Objectivism & General Semantics

[IamBalSimon]

Probably like most people here, I come from a varied, eclectic intellectual background. One of the main pillars of my background is Alfred Korzybski's General Semantics. There are other influences, but I'd like to focus on GS.

I am fairly new to Objectivism. I came here as a result of reading Atlas Shrugged. I realized that while Atlas presented something of a caricature of America, and while Rand painted characters in sharp blacks and whites with very few shades of gray (as are found in the real world), the story nevertheless had a strong ring of truth to it. I felt like I she was writing the headlines for the news of the past 2 years, where the first real socialist president in American history has been systematically trying to fundamentally transform (his words) America into something that I do not recognize as good and against which I rebel. I was intrigued enough to look for the intellectual underpinnings of her work. I picked up The Journals of Ayn Rand and The Fountainhead. I saw The Fountainhead with Gary Cooper, but have not yet read the book. While I've not read most of her Journals, what I have read I find both inspiring and fascinating. Even if I don't agree with her on some things. On recommendation, I also just picked up the Virtue of Selfishness, and I'm looking forward to reading it. And I saw Atlas Shrugged, Part 1 a few weeks ago. I liked it, but not as much as I liked the book. Too much left out.

Anyway, out of my what I've seen so far (in Atlas, the Journals and here at OL), I see some parallel themes in both Objectivism and General Semantics, and I'd like to explore these. I'm not yet well versed enough in Objectivism to state things definitively about parallels and differences. But I'm wondering if there is anyone here at OL who is well versed in both Objectivism and Korzybski's General Semantics? For instance:

1 - Parallel? - Claims of being an Objectivist or General Semanticist provides no indication of personality type. I have seen serene, civil and thoughtful people in both arenas. I have seen people quick to fly off the handle in both arenas.

2 - Difference? - In General Semantics, a great deal is made of "non-identity" and "confusion of orders of abstraction." Korzybski is famous (in some circles) for the GS saying, "The word is not the thing," meaning that words are merely tokens or maps of things in the "real world." And with maps, one necessarily generates a transformation when moving from a lower order abstraction (e.g., the sensing of "red" when looking at an "apple.") to higher order abstractions like "red" and "apple." And the words "red" and "apple" differ in order of abstraction from the word "fruit." As one moves away from the lower order abstractions to higher ones, details are omitted from the higher order maps. What one gains from this is an economy of thought, and the ability to probabilistically generalize so that the next time one encounters an "apple," one has a decent idea of how to interact with it. But Korzybski emphasized the fact that details are omitted from the higher order maps. The word "red" when describing a "red apple" does not describe the yellow striations I see when I actually look at one. The map is incomplete. And no matter how detailed one makes the map, there will always be details left out, which leads to Korzybski's second big formulation: the map does not describe all of the territory. So far as I can tell, this is not emphasized much in Objectivist thought.

3 - Difference? - In GS there is no divorcing of "emotion" from "thinking." These terms are viewed as terms; not as entities themselves. In a Korzybskian world, there is no bright line which tells one where "emotions" stop and "thinking" begins. Indeed, in GS, "emotions" (almost always put in quote marks, as is "thought") are viewed as lower order abstractions, akin to "sensations," and these form the "raw material" for higher order abstractions. In GS one would no more try to "think unemotionally" than to stop breathing. One might try to reason dispassionately, i.e., keeping one's passions at a relatively low level on the belief that "passionate thinking" would lead to maps that were less accurate. This would not necessarily be true all the time, however. Deep passion can lead to some very impressive results because of the "sticking power" that passion can generate. But that's a side exploration. The main thrust here is that in G.S. the "organism works as a whole" and all differentiations of function that treat each as unrelated to the other are necessarily artificial and to some extent misleading. In Objectivist discussions I have seen so far, emotion seems to be something of an ugly step-child that exists but which forms undesirable baggage. Is my perception accurate?

4 - Neither a difference nor parallel - just a question: When someone composes music, what is going on? In General Semantics, the language seems fairly straightforward. The composer works with the lower-order abstractions (the sounds of notes as played by different instruments), some higher-order abstractions (e.g., the recall of musical pieces already heard and/or composed) , still higher abstractions (e.g., the 4-movement structure of a classical symphony), and still higher abstractions (e..g, music theory). All of this gets plowed back into the real-time effort to create new music as lower order abstractions (the notes coming off a piano, for instance). Does O-ist language cover this kind of process?

5 - "The word is not the thing" means also that one is not bound by the verbal descriptions of a thing. The show MacGyver was big on showing that "simple everyday things" had "properties" beyond what their common labels implied. A book may well be a book, but it can also "be" a door jam. It can "be" a projectile. It can "be" fuel for a fire if power goes out in the winter. Etc. Someone I knew refused to let an employee use "book shelves" for storing project notes, saying "book shelves are for books." In GS, one would call this a confusion of orders of abstraction, and an identification of word (the map) and the thing (the territory the map represents). In O-ist thought, it appears that there is a theme of saying that a thing is what it is. If this means that a thing is what we say it is, I have very strong disagreements about that. If O-ists simply mean that a thing is what it is, independent of what we think or say about it, then I think there is some common ground between Objectivism and General Semantics.

"Thoughts?"

- Bal

[william.scherk]

Bal, I have lots of thoughts on what you have written, but:

a. I am not Objectivist, nor even Objectivish, and there are far more listmembers better qualified and educated about Objectivism to comment intelligently and comprehensively

b. my thoughts are not yet marshalled for parade; I realize I have little beyond some lurking and brief observations of General Semantics, and so can only make a useful testimony of our one listmember here who was an adherent of GS. I will do some boning up so I understand some of your terminology and figure out what could we 'weak spots' in a GS frame of understanding for a later reentry into discussion . . .

I do wonder about one aspect of your experience of General Semantics. In your experience of the forum you participated in, was there a cohort that were rather insulated from 'revisions' to the corpus of its founder? I noticed with our departed friend here that he had never read any Rand at all. Never read a book or an article by her, not her fiction, not her non-fiction, and had no interest in doing so as far as I could tell. In a few topics I figured out also that he did not consult research or scientific publications to extend or optimize his GS wisdom, let alone revise it.

So, as with a few Objectivish folk who dismiss certain scientific conclusion because they might require a certain revision of Objectivist tenets, and almost treat Rand herself as never having published an incorrect thought, did some of your Semanticist adherents evince curiosity and a willingness to change their opinions?

[IamBalSimon]

Hey William,

My participation was with a forum that was a listserve back in the 90s. Overall, I had an enjoyable time.

The people in that forum ran the gamut. People who loved the exploration of ideas, implications and extensions more than any particular conclusion or line of thought. People who seemed to operate on the principle that Alfred Korzybski was THE AUTHORITY on GS. Well, technically speaking, he was; much the way that I am the authority of BalSimonism. It was his baby; his creation; who could know it better than him? But from the standpoint of one's own participation, having an authority figure in a field like GS seems kind of strange. You can certainly have teachers; you can have people you respect, love and venerate. But I don't see how you ever get to the point of letting anyone stand in for the responsibility of thinking for yourself. I find the same kind of dynamic here in Objectivist land; it would seem very odd to me for someone to say that Rand is an "authority" that has greater command over your life than your own responsibility to think for yourself. That's also the reason that some of the discussions here about people *wanting* to assume the mantle of being Rand's "intellectual heir" seem odd to me. If I recall, there was some of that in the G.S. world, too; with some people calling others the intellectual heir of Korzybski. But unlike in O-land, GSrs never made a big deal about it; and I don't recall anyone claiming such a status for himself or herself. It was always something suggested by others about someone deservedly well respected.

GS does (or at least did) have it's orthodoxy defenders. I suspect this will be true in most human endeavors. I recall a college professor telling me over coffee that breakthroughs happened in science when the old scientists died away and made room for the new blood. If that's true in something like physics, where I would expect "objectivity" and "dispassion" to be strongest, I guess it's going to be true most everywhere.

Typically, those most resistant to change also seem to be those with the greatest stakes in the organizational structures. And there's probably a legitimate reason of sorts for that; the promotion of the organization might well seem to need a defense of the "original doctrine."

That's one of the reasons I find it nearly impossible to be a joiner.

But it takes all kinds to make this world work. Without the orthodoxy-laden people, the organizations might cease to exist; and the engagement of new blood might very well flounder. Maybe orthodoxies - if they don't become overbearing hogties - serve a real purpose and provide real value.

- Bal

Edited May 14, 2011 by IamBalSimon

[psychoanaleesis]

Bal,

Just a quick comment: Read the fountainhead. Rand was right about the film. The acting was errr... stiff and out of sync. I saw it before I read how Rand reacted/what she said about it (I just have to find that link again).

[IamBalSimon]

Bal,

Just a quick comment: Read the fountainhead. Rand was right about the film. The acting was errr... stiff and out of sync. I saw it before I read how Rand reacted/what she said about it (I just have to find that link again).

Hey David,

It's on my list. Thanks.

- Bal