dan2100

I'd say it put up a good defense, but was doomed -- as can be seen from ceding lots of territory to the Soviet Union. Also, I should've brought up the case of the Soviets warring with the Japanese. If my memories correct, in Manchuria before Germany attacked the Soviets, the Soviets basically wiped out the Japanese army. I believe up the Japanese army in China only ever lost to the Soviets. (I believe the same was true throughout mainland Asia, but I forget about Burma in all its detail.) I think you might be right about that. I believe the tide had turned for the Germans before any substantial US aid got through. I believe the Battles for Moscow, Leningrad, and Stalingrad demonstrated that the German war machine was not invincible. (I think the turning point in North Africa might also be seen as El Alamein. Of course, one might argue this all hindsight. A sufficiently well read, reasonable, and non-partisan person back then might not have seen them as the beginning of the end for Germany and its allies.) I also believe Stalin's biggest problem was Stalin. In this case, it wasn't that he had unseasoned troops in general, but that he had done his best to purged the military's leadership, so he had an officer corps that more loyal than seasoned or spirited. I don't disagree. In this case, Stalin faced a similar problem, but this was a battle between two maximal states that were busy weakening themselves through internal repression and paranoia. In a way, it seems like a race to the bottom. (I also think Hitler's racial policies helped to do in the Soviet campaign. Where he could've made local allies to fight against the Soviets, he went for racial extermination. Stalin was little better here -- when one thinks of the plight of the Volga Germans and other groups put into internal exile which resulted in mass death, but, again, it was a race to the bottom. A pattern that seems to repeat itself in many wars and conflicts.)

I think that, at minimum, a fist fight would break out. Your "Why would a competing police force side with one side or another?" doesn't make sense to me. Didn't Mary and Michael have some sort of loyalty contracts with their competing police forces? Wouldn't the police force chosen by and supported by Mary back her up? Your view of market anarchism, particularly of market anarchist security firms, seems to be one where people are for hire with unlimited obligations to others. In this example, if Mary wishes to hire a firm, she's going to be unlikely to find one that'll do anything to support her position regardless of both costs and justice. chances are, any such firm will want to know if she has a legitimate claim here -- and is not merely being obstinate. I'm not sure what you mean here or why this is relevant. I trust you're not trying to shift ground here. Would you restate your point? I'll try to respond to what I believe you mean... Under competitive supply of legal and security services, there would be some similarities to what happens internationally between the subjects of various governments. Imagine Michael hires ABC, Inc. as his security firm and Mary hires XYZ, Inc. as hers. This kind of maps on to Michael is a subject of of the UK and Mary a subject of the US. What happens in that case? A fist fight? Or does Mary get her way because the US government will go as far a nuclear war to defend her claim against Michael's competing claim? (If you believe that's what happens, then, as I believe you're a US subject, you should try to break contracts with British subjects and see what happens. Surely, this will be an easy way for you siphon off their wealth.) I would really appreciate it if you would avoid a phrase like "Objectivism's deeper principles". If you are referring to the non initiation of force principle then you need to bring in the rest of the principle which is that the only proper use of force is in retaliation against the use of force – so, yes it is compatible if you realize that the only way a competitive government can arise is by taking over (initiating force against) a geographical piece of the original geographical area and its inhabitants. An understanding of this fact is what led to Texas, for example, reserving the right to secede from the union at a later date. I'm not talking, first of all about "competing governments." That's actually Rand's term -- not mine and not one in use by most market anarchists. I'm talking about anyone or any firm provide security and legal services (ones that are currently and usually provided by nation states at this time). Now, this terminological difference aside, a government -- meaning a territorial monopolist on legal use of force in a given area -- can only prevent competitors from arising -- in other words, other people or firms providing the same service -- if it initiates force to prevent them from providing this service. Let me try with a hypothetical example of how this would play out. Imagine the Objectivist minimal state were to arise in a land called Minarchia. Minarchia would, I'm sure you'd agree, have a government. And since it's government is the Objectivist sort, it would not be able, by law, to initiate force. (It wouldn't even be able to tax, so its funding would have to be voluntary.) Imagine a group of people who believe Minarchia's government is inefficient and ineffective and, of course, that they could go better. They start providing things like security and dispute resolution services via a firm called Anarchy, Inc. Mind you, they are libertarians too -- and consistently apply the non-initiation of force principle. So, their security division can't coerce people and their dispute resolution division can't merely side with one party over the other arbitrarily. (People in Minarchia are, of course, mostly libertarian too, so it's not like either the government of Minarchia or Anarchy, Inc. won't fly if either starts initiating force. The people will likely rebell.) How would the government of Minarchia prevent Anarchy, Inc. from operating inside Minarchia? The only way for the government to do so -- presuming, for the moment, Anarchy, Inc. never violates non-initiation of force -- is to initiate force, no? (This leaves alone how any government arises in the first place. All past and existing governments have arisen by initiating force. This includes the US government and the governments of all existing nations.) Yes, on the grounds that the definition of a government is that is has exclusive jurisdiction in a geographical area. If competing legal entities were possible within that land, if the laws contradict each other they are no longer objective. One would have to prove two things here. One is that competing legal entities must needs lead to contradictory laws. The other is the having a government -- in this context, a legal monopoly on law -- always leads to non-contradictory laws. (Note my qualifications here. I'm not asking for either perfection of law under government and I don't expect that under anarchy. Instead, this is an argument about which works best toward that end.) Neither seems to follow and neither can be assumed a priori. Nor will merely asserting loudly that "only under the monopoly can objective law exist." What's required for objective laws is a bit different. For example, Rand states one requirement for objective law to be "men must know clearly, and in advance of taking an action, what the law forbids them to do (and why), what constitutes a crime and what penalty they will incur if they commit it." This doesn't require a monopoly in law -- and more than there is must a monopoly in science to know objective scientific laws. Again, only under the monopoly can objective law exist. This can be answered by simply pointing at the U.S. code of laws itself. The fact is that the U.S., England, France, et al have many objective laws on their books. You could ask – are all of the laws in the U.S. code objective? The notion that any law, objective or not, is accidental is unanswerable. Of course these days our government doesn't always know the contents of it's laws, but…… Were this the case, then even Rand would have had no quibble with existing laws. They would all be objective. However, even a cursory glance at either the laws in the US (the nation whose laws I'm most familiar with) and Rand's writings on this subject would show this isn't the case. Antitrust laws, pornography laws, and eminent domain laws seem to be glaring cases of non-objective laws. In many of these cases, one can't even tell what the outcome will be. Will a given business be considered a monopoly? This can't be known ahead of time and totally depends on judges' moods. Will a given photo, film, or book be considered pornographic? It depends on the whim of a jury. And so forth. I think, too, most here should get the idea whatever objective law is it doesn't mean merely that the legal authority gave an edict that must be obeyed -- such as a dictator decreeing the people belong to him and he may do as he pleases with them. Nor does it mean merely something is written down. Ayn Rand and Nathaniel Branden pointed out the loop holes in the constitution. Judge Narragansett began closing those loop holes with "the congress shall pass no laws abridging the freedom of production and trade…." Judge Narragansett is a fictional character. That aside, a problem is that the so called "loop holes" US Constitution from the start were key elements of it and no minor errors. Most Objectivist minarchists seem unaware of this and have demonstrated no deep knowledge of the Constitution. For instance, some of the chief powers enumerated in the Constitution are the power to tax and the power to regulate commerce. (Yes, Judge Narragansett, a fictional character wanted to get rid of the latter -- and presumably the former. My point here is, however, that these were not minor features or tiny flaws in the Constitution. They were key features and they were ones that the Framers dearly wanted in there. It's not like many wanted the clause on Ex Post Facto laws in there, but a tiny minority held up the proceedings until they were able to slip in the power to tax and regulate commerce. Nor is it the case that everyone at the Convention was tired and let those (and many others) slip by. In fact, one chief motivator for the power to tax was from politically connected creditors who owned US debt. They wanted to be paid off and taxation was one way to get paid off: the government would levy taxes and pay off these creditors. Also, Hamilton had in mind all manner of schemes to grow the government and for big public works projects. None of this would come to pass, I'm sure he knew, if the federal government had no power to tax. And since he and some of his fellow Federalists were basically mercantilist in terms of political economics, they wanted control over commerce.) Which is not exactly true. The state governments still existed and still had their powers. (I'm not arguing for them or for the Articles, though, in my view, the Articles were better because the national government was weak with them -- which is a good thing. And all the state governments, if my memory's correct, did have limiting constitutions with either bills or rights or similar limitations. Also, since any state considered as a unit was much more dependent on national and international trade -- there were much tighter limits on bad policies sticking in place. This is a longer discussion, but the basic idea is the smaller the polity, the quicker bad policies come to fruition, so the quicker they are changed. All else being equal, a larger state -- i.e., one with a larger economy, more resources, more people, etc. -- can get away with much more than a smaller state -- i.e., one with a smaller economy, etc. For instance, it'd be fairly easy, though not painless or costless, for the US today, a continental nation, to completely shut off trade with the outside world. Yes, it'd hurt, but not as much as if Vermont tried the same. And even more harmful would it be if my former home of Morrisville, Vermont cut off trade with the outside world. In the case of Vermont over the US, the inhabitants would quickly notice the policy causing trouble. In the case of the town of Morrisville cutting off trade, the process would be much faster -- as soon as the town ran out of petrol and food -- which would likely be at most a few days for most people living there.) There was a bit more to it than that. In ratifying, some states made specific statements about retaining other rights and privileges. It was probably more of a smokescreen to make more people go along with the Constitution than actually would've otherwise. As for the outcome, you're mistaking, I believe, two different processes, one of economic integration, which requires no government input (save maybe staying out of the way, but such integration can even happen when governments interfere; smuggling is an example of this), and political integration, which, obviously, requires government involvement. It also ignores two other factors. One is that British North America was almost from the start an economic powerhouse (and this probably had more to do with there being little or no government there). The other is that O.K. You got me here. I don't know what "mainstream Objectivist minarchism" is. Minarchism is the kind of government Rand advocated. I use the qualifications "mainstream Objectivist" to distinguish this both from other advocates of minarchism who are not Objectivist -- e.g., Robert Nozick and John Hospers -- and from Objectivists who disagree with minarchism -- some of who are anarchists, but some who are neither minarchist nor anarchist. While they are not synonymous, Objectivism is politically libertarian -- specifically, libertarian minarchism. I.e., Objectivism's core political principle is non-initiation of force and this is what defines libertarianism. I'm not sure what you mean by this. My view is if the theory applies to reality -- i.e., the principles work -- then one should be able to find historical support. (This doesn't mean proof per se. I do agree with much of von Mises on this. But once we interpret history with the proper theoretical outlook, I believe the case for constitutional limits is very weak if not nonexistent.) The examples of constitutional limits being ignored started in the late 1700s -- not the early 1990s -- and the people doing this were generally classed as Federalists -- not Progressives. My point in bringing up these examples was to show that the track record of constitutional limits working should any serious person skeptical. Again, the ink was barely dry before the violations began! I don't know how else I can put this to get the point across. Also, between the Federalist Era and the Progressives lies much abuse of federal power with perhaps the most glaring example being the U.S. Civil War. It seems like you're ignoring most of the history here and focusing merely on the Progressives -- as if all was well in the polity until circa 1900. Where are the constitutional success stories? Do you think that individuals enjoyed more political and economic liberty under the Articles of Confederation than they do under the U.S. Constitution? That seems to be the case. Certainly, I see neither as libertarian as such, but there probably would've been more ability from an individual's perspective to rein in state government than federal government. It's still a longshot, but you'd have likely had more of a chance of influencing a state governor or legislator than a President or Congressman. Also, it'd be easier, all else being equal to move from one state to another than to move out of the US all together. And add to this, once the federal government was in place, it started to tax. This wasn't like you had to pay only federal taxes and could ignore state taxes. You now had to pay both. And, finally, regarding commerce, the federal government did charge duties. The federal government was no friend of free trade -- and some of the Framers, especially Hamilton, were definitely foes of free trade. This eventually led to the 1828 Tariff of Abominations. Again, it's strange that you seem unaware of things like this. Since you agree with the idea of government -- and, unless you're for world government -- what exactly is wrong with the states acting as national governments and doing all these things? If it's wrong for them to do this -- and, they weren't enforcing their laws on others; Virginians weren't enforcing Virginia law on Rhode Islanders -- why is right for a government to do this over them? Each state, too, had a constitution, so what's the problem here? Also, a constitution doesn't limit a government -- as can be seen by looking at, especially, US history. Were that the case, then the US Constitution itself wouldn't have arisen when and how it did. Instead, people would've altered the Articles via its constitutional limits. Why didn't those limits work? Because constitutional limits -- whether in the form of the Articles or the U.S. Constitution, or whatever Rand might have wanted -- can easily be set aside by those in power. Constitutions, as someone once quipped, don't have fangs and claws that bite and scratch those ignoring or abusing the paper limits. I'm not sure what this means. American Indians were, for the most part, given the shaft, especially under the Constitution. Their subjugation, forced migration, and, in too many cases, outright extermination (which seemed to be the federal policy after the Civil War) should give pause to anyone believing constitutions will hold back people from doing harm to others. Some have even argued that the North American Indians had it best when the French, British, and Spanish Empires were balanced against each other and that many tribes and nations made the mistake of side with the British during the French and Indian War. This war ended with France being evicted as a power from the Ohio country and Canada, leaving the American Indians to deal with the British North American colonies alone. (The British Crown actually seemed to want to treat the American Indians fairly -- or, at least, uphold their treaty agreements with them. The Colonists, however, mostly seemed to want the land and saw, rightfully, that the British government was very far away. _The War That Made America: A Short History of the French and Indian War_ by Fred Anderson covers some of this and I hope you and others here will read it. It might give you a better historical perspective here.) I'm not contrasting them and this is a strange claim. Rand's politics are and most Objectivists who follow here with regard to her views on this are minarchist. It's not a matter of mixing things up. The term minarchist, too, is fairly neutral. (I know many Objectivists want to pretend their political views are radically different from everyone else's and somehow have no precedence, but they're basically libertarian minarchists.) But let's leave this aside. After all, one can ignore the labels and even how close Objectivist views are here to those of other libertarians. The problem still remains. Rand's justification for government clashes both with the non-initiation of force principle and her support of constitutionally limited government has almost no historical support. That Rand and other Objectivist minarchists have "not produced a fully detailed system of political philosophy" does not excuse these flaws. And any "principled framework" that bakes in a fundamental contradiction and ignores history is unlikely to be a fruitful ground for further development.

That's what I said. But as for the Soviet Union attacking Germany? This was, if my memory's correct, in a recent biography of Stalin. Also, the Soviet Union did take a chunk of Poland, completely absorbed the Baltic states, and invaded Finland. Hah hah! Finland lost both the Winter War in 1939. Yes, Finland put up a stern defense and it didn't go smoothly for the Soviets, but, in the peace treaty, Finland ceded about a tenth of its territory. I suppose in your book this is kicking someone's ass, but most would see this as being beaten. Maybe you're thinking of the Continuation War, but even this Finland eventually lost. And this was less a case of Finland kicking the Soviet's ass then of Finland bandwagoning with the then winning side Germany. (And Germany might have almost won against the Soviets, but, ultimately, it was the Soviet Union that utterly crushed Germany, don't you think?)

Were I you, I would certainly not have brought up the "True Scotsman" argument here since it it could give your debate opponent the idea to start an interesting discussion about "True Objectivist". So thanks for the inspiration, Dan! I can't stop you from doing so, but I wonder if you understand what the problem with the True Scotsman argument is. Perhaps you should research it before deploying it here. Then again, it will be far more fun if you don't, so please proceed.

Maybe they meant the other side.

I think my review, written in the 1970s, was published in "Books for Libertarians." This newsletter-style publication, edited by Roy Childs, later became "Libertarian Review." I don't think issues have ever been posted online. That's too bad, because they contained many interesting reviews by Roy and others. Ghs I imagine there are many such newsletters lost to the ages now. Kind of sad in a way.

What do you think will happen next? Why would a competing police force side with one side or another? What happens today in the world of both private security firms and of no world government? In the latter case, think about Mary being the subject of nation state X and Michael being the subject of nation state Y. Do they actually go to war all the time when such a conflict arises? If you agree that they don't, then why wouldn't this same logic apply in the case where there are competing security firms and legal authorities? A little context here is probably necessary. That there would be a market or choice in security and legal firms does not mean that conflicts are costless -- both for people hiring such firms or for the firms themselves. On the latter, no doubt, such firms aren't going to, in most cases, want to lose money, reputation, and lives over frivilous or sociopathic clients. They also face not only competition -- in the sense that their investors and other clients can switch to other firms -- but the problem of other firms seeing them as predatory and, thereby, going against them. In this last case, the problem for any such firm is maintaining legal credibility and legitimacy. If they lose this, they face higher costs enforcing their rulings or decisions as well as possible retaliation from other individuals and other firms. In this instance, any firm siding with Mary that does so arbitrarily -- e.g., merely because Mary doesn't like the ruling of Michael's firm -- has to expect the high cost of conflicts. There's a Jefferson quote about men who fear the government and governments that fear their citizens. I believe the quote you're thinking of is: "When the people fear their government, there is tyranny; when the government fears the people, there is liberty." The problem for the advocate of minarchism here is how to insure that the government fears the people -- and how to insure that this does indeed lead to liberty (and to, say, the government seeking ways to overcome this fear -- maybe through scapegoats, a national emergency, etc.). Merely quoting Jefferson here won't solve this problem. This is, of course, Rand's view. However, one has to ask a few questions here: 1. Is this truly compatible with Objectivism's deeper principles? (I maintain it is not. A deeper principle here is that force can't be initiated. If this is so, then any government can do nothing to prevent competitors from arising. Or, as soon as it does, it must initiate force.) 2. Is objective law only possible under a legal monopoly? 3. Is objective law likely under a legal monopoly? (Theory and history here seem to show objective law is at best an accident under government -- and often the objective parts of the law are borrowings from earlier competitive law or have nothing essentially to do with government.) Also, there is the view that somehow the earlier US government was perfect or close to it. But, in truth, the Constitution itself already represented a huge growth in governmental power and whatever limits it set on government power -- the various checks and balances in the document -- were quickly set aside or ignored. Setting aside and ignoring the explicit limits, again, did not happen first in, say, the 1980s or the 1930s, but in the 1790s!!! I'd have a far more sympathetic view of mainstream Objectivist minarchism and of minarchism in general were the history different. Had, for instance, all the constitutional limits proved to last for many generations or maybe a century, I'd probably take the view, "Well, all good things must end, but several generations sounds like something we can work with." But the fact is the limits started being ignored as soon as the Constitution was put in place. Further, the Constitution itself was really a radical shift from the far more libertarian Articles of Confederation -- something completely ignored by most minarchists, including Objectivist minarchists. I think a familiarity with the history of the time would reveal factions in the Founders and also that there were other motives involved in dumping the Articles and writing a radically different constitution -- one with a much more powerful central government. George and I have both pointed this out, but so far those arguing for minarchism here appear to be ignoring this. No, as you might guess, I don't feel this responds "well enough." One must distinguish between the promise or belief about something and the reality. The promise of the Objectivist minarchist (and of minarchists in general) cannot, in my view, meet the demands of reality. It doesn't fit actual history -- which is one of constitutional limits being eroded, amended, or just outright ignored. This should come as no surprise: when the government intreprets its own limits -- as is the case with the US Constitution -- it's bound to argue in favor of itself. (Also, as George pointed out, with the US Constitution, there were no real material differences that would lead to a balance of power -- nothing like Britain's class system that led to a longstanding rivalry between Commons, Lords, and Crown. Sectional interests might have served this purpose, but these were not the lines along which the Constitution divided power. Also, Framers like Alexander Hamilton were mainly interested in increasing central power and authority -- not checking it.) As for the broader issue of objective law, one could conceptually divide between discovering and enforcing objective law. I hope you'd agree that objective law is not something that can only be discovered by government. People in government possess no special wisdom, higher intellectual abilities, or other virtues that set them apart in this regard. In other words, any reasonable person with enough effort and intelligence can discover objective law. There is no need, in other words, for a special authority to discover objective law. As for enforcement, the same seems to apply, though the problem here is avoiding or minimizing contradictory applications or interpretations. Again, government possesses no special insight here. At best, a government might insure -- though, often in the real world, it does not -- that one interpretation or application of law prevails. But this is not because government promulgates, observes, or discovers anything better with regard to law over other individuals or groups. It's merely because it has the force to compell obedience over all others. And therein lies the rub. Since government is the big player, in terms of force, it need not abide by objective law or objective rules. Anytime it comes into conflict with objective laws, it can resort to force to get its way. (Granted, there is a limit on this -- and that limit is either that its subjects will rebell and overthrow it or an external power will crush it -- but that limit is so loose as to allow any real world government to routinely trample objective law without much fear of reprisal.)

Dan, I will try to go real slow. This is GENERALLY the case, not ALWAYS the case. But it happens often enough that it is wise to use it when making provisions against the abuse of power. I think in the context of government, one can't rely on it for the reasons stated earlier and by Madison: those inside the government will expand their power outward rather than bicker with each other. No, these cases are rare. Were the really effectual, then the tide of laws, regulations, orders, and decrees would be much more smaller. Instead, there's a virtual tsunami of encroachments on liberty and a few skirmishes between various factions or individuals in power. (And such factional or individual strife happens in all forms of government and is little better than relying on a gang of bandits to fight amongst themselves rather than prey on the victims. Again, the image of sheep depending on squabbles between a wolf pack's members for defense comes to mind.) I believe you're not seeing how this links up with anarchism: a good check and balance on this tendency to expand power is not to centralize it in the first place. Perhaps another analogy might prove helpful. This comes from von Mises's Liberalism, I believe. If schools are publicly funded and mandatory, then schooling gets politicized as an organized few can gain control over the whole school system to dictate curricula and other aspects of schooling. At this point, one might advocate checks and balances on the power of the school system of the sort any modern liberal supporter of public schooling would advocate. These are for the most ineffectual: they change little or nothing and merely pay off insiders for reshuffling a few details. But what about removing schooling from public control and making them non-mandatory? This sets up a much more effective balance as the consumers of schools -- being many -- would have much more effective control, especially since they could leave the school -- either for another school or all together. I'm not sure what you're getting at here. The problem is not that anarchism has no means of dealing with this aspect of human nature -- just that it offers a different means, one outside the ambit of government. To use your analogy, one might think of this as umbrellas that actually work -- that are easy to use, easy to store, sturdy, and relatively inexpensive -- versus umbrellas that promise to work but only work if at all under very special conditions -- and that are very hard to use (only a few people have access or can understand the lengthy manual), difficult to store, flimsy, and very expensive. (Now, granted, you and I mgiht disagree over what's a good umbrella here and what's a bad one, but I'm not arguing for standing out in the rain until one is soaked.)

Good Lord! What do you think I have been saying all this time? You are now saying what I have been saying. Michael As you might expect, this is not how I see your view. Or, at least, it seems to me you think that effective and stable rivalry can happen within a government. I maintain this is not so. Once you have a government, then it will, as Madison pointed out, direct expansion of its power outward -- into those outside the government. In other words, rivalry within a government is ineffectual and unstable. Ineffectual because it really doesn't do much. Unstable because those within government can easily combine their power. Anyone looking at history, including the early history of the US would see this: the federal government quickly became nonrivalrous between its branches -- the Federalist Era was one where one party basically controlled all three branches and basically got its way. So much for that particular check and balance. (One can argue for all sorts of fancy new checks and balances inside the government or even offer to revive old ones that have been set aside (having Sentors in the US appointed by State legislatures instead of elected comes to mind), I believe this leaves the basic problem in place: the guardians are guarding themselves or the checks and balances are internal to the government and enforced by it so they'll quickly be reinterpreted or ignored.)

I'm not sure where you're going with this. Still not sure where you're going with this. Wouldn't it depend on the concept? Actually, it seemed to me that earlier you were making such a claim -- that all people behaved basically the same, particularly with your claim that "One person with a sliver of power does not want to give it up." I find it strange you're not directly quoting anything I wrote here. You might quote what I actually wrote and point out where you think I went awry. The conclusion does not follow. Don't you see that? Do you see that an anarchist can accept claims about human nature -- specifically, that some people will jealously guard their power, others will not; some people will seek power over others, others will not mind being overpowered by others, and still others will might it -- but that from this does not follow the conclusion you believe -- specifically, government. Let me try another path here. You've used "bullies" to bolster your case. It seems to me your logic is something like: 1. Bullies exist 2. For the rest us -- non-bullies, presumably -- we need a means of dealing with bullies 3. Government is the means or the best means to deal with bullies (at least, to be fair, certain categories of bullies) Conclusion: Ergo, we need government to deal with bullies For anarchists, the flaw in this argument is not steps 1 or 2. They agree that bullies exist and that non-bullies need a means of dealing with bullies and bullying. The flaw is in step 3 and, if step 3 is wrong, then the conclusion does not follow. Let me try yet another path here using your exact wording above: 1. "we have prewired tendencies in our brains or you do not" 2. "those prewired tendencies are part of human nature" Conclusion: "government should emanate from human nature" Do you see how the conclusion doesn't follow here? Now, of course, to be charitable, you could argue that there are missing parts here and this is a distillation of your view. But what are the missing parts? That some humans will bully others? If that's one, then, again, it doesn't seem to me (and to other anarchists) that government follows as a means of dealing with bullying. Let me try yet another argument: 1. Incompetent people exist 2. For the rest us -- competent people, presumably -- we need a means of dealing with incompetent people 3. Government is the means or the best means to deal with incompetent people Conclusion: Ergo, we need government to deal with incompetent people Now let's plug one type of incompetent person into the argument -- to concretize it, as Rand might say. There is a tailor in town who seems to do a lousy job at tailoring clothes. Should a government be setup to compell this tailor to a certain minimal standard of tailoring competence -- or, failing that, close down his shop? Let put this into a similar scheme as above: 1. "philosophy is for humans." 2. "Thus ethics and politics are related to humans and derive from human thought and activity." Conclusion: "Human nature is more basic than government, so government should be based on human nature, not human nature be squashed in to fit government (or lack thereof)." I don't think this leads to the conclusion in the way you want. A serious investigation here would not assume that anarchism is an attempt to squash human nature into the lack of government. In fact, my argument is and has been -- and I'm hardly original in this -- that human nature is best compatible with anarchism: that anarchism fits human nature and not that human nature must be altered to fit anarchism. In fact, I also argue that government doesn't fit it at all. This is because, in the context of our discussion here, it's human nature to find ways around constitutional obstacles; this is, I believe, political entrepreneurship. In other words, certain institutional arrangements, particularly setting up a centralized legal authority -- i.e., a state -- is a bad idea among humans -- in much the same way as it's bad to give matches to most preschoolers. What is the social theory here you believe ignores this "tendency to enjoy power to the point of abuse if it is obtained"? Why would anyone, believing human nature has such a tendency, want to monopolize power in a single institution -- namely, a government? Wouldn't this only be tempting fate? Why would one expect such people not to become part of the government and work to undo any limits on their power? I don't disagree about the need for checks and balances on power, but my point has been as long as these are internal to government, they're not really going to be meaningful. The best check on power is not get more people involved in the same power center or to have said power center write up a rule book it's supposedly going to play by and then have it enforce its own rules. The best check power is actually a rival power. Jefferson and Madison understood this and looked to the several states to check federal power. (In my mind, even this was overly optimistic and it utterly failed as the federal government grew much more powerful than any particular state.) They also saw, as George pointed out, that rebellion is the ultimate check on govenment power, but, as you should know, rebellion is highly costly and so very unlikely except in extreme cases. (This is capture eloquently by the Declaration: people will put up with lots of abuse before even thinking about overthrowing their government.) One might be very charitable here and admit a spectrum of checks and balances -- ranging from the very ineffectual to the very effectual. The very ineffectual would be things along the lines of having a right to appeal in an administrative court. The very effectual are things like your ability to exit many relationships, including, say, your contract with a home security firm. I believe the sort of checks and balances in the Constitution -- the ones you favor -- are far over toward the ineffectual side. I believe history supports me here -- and I gave the case of the First Bank of US as key examples of the federal government overstepping its bounds almost before the ink was dry on the Constitution. Michael Do you agree that at least some of these fugutives are violent criminals? If so, then haven't you admitted that private bounty hunters do go after violent criminals? What blocks you here from believing the same thing might happen in a society without government?

Regarding private bounty hunters, I thought the case was that they do go after violent criminals. (I haven't seen the TV show, so I don't get the reference.) Aren't there or weren't also rewards offered for apprehending criminals, including violent ones? Aren't or weren't such rewards offered to private individuals? Why would this not work in an anarchist society? Also, why would legal authorities in an anarchist society be unable to apprehend criminals? What's magical about a monopoly in legal authority that would make it succeed here? Why would private defense agencies be unable to stop "external enemies"? One would think, too, with the availability of certain weapons today this would be much easier. Imagine that America were libertarian from the US government and all the state and local governments to boot. It'd be a stateless society. Now imagine various people living in, say, Florida were worried about the Cuban military invading. Wouldn't it be relatively easy for said people to buy defense services to protect against this or even self-help (as in do their own defense work)? I can easily imagine them acquiring many of the same weapons the US Navy now uses to do much the same role -- though they'd be far less likely to invest in all kinds of projects just to create jobs in the defense industry. Instead, they'd more likely tailor their defense spending to what they -- not some folks up in Washington D.C. who are being wined and dined by Boeing -- need. (Chances are, some coastal guns and maybe a nuke or two would do the trick. This doesn't require billions and a huge standing military.)

Dan, I will get to the rest later (when I get time to read it all), but on stopping at this point to answer your question, yes you did get the theory wrong. You got your conceptual hierarchy backwards. The itch for power is part of human nature, not human nature is part of the itch for power. Where did I write that "human nature is part of the itch for power"? I don't recall that at all. This might be a case of your misinterpreting what I wrote, don't you think? I agree. And I never said this was central. You, however, did make a fairly broad claim about how people would hold on to their power and not let others encroach on it: "One person with a sliver of power does not want to give it up." from http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8823&st=20&p=101369entry101369 I'm not so stupid as not to see that, but you do understand how this relates to your view of human nature and people guarding their own power? You'd have to rely on the special condition where many or most or perhaps all people were jealously guarding their power. But were that the case, then you wouldn't need a constitution either: people would naturally check each other from any usurpation -- save in cases where someone or some group clearly had an overwhelming advantage. (And, in this last case, under all circumstances, government or no, the bully or bullies is going to win.) But in the real world, people vary much in how they react to encroachments on their power. And it is in that real world we live and where constitutional checks do not actually work -- save in rare cases. Your refrain of the "Founding Fathers" misses that there were several different views amongst them. Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, Adams, etc. all had very different opinions on these issues. They didn't all think exactly alike. In this specific discussion, Jefferson and eventually Madison came to view the federal government checking and balancing itself as unworkable. And, if my reading of them is correct, they saw the states as a check and balance on federal power -- and, ultimately, as both George and I pointed out, rebellion as the limit on government power. Note here, the issue is not whether power needs to be checked and balanced, but how this is done. Is it done by people inside the federal government, then it's weak and ineffectual as can be seen from even a cursory glance at history. Again, the history of the federal government is a history of the almost unchecked growth of power. People and the States resisted this for a time, but after the so called Civil War seems to have settled that issue and State power is no longer a check on federal power. (Or, at best, it's a very weak check on it. Gone are the days of the Hartford Convention or South Carolina's nullification of the Tarriff of Abominations.)

This is a complicated problem, obviously, but I can tell you what I wouldn't do. I wouldn't encourage these bullies to unionize and gain public respectability by calling themselves a "government." That's what we have now. As a result, bullies conceal their thuggery behind the mask of law, and this makes it much easier for them to gain the sanction of their victims. So, yes, we will always have bullies, and many flock to government like moths to a flame. I suggest that we not legitimize their rights-violating activities by giving them a safe haven where they can posture as "public servants." A bully by any other name is still a bully, and libertarians should not hesitate to identify this fact of reality. This is the essence of my proposal. Ghs I wonder if the problem here is that Michael believes that anarchists are taking the position that either bullies don't exist or that they will somehow not exist in an anarchist society. If that's the case, let me assure him that all anarchists I know both believe bullies exist and that they will exist in an anarchist society. The difference is on what to do about them. Also, I would think the standard for legitimacy include both express consent and not violating rights. No existing government, especially not the current US government, and no former government, including even the US government circa 1789, has met either standard. (And this is not a beauty contest here: governments do not become more legitimate because they have slightly more people's consent, violate fewer people's rights, or violate few rights overall. This doesn't mean it might not be preferable to live under one illegitimate government rather than another. But this is along the lines of preferring to, say, being beaten over being beaten and have one's wallet stolen. Neither is legitimate, yet one might prefer the former over the latter.)

Regarding antitrust laws, I don't see businesses as innocent, ignorant victims here. They often lobby and even champion for their use.

These are the same book. The former is the title used by the American publisher. I would also recommend another book by Flew, Thinking About Social Thinking. I've heard of that one too -- and meant to read it years ago, but never got around to it. I'd planned to read more of his work on Hume, but never got around to it. I once wrote a review of Flew's Introduction . I mentioned that it has the only humorous index entries that I had ever seen, viz., "Jesus bar Joseph" and "Mary, mother of Jesus bar Joseph." Ghs Is your review available online? I actually remembered liking that book because of the approach: not strictly placing all the thinkers from one age with only the near contemporaries, but, if my memory's correct, looking at them from a problem or issues centered view.

Dan, This may be true for some people, but I assure you that for others who recognize the need for a government, this is not the case. You cannot eliminate bullying from human nature. So you put checks and balances on it. That's the principle and the reason for it. Not power-lust (as you imply). Once we can figure out how to get rid of bullying, then I see no reason to continue with government. Until then, I want bullies with limitations on their possibilities of action. Real limitations, not pipedreams. The will to bully is the root of power-lust. Michael Michael, I like so much of your thinking that I hate to come in on this thread with a nit pick, but....I have learned from Objectivism that government is always necessary for three reasons: The need to assign the right to use force against external enemies,the need to use it in deployment of a police force and the need for courts to settle disputes between rational men. I would recommend that you refresh yourself on the Government oriented lectures in "The Vision of Ayn Rand" by NB as a reminder of why government is required if men are to live without fear of other men. The view you offer seems to suppose people in government are somehow not to be feared -- at least, not as much as other people. Don't you think history shows us that men or women in government are to be more feared than other men and women? Didn't even Rand admit that more evils were done by government than all the private criminals in history? Also, I don't think anyone arguing the anarchist position -- certainly not me -- is offering that people have no need of defense against external enemies or criminals or that have no need to settle disputes peacefully amongst themselves. The argument is more about whether government is the only or best way of doing these things -- and the anarchist would here, as expected, believe government is neither the only nor the best way of doing these things.

Were I her, I'd try a variety of the True Scotsman argument here. Ah, yes. I believe Antony Flew called it the No True Scotsman Move -- which in our case may become the No True Christian Move. Did I quote some Catholics who favored toleration? Reply: No true Catholic would defend toleration. I'm sure we are all familiar with the No True O'ist Move. I take it you have read Flew's Thinking About Thinking (originally titled Thinking Straight). That's a terrific little book. Ghs I haven't read his Thinking About Thinking or Thinking Straight. I did read his An Introduction to Western Philosophy when I was in college and often consult his A Dictionary of Philosophy. And I have a few of his others books on my shelves, but not the two you mention. Elsewhere in this forum I mentioned scriptural and ideological determinism. I reckon I should've called the latter doctrinal determinism. This is the view that if you know someone's doctrine, you can predict the positions she or he will hold. (I make no claims to originality on this view. I believe I first read the former term in Wright's The Evolution of God, though the idea seems to have been around for a long time and even seems to pervade the culture with things like breaking stereotypes -- not necessarily ethnical or racial ones, but also religious and ideological ones.) I think this is what we're seeing here: people think they know the doctrine of those they criticize -- here, Catholic thinkers and leaders through the ages -- and already "know" they couldn't possibly support toleration. And yet it moves!

George, thanks. Agreed and this is close to Madison's famous quote, no? I don't have the exact quote handy, but your words seems very close. This is a good point and one I wasn't aware of or don't recall. (I confess to not be as much of a scholar of the Antifederalists as I should be. And I don't mean attaining your level of familiarity here.) This would seem to speak to the problem of adopting checks and balances that work in one context to another. I believe Hoppe's point -- about how class divisions might tend to heighten awareness of and antagonism against state power expanding -- applies to this case. And, again, this fits with the Antifederalists seeing the several States as a check on federal power -- as opposed to seeing federal power limiting itself. (This -- the federal government's branches checking each other and not expanding because of this -- even makes less sense when all the federal leadership is in one capitol very far away from everyone else -- as in America after Washington D.C. was finished. If they all work and for the most part live in the same town, and likely dine and party with each other, they're going to see each other as less of problem than everyone else in the country -- not to mention that this made for conspiring together so much easier. Isn't there even a saying today that people start out basically good then go to Washington and, after a few years there, become part of the problem?) No bother to me. Some points bear repeating.

NIOF is a corollary of self-ownership. Either will do. No disagreement from me on this. Kinda, but not quite. There are also problems of interpretation -- theoretical problems that precede specific applications. For example, if you are a self-owner, does this mean you can sell yourself into slavery? This problem, which played a major role in debates over social contract theory and which was addressed by differentiating between alienable and inalienable rights, is more an issue of interpretation than application. I was initially going to write both, but, again, no disagreement here. There is another issue here, namely, the priority that one gives to the principle of self-ownership (or the NIOF principle, if you prefer). This issue arose in debates between abolitionists and gradualists in antebellum America. Both groups appealed to self-ownership in their arguments against slavery. Gradualists, however, argued that the immediate abolition of slavery would cause various economic and social problems, so slavery should be phased out over time. Abolitionists, in contrast, argued that self-ownership is the fundamental issue. As William Lloyd Garrison put it, "the right of the slave to himself [is] paramount to every other claim." (My emphasis.) You've mentioned this before, but wouldn't agree that the priority means another principle is deciding the issue -- namely, a non-libertarian one? If someone were to say, "I agree totally with libertarianism, including on legalizing drugs, but, at this time, we can't legalize because this would cause various economic and social problems," then that person is saying the core libertarian principle must be set aside -- i.e., that it's okay to violate self-ownership (or initiate force) and that her or his true core principle, in this context, is something other than self-ownership (or NIOF)? I wouldn't call Beck a libertarian, but I would say that he is sympathetic to libertarian principles in a way that Limbaugh and Palin are not. It is scarcely accidental that he has so many libertarian guests on his programs. I would be amazed if either Limbaugh or Palin converted to libertarianism, but I wouldn't be surprised if Beck did. There is a different quality or "feel" (for lack of better words) to Beck's approach; it definitely exhibits libertarian tendencies. I can't cite chapter and verse to prove this assertion, but I think those who listen to Beck regularly will know what I mean. I also think this is why some libertarians like Beck. I like Beck -- sometimes more, sometimes less -- and I am not predisposed to like conservatives. Far from it; conservative buffoons like Sean Hannity drive me up a wall. Despite his theatrical manner and religiosity, Beck, whatever he may be ideologically, is no buffoon. Ghs Allowing that your view here is correct, do you believe this is because libertarianism itself has become ever more something to be reckoned with? Rush Limbaugh seems to come from an earlier time -- Glenn Beck is thirteen years his junior -- when libertarian influence was less. Do you think that had some impact? (This doesn't explain Palin, who seems to be just a mainstream conservative statist who will use libertarian rhetoric when it'll score points, but is otherwise anti-libertarian.) Or is it, perhaps, Beck simply came to his ideas from a different path than Rush and this doesn't necessarily add up to some generational difference? (Rush and Hannity also seem much more partisan -- much more Republican cheer leaders than independent thinkers.)

I agree that there are degrees of libertarianism; for example, I would describe Ron Paul as a conservative libertarian, in contrast to radical libertarians. But these graduations result from different interpretations and applications of some shared fundamental principles, most notably self-ownership. Many modern liberals are good on civil liberties, but I wouldn't call them libertarian to a degree. Rather, I would call them liberals who happen to agree with libertarians on certain policies. The same is true of conservatives, such as Limbaugh and Palin, who happen to agree with libertarians on some issues. So how can we tell in particular cases? Well, I think drug legalization is our best litmus test. Regardless of how much a person claims to believe in freedom, if he doesn't defend the fundamental right of the individual to ingest whatever substance he likes, then he doesn't uphold the right of self-ownership. The right to control what you put into your own body is absolutely fundamental to libertarianism. One reason I separated Beck from the conservative crowd is because of his statements about drug legalization. Although he doesn't favor legalization, he clearly understands the argument from self-ownership, and I have heard him say numerous times that he is sympathetic to it but can't quite convince himself to embrace it. I wouldn't be surprised if Beck eventually changes his mind on this subject, as William Buckley did. All this is a far cry from the positions taken by Palin and Limbaugh, both of whom are dedicated drug warriors. I've even heard Limbaugh go ballistic over medical marijuana initiatives. These are not people who accept the right of self-ownership; they are not libertarians, even to a degree. They work from different premises altogether. Ghs I believe being a libertarian means accepting the libertarian core principle -- noninitiation of coercion. The problem is deciding how exactly this applies in different situations. I think the distinction should be made between people who operate from mixing or not really holding this core principle and merely applying it in a different manner. The former is usually what happens when there are people who hold certain libertarian positions, but really are not libertarians. This might even apply to George's litmus test. If my memory serves me, Buckley was mainly if not solely againt drug prohibition not because he believed in self-ownership, but because he felt the policy was too costly and didn't work. This means, to me, that were drug prohibition cheaper -- in his terms -- or more successful, he'd have stayed for it. I might be wrong about this particular case as I'm relying on what I read about his position around a decade or so ago. The latter are just people who are likely misapplying the principle -- as in, I believe, minarchists (who don't see the contradiction inherent in a monopoly in legal authority: it necessarily must involve initiation of force) and, say, people who are tout court against unions (as unions are not necessarily coercive, so being against them is initiating force -- in this case, to prevent freedom of assocation of workers and freedom to contract as they see fit). But this really seems like I'm saying being a libertarian is like being pregnant. In a sense, I think it is. Once one holds the core principle, if one is consistent, one is bound to weed out unlibertarian positions one holds. (One must, of course, beware of people who merely pretend to hold the core principle. This might be something of the case with Alan Greenspan -- though less in terms of his being a libertarian and more in terms of his support of free markets. In his case -- and I've listened to his auto-hagiography -- he seems to have clearly set off his supposedly radical free market views from ever clashing with his rabidly pro-interventionist policy stances: never the twain shall meet. He seems, in many ways, like the joke about people who listen earnestly to the sermon on Sunday and then break ever percept of it Monday through Saturday.) In the case of Beck, George admits that Beck currently fails the litmus test. Yes, he might come around at a future date, but this is kind of strange, especially since Beck isn't usually portrayed by his supporters here as either a moral coward (i.e., too afraid to go all the way with his principles) or as one having major problems in his principles (such as a conflict at the core level). I do agree, though, that people can move closer to being libertarian. I'm not sure I've met a single libertarian I know who didn't start out as a statist of some form or other. And some of them were pretty far out there in statist-land. (And I'm not sure I can generalize on who takes libertarianism to the radical extreme: those who are out and out statists but succumb or those who are much more milder types of statist.) Another matter here is how can libertarians work with various non-libertarians, especially when the latter might hold some libertarian or proto-libertarian position. I believe one must be very careful here and realize in many cases not to be either over-optimistic (as in believing the non-libertarians are all closet libertarians, just need a little prodding, or can be duped into supporting truly libertarian positions) or over-pessimistic (as in "it'll never ever work, so let's never take any chances"). I think each person is probably going to have a different view on where the balance falls, but I'd be careful of believing someone is a friend merely because he's against [some of] your rivals. And one must remember, too, that no one has limited resources and opportunities. On this, I mean, time and effort spent coalitioning with non-libertarians takes away from other things you might be doing.

Pffft... Out goes reality, including the examples I gave. This is replaced by an opinion ("doesn't seem to work") and you build a long argument on that, while ignoring the rest. The theory actually does work, as the unprecedented expansion of created wealth in the USA has proven. Yet these things are not even in your elaboration. But they exist, and they exist as proof that the theory works. You are entitled to your opinion, though. Don't you feel you've quoted me out of context -- as you completely left out the paragraph that follows the quote? Let me be more clear about what the theory is. You wrote: "If you look at human nature as your standard, you will discover just how wise the Founding Fathers were. One person with a sliver of power does not want to give it up. So he will fight for it if another comes along and wants to take it, like someone intent on increasing his own sliver of power. The Founding Fathers used power-lust as its own check and balance, while providing documented rules that sanction the slivers. Human nature basically does the rest." I interpreted this to mean that if someone has power, he or she won't give it up and this would balance against other people holding power. Therefore, there's a natural check and balance on power: everyone is jealously holding on to their power -- protecting themselves from any encroachments from others. Stated this way, the theory seems silly as history abounds if not is filled up with examples of some people taking power from others and even of some people ceding power to others. (Please tell me if this is not the theory. And if it is not, please explain where I got it wrong.) Now, regarding seeing the "unprecedented expansion of created wealth in the USA" proving the constitutional checks and balances -- the ones in the actual Constitution -- this started before the Constitution was even drafted. This is akin to saying that the industrial revolution was caused by some act of Parliament in 1870. If one is going to make a causal argument here, one should be able to at least put the cause before the effect or even place them at the same time, but not put the cause as happening during the effect. (Likewise, one could argue the American standard of living increased during the 20th century -- all while taxes increased, regulations promulgated, and inflation was almost everpresent. Would this mean tax increases, more regulations, and inflation cause wealth to expand? I don't think you'd make such an argument in that case, so why do you make a similar one with regard to the Constitution?) To bring this point home, too, you'd have to show just how the checks and balances actually worked -- when, in many cases, they were set aside, often with an intepretation offered up that they didn't apply in a specific context or at a specific time -- to bring about the ""unprecedented expansion of created wealth." Merely asserting this is so doesn't demostrate it is so. And this is matter under scrutiny here, no? (An example of early setting aside the checks and balance is the First Bank of US. There was no constitutional power for the federal government to create a bank. Hamilton defended this via arguing that the Bank was constitutional because the Constitution didn't strictly forbid it -- which clearly contradicts the enumerated powers clause. Wasn't the enumerated powers clause specifically made to check federal power? Why didn't that work out? Now, one might accept Hamilton's arguments, but then what good are enumerations as a limit on federal power? if the government can overstep bounds via Hamilton's argument -- which also included, if my memory's correct, the view that if the ends were necessary, then the means were constitutional -- then what constitutional bounds would ever stand under such an assault? And this is hardly the only case of the early federal government casting aside or reinterpreting its limitations.) Here you make a presumption that holding on to power is what I mean as the only check and balance in human nature. And off you go on a long explanation about why this is wrong. You truly believe I went off on a tangent by quoting the Declaration of Independence? I'll quote the relevent passage again: "accordingly all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed." And, again, the author of that Declaration noted that rebellion only comes about after a "long train of abuses and usurpations..." In other words, people are much more likely NOT to check power. They're more likely to let it grow and only go about altering it when it really becomes intolerable. This appears to be the case with the actual Constitution: the First and Second Banks of US -- to stick with my earlier example -- were bascially and sadly tolerated, despite some dissenting voices, such as those of Jefferson and, if my memory's correct, Madison. People didn't immediately say, "The federal government is violating its limitations, we must rebell!" Nor did other branches of the federal government rush in to tell the president of the Congress, "Hey, you guys are violating your limits." In fact, the Second Bank of US eventually did lose its national charter, but this was only after Andrew Jackson's strongly opposed but ultimately successful veto of a renewal in 1836. (The bank eventually went under a few years later.) You might cheer this on as a check and balance working, but that doesn't seem at all the case. The bank lost its charter under only after being in existence for twenty years and causing much mayhem, including, if Murray Rothbard is to be trusted, the Panic of 1819. (See his The Panic of 1819.) This overlooks that the Constitution itself was a rash change. The Convention wasn't even set up to draft a new constitution and furtively did so -- keeping its deliberations secret. In other words, the very creation of the Constitution violates the view you're holding here. It was a swift, secretive process, presenting the nation with a new constitution -- rather than slowly altering the Articles of Confederation over the period of years or decades. I'm not sure why brought that up here. I nowhere made an argument for an ideal human or some future changed humanity that would better fit some political program I advocate. In fact, I'd argue, anarchism is based on a realistic view of human nature -- that no one is really fit or should be trusted to hold power over others. The minarchist and statist views believe some are so fit -- and in the case of minarchism, that some people can be trusted to not abuse power or that the government can mind its own limits. Well, the other missing part of your theory of human nature is not only are some people will to put up with abuse -- i.e., having their liberty truncated -- but there are others who actually want to do the abuse. For the life of me, I don't know how you can present the "other missing part" of my "theory of human nature" when I just said what you did. Granted, I used different words, but the gulf between "power-mongers" (my term) and "others who actually want to do the abuse" (your term) doesn't seem to be so far apart conceptually to warrant misunderstanding. A poorly written sentence on my part. Let me put it this way. There are people who are willing to put up with abuse -- in other words, who will give up their "sliver of power." That's missing from your theory. Were it human nature that no one anywhere ever wanted to give up power, the world and history would be quite different. It wouldn't necessarily be better -- as there might still be people who wanted to and could take power from others -- but people would, in general, be much more ready to stop them and it'd be harder for the sort of accretions of power we see to happen. By this is meant, the kind of slow erosion of personal autonomy (and what is personal autonomy but power over one's self?) that happens over the ages? Nor would expect to see emergency expansions of power -- or these would always be tough sells. In other words, something like the PATRIOT Act would cause a national uproar instead of just a tiny number of dissenting voices. Also, you seem to believe power-mongers will work against each other, rather than coalition to work against everyone else. Were your view correct, I'd expect the US would basically have a tiny federal government to this day. In fact, from the start, the Constitution seems to have done little to stop the growth of federal power. (One might argue today's federal government is much larger than the one in 1789, but 1800's federal government was also larger than the one in 1789.) Again, once you have a monopoly government, even with constitutional checks and balances, none of this matters. The hope that the government will check itself is kind of like having a dictatorial triumpharite, like in Ancient Rome, and hoping that the dictators will look toward each other for more power and not at the rest of society. Or another analogy: it's like a bunch of sheep hoping that a wolf pack will be too busy squabbling to attack. I don't know what to make of this. The premise I believe is wrong here is that checks and balances internal to a government are going to do much, especially when that government is the sole arbiter of the checks and balances. The argument from wealth expansion in America seems, at best, a post hoc ergo propter hoc, but it even fails in that case because America's wealth seems to have been expanding rapidly before the Constitution was foisted on it. I think the better argument might be the wealth expanded despite what the government did. And after the Constitution was adopted, the federal government grew and grew and grew, likely putting a drag on wealth creation, but this requires a theory of wealth creation or at least a good theory of economics -- not merely assertion that this or that cause was the case -- to decipher the historical record.

Were I her, I'd try a variety of the True Scotsman argument here.

A mere three years? When government secrecy classifications routinely last ten, twenty, even fifty years, if indeed they're ever lifted at all? That's entirely unrealistic. Ye gads, Lyndon Johnson put an entire category of background sources for the Warren Commission under embargo until 2063. Disgorging such records can take generations. Many such exposés thus become timely whenever they're released. Fortunately, the Net and electronic infiltration tools are opening up more such archives, formal and informal, than ever before. Julian Assange of Wikileaks — now openly stalked for assassination by U.S. "Defense" Department operatives — is one of the true heroes of our time. Again, let's not lament this. We should not see this as a problem, but an opportunity to ourselves conspire. We know there's a expiration date on being caught. More seriously, recently Jeff Riggenbach wrote something relevant here: http://mises.org/daily/4110 Comments?

I don't know. Haven't read the book, though I lean towards skepticism here. Regarding new "data or insight," there is the problem that it seems some relevant documents remain classified and I think one should never be closed to new insight. This reminds me of a few years ago when I was reading Donald Kagan's massive four volume tome on the Peloponnesian War. Even when I was reading it, this book was already two decades old and considered a classic. A friend asked me why I'd bother. Everything about that war was already known, he thought, from basically Thucydides. He wasn't aware of things like uncovering the tribute lists and other things that added more into understanding the war than merely reading Thucydides. Whew! This makes my life so much easier. I have to only hope my associates' and my plans are not uncovered three years after they reach completion.