Starbuckle

Reidy writes: "Brook is correct in saying that as long as you take your employer's money the honest course of action is to do what your employer pays you to do..." That's true in a general way, but with provisos that undercut ARI's claims here. There was never any need, nor has it ever been advisable or right in any respect, for ARI to require public unanimity from its associates on philosophical or cultural positions, especially in light of the fact that it is outfit whose philosophical allegiance declares the importance of arriving at conclusions independently. What's necessary is much more limited; and respecting the intellectual integrity and independence of ARI associates could have been part of the mission instead of set up in conflict with it. Because of this demanded "public unanimity," for example, nobody operating under ARI auspices can ever quote Kelley or Branden in a favorable way, even when their work is directly relevant. Whether there was an explicit ban on this or everybody just happens to function in lockstep out of deference to/fear of Peikoff/ARI, it's one small consequence of this notion that there must be a unitary public face in presenting the philosophy. If you have an organization devoted to a particular political reform, e.g., citizen initiative rights, you wouldn't want spokesmen publicly disputing each other about whether, e.g., onerous new signature gathering requirements for ballot question petitions are or are not a bad thing. There may be many mission-specific questions like that with respect to which the officers have to be on the same page if they are to be successful publicly. I don't know how presidential press agents manage without their brains exploding. But what is the mission of ARI all about if implicit in it is the notion that people can or should hold--or PRETEND to hold--exactly the same positions on vast array of philosophical, cultural, political questions? The mission was wrong from the get-go. (See Kelley's Truth and Toleration.) And yet another proof is that we still being given no inkling about exactly what it is, aside from Peikoff's personal pique, about McCaskey's critique of the historical accounts in Harriman's book that makes it so disastrous to the understanding and promotion of Rand's ideas. One possibility: the principals sharply disagree about how malignant McCaskey's reasonable criticisms are, or even whether they are malignant at all. And given the requirement of public unanimity on important questions, if the organizational unanimity cannot be reached, the only possible solution is public silence. How does that incarnate any of the virtues of reason that Rand talks about?

Xray: "The premise that nature forbids the irrational is wrong." What did Rand mean by it? The same thing as she meant by asserting that contradictions are impossible in nature. Not that people can't be contradictory in their thinking, but that you're not going to find any feathers behaving like boulders. She meant that the irrational is not going to work. Nature permits you to irrationally insist that 2+2=5--it's rational to recognize that people can be irrational--but nature doesn't permit you to act on that claim and get the same result you would get had you functioned as if 2+2=4. Another example: It's possible for people to misread Rand and then knock down a straw man, but nature forbids them from actually succeeding in refuting Rand by this kind of sloppiness or dishonesty. As for Ellis, he too responds to something other than what was said and meant. Rand is talking about how coercion stops you from following the conclusions of your rational judgment, conclusions that you would have been able to follow in the absence of that coercion; and in some cases paralyzes your ability to think. Of course, to the extent that persons are not completely prevented from acting at all on their own behalf, they can often find ways around, e.g., various regulatory controls on the economy. But they are still stopped from taking what in their own considered view is the best course of action that they would have been able to take had they not been forced to expend time and energy on finding second-best alternatives. When coercion is utter and blanketing, as it is in a Nazi concentration camp, a person's capacity to reason may be of vanishingly small help, since he may have no opportunity whatever to exercise it. Judging from accounts of survivors like Victor Frankl's Man's Search For Meaning, luck and personal strength are the kinds of factors that one has to depend on in such brutal circumstances. The scope for deliberatively improving one's fate is very narrow or nil. One's only real choice is to cling to the will to live or not.

"...an employee may present publicly only ARI’s official position (when we have one), not his particular view..." --Yaron Brook "...we engage in a critical discussion of philosophical, cultural, and political issues—with our staff, Objectivist intellectuals and activists, and a range of non-Objectivist thinkers and educators. But, at the end of the debates, ARI presents one, consistent position on each issue that we’re prepared to take a stand on...." --Yaron Brook "Independence is the recognition of the fact that yours is the responsibility of judgment and nothing can help you escape it—that no substitute can do your thinking, as no pinch-hitter can live your life—that the vilest form of self-abasement and self-destruction is the subordination of your mind to the mind of another, the acceptance of an authority over your brain, the acceptance of his assertions as facts, his say-so as truth, his edicts as middle-man between your consciousness and your existence." --not Yaron Brook

Yeah, right. Here's a sample of the alleged "economic sanity" in this article, about how economists thought nothing could ever go wrong again: "Unfortunately, this romanticized and sanitized vision of the economy led most economists to ignore all the things that can go wrong. They turned a blind eye to the limitations of human rationality that often lead to bubbles and busts; to the problems of institutions that run amok; to the imperfections of markets — especially financial markets — that can cause the economy’s operating system to undergo sudden, unpredictable crashes; and to the dangers created when regulators don’t believe in regulation." The role of the Fed in distorting the economy by pumping credit into the system? Government intervention in the housing markets? Government interventionism generally? Blankout. The problem, in Krugman's view, is inadequate government interference with economic actors, not the smothering interventionism that makes it harder to deal rationally with the world and that hides and defers costs of preventing people from doing so. Krugman also repeats the nonsense that economists were all on the same page prior to 2007.

I will be issuing condemnations and repudiations every twenty minutes from now until midnight. To apply, please tell me what you did wrong and why, and the nature of your failure to atone.

Reidy wrote: "'Magazine founders' would seem to be a swipe at Tracinski, though he didn't actually found his magazine, just the email newsletter." No, he means Craig Biddle, publisher of Objective Standard; at his personal web site, Biddle made a statement objecting to Peikoff's treatment of McCaskey.

Ted Keer wrote: "I really wish you people (and goats) would stop commenting on this. It's a private matter. Only Peikoff can talk about it. Not you." You are not looking at the essence of the essentials from a properly essentialist aspect. USE YOUR MIND AND YOUR VALUES.

I hadn't realized a new thread had been opened. The following re-posts what I just added to the older thread: Is it just me, or does Peikoff's "explanation" of the context for his ill treatment of McCasky (posted five days ago?) add absolutely nothing of substance to the discussion? http://www.peikoff.c...i-board-member/ A couple points that occurred to me: 1) Peikoff says that "others" have tried to turn this into a moral issue. What? So, his peremptory bad treatment of McCasky--or how any persons treat others or behave generally--has nothing to do in itself with morality? So much for that intimate connection of ALL "facts" with "values." 2) He admits he has a personal prejudice against McCasky; he dislikes him. 3) He admits that because of his personal prejudice, he never attempted to hash out any intellectual disagreements with his and Harriman's theses. 4) He offers no explanation whatever of what is so "damaging to Objectivism" in McCaskey's unanswered, undiscussed criticisms. 5) He says "God help Objectivism" if people with forums and podcasts are among his critics on this issue that "others" have turned into a moral one. It's a slam at Hsheih. 6) He pretends that letting McCaskey release the memo was his only available option as a public explanation of why he was forcing McCaskey off the ARI board. (Given the weakness of the supplementary "explanation," maybe he's right.) 7) He says McCaskey is a "braggart".... McCaskey? Don't know him. But all these Or-Ob muckamucks seem prone to arrogant prickitudinousness. Leonard, physician, heal thys... Etc. That seems like more than a couple. I meant seven. Seven points occurred to me.

Is it just me, or does Peikoff's "explanation" of the context for his ill treatment of McCasky (posted five days ago?) add absolutely nothing of substance to the discussion? http://www.peikoff.com/peikoff-vs-an-ari-board-member/ A couple points that occurred to me: 1) Peikoff says that "others" have tried to turn this into a moral issue. What? So, his peremptory bad treatment of McCasky--or how any persons treat others or behave generally--has nothing to do in itself with morality? So much for that intimate connection of ALL "facts" with "values." 2) He admits he has a personal prejudice against McCasky; he dislikes him. 3) He admits that because of his personal prejudice, he never attempted to hash out any intellectual disagreements with his and Harriman's theses. 4) He offers no explanation whatever of what is so "damaging to Objectivism" in McCaskey's unanswered, undiscussed criticisms. 5) He says "God help Objectivism" if people with forums and podcasts are among his critics on this issue that "others" have turned into a moral one. It's a slam at Hsheih. 6) He pretends that letting McCaskey release the memo was his only available option as a public explanation of why he was forcing McCaskey off the ARI board. (Given the weakness of the supplementary "explanation," maybe he's right.) 7) He says McCaskey is a "braggart".... McCaskey? Don't know him. But all these Or-Ob muckamucks seem prone to arrogant prickitudinousness. Leonard, physician, heal thys... Etc. That seems like more than a couple. I meant seven. Seven points occurred to me.

What are we supposed to be running out of? Oil (the imminent depletion of which has been periodically predicted for decades)? The sun? As long as the profits and property rights of capitalists are protected, there is no danger of an "energy shortage." If the cheapest means of exploiting energy to run our machines were in fact declining, prices for supply of it would rise, and the next-cheapest means would become the cheapest means and become even cheaper as it becomes more profitable to research and develop that means. The history of technology is littered with the prognostications of pundits who declared that the technology to do X will never be possible. It's not natural resources that are in danger of depletion; it's social and idealogical sources of political liberty to engage in untrammeled exploration and exploitation of natural resources that are in danger of depletion. My hope is that the election returns are a sign that we can reverse the current anti-market trends. If what I'm saying overlaps Martenson much, his crash course may indeed be worth watching. If not, it would be better for the reader to take a crash course in books by Julian Simon and George Reisman.

For those who pretend not to understand rhetorical devices: http://www.uky.edu/AS/Classics/rhetoric.html#42

If by "resolve" is meant "reasonably resolve," then "Objectivists" would resolve the inability to make a deal the same way that everybody else not in the Mafia or government does, that is, by not making the deal. If by resolving the disagreement we mean "find a voluntary, mutually acceptable way to bridge the gap between the 5% and 7%," but these figures represent the bottom lines of the two parties (not merely their initial bargaining positions), then of course the disagreement would not be resolved--just as comparable disagreements are habitually left unresolved by any non-thug non-Objectivists who cannot come to terms. As long as the parties are peaceful, whether they come to an accommodation depends on their value scales at the time of the proposed trade. If I enter a store and expect to purchase a half gallon of milk for two dollars or less, but find that it is being sold for $3.50, whether I buy has little to do with any goal of "resolving" the difference of opinion on what I ought to pay and a lot more with how much money is in my pocket, how urgently I need the milk, and how close I am to other stores that are still open at the time I see the hefty price tag. In certain circumstances, I value the $3.50 less and the milk more; in other circumstances, the reverse holds.

If by "resolve" is meant "reasonably resolve," then "Objectivists" would resolve the inability to make a deal the same way that everybody else not in the Mafia or government does, that is, by not making the deal. If by resolving the disagreement we mean "find a voluntary, mutually acceptable way to bridge the gap between the 5% and 7%," but these figures represent the bottom lines of the two parties (not merely their initial bargaining positions), then of course the disagreement would not be resolved--just as comparable disagreements are habitually left unresolved by any non-thug non-Objectivists who cannot come to terms. As long as the parties are peaceful, whether they come to an accommodation depends on their value scales at the time of the proposed trade. If I enter a store and expect to purchase a half gallon of milk for two dollars or less, but find that it is being sold for $3.50, whether I buy has little to do with any goal of "resolving" the difference of opinion on what I ought to pay and a lot more with how much money is in my pocket, how urgently I need the milk, and how close I am to other stores that are still open at the time I see the hefty price tag. In certain circumstances, I value the $3.50 less and the milk more; in other circumstances, the reverse holds.

JR wrote: "Might it be your stupidity? Just a thought." Any such "thought" automatically redounds to the self-descriptive detriment of its author.

I haven't read the discussion on values very carefully, but it seems to me that one of the combatants is equating objective value with intrinsic value, failing to use his Xray vision. It's true enough that valuation is relational; values aren't "out there" independent of any process of valuing or interaction (and contra the red greens who babble of of the "intrinsic" value of unspoiled verdure, needs of human beings be damned).

George H. Smith wrote: "A book that I like a great deal is Paul Taylor's Normative Discourse (Prentice Hall, 1961). I first read this book during the late 1960s, while taking a graduate seminar on ethics, and I cited it briefly in ATCAG." Thanks for the tip. I will add it to my why-haven't-you-read-me-yet? list.

Re the GHS and WS discussion of objective and subjective value, some years ago a speaker at IOS proposed a neat taxonomy of the concept of value as used in different contexts. I thought it was a great parsing. (Yes, turns out that even if you subjectively value a cup of poison, it's still objectively bad for you. Because, well, then you're dead.) I either lost the binder in which I had all the flyers for that lecture, or it's buried in a box. It's a rotten shame that the lectures at IOS and some other places haven't been embalmed in journals and other permanent archives as a matter of course. One reason I remember being given is that the speakers' thinking was often regarded by themselves as preliminary. But even if a fruitful paper is only half-right, why not make it available to the world? Just tell the conference speakers to make sure to do a spell-check before their drafts get posted. Mises.org has the right idea--they've got a billion papers, journals, books available now in pdf or ebook form for free download, as well as scads of video and audio. They must be doing okay fundraisingwise if they're able to give all that stuff away.

William Scherk: "[Agrees with this, that and the other.]" I agree with your agreements with me. Can't we all get along? William Scherk: "What is odd and seemingly discordant about Betsy's most recent commentary is that she supports Biddle, but can't get let her own opinions out of the bag." Back to me: Yes, she even specifically praises Biddle for being willing to go public with his views despite the criticism it might provoke and strain it might cause in relationships... But if her semi-privately published memo is even 40% correct, that is the wrong thing to do if we are to save the future of Objectivism.... Hello.... I've seen all this a bit closer-up in another context. My brother as a young man was a Jehovah's Witness, and got caught up in their tight social network and mores. When I came back from college, I had more success than I thought at the time persuading him of certain problems with his religious views. (One of the items he said had an effect was a tape I lent him of Peikoff and Ridpath debating socialists in Canada--not because of the subject matter but mostly I think because of Peikoff's forceful thinking-on-his-feet logic, showing a different potential than my brother was seeing in the Bible studies. Irony.) In any case, my brother took a second look at various disturbing things he had witnessed in the conduct of others in the church and began to voice some of his questions. The JWs don't brook many doubts from persons who had been true believers, and ostracism is the ultimate method of dealing with those who stray irremediably. Within a very brief period, my brother lost all his "friends" and associates, who would not even acknowledge him on the street. Whatever. He returned to school in another town, made new friends, and is now making bucks as a software jock in Silicon Valley. I don't question the fact that when people get involved in self-immuring religious social sects, escaping them can be somewhat traumatic and difficult. But my brother's crisis lasted several weeks or a few months, after several years of involvement. A lot of these guys in the ARI orbit or orbiting the orbiters have been witness to the dogmatism and religiosity for two to four decades now. I would tell them: Whether you're thirty or seventy, if you really believe in independence, practice it. If being honest and just means you're likely to get shunned by someone whose respect and friendship you would prefer to have, do it anyway. Certainly don't be afraid to call a spade a spade because it would "give fuel to the enemies of Objectivism," whatever that means. By doing the right and honorable thing, you'll inspire others to be honorable. That's a net plus.

William Scherk writes: "I believe Diana has moved on somewhat since her titanic 14,000 word denunciation of Chris Sciabarra." No. She hasn't. Not anywhat. She has never apologized for that vicious, stupid and puerile attack on a very good guy who had never hurt her in any way, but only given her opportunities; and at least twice on her site has _adamantly_ affirmed that she stands by that vomitous sludge. What is the evidence that she now regrets her nasty and gratuitous attack on Sciabarra? Not that it would be forgiveable in any case. Of course, by contrast, her apologies and apologia for having ever had anything to do with the Institute for Objectivist Studies were endless, as if attending lectures and so forth were akin to axe murdering. Nor is there a new, open and refreshing, Enlightenment-value-inspired, pro-discourse comment policy at Noodlebrain. Does anyone suppose that Branden, Campbell, Kelley et al. would be able to post on Hshyster's site under their own names, no matter how cogent and illuminating their remarks might be? The Betsys and Dianas of the world are confounded by the current brouhaha because Peikoff is being too obviously irrational. As Campbell correctly notes, Hshyster is walking a tightrope, nervously with her finger to the wind.

In lieu of election analysis on election day, Tracinski has published the final part of his series on what went right and why in history. He elaborates his understanding of "implicit" concepts; it would be interesting to see Campbell's take on Tracinski's views. Tracinski says the top-down view of philosophical influence on history is more plausible in the case of bad philosophy, which just can't rely on the implicit knowledge of people dealing rationally with the world, the basis for the development of good philosophy. An excerpt: "The view that ideas are transmitted from the top-down through universities is incomplete—if one is seeking to explain what went right. For explaining what went wrong, however, it's pretty much the whole story. That's why I think the existing Objectivist theory is best at explaining the spread of bad ideas, which—not being based on reality—have to spread top-down from the ivory tower, because they cannot be induced from the bottom up. The purveyors of bad ideas have to take over the schools and universities, because their only hope of survival is to drum their ideas into the heads of the young and ignorant, who have not yet gained enough specialized knowledge or experience of the world to build a base of knowledge that will resist bad philosophical ideas."

Keer: "You obviously haven't read Shirer. (I hadn't read it until recently.)" I've read Rise and Fall of the Third Reich twice. That's the book you mean, I hope? If you have any argument that Peikoff is just a "ripoff" of Shirer, go ahead and present it.

Were the first posts in this thread really about whether it's okay to use the word "flip-flop" to refer to a flip-flop?

Ted Keer wrote: "Ominous Parallels is simply awful. When it is not boring and repetitive or hyperbolic and hysterical it is both. I came of age under Reagan. That book was meant as a warning against Reagan. Rand's opinion of Reagan and Peikoff's of the 'threat' of the right has been spectacularly wrong. (Not that I don't despise Buckley, Buchanan, Santorum, and their ilk.) Finally, the work is simply a rip off of William L Shirer's The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, which everyone should read, especially in today's political and economic climate." Disagree thoroughly with this. First, the book was not meant particularly as a "warning against Reagan," as it's far more sweeping in its cultural and philosophical assessments and had been many years in the making (readers of Rand's periodicals first started hearing about in the late 1960s). I might agree that certain of the books claims are "hyperbolic," but what the warrant for dubbing it "hysterical" is, I can't imagine. "Hysterical" is the most overused slam-word of our age!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! As vehement tract, Ominous Parallels makes for extremely compelling reading. I don't know why anyone interested in the history or its ideas should find it dull. The notion that Ominous Parallels is just a ripoff of Shirer is unintelligible; perhaps it is based on the fact that Peikoff begins the book by quoting a long passage from Shirer about the gassing of Jews and also cites Shirer at other points in the book. Peikoff covers an awful lot of historical and cultural territory that Shirer never touches. It's obvious that Peikoff would take issue with Shirer on various key questions. Among the problems with Ominous Parallels, aside from any shortcomings of its theses (such as the inadequate weight it gives to positive factors in American culture or the excessive weight it gives to the influence of Kant) and unfair abbreviated treatments of various intellectuals (see George H. Smith on Herbert Spencer [search mises.org] versus Leonard Peikoff on Herbert Spencer), is how extremely condensed OP is in arguing for its view of history and the sources of Nazism. It should be a fatter book, maybe at least twice as thick, to fill out its argument more persuasively and take on objections that might be raised. Despite all of the problems, the book has many suggestive leads and sharp insights. I can't countenance such dismissiveness of it as Keer's or David Gordon's.

Neil wrote: "The most incredible thing are the posters (I don't know if Hsieh is one) who dispute or question whether Peikoff issued a 'moral condemnation' of McCaskey. First, that's all Peikoff does. Second, what do they make of the 'rung in hell' line?" This is funny. There are ten-volume treatises out now about how there "must" be some reasonable explanation of Peikoff's conduct, hidden just under the surface, given the kind of man he is, which, let it be stressed, has nothing to do with previous manifestations of the same sort of loony dogmatism. Indeed, there are heated explanations on the Internet about why Peikoff's consignment of McCaskey to the second-lowest rung of hell does not mean what you think it means. Has Neil not read these proofs? Also, vis-a-vis widest context of valuing and facting here, Peikoff explained all about the facts and the values in "Fact and Value." But I guess, like so many who have failed to acquire omniscience before leaping to the only sensible conclusions on this matter, Neil doesn't have time to sift all the evidence. There is only one word for this kind of dropper of contexts, and that word is: context-dropper. Look, if the Alpha Centurions have threatened to annihilate earth unless Peikoff declines to do any further "explicating" of his authoritarian power play, I think he's perfectly justified in keeping mum. And for all we know this is what happened. Here's another scenario for you leap-to-conclusioners: what if the real Peikoff has been abducted and some satirical knockoff has been substituted, just to see how the cultists would react if his premises and m.o. were logically reduced to absurdity? Then all the sniping about Peikoff's latest outbreak would be completely unfair. I am tired of persons like Neil rampantly "leaping to conclusions" about such matters based on "incomplete evidence." The point is, we don't know exactly what really happened in itself here, and we may never know so long as Peikoff keeps hiding the rest of the relevant evidence in his closet (which he may or may not have a perfect right to do, we just don't know, we don't know), AND THAT IS THE POINT. Wait until you have the full context of knowledge so that blah blah blah, etc., okay? Is that too much to ask?

Betsy Speicher praises Craig Biddle for making a public statement on the McCaskey mess that states the obvious: "A real test of virtue is whether someone is honest, just, and acts with integrity when it is difficult to do so. In this case, Craig could have avoided judging altogether and not have to have come to the painful conclusion that at least one of the people he respected was wrong. He might also have kept his opinion to himself and not exposed himself to the public criticism of, and strained relationships with, people he valued. I don't see any reason for Craig to have gone public at all except that he wanted to prevent an injustice to an innocent man. Thus, Craig showed that he could not only think clearly and come to a rational conclusion, but that he is a man of justice and integrity."