SoAMadDeathWish

This is very interesting.

Naomi, Bull. Fields like gravity are physical. They exist. When you deny the obvious with gobbledygook, all you get left over is gobbledygook. But you have your own jargon, I guess. Michael Never said otherwise, just thought you'd wanna know what "field" means in the context of physics.

A field is just an assignment of a quantity to every point in space-time. It's a technical way of describing the "stuff" that the laws of physics act on. Sometimes these quantities are just ordinary numbers, like in scalar fields. Or they can be vectors, like in vector fields. In General Relativity, space-time and matter are both described in terms of tensor fields. And if you want to know why nobody understands Quantum Mechanics, it's because quantum mechanical fields are really fucking abstract. A quantum mechanical system that only has pure states is described by an infinite-dimensional complex vector at each point in space-time.

It's simpe: Premise 1: Either rights violations are at a minimum or they are not. (a true dichotomy) Premise 2: Checks and balances are the best way to keep rights violations to a minimum. Premise 3: If there is a best way to do something, then there is no better way to do it. Premise 4: Rights violations are at a minimum. Conclusion 1: Then there is no better way to safeguard individual rights than what is happening now. OR Premise 1: Either rights violations are at a minimum or they are not. (a true dichotomy) Premise 2: Checks and balances are the best way to keep rights violations to a minimum. Premise 3: If there is a best way to do something, then there is no better way to do it. Premise 4*: Rights violations are not at a minimum. Conclusion 2: Then a checks and balances system is not the best way to keep rights violations to a minimum. You seem to be going with the first route. Neither. As I've argued in the OP and elsewhere, people are incapable of changing society for the better. I really don't care why you think that I think the things I think. If you want to prove your case that a checks and balances system like the one we have now is the best we can do then you must 1) clearly define it and any possible alternatives 2) explore the possible real-world consequences of each alternative 3) evaluate the outcomes and 4) create a plan to reach the most desirable outcome. As it stands, your belief that things will eventually get better rests on nothing more than a blind faith in the Holy Wisdom of the Founding Fathers.

If this is the case, then either rights violations in present-day America are already at a minimum and there's no point in trying to reign in the government any further, or protection for individual rights could be increased, in which case your hypothesis that a system of checks and balances keeps rights violations to a minimum is false.

Are you saying that that the majority will is necessarily opposed to rights?

And the Soviet Union was a representative republic.

-(2n + 1) > p(20 - (2n + 3)) -2n - 1 > 20p -2pn - 3p -2n + 2pn > 17p + 1 2n(p-1) > 17p + 1 n < (17p + 1)/(p - 1) -2n > p(20 - (2n + 2)) -2n > 20p - 2pn - 2p -2n + 2pn > 18p 2n(p - 1) > 18p n < 9p/(p-1) Again, nothing really changes, since the terms on the right hand side are still always negative. Your analysis is definitely arbitrary. The problem is that the strategies that Bob is using here are based on information he does not have, and the analysis changes based on that information. For example, in your first case, it could very well be that Bob will win at either $0 or $1, and then his expected payoff is $19.50. Similarly for the second case. Also, I am not ignoring what happens if the opponent doesn't drop out before the next move. I assigned a probability p to the second term in the inequalities representing the probability of the opponent dropping out. If the opponent doesn't drop out, then n increases, and the game gets re-evaluated. Look, the problem with this game is that it would be obvious to know whether or not you should play if you had information about how much money your opponent has. If he has less than $20 and less than you, then you should play. If he has less than you, but more than $20, then you shouldn't. If he has more money than you, then again, you shouldn't. The trouble is that you don't know how much money your opponent can bid, and even an infinitesimal chance that he might drop out on some round before your bid reaches $20 leaves you with a positive payoff, i.e. p*(20 - current bid). This is true only if you assume that the game cannot end before the bidding reaches $20, but the assumption is too strong. This sounds like pure speculation. I'm gonna have to ask you to prove your conclusions here, though I'm not even sure what they are supposed to be.

I couldn't agree more. Wynand should have been the main character of The Fountainhead. Roark is dull, Galt even more so. Speak for yourself. It's fan-fiction time! Huh... now that scene finally makes sense.

You're right. I had the right equations saved to a png file but it didn't allow me to upload them in my post, and I wrote down the wrong ones by accident but the solutions are right, regardless. In my scheme, n starts at 0 (which is really the second round of the auction), and the right equations are: -(2n + 1) > p*(20 - (2n + 1)) -2n - 1 > 20 -2pn - p 2(p - 1)n - 1 > 19p n < (19p + 1)/(2(p - 1)) and -2n > p(20 - 2n) -2n > 20p - 2pn 2(p - 1)n > 20p n < 10p/(p - 1). So really, nothing changes. An infinite game tree cannot be evaluated. One must start evaluations at the end of the game tree and work backwards. But as an infinite game tree has no end, that obviously won't work. Here is the problem with that line of reasoning. Let's say that Alice predicts that the bidding will reach $20 or more. If she drops out at $20 or more, then her payoff is -$20 or less, and if she drops out at $0, her payoff is $0. Thus, Alice drops out at $0, but Bob bids $0 and wins $20. However, the bidding never goes past $20 or more. A contradiction. Therefore, neither player can predict that the bidding will reach $20 or more and remain consistent. The problem here is that, since Alice is just as rational as Bob and since she has just as much information as he does, she can deduce that if Bob enters the game and bids only $0, then she can out-bid him by bidding $1 for a gain of $19. The game begins and Carl wins. This is exactly my point. If Alice, Bob, and Carl all take turns using this gambit on each other, then they can only ever achieve a re-distribution of money, and never actually create any value. The meta-game is zero-sum. This is what I meant when I said that Carl's gambit is not fundamentally different from him holding up Alice and Bob at gunpoint. Hence why I conclude that this kind of gambit is coercive and therefore immoral.

Greg doesn't even have an argument to begin with. I don't see why I should bother with it at all.

I noticed this too and I went to the library today to get some books and figure out what exactly was going wrong. As it turns out, both calculations are wrong. The game is not sequential, despite being turn-based. In a sequential game, neither player is allowed to switch strategies, but this is obviously untrue for the auction. The problem is that the game-tree is infinite, and so one cannot get an accurate picture of what's going on by picking an arbitrary cutoff point and trying to calculate from there. The right way to look at it is, at each point of the game, for each player to ask whether or not to drop out. At the beginning of the game, dropping out gives you $0 as does bidding only $0, so there is no reason to play the game, but there is also no reason not to. I'll get to this a little later. Assume that the game begins anyway. Then, at each round n ( n greater than or equal to 0), the value of dropping out (for the player who bids first and with 1 dollar increments) is -( 2n + 1), whereas the value of not dropping out is p*(20 - n - 1), where p is the probability that the opponent will drop out. Now, a player should drop out only when -(2n + 1) > p*(20 - n - 1), i.e. when there is more to gain by dropping out than continuing with a probability p of the other player dropping out. Solving this inequality for n we have, n < (19p +1)/(2(p - 1)), and for the even player we have, n < 10p/(p -1) But the term on the right hand side is negative for all p whereas n is always non-negative. Thus, for both players, once the game has started, it is always better to continue than to drop out, regardless of the probability of the other player dropping out. Unless, of course, the probability of the other player dropping out is 1, in which case the analysis is slightly different but the conclusion is the same. If p is 1, then the calculation is -2n - 1 > 20 - 2n - 1 leads to 0 > 20 which is false, and we conclude that it is not better to drop out of the auction if the other player is guaranteed to drop out on his next turn. This is incorrect as the calculation above shows, because they have to minimize their losses. The best way to do this is to win the $20 from Carl rather than drop out immediately because that will reduce the loss by $20. This brings us to the important point. As the expected value of dropping out of the auction at the beginning is $0 and the value of bidding $0 on the first move is also $0, there is no reason to drop out right at the beginning nor is there any reason not to. Now, if it is, in fact, true that it is rational not to play, and Alice deduces this, Bob can deduce that Alice would deduce that and thus predict that she will drop out at the beginning. He can then bid $0 and win $20. This means that an irrational agent would outperform a rational one, which is a problem if you think that reason should be one's guide to action. Damn it. I made a mistake. At the beginning of the auction, one can drop out right away and get $0, or one can bid $0, in which case the value is 20*p where p is the probability that the opponent will drop out on that round. Bidding $0 is a positive value for all p except when p = 0. Therefore, it is rational to play the game, unless one is absolutely certain that the opponent will never drop out. But even then, my argument still holds.

Maybe. But yours is wrong.

Is your grasp of logic so tenuous that you have to resort to ad hominem attacks to support your argument?

Which is still completely irrelevant because that's the wrong kind of value.

Well, actually, my therapist was quite helpful. I don't think any traumatic events are the cause of my alexithymia. I've been like this ever since I can remember.

You're committing an equivocation fallacy. Numerical value is not the same kind of value that people act on.

I noticed this too and I went to the library today to get some books and figure out what exactly was going wrong. As it turns out, both calculations are wrong. The game is not sequential, despite being turn-based. In a sequential game, neither player is allowed to switch strategies, but this is obviously untrue for the auction. The problem is that the game-tree is infinite, and so one cannot get an accurate picture of what's going on by picking an arbitrary cutoff point and trying to calculate from there. The right way to look at it is, at each point of the game, for each player to ask whether or not to drop out. At the beginning of the game, dropping out gives you $0 as does bidding only $0, so there is no reason to play the game, but there is also no reason not to. I'll get to this a little later. Assume that the game begins anyway. Then, at each round n ( n greater than or equal to 0), the value of dropping out (for the player who bids first and with 1 dollar increments) is -( 2n + 1), whereas the value of not dropping out is p*(20 - n - 1), where p is the probability that the opponent will drop out. Now, a player should drop out only when -(2n + 1) > p*(20 - n - 1), i.e. when there is more to gain by dropping out than continuing with a probability p of the other player dropping out. Solving this inequality for n we have, n < (19p +1)/(2(p - 1)), and for the even player we have, n < 10p/(p -1) But the term on the right hand side is negative for all p whereas n is always non-negative. Thus, for both players, once the game has started, it is always better to continue than to drop out, regardless of the probability of the other player dropping out. Unless, of course, the probability of the other player dropping out is 1, in which case the analysis is slightly different but the conclusion is the same. If p is 1, then the calculation is -2n - 1 > 20 - 2n - 1 leads to 0 > 20 which is false, and we conclude that it is not better to drop out of the auction if the other player is guaranteed to drop out on his next turn. This is incorrect as the calculation above shows, because they have to minimize their losses. The best way to do this is to win the $20 from Carl rather than drop out immediately because that will reduce the loss by $20. This brings us to the important point. As the expected value of dropping out of the auction at the beginning is $0 and the value of bidding $0 on the first move is also $0, there is no reason to drop out right at the beginning nor is there any reason not to. Now, if it is, in fact, true that it is rational not to play, and Alice deduces this, Bob can deduce that Alice would deduce that and thus predict that she will drop out at the beginning. He can then bid $0 and win $20. This means that an irrational agent would outperform a rational one, which is a problem if you think that reason should be one's guide to action.

Interesting. For me, the opposite is true. I can perceive others' feelings just fine, but I usually can't bring myself to care. The only person I consistently care about is my father.

Selene, I have some of the traits listed in those articles, but not others. For example, it is very difficult for me to describe what I'm feeling with words, but I can still "understand" the emotion non-verbally. My therapist suggested that I communicate my feelings by finding a song that fit them, and this has worked out perfectly. The songs on my iPod are organized by emotion. But the inability to differentiate between bodily sensations and emotions is spot-on. I also have no trouble with identifying or describing others' emotions, which is strange. However, there does appear to be an empathy deficit. If I see a person in pain, I can empathize with them if I choose to do so, but even then I can't fully appreciate their emotional state, since my first response would be something like "stop whining, you baby."* People that I know tell me that this is highly unusual. I daydream a lot, but my dreams have features that other people's don't. For example, the clocks in my dreams don't work, but they don't go haywire when you look at them, like most people report. The writing on pieces of paper doesn't change and my reflection in a mirror looks normal. My dreams are pretty realistic in those aspects, however, the dream-world is a kind of Bizarro-reality where most things are normal except for a few really weird things. With regards to Asperger's, I don't fit any of the symptoms really. I don't have any trouble in social situations. Unless I'm asked to talk about myself, in which case I just recount something that happened to me and people fill on the blanks about how I felt about things. I just nod and agree. EDIT: *actually my internal response to that is more like: "Your suffering is irrelevant. I am, a machine. (and you should be too)"

I was diagnosed. At some point, my therapist (I was there because I thought I was depressed) asked something like, "What kind of person do you see yourself as? Who are you, deep down inside?". I replied, "I don't know, and I don't care. I know what I want. I know how to get it. The rest doesn't concern me." and her jaw dropped.

I have alexithymia. So it's really hard for me to relate feelings and words. To me, emotionally charged words such as "rape" and "kill", carry no more emotional weight than neutral words like "table" or "chair". "Happiness" is nothing more than a specific tensing of the muscles in my face. I often can't tell whether or not my word choice is "emotionally appropriate" or not unless I take a lot of time to think it through. Nonetheless, I'm still right. Fundamentally, there is no difference.

Valuable to who? Just because you value that $20 a certain amount does not mean that Carl or Alice or Bob do. If Carl is acting according to his rational self-interest, then there is no reason for Alice and Bob not to oblige him if they should choose to do so. If Carl is not acting in his rational self-interest, then he is obviously doing something wrong, as is my conclusion. Alice and Bob are in no way cheating Carl as he's the one that ends up holding all the money at the end. Alice and Bob can end up with more money than they started with, can break even, or they can lose money. Alice and Bob are the only players here, not Carl. The game is definitely not zero-sum. Carl is not playing the game with them. The transaction as a whole, however, is a mere redistribution of value, but this redistribution was initiated by Carl. *rubs hands together conspiratorially* Why, whatever do you mean? I have nothing to hide... he he he he he he... sooooonnnn....

I take it you think that I've misconstrued these words to make Alice and Bob appear rational when they're just greedy? This implies that you think that Bob and Alice are irrational. Suppose that this is true. Then, a rational actor should never enter the auction. However, it is then possible to always win $19 in any auction where the other player is rational. Therefore irrational actors would outperform rational ones. But this is problematic because reality cannot consistently reward irrationality. Therefore, either Alice and Bob are rational, or reason does not work in reality.

I'm gonna re-state my position here for the sake of clarity and because I'm not gonna be able to post much later today. 1) Do not bother looking for ways to "game the system". In non-cooperative game theory, the situation is regarded as an unsolved paradox. You can only win by being irrational. 2) This brings me to my main point. Carl has set up a situation whereby Alice and Bob can only get a desirable outcome by acting against their better judgment. The way I see it, this is not fundamentally different from Carl holding them both up at gunpoint and demanding their money. 3) I don't know whether or not this is a kind of fraud. By the standard definition, it doesn't seem to be, but extending the definition in the way that Darrell suggests seems reasonable. 4) Regardless, I think that creating a situation where using your reason gets you into trouble is the pattern underlying force, fraud, and this third possibility.