rand's essay "Collectivized 'Rights'":

Any group or "collective," large or small, is only a number of individuals. A group can have no rights other than the rights of its individual members. In a free society, the "rights" of any group are derived from the rights of its members through their voluntary, individual choice and contractual agreement, and are merely the application of these individual rights to a specific undertaking. Every legitimate group undertaking is based on the participants' right of free association and free trade. (By "legitimate," I mean: noncriminal and freely formed, that is, a group which no one was forced to join.)

...A group, as such, has no rights. A man can neither acquire new rights by joining a group nor lose the rights which he does possess. The principle of individual rights is the only moral base of all groups or associations.

Any group that does not recognize this principle is not an association, but a gang or a mob.

Given these and similar statements by Rand, is it any wonder that Randian anarchists have been led to ask: So how can a monopolistic government that one is "forced to join," an association of men that is not based on "voluntary, individual choice and contractual agreement," be regarded as anything other than "a gang or mob"?

O'ists have twisted themselves into philosophical pretzels in their efforts to deal with this problem. If Rand had not dismissed anarchism so bluntly and vehemently -- this probably had a lot to do with her personal dislike of Rothbard -- I doubt if this would have been such a hot-button controversy.

Ghs

How is one "forced to join" a Randian government?

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

George,

I agree with that.

But NIOF only removes legitimacy from the institution of government if the goal is used in the place of a standard.

Michael

Nope. If a government systematically violates the NIOF standard, then it is illegitimate, to that extent.

George,

Before I even continue this time, I'm not going to let you skip over what I said, insinuate that it is or might be something else, then repeat a lot of stuff I know already as if this is something new.

I said "the institution of government," not any specific government. I'm talking about a concept, not an example of that concept. A form of human living.

I derive the institution of government from human nature, not from a single principle of human nature. Human nature is a bit more complex to me than a single principle. Thus government is, also.

Besides, I disagree with your comment even by your delimitation of standards. If a government uses force against a deranged individual and saves his life (whether preventing a suicide or keeping him from something dangerous), I think the government did a good and proper thing. I presume that human life is one of the values underpinning NIOF even under your delimitation.

Or am I wrong? Do you uphold the sanctity of volition even for the deranged? The right of a crazy person to jump off a cliff without interference?

Anyway, I don't use your delimitation of standards. I use NIOF as one of the principles, not the fundamental one--which for me is reason.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

There has been a little too much chop up in this discussion between the theorectical, or formal philosophical breaks in principles (ethics, politics), and practical. George needs to refer to his libertarian anarchist philosophy to justify his positions, not Objectivism, unless he's a closet Objectivist. If he is he should come out to us. Rand has one foot in ethics and one in politics, as she should. George seems to have one foot in politics but where is the other one respecting libertarian philosophy? Or, was Rand a closet libertarian? (In many ways I think she was and a closet conservative too.) I'm beginning to suspect she and Branden shouldn't have called the philosophy Objectivism or any thing at all except the philosophy of Ayn Rand. That would have been more inviting of give and take back in the day. Instead we got this whole ball of wax thing with guardians at the gate. --Brant I know George is going to come back to me on this and rightfully acuse me of not reading him closely enough--I don't quite have the time, I wish I did, sorry

At this point I am merely attempting to correct Dennis's multitudinous errors about Rand's theory of rights and the NIOF principle. In his effort to rebut anarchism, Dennis has attributed positions to Rand that she never held, indeed, that she explicitly repudiated. This has left me no option except to teach some Objectivism 101. The sad thing about all this is that Dennis's peculiar twists and turns -- which are original with him and that no other O'ist that I know of would ever endorse -- are completely unncessary to mount a credible defense of minarchism. But once Dennis started to dig himself into a hole, he just kept digging, instead of climbing out and starting fresh. As I have said before, if Dennis concedes that a Randian government will and must initiate force to maintain its monopoly, then this debate is over. The anarchists have won, because this has always been their key claim. If Dennis, in addition, wishes to argue that it is fine and dandy for governments to initiate force in many instances, then the argument is no longer between anarchists and minarchists. Rather, it is now between statists and the advocates of a free society, whether anarchist or minarchist. Ghs

Let's say it's so. A Randian government must initiate force to maintain its monopoly. Now let us say it says no to that as particular after particular presents itself biting away at that monopoly. What do those bites actually consist of? What is being bit off? When therefore does it cease being a Randian government? What is left? The biters? --Brant

I have no idea how to answer your question, because I don't understand it.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

George, I agree with that. But NIOF only removes legitimacy from the institution of government if the goal is used in the place of a standard. Michael

Nope. If a government systematically violates the NIOF standard, then it is illegitimate, to that extent.

George, Before I even continue this time, I'm not going to let you skip over what I said, insinuate that it is or might be something else, then repeat a lot of stuff I know already as if this is something new. I said "the institution of government," not any specific government. I'm talking about a concept, not an example of that concept. A form of human living. I derive the institution of government from human nature, not from a single principle of human nature. Human nature is a bit more complex to me than a single principle. Thus government is, also.

This is too vague for me to comment on.

Besides, I disagree with your comment even by your delimitation of standards. If a government uses force against a deranged individual and saves his life (whether preventing a suicide or keeping him from something dangerous), I think the government did a good and proper thing. I presume that human life is one of the values underpinning NIOF even under your delimitation. Or am I wrong? Do you uphold the sanctity of volition even for the deranged? The right of a crazy person to jump off a cliff without interference? Anyway, I don't use your delimitation of standards. I use NIOF as one of the principles, not the fundamental one--which for me is reason. Michael

"Reason" is a standard of what a government should and should not do? I don't understand this at all.

A person has the right to jump off a cliff, if he likes, or kill himself in some other way. Suicide is a fundamental right of individuals.

As for a "deranged" person, is this person threatening anyone? Is he violating anyone's rights? If not, then what he does is not the government's business. at least not directly.

What I mean by the last phrase is this: If a person legally qualifies as an "infant," i.e., a person is unable to care for himself at all, then he may need a guardian (as parents function as the guardians of infants). This would normally be "next of kin" -- say, a spouse or parent -- but if the deranged person has no one who wishes to assume this responsibility (no one can be compelled to become a guardian), then it could reasonably be argued that a government should appoint a guardian.

I discuss the nature of guardianship in "Children's Rights in Political Philosophy," in Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Michael,

Here is a key passage from Rand's essay "Collectivized 'Rights'":

Any group or "collective," large or small, is only a number of individuals. A group can have no rights other than the rights of its individual members. In a free society, the "rights" of any group are derived from the rights of its members through their voluntary, individual choice and contractual agreement, and are merely the application of these individual rights to a specific undertaking. Every legitimate group undertaking is based on the participants' right of free association and free trade. (By "legitimate," I mean: noncriminal and freely formed, that is, a group which no one was forced to join.)

...A group, as such, has no rights. A man can neither acquire new rights by joining a group nor lose the rights which he does possess. The principle of individual rights is the only moral base of all groups or associations.

Any group that does not recognize this principle is not an association, but a gang or a mob.

Given these and similar statements by Rand, is it any wonder that Randian anarchists have been led to ask: So how can a monopolistic government that one is "forced to join," an association of men that is not based on "voluntary, individual choice and contractual agreement," be regarded as anything other than "a gang or mob"?

O'ists have twisted themselves into philosophical pretzels in their efforts to deal with this problem. If Rand had not dismissed anarchism so bluntly and vehemently -- this probably had a lot to do with her personal dislike of Rothbard -- I doubt if this would have been such a hot-button controversy.

Ghs

How is one "forced to join" a Randian government?

--Brant

Do you honestly not understand what I meant? Must I explain once again, for the umpteenth time on this thread, what the anarchist/minarcist dispute is about?

If it will make you feel better, I will concede your point. One is not literally forced to "join" a Randian government; i.e., one is not forced to become a member of that institution per se, such as by becoming a bureaucrat or a policeman. The word I should have used is "state," not "government." The former normally has a broader meaning than the latter, since it includes not only the institution of government but also the territory over which a government claims coercive jurisdiction. The O'st government does not give you a choice as to whether you will be a member of its state. If it did, you could secede or do business with a justice agency of your own choosing -- and this would lead to that terrible thing, that horror of horrors, that social condition in which humans could not survive from more than a nanosecond, called "anarchism."

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

"Reason" is a standard of what a government should and should not do? I don't understand this at all.

George,

I realize this.

But until you understand that this is the hub of what Rand was getting at (at least, I believe it is), you will not understand why Rand was a minarchist in the first place and why Randian minarchists constantly disagree with what seems obvious to you.

(That goes vice-versa, by the way. I've seen too many Randians skip over the involuntary-delegating-ones-right-to-use-force-to-the-government thing to agree with them. Hell, I don't even agree with Rand on that score. I think that was a major fudge on her part.)

I'll take you through the conceptual hierarchy if you like, but that would sound condescending and I am not in this discussion to win arguments or shoot off my mouth qua shoot off my mouth. There is a hierarchy I am going on, though, and it starts at the bottom with observation, as all valid concepts should.

A person has the right to jump off a cliff, if he likes, or kill himself in some other way. Suicide is a fundamental right of individuals.

This is where we disagree, and it is due precisely to the thing you don't understand.

I do agree that suicide is a right--for people who have a reasonable grip on reality. But a deranged person runs a serious risk of making an undoable decision (like kill himself) that he would not make if he had a better grip on reality. I find it more than reasonable to block him (if at all possible) until he can make that choice, i.e., exercise that right, with a minimum of rationality.

But my fundamental standard is reason. A deranged person does not have his reason operating. I think it is an oxymoron to talk about volitional rights in his case. Thus I believe it is perfectly proper for a government to interfere with him by initiating force to restrain him until it is clear that he has gotten possession of his reasoning mind. Then if he wants to kill himself, at least it is by reasoned choice and not by a mental imbalance that he would otherwise regret.

If you want conceptual referents for this, there are oodles of stories of failed suicides where the person came back to living, deeply regretted attempting it and full of gratitude for those who kept him from succeeding. In almost all cases, he will say he lost his reason when he went off the deep end.

Your standard is force, irrespective of reason. So using that standard (NIOF) as the fundament, we can stand by and let a deranged person kill himself and say he is perfectly within his rights.

Obviously, there are no more rights for this person, and no possibility of discovering if he actually wanted to exercise them, after he kills himself. Volition ends when his life ends.

Agree or disagree, that is an example of how the different fundamental standards lead to different conclusions.

Michael

[Dglgmut]

George, in an anarchist society, what is to stop the protection agencies from colluding like what people suspect proponents of a NWO are doing within different governments around the world?

It seems like a weed... You can rip the top off, break the stem or pull it out from the roots... it's still not really gone. Is information and education what will keep a society free once the miracle of a revolution has happened?

[George H. Smith]

"Reason" is a standard of what a government should and should not do? I don't understand this at all.

George, I realize this. But until you understand that this is the hub of what Rand was getting at (at least, I believe it is), you will not understand why Rand was a minarchist in the first place and why Randian minarchists constantly disagree with what seems obvious to you. (That goes vice-versa, by the way. I've seen too many Randians skip over the involuntary-delegating-ones-right-to-use-force-to-the-government thing to agree with them. Hell, I don't even agree with Rand on that score. I think that was a major fudge on her part.) I'll take you through the conceptual hierarchy if you like, but that would sound condescending and I am not in this discussion to win arguments or shoot off my mouth qua shoot off my mouth. There is a hierarchy I am going on, though, and it starts at the bottom with observation, as all valid concepts should.

Please do lead me through the "conceptual hierarchy." Even quoting a single passage by Rand in which she says or suggests that "reason" per se is a standard by which we should judge the legitimacy of governmental actions would be nice.

Rand claimed to have derived and justified the NIOF principle via a process of reason, but this is a different issue. She claimed to have derived and justified every conclusion she ever reached, regardless of the field, via the same process. "Reason" is too nebulous to serve as a proximate standard in any field. For Rand, there are rational standards in ethics, art, literature, and so forth. The NIOF principle was Rand's rational standard in politics. It is reason applied to the problem of government, according to Rand.

Does military conscription violate your standard of "reason"? Many people consider conscription to be perfectly reasonable. So how would your standard of reason reach a different conclusion, without first being used to justify a theory of rights and the NIOF principle?

Ghs

[Dennis Hardin]

Dennis,

It occurs to me that using NIOF as an axiom instead of one principle among others within a hierarchy of concepts is the ultimate in mind-body dichotomy.

In the axiom version, the mind is removed from social relations at the foundation and the body reigns supreme. In other words, you can only use force against a body--and it doesn't matter at that level (at the principle level) whether that body has a mind or not.

I understand NIOF more in terms of bullying human beings than just initiating force--which means I reject it as an axiom. (Sometimes you have to initiate force against a person to save his or her life so I exclude that from rights violations, but this stuff has been discussed and nit-picked ad nauseum). Bullying means exercising power over others to extract advantages and values from them that they would not freely give, in trade or otherwise. (Stupid extraction is when the bully doesn't even gain value from the value he takes away from the victim. He just takes and/or destroys.)

Michael

Michael,

Your identification of the connection between the reductionist interpretation of NIOF and the mind-body dichotomy is superb. I agree completely. I want to do some more thinking on that topic before commenting further.

Thanks for your insight on this. I'll look forward to your essay on Napoleon Hill. That little gem of a book has always been an inspiration to me.