imurray
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Posts posted by imurray
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Peter,
Thanks for posting, however, it would be nice if you could distill these long copy and paste pieces down a bit for us. That would actually really help you make your points better as I doubt many people have time to read through all of this and on top of that dig through it to find and make all the relevant connections. Of course, this would take some time on your part that, understandably, you may not have.
I wasn't being facetious when I asked for some clarification of your last post (as I'm not being facetious now). I wasn't sure what you wanted us to see and was giving you a chance to clarify yourself before agreeing or attempting a rebuttal.
Ian
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From: "William Dwyer" <wswdwyer@attbi.com>
Reply-To: wswdwyer@attbi.com
To: <atlantis@wetheliving.com>
Subject: ATL: Objectivism's values and virtues
Date: Sun, 29 Jun 2003 16:11:18 -0700
> What about David Kelley's argument that Benevolence is an 8th, distinguishable objectivist virtue (as presented in his “Unrugged Individualism: The Selfish Basis of Benevolence”)? Or is Benevolence merely an application of the virtue of Justice, as is claimed by some objectivists, like the ARIans?
I think that Benevolence is a corollary of Justice. It is an aspect of "giving each man his due." This means judging them and treating them accordingly. As Rand points out in "The Ethics of Emergencies", "a rational man regards strangers as innocent until proved guilty, and grants them that initial good will in the name of their human potential. After that he judges them according to the moral character they have actualized....If he finds them to be virtuous, he grants them personal, individual value and appreciation, in proportion to their virtues. It is on the ground of that generalized good will and respect for the value of human life that one helps strangers in an emergency -- AND ONLY IN AN EMERGENCY." (VOS, p. 47) For people one knows and values personally, however, one helps them because and to the extent that doing so is a "practical implementation of friendship, affection and love," i.e., one incorporates "the welfare (the ~rational~ welfare) of the person involved into one's own hierarchy of values, then act accordingly." (VOS, p. 46) This are applications of the virtue of benevolence, which clearly seems to be a corollary of the virtue of justice.
Peter,
I'm not sure this addresses Xray's assertion that friendship, family life, and human relationships are not primary to a rational (and by extension moral) person and the implications of conceptualizing morality in that way. Like Xray, I struggle with this, but I think I am more generous in my assessment of Rand's intentions. Perhaps you can parse this quotation out for us and show us where you think it addresses Xray's comment? I for one would appreciate if you took the time to do that.
Ian
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Xray and Daniel,
Let me help you both out. This is an excerpt from a famous essay by Stanley Fish: "Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser" (in Doing What Comes Naturally, 1989). It's an elegant essay and, I think, you'll immediately see why your arguments reminded me of it.
But the asking of hard questions is not something the theory encourages, and indeed its weaknesses from one point of view are its strengths from another. By defining his key terms in a number of ways, Iser provides himself in advance with a storehouse of defensive strategies. A theory that characterizes reality in on place as a set of determinate objects, and in another place as the product of "thought systems," and in a third place as a heterogeneous flux will not be embarrassed by any question you might put to it. It is a marvelous machine whose very loose-jointedness makes it invulnerable to a frontal assault (including, no doubt, the assault I am now mounting). It is in fact not a theory at all, but a piece of literature that satisfied Iser's own criteria for an "aesthetic object"...
I think you can see how this, after swapping out a few terms, would work rather nicely with your arguments against Rand. I think it's ironic that the same argument Fish launched against Iser, whose theory revolves around subjectivity and pluralism, has been made against Rand.
Switching gears.
Regarding morality: do you agree with Rand's definition?
Rand: "What is morality, or ethics? It is a code of values to guide man’s choices and actions—the choices and actions that determine the purpose and the course of his life." (TVOS, p.13)
If yes, then this implies all kinds of moral codes of values out there, since they all have the purpose of "guiding man's choices and actions that determine the purpose and the course of his life."
I'd agree, this definition does imply all kinds of moral codes and values, but I don't think it's correct to conclude that Rand intended it to mean that any code of values is moral and ethical. Seeing as this was on page 13, I think it's more accurate to say that she was simply defining what constitutes morality or ethics - not what makes a moral code of values moral or ethical.
The question is if there exists such a thing as a "wrong" definition. Either it is a definition or it is not.
For example, it I told you the definition of "fork" is "a round object soccer players use to score goals", this is not a "wrong definition" - it is simply no definition of the term 'fork'.
Agreed, but this isn't an analogous example. The correct term, of course would be soccer ball, in the context of soccer. However, I could write a book and decide that I'm going to call a soccer ball a "fork" and choose to define it as such. In that case, you'd be wrong to imagine a fork (the kind with tines that you eat with) when you come across the word in my book. It would be confusing, of course, but not wrong.
I don't think Rand called for universal, absolute, definitions for words. I could be wrong, but I don't think her theory necessitates that concept.
More later, have to go judge a debate!
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Also they're called "technical" definitions, not "connotative" definitions since the definitions are usually very specific and constitute the PRIMARY definitions within the context of a particular philosophical treatise. You wouldn't argue that biologist's are using "sympathetic" wrong in "sympathetic system" and insist that it must mean something else - would you? My advice is either to use her definition or if you just can't get past it, use a word instead of "sacrifice" when you come across it in her writing - call it "arcoplastiopterice" instead. It doesn't really matter which word you use - it's the meaning that counts and she has defined it as well as one could expect (although the overarching concept itself is not unambiguous - that I'd agree with).
Very good advice! I do this with Rands use of 'morality' which I take to mean 'rationality' because she uses it in a non-standard way;
You who prattle that morality is social and that man would need no morality on a desert island—it is on a desert island that he would need it most. Let him try to claim, when there are no victims to pay for it, that a rock is a house, that sand is clothing, that food will drop into his mouth without cause or effort, that he will collect a harvest tomorrow by devouring his stock seed today—and reality will wipe him out, as he deserves; reality will show him that life is a value to be bought and that thinking is the only coin noble enough to buy it.I take this to mean that if you don't use your head (rationality) you will die when left to you own devices but she calls this 'morality'.
I noticed that too. The more I read by Rand, the more I'm convinced that rationality and morality (as she conceives of them) are interchangeable as acting rationality is acting morally as acting morally is acting rationally.
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It is important to separate technical terms used in philosophy (like e.g. a priori) from the attaching of different meanings to common words, which is always a connotative act.
The problems arise when such associations are not identified as connotative, but mistaken for an actual definition.
Take the term "sacrifice" for example: without doubt, Rand was convinced that her "definition" of sacrifice was the correct one.
But to define "sacrifice" as 'trading a higher for a lower value' is incorrect.
Xray,
I disagree. Philosophers do this all the time out of necessity - they just can't go around inventing new words all the time. Here are just a few examples: Kierkegaard's use of "anxiety", "despair", "faith", "absurd", etc.; Heidegger's use of "authentic" and "inauthentic", "equipment", "being", "temporality", etc.; Nietzsche's use of "morality", "genealogy", "power", etc.; Wittgenstein's use of "grammar"; Foucault's use of "archaeology", "archive", "culture", "technology", etc. Not to mention all the other terms commonly used in philosophy: "truth", "reality", "identity", etc. And not to mention all the various translations of these words - as you well know, not all of these words translate easily from one language to another. I understand Rand wrote in English, but perhaps there was a Russian word better suited, but "sacrifice" was the closest word in English? I don't know, but I do know that happens - one example is that most of Foucault's translators retain "lange" and "parole" because there are no suitable English equivalents.
Sure there are words like "a priori" that are part of the universal jargon of philosophy, but that's not a good analogy. Really, what separates one philosophy from another are nuanced definition of common terms! If everyone agreed on an absolute definition for each word then we wouldn't have anything to argue about (disputes over what is truth, reality, self, identity, knowledge, time, etc. would all be settled if we all agreed to a universal definition for these words). Words are like tools - you reach for the best one for the job, but sometimes it isn't exactly what you need, so you improvise a little. Within the context of a philosophy the meaning given by the author is the "real" definition, your problem is that you insist on arguing that the author is somehow confused or deliberately trying to confuse others. That's more than likely not the case - most take great pains in defining their terms. You need to use their definitions if you want to understand their philosophy; if not it is YOU who is using the "wrong" definition not them.
Also they're called "technical" definitions, not "connotative" definitions since the definitions are usually very specific and constitute the PRIMARY definitions within the context of a particular philosophical treatise. You wouldn't argue that biologists are using "sympathetic" wrong in "sympathetic system" and insist that it must mean something else - would you? My advice is either to use her definition or if you just can't get past it, use a word instead of "sacrifice" when you come across it in her writing - call it "arcoplastiopterice" instead. It doesn't really matter which word you use - it's the meaning that counts and she has defined it as well as one could expect (although the overarching concept itself is not unambiguous - that I'd agree with).
In other words, who cares if "sacrifice" is the wrong word? All that matters is the meaning she's clearly assigned to it. Sacrifice, as DEFINED BY RAND, IS trading a higher value for a lower value. That is the correct, technical, definition within the context of her work. You can make an argument that she should have used a different word with a standard definition that fits closer to her meaning, but that's not an argument against her philosophy - only against her choice of words.
Practically any guide to writing a technical work (like a thesis) will give you this advice (this is from http://www.cs.purdue.edu/homes/dec/essay.dissertation.html):
1. Each technical term used in a dissertation must be defined either by a reference to a previously published definition (for standard terms with their usual meaning) or by a precise, unambiguous definition that appears before the term is used (for a new term or a standard term used in an unusual way).
2. Each term should be used in one and only one way throughout the dissertation.
3. The easiest way to avoid a long series of definitions is to include a statement: ``the terminology used throughout this document follows that given in [CITATION].'' Then, only define exceptions.
Ok, this is frustrating me lol. Sorry for the sharp tone of the email, grammar, and spelling, but I'm firing this off quick.
Ian
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Angela, I wish Rand had kept the dictionary versions of definitions. Since she redefined things, it’s caused some terrible misunderstandings.
Indeed it has. Classic case of a false premise is Rand's so-called "definition" of "sacrifice" (= trading a higher for a lower value).
This is no definition, but a value judgement. She presents as an "objective" definition what are merely her personal feelings and associations with a term. That is, she confuses connotation and denotation. I doubt she was even aware of the mistake she made here.
Xray:
I sound like a broken record, but I'd like to once again point out that philosophers often use different meanings for common words - these are not connotative of denotative definitions, but technical. The only real problem occurs when the propriety of a term is violated within the context of the system itself without an acknowledgement.
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Interesting, but I was surprised there was no mention of Paine's "Common Sense" or Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" - two works that help to inform the "why" and to a lesser degree the "how" of American government and that are still relevant to the philosophical discussion.
Thanks. I don't deny their continued relevance, though I believe that, in so far as I understand them, they're mistaken on the central issue of government itself. And, going to back to something George said in another topic, I do think that once the "consent door" is opened, the end is no government -- at least, no government of the traditional territorial monopolist of legitimate force variety.
Since Dan is a member of Atlantis II, he has probably seen this before, but others may find it of interest. I submitted it to A2 on 12/04/09:
Speaking of first-hand experiences of anarchy, one of the most interesting examples of this is found in Part II of Thomas Paine's "Rights of Man." In Chapter 1, Paine writes:
"Government is no farther necessary than to supply the few cases to which society and civilization are not conveniently competent, and instances are not wanting to show, that everything which government can usefully add thereto, has been performed by the common consent of society without government."
To buttress his contention that government is a convenience, not a necessity, Paine points out that many American communities during the Revolution functioned quite well without any government:
"For upwards of two years from the commencement of the American war, and to a longer period in several of the American States, there were no established forms of government. The old governments had been abolished, and the country was too much occupied in defence, to employ its attention in establishing new governments; yet during this interval, order and harmony were preserved as inviolate as in any country in Europe."
The view that government is a convenience, not an absolute necessity, was also expressed by Thomas Jefferson, especially in his numerous references to anarchistic Indian communities. For example: "I am convinced that those societies (as the Indians) which live without government, enjoy in their general mass an infinitely greater degree of happiness than those who live under the European governments." (Letter to Colonel Edward Carrington, January 16, 1787).
Jefferson once remarked that anarchy is the ideal social condition, but that it is impractical for larger societies for which a republican form of government serves as second-best, in effect. The position that government is a convenience rather than a necessity was rooted in Locke's observation that a government is needed to remedy certain "inconveniences" that will arise in a state of nature. These radical Lockeans were not anarchists, of course, but their position differs radically from that of Ayn Rand, who is much more of a Hobbesian than a Lockean in her argument for the necessity of government.
Ghs
Yes, I think I do remember you posting this. Also, I recall something recorded of you a long time ago giving a presentation on that period where you discussed what sounded to me like a no government situation: the colonial legislatures were at a stalemate with the royally appointed governors and nothing or very little got done -- got done in terms of the government doing it.
Also, the recent book Indian Givers: How the Indians of the Americas Transformed the by Jack Weatherford goes over, in some detail, the influence of Native American examples of European and American political philosophy. I believe Weatherford might be overstating his case, though I don't doubt having these examples close at hand did provoke some thought and probably served to reinforce some liberal or proto-liberal political ideas in European and in British North American thought.
Excellent summary of Locke and Paine, George. That's the kind of thinking that, in my opinion, would have been a nice addition to Dan's article. It actually works to buttress some of his key points. To make myself clear - Dan's article and argument is no less elegant without it.
Ian
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There are journals that talk about this stuff. On top of that, they're often peer reviewed and written by people who know what the hell they're talking about. Just saying...
And this means what? Mere mortals can't aspire to such knowledge and shouldn't bother discussing these things?
Nope, just that one might want to start there first rather than sitting around speculating out of their derriere.
Mortals have already done a lot of the work - why not try to understand what they've done first and then try to move the discussion forward...? -
There are journals that talk about this stuff. On top of that, they're often peer reviewed and written by people who know what the hell they're talking about. Just saying...
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Introduction
I’ve been arguing the free market anarchist position in one form or another now for several years. Last year, in an online forum, a critic of anarchism asked me for a short explanation of free market anarchism. Providing this in a brief email forced me to boil down a lot of ideas to what I believed were essential to the position. Here follows an expanded version of that email explanation. Let’s start by defining some terms. Anarchy is the absence of government. By “government” is meant a single agency that enforces social rules, particularly what is called “law.” Naturally, this can cover many things, just as government can. If someone says a society has a government, this doesn’t tell us whether the government is limited or unlimited, democratic or oligarchic or autocratic, or the character of its laws. To give but one example, Spain and the US both had governments during the Spanish-American War, but they were quite different in character. The same is true of anarchy. The absence of government could mean something like a civil war, such as we see in Somalia today, or it could mean a fairly peaceful society, such as that of the American Old West or Iceland circa 1000 CE.
Anarchism is the view that some form anarchy would be a better way of organizing society -- that things would be better without a government at least in some circumstances. This does not mean that any form of anarchy -- any absence of government is better than any government. The worst form of anarchy might be far worse than the best form of government -- whether one compares theoretical cases or historical ones. The anarchist need not posit that all anarchies are better than any government. Nor is anarchism flawed if there indeed is some government that is better than some anarchy.
The absence of government, as noted above, can take many forms, some tried and some hypothesized. Just as there are many forms of anarchy, there are many forms of anarchism. Each particular variant of the latter posits some particular kind of anarchy that is better than government -- either in general or as one is likely to find. E.g., free market anarchism posits that legal authority should be competitive. Anarcho-socialism, on the other hand, mainly focuses on dispensing with private property. (I won’t go into anarcho-socialism in any detail.)
Minarchism is minimal government. While there are many different flavors of minarchism, the general idea is to strictly limit government to only what is seen as legitimate role. The legitimate role for minarchism is to have the government act only to respond to the initiation of force and perhaps to settle disputes. Usually, this boils down to government protecting only individual negative rights, such as the right to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness in the classical liberal sense of those rights. (I use “individual negative rights” to distinguish them from collective rights -- rights supposed to belong to groups, such as ethnic groups, nations, classes, gender-based groups, or what have you -- and from positive rights -- rights supposed to guarantee something, such as rights to a job, education, medical treatment, food, housing, etc.)
Statism is any social or political system that concentrates power in the hands of governments at the expense of individual negative rights or freedoms. Statism per se is different from minarchism -- at least in theory. (Some anarchists would argue that a having a government at all violates individual rights and freedoms because to remain a government it must not allow competitors to operate inside its territory. Some minarchists would argue that there’s no right to choose between competing governments.)
Resolving Disputes
Why worry about anarchy and government? There is one major problem of living in society: how to get along with other people. As long as no disputes arise, there is no problem, but when they do arise -- as they have in all known societies -- there needs to be a means of resolving them. So what happens when people can't coordinate their actions? E.g., if Stan does something that negatively impacts Eileen, such as, to use an example from Ellickson (1994), let's his sheep graze on Eileen's wheat field.
One generally accepted solution to this problem is to define property rights between such parties. This way, each party can be sure, to some extent, of what is expected of her or him (or them) and can reduce social conflict. (I'm not claiming here that this is a planned outcome, but more that it's a spontaneous order that evolves based on human actions not human design. Put another way, societies that are able to resolve such conflicts and increase social coordination tend to be more successful and flourish. Hence, relatively free societies. Those that can’t resolve such conflicts in a mostly peaceful fashion and otherwise increase social cooperation have to rely on other policies to continue to exist or grow. Hence, statism and imperialism.)
Defining property rights alone is not enough. They can provide a framework within which to resolve disputes, but they don’t enforce themselves. So how should property rights be enforced? (Many minarchists claim that property rights exist independent of government, so no government is needed define them ab initio. Most natural rights theorists, such as John Locke and Ayn Rand, believe much the same. Rights precede government.) The problem is not so hard if one postulates that the people involved have the incentive and information to do so. However, in the real world, not only might incentives be otherwise (after all, in any real society some people steal, assault, rape, and kill), there's still an information problem. On the latter, in any given case, it might be hard to define a concrete right to property and hard to define when a violation of such a right happens or what should be done in such a case; e.g., if Stan walks across Eileen's lawn today, should she be able to shoot him two years later when she finds out about it?
By the way, this example is not a strike against anarchism, but a general problem with enforcing rights or any social rule. Arbitrary laws and punishments exist under government. There is no guarantee that even the best minarchy won't have such, given the potential for errors and corruption. A question to ask here is: What type of system is more likely to have these kinds of outcomes? A related question is: What type of system is more likely to correct them when they do happen?
These problems, however, are regularly overcome, again, by spontaneous orders. In a free market, people have an incentive to overcome the information problem to further social coordination mainly out of self-interest and through the ability of market actors to use dispersed and even tacit information. (Hayek 1980)
This does not mean every last member of society will perceive the incentives or once perceiving them not forego short-term gains over long-term ones. In fact, in markets, this happens all the time. Aside from sheer ignorance (not knowing what and that you don’t know: not knowing even the scope of your ignorance; see Kirzner 1992), people sometimes misjudge and incentives don't impact each individual the same way. However, the costs of such mistakes are visited locally and mostly on those making the choices.
Despite these shortcomings, markets do fairly well in the provisioning all sorts of goods and services. (It is more accurate to say that individuals interacting through markets do fairly well in the provisioning all sorts of goods and services. Alternatives to markets are, likewise, ways of people interacting through some alternate system.) The alternative to markets is to have some form of central control over such provision. Most minarchists accept markets in general, but still believe there are certain activities that markets either can't do well or can't do at all. For minarchists, the main one of these is the provision of rights enforcement services. They argue for having central control over such services, usually configured for a given geographical area. This would mean that, in the area of rights enforcement (for now, let’s bundle security as well as dispute resolution into this function), there must be a centrally planned and controlled order -- in short, a government. Hence the debate over anarchism (or polycentric legal orders) and government (or monocentric legal orders).
I believe that one can be objective here by asking a few questions that won't prejudice the issue. For example: would a polycentric or a monocentric legal order work better at rights enforcement? (It could be that the answer to these questions is neither -- that both work equally well, as good or as bad.) Which type of order is more stable? Do different types of cultures fit better into one type of order or the other? How do such orders evolve over time? Are there historical examples of either worth considering? Can either be applied to today’s world? How do we get to either from current social arrangements? (It might be that there is no easy path to either or that one is much easier to accomplish than the other, so we should take the easier path.)
I would add to the above that minarchism is not just any monocentric legal order, but a certain type. Obviously, neither type of legal order mentioned above has to be rights respecting. One can imagine a polycentric one that is probably many a minarchist’s view of anarchism: civil war or the international system of today. In the latter case, there is no international government, so the legal order is polycentric, but not the type most anarchists would applaud. (Waltz 1979) Note that this condition is not completely lawless as even between nation states spontaneous orders can arise -- as well as planned ones such as treaties, agreements, alliances, and international institutions.
Likewise, monocentric legal orders need not be rights respecting. All known nation states within their own borders are monocentric legal orders and all of them have violated rights on a greater or lesser scale and not just by accident. An auxiliary question, one related to the one about social evolution above, is: Is one type of legal order more likely to change into a worse form even if it starts out near its optimum? More concretely: would a minarchy be more likely over time to evolve into statism? Would a good form of anarchy be more likely to evolve into lawlessness? This also goes for evolution to something else entirely. After all, one can imagine a quite limited government having a civil war and that leading to lawlessness. One can also conceive of an anarchic society evolving into a statist one. In fact, at this time in history, some form of statism seems to be the end state of all socio-political evolution.
Where I stand here should be quite clear: I believe free market anarchism is more effective and efficient at rights enforcement than minarchism or any form of government. I also believe polycentric legal orders are more stable in the long run, while monocentric ones tend toward less stability. In fact, from the historical record, they tend to undergo revolutionary changes after periods of stasis leading until pressure builds (discontent rises) for the next revolutionary change. This has been the history of nation states. This tendency exists because monocentric legal systems are less efficient at solving the information problem -- for the same reason central planning in other areas fails relative to free markets -- and also because the incentives are decoupled or only loosely coupled with costs. Thus, even if saints peopled governments, they would still have the information problem to contend. They are not, so they also have the incentive problem.
(The difference between polycentric and monocentric legal systems might be put into terms of the difference between exit and voice systems. (Lieberman 1989) In an exit system, one can select between providers for a good or service. In a voice system, one can't select between such providers, but one can have in a say -- a voice -- in how a good or service is provided. These are, respectively, incarnated in free markets and governments. In a free market, one usually selects between providers. That's the main form of feedback between providers and consumers. In a government, one cannot make such selection (save by emigrating), though often one has some voice in the government -- whether through elections, polls, lobbying, or other means. Which system responds better to the people it services?)
Anarchic societies, likewise, are not peopled by saints, but by having competition in rights enforcement, the knowledge problem is, while not completely solved, much more manageable because there will be a free market in law. The incentive problem, again while not completely solved, is mostly solved because costs and incentives are aligned with costs. The ability to select between different providers of law means that such providers have to compete to better their product or lose clients to other purveyors -- at least, at the margin.
This is a mostly political-economic justification for anarchism and more Hayekian than Rothbardian. (Not that Hayek was an anarchist, but I rely on his view of the market here instead of Rothbard's view of natural rights.) This is not to say Rothbard’s rights basis for anarchy is wrong. I believe it complements the Hayekian social order basis. One would expect this if natural rights derive from human nature. One would expect them to be consistent with human economic and social nature as well as with psychology and the rest of human nature. The two are compatible. Or, as Hegel would put it, the True is the Whole. Each perspective is part of that Whole.
Some Evidence
Examples of this type of anarchy have existed in the past, such as the Law Merchants (Benson 1990), Early Iceland (Friedman 1989; Long 2002), Celtic Ireland (Rothbard 1973), the Kapauku Papuans (Benson 1990), the American Old West (Benson 1990), and, perhaps, the ancient Harappan civilization (Thompson 2006). There are many others and there are also borderline cases, such as the British Colonies in North America. George H. Smith pointed out that a competitive condition existed between the British government and colonial governments and this checked each other’s powers before the War of Independence. While some might argue this was not anarchy per se, it was an instance of not having a monopoly government in one geographic area. (Polycentrism, of course, can come in degrees.)
Law also preceded government. As Roderick Long points out, "for the overwhelming preponderance of historical and anthropological evidence verifies that law is far older than the state. Until recently, states were the exception, not the norm, in human society; and stateless societies have enjoyed quite sophisticated and long-lasting legal codes." (Long 1998) In other words, societies had laws long before they had governments. The first evidence of governments seems to date back maybe five or six thousand years. Even then, such governments were small and most of mankind still lived without any government. So, it’s safe to say that humanity has lived for most of its history -- maybe one hundred to three hundred thousand years or even more -- without government.
Whither Minarchism?
What of minarchism? No government has yet been a full-fledged minarchy. Some constitutional states in the West may have come close, but only for a very short space of time. The limited governments of the United States, Britain, and other nations have violated individual rights as a matter of routine. It's also notable that even the most limited constitutional state has grown outside its limits very quickly. The problem with using constitutional and other legal limits -- at least in the way it's been done -- is that such checks on power rely on the government to police itself. The problem always turns on who guards the guardians. (This, and again the knowledge problem that exists for any monopoly.) Perhaps newer methods of limiting power would work, such as sortition (adding a random factor into elections to prevent influence-peddling; this could be having several rounds of voting for an office where the last round is decided by random selection; see Knag 1998) and the use of supermajorities for key decisions (e.g., increasing spending, engaging in military operations). Yet these all seem like cosmetic solutions as the incentives to increase power and the overall structures remain in place. As long as government stays a monopoly and some people want power, there will be a tendency for the latter to use the former for their ends. New and better limits might make that difficult, but the obstacles will probably never be so great that no one will think the race isn’t worth the candle.
Now, this is a critique of limiting government. It’s not an argument for anarchy, though by showing some of the problems inherent in even the best form of government, it might be found that anarchism, in some form, is as least as appealing if not more so. Also, inherent in systematic thinking is that often many questions are answered at once -- the solution to one problem is related to others. The answer of how anarchism works is, to some extent, a challenge to any form of government. This naturally leads, if anarchism is possible, people to question government. After all, if anarchism can do anything minarchism can do, maybe minarchism isn't necessary. A free and open market in political discourse might lead to more people selecting anarchism over minarchism.
Works Cited:
Bruce L. Benson. 1990. The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State. Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy: San Francisco.
Robert C. Ellickson. 1994. Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts.
David Friedman. 1989 [1973]. The Machinery of Freedom: A Guide to Radical Capitalism. Open Court: Las Salle, Illinois.
Freidrich Hayek. 1980 [1948]. "The Use of Knowledge in Society" in Individualism and Economic Order. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
Hans-Hermann Hoppe. 2001. Democracy -- The God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order. Transaction: New Brunswick, New Jersey.
Israel Kirzner. 1992. The Meaning of Market Process: Essays in the Development of Modern Austrian Economics. Routledge: New York.
Sigmund Knag. 1998. "Let's Toss for It: A Surprising Curb on Political Greed" in Independent Review, Vol. 3 No. 2, Autumn 1998, and available online at http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=323
Myron Lieberman. 1989. Privatization and Educational Choice. Saint Martin’s Press: New York.
Roderick T. Long. 1998. "Why Objective Law Requires Anarchy" in Autumn 1998 Formulations, and available online at http://libertariannation.org/a/f61l1.html
Roderick T. Long. 2002. “Privatization, Viking Style: Model or Misfortune?” in LewRockwell.com June 6, 2002 issue.
Murray N. Rothbard. 1973. For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto. Macmillian: New York, and available online at http://mises.org/rothbard/newlibertywhole.asp
George H. Smith. 1991. "Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market" in Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies. Prometheus Books: Buffalo, New York.
Thomas J. Thompson. "An Ancient Stateless Civilization: Bronze Age India and the State in History" in Independent Review, Vol. 10 No. 3, Winter 2006, and available online at http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?issueID=44&articleID=560
Kenneth M. Waltz. 1979. Theory of International Politics. McGraw-Hill: New York.
Interesting, but I was surprised there was no mention of Paine's "Common Sense" or Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" - two works that help to inform the "why" and to a lesser degree the "how" of American government and that are still relevant to the philosophical discussion.
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Once again Altruism is used to bolster Totalitarianism and right here in America.
Peter
From a speech given to a Tea Party by Robert Tracinski:
If there's a war between these classes, between the government class and the producer class, then they started it. What is driving this war is that the government class has a contempt for producers and for wealth creation. You can see this expressed in thousands of little ways. Nancy Pelosi tried to sell the health care bill by saying how good it would be for unemployed artists: "Think of an economy where people could be an artist or a photographer or a writer without worrying about keeping their day job in order to have health insurance." So notice that these people are considered to be in nobler and more worthy professions, which should be supported by government, as opposed to those who hold productive jobs.
And then there is Michelle Obama's advice to college graduates encouraging them to "move out of the money-making industry" and "into the helping industry." So if you work for government, you're the good guys because you're "helping" people, which makes you better than those money-grubbing jerks in the private sector.
All of this goes against the grain of American history and American culture.
Your point? The guy gave a speech not unlike many other speeches in American history pointing out what he thinks are flawed ideals, which are themselves historically commonplace...this has been played out over and over again in American history so why should I be shocked? I'd say if this type of rhetoric and debate ceased then that would be something to talk about.
Do you ever have your own ideas, Peter? Or do you just quote and summarize?
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"In one scene she describes in careful detail the characteristics of passengers, doomed to perish in a violent railroad crash, making it clear that their deaths are warranted, by their ideological errors. (566-568)."
She obiously didn't read or understand Crime and Punishment. Ayn Rand is a lot like dear Rodya except she didn't attempt to really live her philosophy. She insulated herself within a close knit inner-circle and never left herself open to feel the cruelty and alienation that a strict adherence to her ideals may have caused, but we'll never know for sure since the way she lived excluded her from being a testament to her own philosophy. Perhaps she would have gone crazy like our friend Friedrich - imagine how crazy he would have been if he had to hock his books or defend his philosophy on the Phil Donahue show!
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Mad Men- episode 8 entitled Hobo Code
Self-interested and unsentimental - is that why Don Draper is a cheater and about to lose his wife and family on the show? Viva Objectivism! ;)
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Around 1997. while I was living in San Francisco, I had a conversation with an old friend (from my high-school days) who was a contributor to the Ayn Rand Institute and who had attended many lectures by Peikoff and his "colleagues" (as I characterized them in the deleted passage). My friend told me of an argument that he found incredible, , i.e., that a valid syllogism was not in fact "valid" for someone who didn't understand the rules of deductive logic.
Ghs
I don't think the position is too absurd. If someone doesn't understand (at least intuitively) the way logic works, then they will be unable to recognize when a syllogism is true, or why. In other words, for them, if P then Q would be as "valid" a syllogism as if P then not Q.
Of course, this assumes that this is what the ARIans intended in making that claim.
Jeffrey S.
Jeffrey,
I agree with you, but think you've make a subtle distinction in your analysis that is not made in the original. There's a difference between somebody who is unable to recognize a syllogism as valid because they don't understand the rules of deductive logic and a syllogism being "invalid" for somebody who doesn't understand the rules of deductive logic. The former seems rather obvious because the error in or lack of logic rests in the person, the latter seems to imply that the syllogism itself somehow loses its inherent validity to a person who does not understand logic.
This is the duty/obligation in relation to moral/immoral argument all over again and I'm beginning to see that Ayn's detractors are rightly confused.
Ian
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George H. Smith recently responded to Xray. I always loved the way Tony Danza said, “Angela” to a character on the show, the same actress who later appeared on “Ugly Betty,” once again as the Mom. He kind of said, AAAnnn Ju Laaaaa!
Anyway, George wrote:
Let me be blunt: Rand’s contextualism, as interpreted by Peikoff and his colleagues, has become virtually indistinguishable from epistemological relativism.
End quote
AAAnnn Ju Laaaaa, I don’t think George gave it a pass at all. This is going over ground from just a couple of months ago, and a few years ago, so George is free to skip the following portion of an old letter, (if he reads this at all. I tried to send him something directly to his old web address and it came back undeliverable. He may have blocked me. Ouch!) Skip the portions between the X’s George and go to the end of the post where I will beseech The Great and Wonderful Oz to do more.
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Leonard Peikoff writes in “Objectivism the Philosophy of Ayn Rand,” on pages 120 and 175:
"Proof" is the process of establishing truth by reducing a proposition to axioms, i.e., ultimately, to sensory evidence. Such reduction is the only means man has of discovering the relationship between nonaxiomatic propositions and the facts of reality.
Many people regard logic not as a cognitive function, but as a social one; they regard it as a means of forcing other men to accept *their* arbitrary ideas. For oneself, according the this viewpoint, a farrago of unproved assertions would be satisfactory; logic, however, is necessary for polemics; it is necessary as a means of trapping opponents in internal inconsistencies and thereby of battering down one's enemy.
Objectivism rejects this approach. Proof is not a social ritual, nor is it an unworldly pursuit, a means of constructing rationalistic castles in the air. It is a personal, practical, selfish necessity of earthly cognition. Just as man would need concepts (including language) on a desert island, so he would need logic there, too. Otherwise, by the nature of human consciousness, he would be directionless and cognitively helpless . . . .
The modern definition of "absolute" represents the rejection of a rational metaphysics and epistemology. It is the inversion of a crucial truth: *relationships are not the enemy of absolutism; they are what makes it possible.* We prove a conclusion on the basis of facts logically related to it and then integrate it into the sum of our knowledge. That process is what enables us to say: "Everything points to this conclusion; the total context demands it; within these conditions, it is unshakeable." About an isolated revelation, by contrast, we would never be secure. Since we would know nothing that *makes* it so, we could count on nothing to keep it so, either.
Contextualism does not mean relativism. It means the opposite. The fact of context does not weaken human conclusions or make them vulnerable to overthrow. On the contrary, context is precisely what makes a (properly specified) conclusion invulnerable."
End of quote
The quote that George H. Smith uses about blood types is from a chapter in OPAR titled, "Reason" (page 173):
"This proposition, (that ‘A' bloods are compatible) represented real *knowledge* when it was first reached, and it still does so; in fact, like all properly formulated truths, this truth is immutable. Within the context initially specified, A bloods are, and always will be compatible."
end quote
As I mentioned, this quote is from a chapter titled "Reason" and was preceded by a chapter titled, "Objectivity," so we need to remember that Mr. Peikoff is speaking, IN CONTEXT, about the amalgamation of Epistemology and Metaphysics, that is Medical Science. Doctor Peikoff is describing how a fallible human can achieve psychological certainty and be sure that his thinking processes do correctly describe reality.
And contextualism requires a certain time frame. Contextualism requires the present, i.e., the sum total of all knowledge acquired up to the second you are reading this, and I am writing this. Perhaps it would be fair to paraphrase some more of Doctor Peikoff's sentences, to read, "On the basis of the available evidence, i.e., within the context of the factors so far discovered, the following is the proper conclusion to draw. Type ‘A' bloods are compatible. Thereafter, the individual medical scientist must continue to observe and identify; and if new information should warrant it, he or she must qualify their conclusions accordingly."
Doctor Peikoff did say the preceding paragraph. Now, I am up to the point where I somewhat agree with George. I would revise what Peikoff said in the original ‘Type A' quote:
quote
"This proposition, (that ‘A' bloods are compatible) represented real *knowledge* when it was first reached, and it still does so; in fact, like all properly formulated truths, this truth is immutable. Within the context initially specified, A bloods are, and always will be compatible."
end quote
I would risk redundancy, CHANGE SOME VERB TENSES and say,
"This proposition, (that ‘A' bloods are compatible) represented real *knowledge* when it was first reached, and it still does so; in fact, like all properly formulated truths, this truth WAS immutable (NOT CAPABLE OR SUSCEPTIBLE TO CHANGE), within the context initially specified. Within the context initially specified, ‘A' bloods are, and always will be compatible, and AT THAT TIME, we WERE correct to act on that objective fact to treat our patients."
On second thought, maybe I would not use the word, ‘immutable' at all. How would you change it in the PRESENT CONTEXT, George, and now here is my note at the end 8-)
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George also wrote for the Contextualism thread on Atlantis:
I quoted Gilson in WA? in the course of developing a point about the inner logic of ideas, and how seemingly innocuous ideas have sometimes carried within themselves implications with radical potential. This is why philosophy and science have often taken unexpected turns, as the interpreters and expositors of a theory pursue implications that were not apparent to its originator and who, if he had been aware, may have disagreed or disapproved of them. In other words, ideas, like actions, have unintended and unforeseen consequences.
End quote
George, once more I ask you to write a critique of “The Ayn Rand Lexicon,” for wealth and fame. I don’t know how many copies it would sell (but just don’t have the word “anarchy” or “atheism” in the title and it might sell better.) Dissect the ideas of Rand. Improve them. Make them one hundred percent correct in the context of her entire philosophy up to 2010. And what about a critique of that little bitty book, “The Objectivist Epistemology?”
This brings up the big turning point in any philosophy. What Rand wrote was Randian Objectivism, but can David Kelley, or George H. Smith, or Leonard Peikoff also write Objectivism? Of course they can, if they are rationally correct! And if you are correct in your “fixes” you might be able to sell it thru The Atlas Society AND the Ayn Rand Institute (though I would not hold my breathe for them.)
I just bought two bio’s about Rand. There is a resurgence in interest and sales of “Atlas Shrugged.” And you George, could do as good or a better job than anyone.
Now if I could just get you to drop your religious attachment to “Competing Defense Agencies” . . . And could you please get JR to stop picking on me? 8-)
Semper cogitans fidele,
Peter Taylor
Somebody has a special admirer.
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Shorter Rand:
"What you mean by up, I mean by down, and what you mean by down, I mean by up. Now, let's talk about elevators...."
:-)
I agree that words should be used carefully and that every attempt should be made to follow the basic rules of precision and propriety; however, many if not most philosophers take some liberty in using words in ways that aren't aligned with their denotative meanings. It doesn't make it wrong per se, but it brings us into the realm of technical jargon where one needs to familiarize oneself with the "special" meanings. I thing George and others have pointed out the more serious problem - Rand seems to occasionally slip between denotative and technical meanings and violates propriety within the context of her own work.
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Proof that Obama is a Socialist
In the Objectivist-libertarian world, we all know that President Obama is a socialist in everything but name. But the mainstream?
Obama made a mistake and tried to brush off Glenn Beck and Rush Limbaugh by name on national TV, and said, "This is based on what, this notion that Obama is a socialist, for example? Nobody can really give you a good answer." See Obama saying this here:
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Beck took up the challenge and presented his evidence. It is quite compelling and goes into depth. For instance, he gives the political-thought profile of Obama's parents and people who were major influences as he grew up and progressed in life.
Beck made a whole show about it on April 6, 2010. See it here. (There's a trick to see the whole show. Right click anywhere on the video and choose "Watch on YouTube." This is the first of 4 videos. After you see it, then take the title of the video and copy it to the YouTube search box directly above. Delete the very last number in the title (1) and replace it with 2. Then perform the search. YouTube will present the video as a search item and you can watch it by clicking on it. Then do this for 3 and 4.)
Now Beck keeps a page on his site for collecting facts: Is Obama a socialist?
Here is the bulk of that page as of today. I expect is will grow as people send in things, so be sure to go to the link if you want to see more than what I post below.
The response:Barack Obama Sr. (Dad)
*Communist who saw nothing wrong with government 'taxing 100%' so long as the people got benefits...
- Obama Sr. on socialism (Link)
- Overview of the paper (Link)
*Harvard educated economist
*Nairobi bureaucrat who advised government to 'redistribute' income through higher taxes
*Demonized corporations
*Abandoned Barack Obama Jr. when he was 2 years old to continue at Harvard (teaching son that ideology is more important than family)
Stanley Ann Dunham (Mom)
*Communist sympathizer
*Practiced 'critical theory' (aka Marxism)
*Influenced by Nietzsche and Freud
*Left Hawaii for Indonesia, Pakistan
*Attended a leftist church nicknamed the 'little red church' because of its Communist sympathies
*Left Barack Obama Jr.
Mentor
*Barack's grandparents introduced Barack Obama Jr. to poet and communist Frank Marshall Davis (Link)
*Davis becomes a mentor as young Barack struggled with abandonment by parents
College & Church
*Admittedly sought out 'Marxist' professors (
)*Admittedly attended 'socialist conferences' (Link)
*Began attending a Marxist church - led by pastor Jeremiah Wright (attended for 20 years) (Link)
Career
*Tragedy of the Warren Court: No redistributive change (
)*Voted for TARP (Link)
*$787 billion stimulus redistribution bill
*Healthcare bill admittedly about 'redistributing the wealth'
*Single Payer Healthcare proponent (Link)
*President Obama now also President of GM & Chrysler
*President Obama seizes control of insurance giant AIG
*President Obama is leading America to single payer healthcare
*President Obama seized control of Student Loan industry in order to 'cut out middle man'
*President Obama seizes control in massive land grabs
*Repeatedly vilifies 'the rich'
*Obama believes race problems can be solved through redistribution of wealth... he said "race is still an enormous factor in our society. But economics can overcome a lot of racial division."
*Trying to regulate the Internet via FCC
*Forces mortgage co's to cover people who aren't paying mortgage (Link)
*Extends unemployment benefits to 99 weeks (Link)
*Told Joe the plumber 'it's better when you spread things around' (
)Family, Friends, Advisors & Administration
*Wife Michelle Obama said "The truth is, in order to get things like universal health care and a revamped education system, then someone is going to have to give up a piece of their pie so that someone else can have more."
*Jim Wallis, Obama's spiritual advisor & forced redistribution of wealth advocate
*Van Jones, disgraced Green Jobs Czar & Communist
*Ron Bloom, Manufacturing Czar & anti-free market
*John Holdren, pro-redistribution of wealth
*Andy Stern, SEIU President & redistribution of wealth fan
*Anita Dunn, fan of Chairman Mao
*Mark Lloyd, FCC 'Diversity Czar'
*Carol Browner, socialist
*Robert Creamer, socialist
(You can watch Glenn debunk Obama's claim HERE) Help add to this list. Send us news and videos we may have missed, please include sources. Email us here...
If anyone needs facts for their arguments outside of the forum about Obama being a socialist, I believe this is a good resource.
Michael
Sorry, can't listen to Beck. Easy rebuttal to 99% of his claims (not just about Obama) Occam's Razor. He's a conspiracy theorist. He studied Freud and Nietzsche and practiced critical theory and those are part of an argument that he's a Socialist? Maybe Rand is too - she read Nietzsche. My whole grad research seminar is... Just don't care for the associative style of arguing.
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'As the work progressed [on the Lexicon], Miss Rand became increasingly enthusiastic about the project. One value of the book had special meaning to her: it eliminates any shred of excuse (if ever there had been one) for the continual gross misrepresentation of her philosophy at the hands of hostile commentators. As she quipped to me, "People will be able to look up BREAKFAST and see that I did not advocate eating babies for breakfast."' -- http://aynrandlexicon.com/book/preface.html
But she doesn't say anything about dinner. I can't help wondering about her preference for beef Stroganoff, what was it made of?
People! Beef Stoganoff is peeeoople!
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Go back and read Aristotle's N.Ethics.
You're missing a HUGE part.
To which I reply: go and read your:
We're looking at two different perspectives here: 1. From the mother's value hierarchy and 2. from a rational value hierarchy.
Then consider this: Isn't 2. what Rand is seeking to establish with her various ethical assertions, including the one under discussion?
Hence you can't introduce another "rational value hierarchy" ad hoc as a assumption in order to save Rand from absurd consequences of those assertions. That seems to be the upshot of your "two perspectives" argument AFAICS.
The situation is basically incoherent, which is unfortunately where you often get to with Rand when you drill down. (I think, for example, of her truly amazing garbling of Antisthenes' famous "horseness" remark in the ITOE, a passage that deserves a mini-essay in itself). I think a more detailed layout of the convolutions of this child-hat passage would be helpful, as there is plenty that people could get wrong, me included, and I will do that when I get a clear moment. Unless anyone else feels like doing it!
There is only one rational hierarchy in the example (the mother's is obviously not rational) so I'm not introducing anything or fixing anything. In this example there is only one rational choice, but don't confuse that with Rand being prescriptive. In most other situations there will be more than on rational choice. That's what makes this a good example - imagine if she used an example with numerous rational choices that weren't all as obvious as this one. OK I'm done - choose not to understand this and go back to spinning in circles.
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Is anyone even reading my posts? You just keep going around and around in circles. If I'm wrong - show me how. Any reason nobody is taking my argument on?
I read and agreed with your post #884. Are you happier now?
Haha - you're not the one I'm trying to convince! But thanks for acknowledging it.
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But someone has convinced him to read some books about Objectivism and now he feels guilty about his desires, so he feels he has the duty to be productive and independent and lead a life according to Objectivist principles.
Why couldn't he desire to do so without regarding it as a duty?
The whole problem lies in Rand's definition of sacrifice as giving up a higher value for a lower value, that inevitably leads to such absurd conclusions that are so tenaciously defended against better judgment. The essence of sacrifice is giving up a significant value to gain a greater value. The sacrifice in chess is a perfect example.In my opinion Rand's definition is less problematic than yours. Suppose I were to buy a luxury car for $60,000. The $60,000 is a significant value and the car the higher value. That is not a sacrifice in my book.
Is anyone even reading my posts? You just keep going around and around in circles. If I'm wrong - show me how. Any reason nobody is taking my argument on?
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Your P3 omits a very key phrase -- feeding the child only from a sense of duty. Your alleged analysis also ignores the first part of Rand's sentence -- the mother who feeds her child rather than buying a hat (but not purely from a sense of duty).
I don't believe Rand picked a great example to illustrate her meaning of sacrifice. Neither is your primary example of "sacrifice" giving up a piece in a game of chess.
Hi Merlin
You tell me about these supposedly important omissions, of which I am perfectly aware, but it would be helpful if you explained how these impact on the problem. I am of the view that they do not, but you can always put me straight.
In fact I get the sense that you agree with me that this example is basically flawed.
However where we no doubt differ is that you will probably view this as simply an infelicitous example. Whereas I think it is symptomatic of a fundamental befuddlement.
This example is good because there is only ONE OBVIOUS rational/moral choice. I can imagine other examples that would be less extreme, but in all probability there will be more than one rational choice which would make for a confusing example.
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Daniel, I address this in my last post. Yes it's immoral to feed the child instead of buying the hat - yes because it's a sacrifice, but also because the mother does not value her child more than the hat, which would be the rational value to hold.
Hi Panoptic,
The obvious rebuttal seems to be that this a petitio error?
regards
Daniel
Daniel,
Read the rest. We're looking at two different perspectives here: 1. From the mother's value hierarchy and 2. from a rational value hierarchy.
From perspective one buying the hat would appear to moral. From perspective two buying the hat is immoral. It follows that since the mother's value hierarchy isn't rational, buying the hat would be judged immoral and that would be the reality because it was judged rationally from a rational perspective and not the mother's irrational perspective. It is not a petitio error.
Only a person not thinking rationally would come to the conclusion that it was moral to buy the hat. You have to look at this as a rational person. This philosophy hinges on the idea of an objective rational mind - if it didn't then values and morals would be relative and not grounded in reality, which they cannot be in Rand's system.
Go back and read Aristotle's N.Ethics.
You're missing a HUGE part.
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Of course, it's going to be the rare case where a politician supports a program and then later on admits it isn't working.
The same could be said about the followers of a certain philosophy? (joking)
To be sure, I think no particular philosophical movement has a monopoly on true believers, if that's what you're hinting at.
Also, typically, reality-deniers following a philosophy don't also have political power. The former tend to be self-limitng -- they are easy for the rest of us to avoid and even provide some mild entertainment; the latter tend to visit the costs of their lies on the whole of society.
We need to get those realists visiting the cost of their lies on the whole of society out of office AND get in some of those funny harmless reality-deniers/ moral relativists! I can't even imagine what that would look like!
Mortals have already done a lot of the work - why not try to understand what they've done first and then try to move the discussion forward...?
Settling the debate on Altruism
in 3 - Ethics
Posted · Edited by Panoptic
George, I took the time to read the whole article and I enjoyed it very much. I can see why you are admired for you clear and concise style. I must say that I am on my way to agreeing with you, but I've hit a few snags. One of them came today when Peter posted:
Now, this explanation he posted may be wrong and, if you're so inclined, please tell me it is (a simple yes or no will do for me and I'll be on my way to do more research). If it is correct, which I currently have no reason to doubt based on Peter's use of what seem to be 'encyclopedic' references and my own understand of Rand, how can one objectively "judge" a person "according to the moral character they have actualized" and "grant" them "personal, individual value and appreciation, in proportion to their virtues?" It would seem that in order for her basic philosophy about the individual in society to be true, it would be necessary to work from a universal code of values. Doesn't her theory rest on the idea that rational people will treat each other morally? Which leads me to question: if indeed people are free and in another sense obligated to judge others according to their own perception of reality, what if a group of rational people reached different judgments about the same people or issues - how would that be resolved by her philosophy? If that situation is allowed for her system, how does it differ from more subjective philosophies? And finally, if rational people can reach different conclusions about reality, that is also to say rational people can hold different values (and by extension different conclusions about who and what is valuable or not valuable in society), how can she be so sure something like laissez faire government or free market capitalism would work as she conceives it?
Ian