Kallikanzarid

tmj, so when talking about metaphysical properties, how do you answer questions that I raised in the OP? It seems that your version of metaphysics is too barebone to be a useful foundation for anything.

True

BaalChatzaf, of course

tmj, I guess I call attributes what you call properties or characterisitcs.

tmj, ok, I got your position.

tmj, so you *do* believe that in some form attributes exist even when minds don't? Can you answer the questions I posed about such attributes in the first message of the thread?

I have read the section 6. You claim that in classical mechanics, sufficiently chaotic systems are not deterministic in the long run. It is not true, they are merely unstable. There's a difference.

Generally, the laws of classical mechanics are formulated as ordinary differential equations. Under mild restrictions, they have unique solutions given any initial conditions. For classical physical systems (for which the forces in the appropriate coordinate systems have potentials proportional to 1/|x|^(-n), n >= 1) Lipschitz continuity always holds in a system constrained by the following assumptions:

1. That the energy is conserved (or, equivalently, that laws of physics don't change with time in the sense that a time translation of a valid solution is a valid solution), and in fundamental systems this always holds.
2. That the initial total energy of the system is finite (which is equivalent to saying that no two particles have coinciding coordinates).

Since the Lipschitz condition holds everywhere for a system constrained by energy conservation, it has a unique global solution for any initial conditions. That's really it, that's determinism in classical physics in a nutshell. It's math, you can't disprove it by marveling a waterfall and appealing to intuition.

Off topic: real numbers (which can be defined as equivalence classes of sequences of rational numbers) are in general not computable. So your claim that all "non-random" sequences can be computed by algorithms is false.

Edit: I've just realized that I've made a stupid assumption that all forces in the system are repellent. In fact, there are cases when particles could bump into each other: for example, consider two uncharged particles of positive mass initially at rest. I'm not sure if the energy is defined when they have the same coordinates, and on such distances quantum effects become noticeable, anyway, so classical mechanics breaks down.

It's not relevant to most systems of classical mechanics, though:

1. Matter in most everyday scenarios is composed of atoms, and atomic cores are positively charged (and electron shells are negatively charged, I'm not sure what matters more), so atoms can't collide in the above sense classically (instead they smoothly repel each other in a way that merely looks like rigid collision on large scales).
2. Such collision solutions are not likely, in the sense that even the slightest perturbation ensures that they don't happen, and given random initial conditions with a continuous probability distribution, they have zero probability of happening, assuming that the number of particles is not 2.

So, here's a limitation to the existence of global solutions in classical systems. It still can't "conceal" free will, though, because the system is still well-behaved enough so that solutions, where they exist, are unique. Thus, if you want free will you'll have to ponder quantum mechanics, which is deterministic in the above sense in between measurements. And in cases of measurements the hypothesized indeterminism is constrained by the free will theorem, assuming that it is indeed correct.

tmj, before you said: "All attributes do really exist, or at least they do in my version. I believe in the existence of mental constructs , mine and others'." Didn't you mean that attributes are mental constructs? What did you mean? Also, can you explicitly answer questions in my first post in the thread, please?

tmj, so before the first mind existed, existents were featureless blobs? That's a bold statement.

whYNOT, I wouldn't consider Peikoff an expert on modrn philosophy

So length is part of knowledge that is derived from the identity of entities, but as an attribute it does not exist (metaphysically) apart from any entity.

Unless you take at least some attributes as really existing, your version of Objectivist metaphysics is trivial: you basically say "things exist" and that's it. Not that I mind (I'm skeptical to the idea that any metaphysics is more than idle guesswork), but Rand certainly would object here

Would it help to say that attributes are epistemologic and not metaphysic

Leonid, I'm afraid that's not very helpful.

Brent, it has more to do with lack of clarity on what "existence" and "identity" exactly mean in this context.

Stephen, thank you for the link. I'm afraid it's over my head for now

While your clarification helped somewhat, you didn't touch my main two questions.

If Rand didn't identify an attribute with a predicate, then what is the difference between the two? Predicates are usually part of some logic and thus there are many logical operations and axioms defined which affect them and allow us to study them. Did Rand assume something like that?

I'm insisting on clearing this up because there are mathematical implications: are paradoxes of naive set theory relevant? Can the Yoneda lemma be applied? And so on... Also, like I mentioned above, our ability to reason about metaphysical counterfactuals depends on predicates' independent existence.

And before that, the status of logic(s) needs some clearing up. Is there a logical system that Rand thought is engraved in the fabric of reality? Or there a systematic way by which any logic or some class of logics (e.g. consistent ones) can be applied to Rand's metaphysics?

I imagine you and Rand both take every entity to be able to stand in relations presently unknown to us. I do. One might say that “Existence is Identity” entails not only that if there is no identity there is no existent, but that the entirety of an existent is the entirety of its identity. If so, that would be true not only for entities, but for attributes and actions and relationships. Any of them can be subjects of predication and have the identities predicated. But in no case could we predicate all the identity of an existent. Then no existent, so, no entity, could be reduced to its true predicates by a finite intelligence.

I didn't understand this part at all.

Alexei, thanks for bringing the theorem of Conway and Kochen to our attention. The link refers to three serious criticisms that have been made of the argument.

If you're referring to the Limitations section:

• Conflation of indeterminism and free will: I'm well aware of that, that's why I restated the theorem in weaker terms above.
• The criticism of Goldstein et al: I haven't noticed it before I'll read up on it, it seems like an interesting topic.
• The pressuposition of indeterminism: I don't think that it applies to the most famous formulation, because it merely constrains indeterminism and does not attempt to "prove" it.

To be not uniquely determined by antecedent conditions is a larger class than making a choice that is not determined by antecedent conditions.

It could be, it depends on the precise distinction.

I have argued that that condition is satisfied for indeterministic brain processes even within classical physics in Volitional Synapses. That is, the required indeterminism is the case at the level of classical physical system behaviors in which quantum indeterminacy has already vanished.

I don't understand what you mean by indeterministic processes within classical physics. Fundamentally, classical mechanics is deterministic, and stochastic systems are characterized by randomness, and they are not fundamental. But assuming you're talking about some kind of stochastic system, how can you base volition on randomness yet still maintain that it's qualitatively different from simple indeterminism?

Beyond the part on biological indeterminism in that essay, there is an essay pondering volitional consciousness in man and other animals. That is Ascent to Volitional Consciousness by John Enright, another Rand scholar and a friend of mine.

I can't say much about it just by reading the abstract, except that I'm skeptical that there is "a choice to think".

I should ask if you have read the part of Rand’s Atlas Shrugged known as Galt’s Speech. Is that much part of what you know about Rand’s philosophy?

Yes, I've read the whole novel. Back in my Objectivist days I was mostly getting my Rand's non-fiction fix at ARI and various links at OO. And then there was a small compilation translated to Russian that I found in a library.

Edit: I was considering myself an Objectivist for roughly 3 years: from 2006 to late 2008. I read Atlas Shrugged in 2007 (before that I was reading stuff freely available on the Internet).

How does Objectivism address the following issues with the free will hypothesis:

1. The free will theorem states under very mild conditions that if humans are indeterministic, then so are elementary particles.
2. Humans have evolved biologically from more primitive species. Also, studies of animal intelligence show that other mammals have (limited) capacity for abstract thought.

Both facts highly suggest that if free will is there, it's not limited to humans. In particular, if one wants to maintain "human exceptionalism", the following questions need to be answered:

1. What is the difference between simple indeterminism and free will?
2. What human ancestors had free will? By which process had free will evolved?

I'm not sure that item 3 is true or that Rand believed it. The difference between the coat-hanger theory of predication (entities exist, and they have attributes; take away the attributes and eventually you get down to the bare entity) and the onion theory (take away the attributes and eventually nothing is left) is an ancient controversy, but I'm not aware that Rand endorsed the latter position. If she didn't, then problems with it are not problems with her theory. What are the sources for this in Rand?

It's not really about that. Before we can ask the question of whether or not attributes define the entity completely, we need to agree on what the attributes are.

What is it like to be an Objectivist inside of Russia?

Hello, Alexei, and welcome to Objectivist Living.

I have some questions on the personal side in this post. You described yourself as an ex-Objectivist, and you wrote of liking Rand's ideas in the past. If I understand you correctly, you do not like them now, meaning that you do not agree with them now. But all of them?

You still seem to be interested in Rand's ideas and in assimilating them into your broader knowledge of logic and metaphysics. Do you think at this time that some of Rand's ideas are correct or perhaps some incorrect but worthwhile to correct? Do you think some of Rand's ideas, with proper adjustment, could be set true and yield a solid novel contribution?

You mentioned you were looking for closure. I wonder if, as part of that, you are still sorting out which things in Rand are right and which wrong.

Are you studying philosophy in school?

Are there any thinkers who have influenced you in philosophy so far besides Rand?

Are there philosophers you have found pretty neat so far or ones you have found pretty bad?

A fair warning is due:

1. I'm an ex-Objectivist. Back when I liked Rand's ideas, I didn't have enough money to read her seminal non-fiction works, so I'm going by bits and pieces here. Also, I've only recently have overcome the shame I used to feel for having been a randroid (in the worst way possible), so if you look up my messages on other resources, you will see a lot of inflammatory comments. I'm sorry I've made them, I made a promise to be more considerate in the future.
2. The following is patched together from my Reddit posts. The discussion there didn't take off, and eventually I was redirected here.
3. My goal is to "scientifically" break down Objectivism to see what it's made of and how the pieces fit together; I'm doing it to get some closure for myself.

I'm starting this thread to ask for some clarification and hopefully to start an interesting discussion. Here is my parsing of the description of Objectivist Metaphysics on Wikipedia:

1. Existence (the sum of everything existing) is non-trivial, which is self-evident.
2. To be conscious is to be conscious of existence
3. Existence is composed of entities, which are completely defined by their attributes.
4. There are no contradictions in reality.