dan2100

Thank you for the suggestion. My family members are trying with various degrees of effort to improve the situation, so I don't see distancing as the best alternative. I will be leaving home in about 3 weeks, so I suppose I'm looking for suggestions about how to mentally approach the situation. You might also look into the folks at http://freedomainradio.com/ Many of them have dealt with these kinds of issues -- especially, getting out of bad family situations.

Thanks.

Reminds me of Bartok, The Miraculous Mandarin and Music for Strings Percussion and Celesta come to mind. The latter piece is used here, though this video is too brief: I've heard that one before -- and have actually seen the movie several times. For me, I don't see -- or hear -- the link with The Omega Factor theme music. Maybe I'm deaf to it. I like the earlier Dr. Who themes. What's this thing they have for snakes?

I'm happy that you liked it.

The Good Guys fight cooperatively and collectively to defend their common weal against the enemy. No one fights a one man war for very long. Who makes the weapons. Who supplies the warrior? Who gives the orders and who formulates the plan and order of battle. Who supplies the intelligence. War is a cooperative collective activity. It cannot be fought properly as a mob of individuals each doing their own thing. This doesn't really support your case. Good guys -- not you because you're not one; you're a terrorist -- can work together and cooperate. That doesn't, however, mean they must follow the terrorist strategy of war -- the strategy you advocate. In fact, because they're the good guys, that would, in my mind, preclude the evil strategy. (Also, wars should not be fought to win at any cost. They should be fought, if they are fought at all, to win a better peace.) And how does this speak against the philosophy of individualism? Individualists can work together. There is no social atomism in Rand's view -- just in your view of her view.

http://fountainheadinstitute.com/why-man-needs-approval/ Comments?

Either actually or potentially. Consider the example of bombing civilians in Germany and Japan. The adult male population not directly engaged in combat and part of the adult female population were in manufacturing or expediting the activities of the military. They were in effect armaments of the enemy and therefore legitimate military targets. The children and infants who were killed in bombing the above were collateral damage. Collateral damage is one of the infelicities of modern warfare. If one wishes to win, one must expect to inflict collateral damage upon the enemy population. As to younger people, in Germany ten and eleven year old kids were inducted into the Volkssturm along with old men. They became legitimate military targets. Such is the nature of modern war. It were better that such wars did not have to be fought. As I have said before, to fight a modern war one must divest himself of mercy, sympathy and compassion. If the enemy finds out we are soft on infants in cribs, they will line the tops of their buildings with infants in cribs. Count on it. To fight the kind of nasty wars that have become the usual kind of wars, one must become hard and nasty. To answer another of your questions. Yes, we do have a people. Where and how did you acquire your first language as a child. Who fed you. How did you learn to put your clothes on. We are all part of large social unit starting with the natural nurturing family. None of us are atomic hermits, except when we are older and when we chose to be. Even then we are dependent on the products and services of others. If you wish to live in the woods you go into the woods wearing clothes you did not weave. So a "hermit" is to some extent, dependent on others. Rand's notion that we are atomic individuals is faulty. No matter how individual we are we are still connected to others in some fashion. Man is a social being. The only issue is how we weight our individual aspects vs our social aspects. Ba'al Chatzaf So, what is the chain of reasoning from "Man is a social being" to your philosophy of war? It seems you missed a few steps in it while you lashed out at the social atomist strawman.

I don't know. I'd have to see more of his films, and probably revisit the ones I have seen, to see if there's a pattern. I actually didn't mind his 2003 film "The Dreamers." I saw it a few months ago and thought it was okay. So I'm not sure I'd say he started out strong and then decided to rest on his laurels. Like you, too, I rate Fellini higher than him -- though I'm not sure one must compare either to the other. In many ways -- not just quality or my overall feeling about their work -- I find them very different directors -- even if they're both Italian.

I remember someone once relating something like, "You help the poor first by not being one of them." I forget the reference...

Yeah, I think that's how I feel about his films too. I think I've seen four or five of them. They have some really powerful moments, but the rest of them are blah. This is, for me, unlike, say, many films by Ingmar Bergman or some films by Michelangelo Antonioni, where there's more consistency overall. It's kind of like the difference between reading a so so novel that has a few scattered passages of great prose versus reading a novel that's well written and enticing throughout.

I actually didn't like the movie. The novel I found okay. I wasn't blown away by it... While watching the film, I had the suspicion that this was not the best novel to adapt for the film. Or maybe it's just Bertolucci. I've seen a few of his films and none of them really hit me. This isn't to say there weren't fine moments in any of these films. In "The Sheltering Sky," I really liked the scene at the port -- with the gigantic crane. Oh, well, chalk it up to tastes. Yeah, I see the reference. Doesn't seem to have as much as I thought to do, though, with the novel. Not that it has to!

I am not for shedding the blood of my own people. Foreign devils I will gladly kill. My own? No. I will not fight a civil war unless the government became as ruthless as the Nazis or Stalinists. Ba'al Chatzaf I was unaware you had a people. So who are your people? Please don't gush and tell me fellow Americans. Some fellow Americans surely would prefer you joined the other side -- since your ideological brethren seem to be there. And this only seems a way of sidestepping the question. And, above, sure enough, you do bring your ruthless view of war back in: you reveal you would fight a civil war. Now, would you fight it in the same manner as you would one against foreigners -- i.e., total war with no concern for civilian deaths? Also, what do you mean by "foreign devils"? In other posts, you've demonstrated -- at least from the safety of your armchair; I hope you'd actually act different in the field -- a callousness toward the safety and lives of non-belligerents. Tell me, is everyone not over here a "foreign devil"?

I believe Objectivism's notion of self-interest is not merely to follow innate inclinations. The view is rather that rational self-interest, as a moral ideal, must be first investigated (knowledge of it is not automatic or guaranteed), rigorously pursued (it's not an easy path to take as one's inclinations can and might clash with it), and frequently updated. This really depends on the situation and what's meant by "benefits society." Also, Objectivist morality as such is not about what the wealthy should do. It's about what any person should do. It aims at a general moral code -- not one based merely on how much wealth one has. Further, "benefits society" needs to be unpacked. What does this mean? Who is society? Wouldn't wealthy members of a society also be part of that society? And how does one determine what "benefits society"? Surely, members of society might clash over benefits. E.g., the thief benefits at the expense of her or his victim -- yet both are members of society. How would you decide that, say, preventing the thief from stealing benefits society? (I'm not revealing my position here -- just raising the question. I do have definite answers to the question and, I believe, somewhat sound justifications for them, but merely to say "benefits society" without clarification doesn't answer much. It's more likely to end analysis rather than further it.) That's the survivalist application of self-interest. Inside the Objectivist movement, there is a debate over survivalism -- whether it's the sufficient grounds for Objectivist morality. That's a big debate and I'm not sure it's been resolved to everyone's satisfaction. No one ever started from zero. Everyone is extremely lucky to even have what they have. This inequality in itself, however, is not reason to try to make people more equal. For instance, that some are blind, others heathily and normally sighted, and still others have sight but with vision problems make for inequality. So? Should we blind everyone to make everyone equal? Should blind people get a big cash payment from those with sight? After all, the sighted people have a huge advantage over the blind. Shouldn't we equalize that? Should those who are nearsighted, who are farsighted, who are colorblind (fully or partly), and who have some other vision problem get some payment from those with so called perfect vision? Why? Justice, in both the classical liberal and Objectivist senses, would actually dictate that one those who caused someone else harm be made to make up for that harm. In this case, if someone blinds someone else, then there is cause to make the former make up for this. But merely that someone is born or has good vision doesn't make her or him the cause of someone else's lack of this sense. (Also, there is no collective guilt here. Every last member of a racial, ethnic, language, or whatever group does not cause members of another group to have this or that problem. There would be specific individuals causing harming specific other individuals. If there were, say, restitution to be made, it would be not between all the members of one group and all of the members of another, but between specific individuals to other specific individuals -- and their membership in such groups would be irrelevant to this.)

The problem as I see it is that using 'true' and 'false' with respect to a complex model is inappropriate. You have to introduce levels of "truthness" and I don't think the formulation lends itself to this. There is, however, well developed formulations in probability and statistics to handle this situation. While I agree that there might be complicated cases, including cases where one has two models where one can't currently decide which is better. But even if you introduce a probabilistic view and statistical tests, this still doesn't rid truth and falsity from them. It merely means there's a complicated way of arriving at them. For instance, two or more models might be very complex and only open to statistical tests on an empirical level (let's say the theoretical structure is not decisive). In which case, one still might say that the model that passes the appropriate tests is the better -- truer one -- than the one that doesn't. (There are also other complications here too. I hope we're talking about models that aim to capture something about reality and not merely models that fit certain data. In the latter case, think of an equation of a lower degree that can fit data generated by an equation of a higher degree. In this case, over a certain range or within a certain level of approximation, the former equation fits the latter's data, but it really isn't actually capturing what's going on outside that approximation. A favorite example among Austrian economists and their fellow travelers seems to be that of predicting the next "Lord of the Rings" movie. Had you seen the first movie and the second, you might predict that in the following year a third one would come out -- a purely empirical generalization -- and you'd be right. But if you went on to say the year after that there'd be a fourth one, you'd be wrong. Why? Your model here seems to capture nothing relavent about "Lord of the Rings" movies, especially the fact that they're based on the books. Had you known the latter, you'd probably have predicted there will be three and only three movies -- assuming the movies are based on each book, none of the other material, and that the rule is "one movie per book." Using this model, you might go on to predict that there might be seven "Chronicles of Narnia" movies -- since there are seven novels in that series. But imagine, in both cases, that you came up with models that made the correct predictions -- three "Lord of the Rings" films and seven "Chronicles" ones -- would you model really be said to be truthful if it made the correct prediction but couldn't tell anything of why this was so? Surely, you might say it captured something about the structure of both, but how would you say this was meaningful? It might be sheer coincidence...)

Thanks. I think it still needs some work, but I wanted to see if I'd get a positive response anyhow. I'm not familiar, but is that a reference to the Paul Bowles novel? I read that a few years ago and saw a (or the?) movie based on it. I recall the novel having a section called "Tea in the Sahara."

The Feds have more physical force than the States. The Feds have tanks and planes. If it comes to a physical fight, the Feds will will. The last thing you or I want is a Civil War. The last one we have killed 620,000 outright and maimed 1.5 million. That is more casualties than in any other war the U.S. has been in. I didn't call for one. I don't think, either, that jury nullification or decentralization strategies will result in one. I was expressing my surprise that you would care here. If there were a chance for your side to win such a war and it involved killing or maiming whatever number of people, wouldn't you be for it? If not, why not?

And you should not be. War is an emergency and in an emergency the first things to ditch are compassion, mercy and morality. What is left is victory or defeat. In the pursuit of victory, any means not fatal to our side are fair means. There is really only One Law of War ---- Win it. And god damn the collateral damages. Ba'al Chatzaf I hate to tell everyone but I think Ayn Rand would agree with Ba'al. I don't know about that, but were it true, it wouldn't mean the position is correct or even consistent with Objectivist core principles.

Yes. I speculate that such an attitude maybe comes from fear -- not reason. And, indeed, the person who advocates the view most vocally here seems extremely fear-driven to me.

Might not improvements be thought of as finding out what's true or false about something? For instance, when I think of my model of, say, a physical system, such as a volcano, I make an improvement to this because I believe something in my current model -- or its structure (if using "structure" here is believed to add value) -- is incorrect -- e.g., doesn't capture some relevant feature of the real physical system -- or, in other words, is false. Merely using another word -- structure or whatever you care to come up with next -- only seems to hide this, don't you think? Dan, I have not given this much thought, but prima facie GS's "definition" of knowlege seems the most objective. You accused him of using the term "structure" to add value, but I see it as value neutral. My point was not that one would switch to his idea, I hope, because one thought it actually was an improvement. I wasn't accusing him in the sense that this is something he wouldn't want to do. I presume he is aiming at this because he believes it's more objective or better. In that case, he is making a value choice, but so what? This is to look at things ahistorically and acontextually. Of course, one model might fit one set of data while another model fits another set of data. But the usual case in science, including geology is that one set of data is often better because it includes the other set as a subset or a boundary condition. In other words, these models aren't seen as floating around in some space of models, but the worker is actually looking for the model that captures more of the real system -- or more of the revelant or interesting features of the real system. As more is found out, yes, more has to be included or accounted for. But if you're going to disregard this, then there is no ongoing process -- just a series of unrelated moments, or of unrelated models and unrelated data.

Might not improvements be thought of as finding out what's true or false about something? For instance, when I think of my model of, say, a physical system, such as a volcano, I make an improvement to this because I believe something in my current model -- or its structure (if using "structure" here is believed to add value) -- is incorrect -- e.g., doesn't capture some relevant feature of the real physical system -- or, in other words, is false. Merely using another word -- structure or whatever you care to come up with next -- only seems to hide this, don't you think? Well, if we know something about the structure of events, but not all, then our calculations will always be approximate. This is why probability theory is so important because it replaces 2-valued logic with infinite valued logic. As we learn more about a given system our calculations get more and more accurate and probability of "correct structure" increases. I'm not denying all of this; merely saying that this doesn't resolve all the problems and is only a roundabout way of getting to the same ends. Moreover (how often does one get to use "moreover" in a sentence?), when comparing two approximate models for a given set of data or in a given context, it might be that one is more precise than the other (or it might not be, but let's stick with the case where one is a better approximation than the other). In that case, one might say one model captures more of the truth of the situation than the other -- using "structure" here only uses different words to mean much the same thing. Even your use of "correct structure" seems to belie your view. Let me put this another way. If something is an approximation of something else, then this presupposes that the approximation is not completely true about the thing it's approximating and in comparing two approximations one might be considered truer than the other. (Of course, at this point, one could introduce things like precisive vs. nonprecisive abstractions. See, e.g., "Realism and Abstraction in Economics: Aristotle and Mises versus Friedman" by Roderick Long at: http://mises.org/journals/qjae/pdf/qjae9_3_1.pdf )

Nullification will bring federal court orders preventing such acts from becoming effective. Any further resistance will bring Federal troops. Think about the the Whiskey Rebellion. Think about secession and what it came to. Ba'al Chatzaf LOL! So, when it comes to foreigners who probably are unlikely to do you any direct harm, you're for total war, killing civilians, bombing everything in sight, but when it comes to something like jury nullification, suddenly you're reluctant because of fear of what the feds might not like it?

This was a lesson, too, that many foreign anti-terrorist efforts learned long ago -- though one many forget because they don't study history. One of the better strategies in fighting terrorism is a combination of reducing overall "collateral damage" -- even if this means the anti-terrorist forces take more casualties -- and recognizing that some terrorist groups might have legitimate grievances. The former part of this strategy was used successfully in Northern Ireland. This means, yes, more British troops are casualties, but it keeps civilian casualties low -- hence making civilians less supportive of terrorists. The latter was especially successful in the Philippines, according to my readings, because it tends to isolate the more extreme terrorist groups from the moderate ones with the latter tending to give up violence, negotiate, and break off relations with the former -- further isolating the former. BC's strategy is probably a surefire way of getting civilians completely behind the terrorists -- choosing the lesser of two evils -- and also of uniting terrorist and even just non-terrorist but anti-occupation groups together. This is aside from the sheer immorality of it. (Of course, it should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with Rand, that morality and practicality are not completely unrelated.) When we nuked Japan in 1945 did all the Japanese adults become Bushido Samari? No. When we wrecked Germany in WW2 did all the Germans become Nazis? No. I never said everyone would be converted. The point is the more innocent deaths are seen as caused by a belligerent, the more this will help that belligerent's adversaries. That doesn't mean conversion per se, but it can mean support or lessening opposition to the other side. A good case of this seems to be what happened in the Soviet Union. The Nazis did their best to turn people that might have been allies against them -- even if these same people were not good little Soviets much less wholehearted Stalinists. And one can make a good case that had conditional surrender been sought after, then the war might have ended earlier -- perhaps a year or more earlier. How many innocent lives might have been saved? (As an aside, too, if the focus is on World War Two, one should look closely at the cases of Italy and Finland. The more limited wars pursued against both -- much more limited in the latter case, of course, as the Soviets didn't occupy all of Finland -- made them much more amenable to quitting the war. Had, for example, the Soviets pursued a policy of annihilation in Finland, I think it's safe to say the Finns would've put up more a fight.) So much for total war here... Also, if the strategy of killing civilians works so well, why didn't Nazi Germany win the Battle of Britain, especially after it went from attacking ostensibly military targets, such as bombing airfields, to raiding cities? If your view were correct, this should have brought Britain to its knees or at least softened it up -- maybe even bringing it to sue for peace. Why didn't this happen? And let me ask, if someone attacked America enough, would you eventually cower, kiss their butts, and be a good little subject?

I saw it on DVD. It first aired before I was born. It held my interest.

Yeah, that was funny.

Might not improvements be thought of as finding out what's true or false about something? For instance, when I think of my model of, say, a physical system, such as a volcano, I make an improvement to this because I believe something in my current model -- or its structure (if using "structure" here is believed to add value) -- is incorrect -- e.g., doesn't capture some relevant feature of the real physical system -- or, in other words, is false. Merely using another word -- structure or whatever you care to come up with next -- only seems to hide this, don't you think?