Your formulation of what ethics is, and your claim that there are only these two bases for ethics are based on what?
I myself don't even agree with the formulation of ethics I use in this article. I consent to using the term "ethics" in places I would normally object to using it. I do this to avoid introducing even more complexity and bulk into the article.
Here's my REAL stance:
The two bases for "ethics" I describe are not really two bases for "ethics," but rather two bases for human justification of human action. One is ethical, the other not. All ETHICAL justifications are based in duty, or "obligation" if you prefer. But there's another kind of justification: the NON-ethical justifications. They are based in desire.
This is how *I* see it.
I suspect YOU see it differently, perhaps objecting to the way I regard desire as a form of justification. After all, isn't "justification" an entirely ethical matter? And if so, there can be no such thing as a NON-ethical sub-category of justification. Desire can never be a justification.
You may find this impossible to believe, but I DO see desire as a form of justification, indeed, a NON-ethical form of justification.
Some actions are justified simply because one desires to so act.
Some actions are not justified simply because one desires to so act, but must obtain their justification from an ethical/moral principle.
If I had been true to my meaning in that article, I would have entitled it:
"Did Rand Implicitly Implement the Concept of Duty in Her JUSTIFICATION System?"
And then I would have had to translate her talk of "ethics" into my talk of "justification", which would have been more precise, but also would have doubled the text of the article. But in the light of what I'm learning about moralists who read my article, I think I would have taken the time to write out that extra explanation and let it be double the size. Yes. What I'm learning about moralists is that they cannot conceive of a non-moralistic form of justification for action. As soon as one even hints at the issue of justification for action, all moralists eject matters of desire from their minds and think ultimately in terms of justification criteria that are ANYTHING BUT DESIRE-BASED. Desire may be present in their moral systems, and given some "token" role as a kind of "pseudo-half-quasi-justification," but when push comes to shove, desire is what gets shoved out of justification. Duty or obligation is what's left.
Anyway, given all this, your original question to me might then be re-phrased as follows:
Your formulation of what JUSTIFICATION is, and your claim that there are only these two bases for JUSTIFICATION are based on what?
My answer is as follows:
Introspection and my trust in reports form others. The introspective base of my formulation is this: I examined my own decision criteria for action. In every case, I found that I decided to act (or not) because of my desires. I could not find any moral/ethical justification for my actions. Yes, so by introspection I found that desire can justify action, because that's precisely how it works for me.
So that's what I get from introspection. Now here's what I get from trusting the reports of others: Other people (moralists) DO find moral justification when THEY introspect. They SWEAR that a non-desire-based form of justification exists. They feel some kind of urge to act that comes from a place other than desire, or rather, they recognize some kind of necessity to act that comes from outside their desires. Again, I myself don't feel or recognize these things when I introspect, but who am I to say they are wrong when THEY introspect? I trust them to their word.
(And by the way, I have read the works of non-moralists other than myself who are rather arrogant and dismissive on this issue. They think moralist are deluded mystics who are lying to everyone, in denial and so on. I don't know where they get their certainty on this account. Those folk scare me a bit.)
So anyway, that is where I get my formulation of the two kinds of justification.
Now of course, one might object to my hijacking of the word "justification" just so I can "fantasize" about a desire-based and non-ethical variant of justification. Ok. I can work with that. If anyone so objects, they can have the word "justification" back as an exclusively ethical term. But then we need a new term to describe how it is I decide what actions to take. A word that means "to use desire to decide how to act - and only desire". And, if we create such a word, then we've admitted that action decisions can be made by desire alone. And if we do that, we admit the existence of the very distinction I make in my article, (but just make it under different words). The distinction exists between deciding to act based on desire versus deciding to act based on something other than desire (what I call "obligation" or "duty").
But, if moralist insists that I make my action decisions exactly the same way as any moralist does, then they're invalidating my inner world, accusing me of being the deluded evader and all that. This too I find a bit arrogant and dismissive. This too scares me. I trust moralists when they report their introspections on this issue. Why don't they trust me back?
He he. Well, obviously I've gone way past giving you an answer to your question and have started ranting about some emotionally laden issues on top of the answer I offer. Oi. Sorry. I hope it entertains you anyway.
Did Rand Implicitly Implement the Concept of Duty in Her Moral System?
in Benevolist Ponderings
A blog by Lukon in General
Posted
I myself don't even agree with the formulation of ethics I use in this article. I consent to using the term "ethics" in places I would normally object to using it. I do this to avoid introducing even more complexity and bulk into the article.
Here's my REAL stance:
The two bases for "ethics" I describe are not really two bases for "ethics," but rather two bases for human justification of human action. One is ethical, the other not. All ETHICAL justifications are based in duty, or "obligation" if you prefer. But there's another kind of justification: the NON-ethical justifications. They are based in desire.
This is how *I* see it.
I suspect YOU see it differently, perhaps objecting to the way I regard desire as a form of justification. After all, isn't "justification" an entirely ethical matter? And if so, there can be no such thing as a NON-ethical sub-category of justification. Desire can never be a justification.
You may find this impossible to believe, but I DO see desire as a form of justification, indeed, a NON-ethical form of justification.
Some actions are justified simply because one desires to so act.
Some actions are not justified simply because one desires to so act, but must obtain their justification from an ethical/moral principle.
If I had been true to my meaning in that article, I would have entitled it:
"Did Rand Implicitly Implement the Concept of Duty in Her JUSTIFICATION System?"
And then I would have had to translate her talk of "ethics" into my talk of "justification", which would have been more precise, but also would have doubled the text of the article. But in the light of what I'm learning about moralists who read my article, I think I would have taken the time to write out that extra explanation and let it be double the size. Yes. What I'm learning about moralists is that they cannot conceive of a non-moralistic form of justification for action. As soon as one even hints at the issue of justification for action, all moralists eject matters of desire from their minds and think ultimately in terms of justification criteria that are ANYTHING BUT DESIRE-BASED. Desire may be present in their moral systems, and given some "token" role as a kind of "pseudo-half-quasi-justification," but when push comes to shove, desire is what gets shoved out of justification. Duty or obligation is what's left.
Anyway, given all this, your original question to me might then be re-phrased as follows:
Your formulation of what JUSTIFICATION is, and your claim that there are only these two bases for JUSTIFICATION are based on what?
My answer is as follows:
Introspection and my trust in reports form others. The introspective base of my formulation is this: I examined my own decision criteria for action. In every case, I found that I decided to act (or not) because of my desires. I could not find any moral/ethical justification for my actions. Yes, so by introspection I found that desire can justify action, because that's precisely how it works for me.
So that's what I get from introspection. Now here's what I get from trusting the reports of others: Other people (moralists) DO find moral justification when THEY introspect. They SWEAR that a non-desire-based form of justification exists. They feel some kind of urge to act that comes from a place other than desire, or rather, they recognize some kind of necessity to act that comes from outside their desires. Again, I myself don't feel or recognize these things when I introspect, but who am I to say they are wrong when THEY introspect? I trust them to their word.
(And by the way, I have read the works of non-moralists other than myself who are rather arrogant and dismissive on this issue. They think moralist are deluded mystics who are lying to everyone, in denial and so on. I don't know where they get their certainty on this account. Those folk scare me a bit.)
So anyway, that is where I get my formulation of the two kinds of justification.
Now of course, one might object to my hijacking of the word "justification" just so I can "fantasize" about a desire-based and non-ethical variant of justification. Ok. I can work with that. If anyone so objects, they can have the word "justification" back as an exclusively ethical term. But then we need a new term to describe how it is I decide what actions to take. A word that means "to use desire to decide how to act - and only desire". And, if we create such a word, then we've admitted that action decisions can be made by desire alone. And if we do that, we admit the existence of the very distinction I make in my article, (but just make it under different words). The distinction exists between deciding to act based on desire versus deciding to act based on something other than desire (what I call "obligation" or "duty").
But, if moralist insists that I make my action decisions exactly the same way as any moralist does, then they're invalidating my inner world, accusing me of being the deluded evader and all that. This too I find a bit arrogant and dismissive. This too scares me. I trust moralists when they report their introspections on this issue. Why don't they trust me back?
He he. Well, obviously I've gone way past giving you an answer to your question and have started ranting about some emotionally laden issues on top of the answer I offer. Oi. Sorry. I hope it entertains you anyway.
-Luke-