We Erred Rand

>>>Fine. We're talking about "warm colors," not "very hot colors." In that case, you admit that the color blue is somehow both "cool" and "very hot"?

>>>The upshot though is that the colors or hues of light have long been objectively and precisely measurable, whatever the varying, individual assessment of them may be. Yep. That's the upshot.

>>>Seems someone does....http://scholarlyrepo...hy_articles/13/ AbstractIn this paper we defend a particular version of the epistemic approach to argumentation. We advance some general considerations in favor of the approach and then examine the ways in which different versions of it play out with respect to the theory of fallacies, which we see as central to an understanding of argumentation. Epistemic theories divide into objective and subjective versions. We argue in favor of the objective version, showing that it provides a better account than its subjectivist rival of the central fallacy of begging the question. We suggest that the strengths of the objective epistemic theory of fallacies provide support for the epistemic approach to argumentation more generally. The linked paper has to do with "argumentation" and the "theory of fallacies," not color perception. Now you can explain to us what Leonid meant by saying "color is objective-epistemic."

>>>What is the mechanism to you about how propositions can relate to reality? It's irrelevant to logic, which studies the relation of propositions to one another. You're confusing logic with epistemology. >>>How does that work in a non-propositional way, since the rules governing valid/invalid propositions--to you--are not bound by reality? I wrote that they are not bound by physical reality, not simply reality. Big difference to those of us who don't reduce all of reality to the merely physical/material part of it.

>>> This is why men have never succeeded in applying Christianity in practice "All" men? "Most" men? "Some" men? It's an unusually opaque statement for her. She seems almost intentionally to avoid specifying what, precisely, she meant. In any case, we could easily do the same (by means of the same opacity of meaning) by claiming that men have never succeeded in applying Objectivism in practice. "All"? "Most"? "Some"? I don't know. I do know that I personally have never met anyone who has succeeded in applying Objectivism in practice; though I have met many who have claimed that they and only they have hewed to the true Objectivist Way.

>>>That is interesting... No. Not really in the sense that we gather control groups and subjects, test their self-esteem, and then put them in relationships that are subjected to triangles, and then administer an instrument (questionnaire; survey) to see how they respond. That would be scientific proof. No proof. >>>What we do have is explanatory models from Freud, through Adler and Jung, to Maslow and the Americans, Gestalt and TA, and so on, up to Branden. Any quotes or excerpts from their writings supporting your opinion? >>> If you have self-esteem, whatever you feel for the loss of opportunity, it will not be jealousy or envy. In other words, if an alpha-male with presumed "high self-esteem" actually were to feel jealousy or envy, he could simply deny it, and claim that he actually felt something else. Conversely, if an alpha-male actually did admit to feeling jealous over something or someone, you could claim that his self-esteem must not have been as high as originally thought. It's a very neat, clean, convenient model correlating two subjective unmeasurables. Since you admit there's no objective evidence, and haven't provided any quotes, excerpts, or references of the self-esteem/jealousy linkage you claim are available in the works of Freud, et al., many of us are wondering just how you came up with the idea in the first place. Did you read it at some point in one of the works of the authors cited above? Anyway, I don't think Rand would have claimed that high self-esteem is some sort of "protective shield" against feelings of jealousy. It's pretty obvious that John Galt experienced jealousy pangs over Dagny's affair with Rearden. And the almost violent jealousy that Rearden experienced when plying Dagny with questions about her sexual history were not because of a lack of self-esteem on his part.

>>>If that is true, then propositions are no more useful--or valid for living--than daydreams. Daydreams are extremely useful and valid for living. Logic might not be "valid for living" (whatever that means), but it is both useful and valid for confirming or disconfirming the validity of arguments. >>>if that's your view, then why bother discussing it? It's not important. Because the ability to discriminate between "valid" and "invalid" in the realm of arguments is a useful skill. >>>Well, maybe if you like games as the only way to use reason. I suppose a case could be made that the meaning of life is to spend it playing sudoku or doing crossword puzzles or things like that--and that logic is nothing more than a type of that. How does playing sudoku or doing crossword puzzles help one discriminate between the categories of "valid" and "invalid" among different kinds of arguments? >>>Obviously, I am more Randian in my epistemology than boilerplate academia. One might say you're a boilerplate Randian. On the other hand, you've also admitted that you've never studied logic, so on what do you base this opinion? >>>In other words, according to the standard I use, there is a reality connection to abstractions. All abstractions? Or only some abstractions? >>>Oh... there's also imaginary stuff, but there is real correspondence, too. And logic is a tool capable of working with both the imaginary stuff and the stuff with real correspondence. >>>In fact, I will, go one further, which takes me out of Rand's epistemology. I contend that human consciousness is made of the same basic stuff as the rest of the universe and that the reason an abstraction can correspond to, say, an external form with validity in the first place is because both are made of the same stuff, therefore both obey the same laws of nature. Interesting. That, of course, was not Ayn Rand's view, but you're entitled to your own speculations even if they are 100 years out of date. Material reductionism went out a long time ago, at least as a plausible philosophical model. If consciousness is simply a very finely attenuated form of matter, and follows the same laws of matter (including, of course, the 2nd law of thermodynamics, which all matter obeys), and since matter cannot contradict its own nature, you'll have to explain how it happens that when it becomes very rarefied and "mind-like" it becomes capable of holding the statement "All X is Y" in one person's mind, yet the same kind of matter, with the same identity, and therefore obeying the same laws of physical nature, becomes capable of holding the statement "Some X is not Y" in someone else's mind!? A logical contradiction. The two statements cannot both be true, and neither can they both be false. Just like the Act Heading in Atlas Shrugged: it's Either-Or. Yet according to you, it's matter comprising these two statements: matter that apparently has no problem contradicting itself. And if you were to reply, "There are simply many different kinds of particles that become mind-like and comprise ideas: one kind of particle comprises the statement 'All X is Y' in Joe's skull, and another kind of particle comprises the statement 'Some X is not Y' in Mary's skull. Problem solved!" My response would be: Not exactly. Because in that case, we cannot say that the particles in Joe's skull are objectively true (or false), nor can we say that about the particles in Mary's skull: In this kind of universe, there are simply two sets of particles, functioning as material agents, causing two kinds of effects. We cannot validly claim that the material effect in Joe's skull is worthier of our consideration than the material effect in Mary's. The concept of "Objective Truth" is now gone! >>>(And "all" is a math expression. Interesting. What's the symbol for it? >>>It's more in the ordinal camp than cardinal, Ordinal camp: First, Second, Third, Fourth, . . . these show the order of something within a series. How does "all" show the order of something within a series? >>>but it's still math. You don't have to agree.) You're both kind and generous to me. Thanks. I don't agree.

@Ghs: >>>At 16 you may not legally be an "adult," but you are certainly an adult in terms of your ability to make reasoned decisions. Do you know the kid personally? You mean, automatically, just by virtue of biological age, the ability to make reasoned decisions "kicks in"? I don't think so. Additionally, how do you know this was a reasoned decision and not simply some spur-of-the-moment whim, as in "I just don't feel like going"? Most teenagers make most of their decisions in this manner; what makes you so sure that Evan isn't doing so also? Just because he claims to have read the Fountainhead? >>>Moreover, even the legitimate rights of parents do not include the right to violate the conscience of their children. Saying to Evan, "Son, we'd really like for you to join us at church on Easter" is, in your view, a violation of their son's conscience? >>>Your parents are wrong, in other words, pure and simple. Evan's parents are WRONG (morally?) for WANTING him to join them at church during Easter? >>>It is difficult for an outsider to give advice in this matter, but here is what I would do. Notice, please, Evan, the use of the first-person-singular: "Here is what I would do." Let's see if he's able to maintain this: >>>1) I would make it clear that you view being pressured to go to church as a violation of your conscience, (Ahem) I would make it clear that I view being pressured to go to church as a violation of my conscience. >>>and that as Christians they should understand and respect this principle. You respect their decisions in this matter, and they should respect yours. (Ahem) I respect their decisions in this matter, and they should respect mine. >>>You might even ask them to consult their minister in this matter and ask his advice. (Ahem) I might even ask them to consult their minister in this matter and ask their advice. >>>Many Christian ministers -- the intelligent and conscientious ones, at least -- would counsel them to respect your decision. (Ahem) Many Christian ministers . . . would counsel them to respect my decision. [That last statement is a riot. Yes, I can see it now: "Minister, our son doesn't want to join us at church for Easter. What should we do?" "Well, let's see. Has he read The Fountainhead?" "Why, yes, we believe he has. Why do you ask?" "It has been my experience that when an adolescent of the male sex has read The Fountainhead and responded positively to it — and by 'positively', I don't just mean masturbating furiously over the rape scene, but actually grasping the deeper meaning of individualism and integrity comprising much of the theme of that great novel (and please, please! Don't misunderstand me! I'm not saying that he shouldn't masturbate furiously over the rape scene! God forbid! I would never dare to interfere...I mean, when I read the novel as an adolescent and I began to furiously... I mean, well, never mind...), to continue: I have found that adolescent men, that is, teenage boys, appear to be fully in control of their cognitive faculties, and completely able to make informed, mature, reasoned decisions. So if he wants to stay home on Easter, do not violate his conscience by enticing him with the promise of free food, and cajoling him with the possibility of a romantic liaison (perhaps even a tryst) with one of our juicy, nubile female church members. That would be morally wrong, plain and simple. Respect his rationally-informed wishes and let him stay at home." "Thank you, minister! That was a great help, and eased our burden considerably. God bless you!" "You're most welcome! By the way, what did your son plan on doing during that time while you two are attending Easter service?" "He told us that he wants to reread the rape scene in The Fountainhead.] * * * * * * * * * * See that, Evan? Even when someone claims not to pressure you by saying "It is difficult for an outsider to give advice in this matter, but here is what I would do", he reveals (by unwittingly switching pronouns) that he's really telling you what to do. Don't you find that fascinating? He does...I mean, they do...I mean, I do.

>>>But now, they want me to go to church for Easter . . . should I let them force me into going? You appear to be claiming that your parents' desire to have you join them at church for Easter is a form of coercion against you. Did they threaten you? Did they issue an ultimatum? It doesn't sound like it. >>>They paid for a ticket at the dinner as well... You're turning down free food (not to mention the chance to meet some hot Catholic girls)? You have a lot to learn. (If it will help matters any, tell your mom and dad that I'd be perfectly willing go in your place. Should I bring my yarmulka?)

>>>All is a quantity of units. No it isn't. Where did you get that idea? If "all" were a quantity of units, then we could replace the word "all" in the assertion "All men are mortal" with an actual number representing the quantity of units, e.g., "6 billion men are mortal." It's perfectly true that "6 billion men are mortal" but the point is that it doesn't mean the same thing as "ALL men are mortal" which is most definitely not a quantity, or enumeration, of units. The two sentences mean different things. >>>Each unit is represented by the number one. We can call "all" a boundary of a mathematical set, just like "none." You could if you were a nominalist. But I'm not a nominalist. You could also do it if you believe that syllogistic reasoning from premises to conclusion is nothing but a tautology; i.e., in order to construct the syllogism, "All men are mortal / Socrates is a man / therefore, Socrates is mortal" you would not only have to enumerate the "units" of men (e.g., "6 billion" units in total) but since your enumeration of "all" would obviously have to include "Socrates" as one of the units you've counted, it would be superfluous to state the conclusion that "Socrates is mortal", because that fact was already known to you when you included him in your enumeration of "All." "All men [the enumeration of which includes Socrates, of course] are mortal" "Socrates is a man" [already known by you in the major premise] "Therefore, Socrates is mortal" [already known by you in the major premise"] To assume a mathematical/set-theory/nominalist approach to logic makes the very study of it superfluous. >>>That seems kind of obvious to me. To those who never studied basic physics, it might seem obvious that heavy objects fall faster than light ones. Educated people believed it for centuries. That it happens not to be so is actually a bit counter-intuitive. >>>But then again, I never studied formal logic to unlearn it. That seems kind of obvious to me. You should take a course in it. I think you'd like it. >>>In other words, all these logic rules pertain to nothing connected to reality outside the human skull? Formal logic is the study of propositions and how they relate to one another, irrespective of how — or even if — they relate to physical reality. "All skidoodles are kerfluffled" "Jupiquarlin is a skidoodle" "Therefore, Jupiquarlin is kerfluffled" Formally, a perfectly valid argument in logic, even if the terms are nonsensical. In any case, don't fret. Leonid has already admitted that many of the things we make statements about during ordinary discourse — e.g., color, sound, scent, texture — are phenomena that occur only inside the human skull, and which usually (though not necessarily) correlate to some extra-skull entity or process. They are percepts requiring a perceiver. When we make statements about "the color blue", "the sound of ocean waves", "the scent of lavender", and "the feel of velvet", we are not making statements about electromagnetic wavelength, air vibration, pheromone molecules, and electro-chemical impulses transmitted from the skin to the brain. Those are merely correlate to our percepts. We are making statements about our percepts (our subjective percepts), which occur only inside our human skull. Yet that in no way invalidates or weakens our ability make logical propositions out of them, and to draw logical conclusions from them.

>>>All limes are the size of houses and square. >>>All limes are tiny, round and flat like a penny. >>>If one is all, the other can't be any. >>>A direct contradiction. No. It's merely materially false, and not a formal contradiction. To contradict a statement in formal logic, you have to put the proposition in the correct form. For example, suppose a fellow named Smith shows up at a social event and is introduced by the host with the assertion, "This is Smith," if someone then says "You're Jones!", he's not formally contradicting anything, he's merely uttering a falsehood. It becomes both a falsehood and a formal contradiction if he says "You are NOT Smith!" The contradiction of "All limes are the size of houses and square" is "Some limes are not the size of houses and square." As a matter of material fact, it might be true that the reasons "some limes are not the size of houses and square" is because all of them happen to be tiny, round and flat like penny. It might be materially true, but it is formally irrelevant. Logic only needs to know that some limes are not the size of houses and square to establish a contradiction. The contrary of "All limes are the size of houses and square" is "No lime is the size of a house and square." You might be trying to conflate the notions of "factual untruth" and "logical contradiction." They're very different. >>>In other words, the problem no longer concerns limes and is only about math. 　 I don't see any math, but you're right that the problem here is not about any sort of factual truth about limes; it's about the logical relation between propositions qua propositions. >>>Yet the limes live on in the statements. They are essential to it because we are talking about limes. No. We're merely talking about the word "limes", not real material limes. Formal logic only pertains to statements about limes; not real limes, or the practical science of cultivating them. That is only relevant to the practical science of lime-growing; it is irrelevant to logical statements about limes.

>>>@ Michael: Limes are the size of houses and square. Limes are tiny, round and flat like a penny. >>>Both statements contradict each other, No. They do not contradict each other. >>>... both are false. Correct. Both are false. That's the clue that they are not *formal* contradictories. >>>What am I missing? You might be confusing "contradiction" with "contrary" (or "contrariety"). In casual conversation, we might substitute one term for the other, but in formal logic, they are utterly different. The textbook examples are usually the following: 1) All swans are white. 2) No swan is white. These two statements are "logical contraries" (not "contradictions"). They are both false. Therefore, they leave open the possibility of some 3rd alternative that hasn't been considered. In logical jargon, these two statements are "strongly opposed to each other" but not "perfectly opposed to one another." In order to be "perfectly opposed," two statements must leave no possibility of a 3rd alternative; they must present you with a choice of "either / or." In the above textbook example, two perfectly opposed statements would be: 1) All swans are white. 2) Some swans are not white. The two assertions present an either/or alternative, with no 3rd alternative possible: in other words, if 1 is true, 2 is false; if 2 is true, 1 is false. They cannot both be true, and they cannot both be false. The formal name for this sort of "perfect" opposition is: CONTRADICTION. In your example, the contradiction of "(All) Limes are the size of houses and square" would be "(Some) Limes are not the size of houses and square." They cannot both be true and they cannot both be false. It's "either / or."

>>>If for example Jim says that the capital of Romania is Budapest, but John says it is Sofia, their statetments are incompatible because they contradict each other. Wrong. >>>The next step is whether it can be determined whose statement is correct. In the above example, both have got it wrong. That they both have it wrong proves they are not contradictory. When two assertions contradict each other, one of them, by definition, must be true. Actual contradictory statements would be the following: Jim: "The capital of Romania is Budapest." John: "The capital of Romania is not Budapest." They cannot both be right, and they cannot both be wrong. They are "mutually exclusive AND jointly exhaustive." One of these two assertions must be right.

>>>>Moreover, what is wrong with a university-level class in sex? What's right about it? >>>What makes you think that "everyone" (including you) knows all you need to about (sshh!) sex. A compelling argument. It makes me wonder how we all got along for so many centuries in the absence of university-level classes in fellatio and cunnilingus. (Life must have been so difficult back then. My, my, how DID we ever manage?) >>>It is a study like any other. Like any other? Then why limit such studies to sex? We should have university-level courses in defecation and micturation. Those, too, are "studies like any other." And paraphrasing you: What makes you think that "everyone" (including you) knows all you need to about (sshh!) ka-ka and pee-pee. Your viewpoint strikes me as simple classroom bias. Many studies do not require classrooms for learning; we can learn them (and in this case, ought to do so) informally, outside of the classroom. Neither learning nor teaching stops when one steps outside of a classroom. >>>If you think that it is "dirty" or "private" then that puts the ball in your court. Serve or shut up. Not exactly sure what you mean by "dirty", but in any case, whether sex is "dirty" or "clean" would be someone's subjective evaluation. In other words, it's of little relevance for this discussion. Whether or not sex ought to be a private act, however, is a question bearing on both ethics and politics, and has nothing to do with whether one regards it as dirty or not (in other words, just because one regards sex as squeaky-clean, it doesn't follow therefore that it ought to be done publicly, or presented in classrooms). At root is the distinction between "public space" and "private space" which, apparently, you don't recognize; and equally at root is the traditional notion that sex — dirty or clean — is an intimate act, that acquires much of its unique value precisely because it is done in private; i.e., the privacy enhances the intimacy, and the intimacy reinforces the private, individualistic nature of the act. I don't see university-level courses in sex acts as having any other effect on students than to make sex less intimate, less private, less individualistic, less important, and ultimately less meaningful and enjoyable. In fact, I believe that is the actual purpose behind teaching it as if it were a "subject" like accounting. Rand sometimes spoke about admirers of her novels telling her that they would often ask themselves, "What would Howard Roark [or John Galt, or Dagny Taggart] do in this situation?" Accordingly, it behooves Objectivists to ask themselves, "I wonder if John Galt, Francisco D'Anconia, and Dagny Taggart, as students at the Patrick Henry University, would have changed their majors from physics and philosophy to blow-jobs and double-penetration?" I don't think so.

>>>>Blue is 'cool'. For sure-- just like that body of water out there, the cool one. And red is 'hot' -- just like fire. The division of colors into "warm" (red/orange/yellow) and "cool" (blue/green/violet) is, of course, subjective, though it does have perfectly legitimate application in things requiring the use of "subtractive" color: i.e., paint, pigment, dye, ink, glass filters, etc.; i.e., physical objects that do not emit their own light, but require an outside light source from which they absorb certain wavelengths, and reflect the rest. Those that are reflected are what enter our eyes and retinas and cause us to perceive the object in question as having color (e.g., a red beach-ball reflects the red element in white sunlight and absorbs the other elements). With direct, incident light, however (the "additive system") photographers and lighting engineers (who provide lighting for large business spaces such as shopping malls, etc.) often use a scientific measurement called "color-temperature." This relates to an experiment done by Lord Kelvin, in which a piece of blackened iron was heated until it glowed: at first, red, then orange, then yellow, then white ("white hot"), then blue, as the temperature of the iron was increased. The color that the "black body" glowed was then correlated with the temperature (measured in degrees-Kelvin) at that point. This provides an objective measure of color-incandescence because any "black body" robust enough to withstand the heat will glow the same color at the same given temperature. Thus, at 3200K, a black-body (e.g., a tungsten filament) will glow orange-yellow. If you wish to reproduce that color at some other time and place, you merely need to heat a black-body to 3200K and you will have it. If you heat the black-body higher — say to 5500K — it will glow blue. Interestingly, if we consider color-temperature, colors that we might ordinarily call "warm" (red, orange, yellow) correlate to fairly low temperatures on the Kelvin scale; while colors we ordinarily associate with ice, cold water, winter skies, etc. (blue, green, violet) correlate to very high ones. So by this measure, "red" is "cool" and "blue" is "hot."

>>>> Color is objective epistemic. I have no idea what that means. Why not simply say that color is subjective? Your visual experience with trees at dusk is known as the "Purkinje Effect." It has to do with the fact that human retinas have many more "rod" cells (which are sensitive only to the grayscale, giving us the experience of varying degrees of brightness) than we have "cones" (which give us the experience of hue, or color). The upshot of this difference is that ambient light levels have to reach a certain level before the cones become activated; below that threshold, we see only shades of gray. More precisely, the Purkinje Effect occurs midway between environments (or times of day) in which we perceive mainly with "cone-based" vision (required for sharp acuity, such as when reading), and "rod-based" vision. There are situations when humans need to have both "cone-based" and "rod-based", such as when having to navigate through a very dark environment (e.g., night-driving; night-flying; submarine travel) but also having to read instrument panels, dials, etc. The idea is to raise the ambient level of light just enough so that the rods and the cones are both activated, but without "saturating" the rods, which would reduce acuity while looking into the darkened environment. The rods are easily overwhelmed with green or blue light but are very insensitive to red light. That's why submarines, aircraft cockpits, some research facilities, etc., are illuminated by red light. In theory, of course, the dashboards of cars ought to be backlit with red light, since it would allow the driver to read the instruments clearly while not reducing acuity of the road during night-driving. Unfortunately for the drivers, almost all car dashes today are backlit by "sexy" blue or blue-green light. It provides great contrast, but actually interferes somewhat with seeing into the dark while driving at night.

>>>>The key word in this is “isolated”. The 2nd law is invoked incorrectly in many situations because the entire context of the law is not taken into account. I think the 2nd Law is more clearly conceptualized in its statistical-mechanics version as referring to the probability of certain spatial configurations of particles. The 2nd Law confidently predicts that configurations always move from states of lower probability to those of higher probability within an isolated system. However (and this is a big "however"), the 2nd Law does NOT say that simply because one opens the barrier between the isolated system and some larger system encompassing it, that configurations "must", or "shall", move from states of high probability to states of lower probability. There's no inevitability about it. Configurations "MIGHT" or "MAY" move from high-to-low probability, given the additional resources of the enlarged (so-called "open") system. I state the obvious only because many people mistakenly assume that an enlarged system gives them "poetic license", so to speak, to invoke miracles when convenient for their hypotheses. It usually takes the form of saying, "Of course my scenario could work. All it requires is an open system!" And voila! all problems are (supposedly) solved. I always ask them, "What makes you so sure that only 'benevolent', constructive forces will enter your previously closed system leading to states of lower probability? Why wouldn't your putative open system also contribute additional destructive elements as well?" They never have an answer. For them, simply having an enlarged pool, or resource, of energy available automatically leads to constructive processes rather than additional destructive ones. In sum: the 2nd Law does not state that "anything you want to imagine is possible so long as there's an open system."

>>>It pertains to consciousness, not existence. But consciousness exists and is part of existence. It's more precise, I think, to say "it pertains to the strictly material side of existence." And what you posted above would include all percepts, not just that class we call "color"; i.e., it includes the class of vibrations through air and other solid media we call "sound", which enters through our ears; it includes the class of percepts we call "scents" and "tastes"; and it includes the class of percepts integrated by consciousness that enters through our sense of touch — which itself includes textures (rough, smooth, hard, soft), and from which we actually derive(d) our concept of "materiality."

Apparently, there are already devices like this. Google "Second Sight Medical Products" and research the company's first approved Bionic Eye for patients suffering from retinitis pigmentosa.

>>If a person were totally blind, say born without eyes as one individual I knew years ago, can color or even the concept of color exist for that person? Neither the subjective psychic experience of color, nor any sort of concept of color would exist for that person. He could, of course, have a concept of any non-visual physical correlative of the color experience, such as a mathematical grasp of wavelength (and certainly, he'd be able to sense differences in heat). Wavelength, however, is something that *correlates* with the subjective experience of color, but it is not, itself, color. Sighted people do not experience "wavelength". The name of the percept they subjectively experience is "color." >>I mean the redness of red or the brownness of brown, etc.? I would assume not, as this is outside of his nature (i.e., total blindness). If the blind person then stated that color doesn't exist and anyone who believes there is such a thing as color is irrational, would he be correct? If not, how would you prove he was incorrect? There are experiments that could be devised based on the responses of a sighted person vs. an unsighted one that could persuade both parties that they were responding to different effects, even if the causes were identical. For example, there are laboratory devices that can send a single photon pulse at a time of "white" light through a fine fiber-optic. When the pulse exits the other end of the fiber, it is still, of course (technically) "white"; but when it strikes the retina of a sighted person, it will randomly strike only one set of color-sensitive cones at a time — red-sensitive, green-sensitive, or blue-sensitive. Depending on which cones the minute pulse of white light strikes, the subject will experience a "sparkle" of red, green, or blue. If a pulse is emitted once per second, e.g., and each pulse strikes a set of cones randomly, the subject experiences a multi-colored sparkle effect (one spark per second) — this, despite the fact that objectively speaking, white light was sent into the fiber-optic, and white light was emitted from the fiber-optic. If the blind person had some sort of sensing device that could detect the physical correlative of wavelength, it would tell him that it was simply pulses of "white" light. That would be completely correct and true, but it would be a clear difference between the sort of information about the world available to the two subjects.