Lukon

Michael wrote: I agree. I strive to ground my understanding of morality vs. non-morality in epistemology because I see the relevance in so doing. Really? I thought I was actually applying concepts to consciousness. I mean, what does it mean to reject such practice? Perhaps you mean that I'm applying ANTI-concepts to consciousness. Is this just a complicated way of saying I'm confused? And why would you claim I'm replacing knowledge with feelings? Do you really think I regard something as true because I desire it to be true? Do you really think I'm a subjectivist? Where did you get this notion about me? In what post did I even implicitly claim that desire determines truth? I agree. It is not an axiom or fundamental. Not so. I'm not seeking to make non-moralism into a fundamental. Other non-moralists (especially in the anarchist crowd) might try to do this, but not me. But I AM trying to challenge the notion that morality IS fundamental. I am suggesting that an alternative exists. Morality AND non-morality may BOTH be valid theories relevant to epistemology. I'm not trying to make either trump the other. I'm not saying morality is invalid. But YOU are definitely saying non-morality is invalid. (Aren't you?) I'm disappointed that I give that impression. I, Luke, encourage and applaud MICHAEL checking this premise too, but I too want to caution against a preconceived result in any inquiry. A speculation is one thing and we all have to do that before investigating anything. A belief seeking to become a fact despite any and all knowledge that may be encountered is quite another. Yae! We're on the same page! But here's the thing: You, Michael, keep bringing up epistemology and saying that my challenges to morality's universality are an error in epistemological understanding. You also mention the book, ITOE as a reference for what I'm missing, asking whether I have read it. Yes, by the way. I have read it. I loved that book. But it has been many years since reading it. Now, I wonder whether you could do me a favor and tell me what specific passages from ITOE you would like me to read again so that I can satisfy your insistence that I become more informed. You understand, I'm just trying to avoid reading EVERYTHING over again. That's a lot of work. And I have both versions of the book, the expanded second edition too. So you can cite either one. -Luke-

Thanks for the clarification, Brant. You claim: I think I can see your point here. If "moral agent" is defined precisely as someone who has volition, then I leave open the possibility that I am indeed a moral agent. I may indeed have volition. And if I do, then I am a moral agent by this definition of yours. But if I am a moral agent, if I do have volition, then we arrive at the next issue. I think, according to Objectivism, the fact of our volition is what makes morality necessary. One needs morality to "guide" the choices one makes. Otherwise, the choices made would be random or something. I reject this premise. It is too narrow. Why must volition be "guided" only by morality? Why can't desire guide it instead? I say desire can guide volition just as effectively as do moral (sometimes desire-void) values. Why limit this role of "volition guide" to just one category of human drive? I don't get it. If I am a moral agent, I am one who can't see morality as a guide for my volition. I am a non-moral, moral agent. -Luke-

To Barbara's second, additional post, in which she begins: Good question. Here is my answer, which comprises my attempt to define and describe desire many years ago: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ DESIRE aka WANT: ...is a non-definable, phenomenological primary. One of the two motivations (aversion being the other), the referent of the word "desire" is learned by "sharing" the experience of desire for a common set of objects, usually those evoking pleasure. It is merely assumed that we all feel desire for these common objects by similarity of our actions toward them, such as grabbing them. [Luke Turner] DESIRE aka WANT: Desire is a phenomenological primary for which a full, formal definition cannot be given. In place of a formal definition, descriptive analogies can be offered. Desire is the soul's magnet turned to attraction. Desire is one of the two motivations, the other being aversion. Where desire attracts, aversion repels. DISCUSSION: Metaphorically speaking, desire is a rubber band born stretched between the subject and (certain) object(s) of individuating consciousness. This band pressures to unite subject with object(s) in a state of non-individuating consciousness (i.e., mimesistic consciousness). Hence desire pressures to undo itself by uniting the very things which in their separation allowed desire to exist. Hence we may, with Freud, claim that all desire is ultimately a desire not to desire. I would not go this far. For we can also desire to desire. We can also desire some of our desires remain frustrated. Hence I don't feel the need to posit any death instinct, as an extension of the nirvana principle, as did Fruid, to explain desire. I don't posit anything at all, in fact, to explain desire. Desire is a phenomenological primary for me. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Desire is intentional, pleasure is phenomenal. ----------------------------------------------------------------- MAXIMS OF DESIRE 1. For any given object of consciousness, there can be one and only one desire relation. 2. For any given desire relation, there can be one and only one object. (Note: Desire relation means: An instance of desire, in a given individual subject, of specific type and degree - such as positive want of specific degree.) 3. Likewise, there is no such thing as ambivalent desire(s) for a single object at one time. [Luke Turner] And now here's a definition I fond terribly circular: DESIRE: An emotional appetite available to anyone who has an exciting goal and has begun moving toward it. [bob Moawad, Unlocking Your Potential Student's Guide; Unit 9, P62] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Incidentally, I don't recall a definition for desire ever appearing in a published work on Objectivism. But this leads to your next item about Nathaniel's definition for emotion. Now, this definition seems ok to me as long as it doesn't subsume desire. I don't currently think of desire as a mere emotion – not in the strictest sense. So I would object to this definition if it were implied that desire were included. I say this because, if this definition applies to desire as well, then it would seem terribly circular to me. To see what I'm talking about, let's narrow the definition down to desire. "A DESIRE is the psychosomatic form in which a person experiences his esimate of the beneficial or harmful relationship of some aspect of reality to himself." According to such a definition, desire is a form of an experience of an estimation of benefit or harm. This makes a distinction between the estimation of benefit or harm on the one hand, and one's EXPERIENCE of that estimation on the other. The estimating is one thing, and the experience of it is another. Not only that, but I get the impression that the estimating has primacy in this relationship. One must first do the estimating before one can experience it. The doing has causal primacy over experiencing the doing. Hence, one must first estimate benefit or harm before one can feel a desire. First estimate, then desire. Here's the circularity: To feel desire, I must first estimate benefit or harm. But to estimate benefit or harm, I must first desire. For a non-moralist like me, I have only the gratification of desire as a standard by which I can measure benefit or harm. Something benefits me if it supports the gratification of my desire. Something harms me if it frustrates my desire. This makes the definition circular to me because it defines desire as dependent on desire. This circularity applies only to ME as a NON-MORALIST. You moralists won't have this circularity problem because you can estimate benefit or harm based on desire-void values instead of desire. For you, desires can arise out of desire-void estimations of benefit or harm to your desire-void values. But I beg you not to embrace this limiting definition because it limits the causes of desire to only your moralistic view of desire. In you, desires may be caused by desire-void moral estimations. But that doesn't mean desires are caused that way in ME. I claim to work differently inside. If you claim I don't work differently inside, you need to provide a supporting argument to that effect. I affirm your assumptions. Yes. These are my desires. I must disagree, based on the argument I presented in my previous reply to you. All these above aren't necessarily my "values." They are more precisely and unequivocally my DESIRES, resulting from the intensity with which I DESIRE my life. As for values, I won't even use that term because sometimes it means desire, but sometimes it means desire-void goals instead. Talk of values is tricky. There's that "deontological glitch" I mentioned in that other post. I won't buy into that deontological glitch. When I use the word "desire," I mean only desire, precisely because I don't want to be mistaken for talking about desire-void values instead. The term "value" is a bate-and-switch" package deal. I won't take that bate. I won't take that package. Well, not without a sound argument at least. So, if a moral code is a code of values, I don't have a moral code because I don't operate by values, but by desire alone. -Luke-

Thanks for your contribution to this discussion, Barbara. Forgive me if I ignore for now some of your specific points. I want to latch on to one basic premise that I believe rests under your entire post here. I believe your analysis rests on a very important distinction between desires and values. But I believe this distinction fails to support the necessity of morality. I believe this distinction is useful in further amplifying the general distinction between Objectivist ethics and non-morality. Nothing more. This distinction disproves neither Objectivist ethics nor non-morality. it merely drive the axe between them a bit deeper. And I think this is useful in helping moralists imagine the possibility of a non-moralist like myself. So here's my discussion on the issue: According to Objectivism, values are that which we act to gain and/or keep. This definition does not specify the subjective feelings that may or may not provoke us to so act. Sometimes a value is pursued from one's desire for it. But sometimes a value is pursued for reasons other than one's desire for it. Values may therefore be pursued regardless of subjective desires, even contrary to desires – and vice versa. As Peikoff states in OPAR Page 268: "The satisfaction of a desire, accordingly, is not necessarily a value; it may be a disvalue." Now observe: it is possible to pursue values we do not desire. Or even less harmonious, it is possible to pursue values against which we have a strong aversion. Pursuing some values means doing things we don't want to do, or doing things we hate and fear. The values exemplified here are what I call "desire-void," they are to be pursued regardless of our desires, even in opposition to our desires. (This subset of values that are to be pursued against desire I call the "deontological glitch of objectivist ethics.") Now, my problem is that I can't, for all honesty, understand what a desire-void value is. Why would anyone pursue something they don't want, or something they hate or fear? I can't figure this one out. Moralists of all flavors swear they do it regularly. All moralists insist with great vehemence that certain values are to be pursued REGARDLESS of desires, and in OPPOSITION to desires if necessary. And moralists swear they can't imagine a person who lacked the recognition of such desire-void values. All I know about desire-void values is what moralists report about them. I have no first-person experience of them. And what I can gather so far is that desire-void values are experienced as similar to desire, in that they urge one to act, but that they are simply not the same thing as desire. Objectivism stresses causal consequences in the derivation of its values. One needs to look at the causal consequences of reality to measure the particular value of a given action. The standard of this measurement should be something called an "ultimate value," which, in the case of Objectivism is "Human life qua human life." Objectivism's ultimate value is also one of these desire-void values. One is to pursue one's life qua human life REGARDLESS of one's desires, and even in OPPOSITION to desires if necessary. The supposed consequence and purpose of such a desire-void pursuit is a state called "happiness." Happiness, according to Objectivism, is the psychological state caused by achieving one's values. And this means a person can become happy even by achieving some values that are desire-void. One can become happy even by frustrating desires, so long as one achieves some desire-oppositional value in so doing. In short, one can be happy while experiencing the misery of frustrated desires. And this seems like a bizarre notion of happiness to me. But if objectivists want to define happiness in such a bizarre way, I'll not argue. I'll just avoid using the term "happiness" when I want to express my concern for whether people get what they want, i.e., when I want to express my benevolence. But the bottom line concerning Objectivism's ultimate value is that it is DESIRE-VOID. It is to be pursued REGARDLESS of our desires, in OPPOSITION to our desires if necessary. But since one can be miserable achieving this value, I don't accept it as MY ultimate value. MY ultimate value is the gratification of my most intense desires. One of my most intense desires is in fact to live qua human. I do act to stay alive, and by means uniquely human. I do so because I desire to, not in spite of my desiring to. I pursue many of the same values as do Objectivists. But I do so because I desire it. My values are all desire-based – ALL of them. My ultimate desirous value is gratification. All other of my desirous values are measured against that ultimate desirous value of mine. I measure the value of life qua human against my ultimate value of gratification. I know from looking at reality that I must stay alive to achieve significant gratification. Another of my strongest desires is benevolence toward others. I know that to live by my own productivity is most compatible with my benevolence toward others. Therefore, to live by my own productivity is also one of my desire-based values. Speaking for myself only, I don't need desire-void values to do any of this. Desire does the job just fine, for me. -Luke-

I wrote: And Brant replied: I never claimed otherwise on this forum. I never claimed to be an objectivist here. I respect the integrity of Objectivism as an integrated whole. I would not insult that integrity by trying to make my non-moralism fit into Objectivism. If this is an attack on my moral character, the ironic thing about it is that I can't feel any injury from this attack because I claim to have no moral sensibilities whatever. Your sward runs me through my "moral organ," but I don't feel it because I can't detect the very existence of any moral organs. Where are they? Where is the damage to mine? But, if this is an attack on more than just my moral character, and is also an expression of malevolence toward me, then I do feel the injury. I feel hurt that you want me to suffer the lack of your respect. If you meant to hurt me, I'll acknowledge your malevolence and do my best to avoid you. I myself wish you no harm. So, please make yourself clear. Do you harbor malevolence toward me? But let's address something of substance here too: Does this translate to: if I were honestly a non-moralist I could not know the truth about whether or not I was a non-moralist? Are you referring to the link between morality and epistemology, i.e., that truth can be distinguished from falsehood only by the moral choice to focus? Are you then implying that my claim to be a non-moralist implies that I regard that claim as true, which in turn implies that I made a moral choice to focus on reality enough to distinguish truth from falsehood? If so, I reject this assertion of yours. I can focus on reality and distinguish truth from falsehood by simply DESIRING to focus as such. I don't need morality to do it. -Luke-

You ask how I chose between right and wrong. My answer is that I don't. I do not understand right and wrong. I have no moral sensibilities. You speculate that I had to start out as a moralist, from an upbringing perspective. This is true. I used to think of myself as a moralist. It used to make perfect, common sense for me to ask "What is the right thing for me to do?" and "What SHOULD I do?" For many years I was even an Objectivist moralist. But I began to check my premises in this issue, to introspect with an ever increasing logical rigor. And when I introspected this way, I honestly found no such thing as "right" and "wrong" and "should". As I reflected on all the instances in which I used these moral terms, it appeared to me that I was just talking about what I desire. I had been dressing up my subjective desires in the disguise of objective morality. So once I discovered this mental self-trickery, I made an effort to stop. This is my experience with losing my morality. I'm not sure I understand you here. Are you expressing worry that since my behavior is governed by desire, I will be just as likely to be governed by MALevolence as I am BENevolence? -Luke-

Yes. My post was a response to yours. If my response was unrecognizable as a proper response, please ignore it. I obviously misunderstood you. -Luke-

Mindy addressed my challenge to something we've been calling "premise 3", since it is "premise 3" in the following argument: I challenged premise 3, saying that there exists a type of interest that does not require morality. (I call it "desire".) Mindy replied as follows: Ok, so thanks for addressing the issue further, Mindy. I'll now respond. First Mindy claims: You apparently think I have mistaken "moral code" as the relevant part of morality, such that when I reject premise 3, I'm really rejecting this mistaken version of premise 3: According to you, the truly relevant part of morality I need to consider is what you call the "moral option," which looks a lot like a cooperation between volition and preferences: Thus, when I objected to premise 3, that is, when I objected to ALL interest being moral, it was because I had the wrong idea of what morality is. So once I grasp the relevant aspect of morality, I'll see that morality DOES subsume ALL interest. Unfortunately, this argument fails on me. I still reject premise 3, even when I understand morality as the "moral option" instead of just "moral code." I say there's a type of interest that does not rely on what you call "moral option." Given the "awareness of an alternative," you say one must also have something called a "preference" for one of the alternatives. Normally, I would think of "preference" as a "ranking among desires whose gratifications conflict in reality," but you apparently want to use "preference" in a way that has nothing to do with desire. If you let "preference" mean desire, then you'd have to admit the validity of my notion that desire could be the very kind of interest we've been talking about all along. So you have to mean a desire-void kind of preference. You mean a MORAL kind of preference. Ok. I'll play "preference" by your meaning for now. I'll let you use the word "preference" to mean a way of deciding among alternatives that isn't necessarily desire. So again, you say that deciding among alternatives is done by desire-void preference. But I may still object to this narrow idea of how we select among alternatives. I say desire can do the job too. You moralists may use desire-void "preference" to do it. But we non-moralists use desire to do it. And thus we return to my original objection to premise 3. Interest does not comprise ONLY this thing you call [desire-void] "preference". Interest can also include desire. -Luke-

That's a substantive argument. Thanks for offering it, Michael. Of course I object precisely to this view of what's required for valid concept formation. I say one can form objective concepts from a DESIRE to do so. Desire-driven concept formation does not condemn one to mental retardation. The requirement for forming objective concepts is a focus on perceptually given reality. This focus can be initiated and maintained by the DESIRE to do so. No further forms of "evaluation" are necessary. Moral beings can initiate and maintain focus by complying with a moral code that obligates them to do so. (Or, "acting according to their values," if you prefer.) Non-moral beings can do the same thing by just wanting to. I myself WANT to focus on perceptual reality when forming concepts, and to check abstract ones by reducing them to perceptual reality. Desire is not always an enemy of focus! A mind "flooded" with desires may or may not be able to focus. This is true. But if a that mind's flood of desires includes one dominating desire to focus, then focus shall happen. Just because a mind is full of desire, it does not follow that desire shall determine the conceptual content of that mind. Whenever desire has anything to do with concept-formation, it does not always lead to subjectivism or retardation. Again, when the desire in command is the desire to focus, objectivity results. I can be objective, and the reason for my objectivity can be because I desire to. Desire need not determine the content of one's ideas, as in "I believe it's true because I want it to be true." Desire can direct one's mind to reality for the source of one's ideas, as in "I believe it's true because I wanted to focus on reality, and this belief is the result." So please, do not condemn desire as a necessary agent of distortion and subjectivity. HEAR ME: I DO RECOGNIZE THAT WHEN WE DEPART OBJECTIVITY, UNCHECKED DESIRE IS NEARLY ALWAYS THE REASON. There is no need to beat this point into my head any further. Objectivity does require that we keep desires out of the role of "cognition tool." This is what it would mean to keep desires in check: prevent desires from making us drop context, or making us go beyond context. I suspect most Objectivists agree that volition can keep our desires in check like this. But volition isn't the only thing. An overruling desire to keep desires in check can also do it. Yes, provided one has a very unique and over-ruling desire to keep all the other desires in check, objectivity can be achieved. I sometimes call it a "watchdog desire," based on the image of a guardian watchdog who repels all the other desires. Woof! Woof! A head flooded with desires isn't always a head full of chaos. The desires in one's head may conflict one another, but there can be an order to it, an order of ranking, an order of priorities. One single desire can overturn all those with which it conflicts. If this one single desire is the desire to focus on reality while thinking, then the other conflicting desires are kept in check. Objectivity results. So again, I say morality is not the only source of objectivity and truth. A cognitive watchdog desire can do it too. Now, if my case is valid, then it supports the notion that a non-moralist can exist. And not just a retarded one either. A logically proficient human non-moralist, can exist.

That's really interesting. This is what I would call the "convergence of obligation and desire" - when their aims converge on the same goal. It is precisely the case in which compliance with a moral obligation is instantiated by that same state of affairs as the gratification of a desire. This is an intricate issue to unravel. And I would therefore like to postpone it for a separate posted topic of its own. -Luke-

This bothers me. These pets did not wander into your house. You accepted the responsibility to care for them, or to make other provisions such as finding another owner for them when you adopted them. You most certainly have an obligation to carry out voluntarily chosen responsibilities. That is why having a pet is an important lesson for children. Were you raised by wolves? I'm sorry it bothers you. I don't mean to bother people on purpose. But I obviously disagree with your response to it. I can care for pets without feeling things like "responsibility" and "obligation". My DESIRE to care for them is quite enough. You apparently worry that if I lack moral feelings of "responsibility" or "obligation" I'll necessarily hurt my pets by starving them, neglecting them, or by outright assault. Don't my feelings of sympathy, empathy, compassion, and benevolence count for anything? And what about what Nathaniel Branden called the "Mutnik Principle"? All these are causes and categories of desire. And they assure my care for my pets. -Luke-

Thanks for keeping this argument current, Ted. Yes. Mindy's argument is substantial. I took time to analyze it into a progression of essential statements. And I then explained why it failed to convince me. But here's my version of her argument: So far, Mindy has not objected my paraphrasing of her argument. So I'll assume it is valid for now. The reason her argument fails to convince me is that I object to premise 3. I don't agree that all types of interest require morality. There is a non-moralistic type of interest that I call "desire." And yes, desire can create a serious preference for truth over falsehood - a SERIOUS one at that. Well, they can demand it all they want. Expecting it is another story. LOL But I get what you mean here. Anyway, the quoted statement would hold if morality was the exclusive domain of interests in truth. But I contest this very point. And so far, nobody has explicitly addressed it. -Luke-

Hmm, this sounds a bit like playing semantic games to me. Do you mean that it wouldn't have bothered you if your pets had been starved? Or do you say that you just desired that they wouldn't starve? If so, what is then in fact the difference with saying that you felt obligated to feed them? I guess you were not indifferent to their fate and that you wouldn't as easily have decided not to feed them (because you didn't desire that action, or more accurately: inaction). In that case we're talking about a feeling of obligation. A feeling of obligation doesn't need an outside source like a guru or a priest who will tell you what you should do. Thanks for considering this issue, DF. Let me try a reply here. The latter. I simply DESIRED they not starve. I DESIRED my pets to enjoy their lives, free of sufferings and pains, including the pains of hunger. To feel OBLIGATED to feed them would mean that I felt some kind of drive to feed them that was in no way a form of desire, nor derived from desire. It is like seeing something as a goal to be achieved, but feeling no desire for that goal, such that the goal is what I would call a desire-void goal. This is the beast way I know how to describe an obligation to you. I claim not to feel such things, so I'm not working from introspection here. I'm just describing it based on what I can imply from the reports of others who DO claim to feel such things. You guess correctly. My strong preference is to feed them, for the reasons already stated. Well, not by the definition of obligation I offer. The preference I have (that my pets enjoy and thrive) seem like a goal well grounded in desire. I totally agree. Based on my definition for "obligation" as a desire-void goal, the goal need not be assigned by an external authority. The origins of this desire-void goal are not specified. The closest thing to an obligation I can imagine experiencing is a desire so strong that I cannot resist seeking it's gratification. Because of this, I have been tempted to claim that "obligation" is just irresistibly strong desire. But moralist reject this. They hold that obligation is desire-void. I trust their word on this. -Luke-

Can I imagine a person merely desiring and expecting this to fulfill his needs, like food and shelter? I sure can. I can imagine lots of them. Thanks for your thoughts, Micheal. This appears to be your answer, then. You can imagine a person going through life deciding what to do exclusively by desire. Is this so? -Luke-

Hard to say. Did you ever have a pet? If so, did you feel obligated to feed it? I have had pets. I never felt obligated to feed them. But I did feel a DESIRE to feed them. -Luke-

My next questions: 1. If it would be difficult, would it still be possible? Are you admitting that it would at least be possible? 2. Why would it be difficult? I believe I feel no sense of "obligation," yet I find this condition really easy. I don't have to work at achieving it. It is my default state, normal. In fact, I find it impossible for me to feel an "obligation." The only difficult thing about my lack of "obligation sense" is trying to convince others that I do indeed lack it. -Luke-

Oh, and well then, let me ask you this: Can you imagine a person who had no such "code of values used as a guide"? Can a person exist who was "guided" by DESIRES instead of "values"? -Luke-

I have a question on the wording in this premise. Shouldn't morality be about right and wrong? I understand that truth (right) and falsehood (wrong) could fit under morality, but it is not as all-encompassing as right and wrong. Or were you being specific in selecting truth and falsehood (based on Mindy's response)? ~ Shane Thanks for prompting clarification on this issue, Shane. To answer your question, I intended to limit the context of "right/wrong" to matters of truth versus falsehood. The larger context of "right" versus "wrong" is too ambiguous, and can lead to confusion between COGNITIVE right/wrong versus MORAL right/wrong. Let me emphatically state that I mean ONLY matters of truth versus falsehood in premise 1. And I think Mindy means it this way too. That's the only way the proposed demonstration of a contradiction can work. -Luke-

Thanks for commenting, GS. It sounds to me like you do recognize a distinction between moral obligation and feelings of want, of desire. So my question for you is whether you can imagine someone living their life without feeling moral obligations. Is it possible? Psychology has cataloged many cases of people who lack the capacity for certain experiences. Perhaps a person could lack moral obligation, no? -Luke-

Thanks for your comment, Michael. Yes, I suppose our definitions for morality disagree, or they might actually agree when analyzed further. I won't get into this now. But your definition does remind me of Peikoff's definition, especially the "nothing more" part. -Luke-

Thanks for joining THIS fray, Mindy. Your demonstration of contradiction is a start. But it still confuses me a bit. So let's look at it again: To make sure I understand you correctly, consider my paraphrasing as follows: Premise 1: Skepticism about the validity of morality requires an interest in distinguishing truth from falsehood. Premise 2: An interest in distinguishing truth from falsehood is a type of interest. Premise 3: All types of interest require morality. Conclusion: Therefore, skepticism about the validity of morality requires morality. Doubt affirms that which has been doubted. Doubt implies certainty. "A" is "not-A." This fits the model of the Stolen Concept fallacy, the fallacy of affirming (or even just considering) a concept while denying the epistemological roots of the concept. In this case, the stolen concept is "non-morality". This argument fails to convince me because I don't buy premise 3. I don't think all types of interest require morality. I believe in a non-moral type of interest that I call "desire". Even stronger, I believe in a non-moral type of interest that we all call "whim" – a "whim" being a desire that one does not care the origins or causes. I believe people can distinguish truth from falsehood because they have a whim desire to do so. They can seek the truth because they desire to. And they can desire to for reasons they don't know, nor care to know. So, for me to fully grasp the contradiction of non-morality, I first need to be convinced that morality has a monopoly on any interest in truth. -Luke-

Yes. Does your "yes" answer depend on the axiomatic status of volition? -Luke- What do you mean by depend? The idea that volition exists and is axiomatic (which I do believe) certainly wasn't explicit in my mind when I answered you. Well, more precisely my question is whether you think the denial of morality leads to a demonstrable logical contradiction, the way denying the axioms does. I just took a guess that an Objectivist who wanted to demonstrate such a logical contradiction would somehow use the axiomatic status of volition to support that demonstration. If my guess was wrong, please forgive me. But regardless, I am still interested in my more precise question: Do you think the denial of morality leads to a demonstrable logical contradiction? And if so, I don't expect you to demonstrate that contradiction. That may be more laborious that you want to undertake, and I could respect that. But if you happen to know of a demonstration that already exists somewhere, I'd appreciate a reference to it. I'm looking for a demonstration that expresses the contradiction most clearly. -Luke-

I myself don't even agree with the formulation of ethics I use in this article. I consent to using the term "ethics" in places I would normally object to using it. I do this to avoid introducing even more complexity and bulk into the article. Here's my REAL stance: The two bases for "ethics" I describe are not really two bases for "ethics," but rather two bases for human justification of human action. One is ethical, the other not. All ETHICAL justifications are based in duty, or "obligation" if you prefer. But there's another kind of justification: the NON-ethical justifications. They are based in desire. This is how *I* see it. I suspect YOU see it differently, perhaps objecting to the way I regard desire as a form of justification. After all, isn't "justification" an entirely ethical matter? And if so, there can be no such thing as a NON-ethical sub-category of justification. Desire can never be a justification. You may find this impossible to believe, but I DO see desire as a form of justification, indeed, a NON-ethical form of justification. Some actions are justified simply because one desires to so act. Some actions are not justified simply because one desires to so act, but must obtain their justification from an ethical/moral principle. If I had been true to my meaning in that article, I would have entitled it: "Did Rand Implicitly Implement the Concept of Duty in Her JUSTIFICATION System?" And then I would have had to translate her talk of "ethics" into my talk of "justification", which would have been more precise, but also would have doubled the text of the article. But in the light of what I'm learning about moralists who read my article, I think I would have taken the time to write out that extra explanation and let it be double the size. Yes. What I'm learning about moralists is that they cannot conceive of a non-moralistic form of justification for action. As soon as one even hints at the issue of justification for action, all moralists eject matters of desire from their minds and think ultimately in terms of justification criteria that are ANYTHING BUT DESIRE-BASED. Desire may be present in their moral systems, and given some "token" role as a kind of "pseudo-half-quasi-justification," but when push comes to shove, desire is what gets shoved out of justification. Duty or obligation is what's left. Anyway, given all this, your original question to me might then be re-phrased as follows: Your formulation of what JUSTIFICATION is, and your claim that there are only these two bases for JUSTIFICATION are based on what? My answer is as follows: Introspection and my trust in reports form others. The introspective base of my formulation is this: I examined my own decision criteria for action. In every case, I found that I decided to act (or not) because of my desires. I could not find any moral/ethical justification for my actions. Yes, so by introspection I found that desire can justify action, because that's precisely how it works for me. So that's what I get from introspection. Now here's what I get from trusting the reports of others: Other people (moralists) DO find moral justification when THEY introspect. They SWEAR that a non-desire-based form of justification exists. They feel some kind of urge to act that comes from a place other than desire, or rather, they recognize some kind of necessity to act that comes from outside their desires. Again, I myself don't feel or recognize these things when I introspect, but who am I to say they are wrong when THEY introspect? I trust them to their word. (And by the way, I have read the works of non-moralists other than myself who are rather arrogant and dismissive on this issue. They think moralist are deluded mystics who are lying to everyone, in denial and so on. I don't know where they get their certainty on this account. Those folk scare me a bit.) So anyway, that is where I get my formulation of the two kinds of justification. Now of course, one might object to my hijacking of the word "justification" just so I can "fantasize" about a desire-based and non-ethical variant of justification. Ok. I can work with that. If anyone so objects, they can have the word "justification" back as an exclusively ethical term. But then we need a new term to describe how it is I decide what actions to take. A word that means "to use desire to decide how to act - and only desire". And, if we create such a word, then we've admitted that action decisions can be made by desire alone. And if we do that, we admit the existence of the very distinction I make in my article, (but just make it under different words). The distinction exists between deciding to act based on desire versus deciding to act based on something other than desire (what I call "obligation" or "duty"). But, if moralist insists that I make my action decisions exactly the same way as any moralist does, then they're invalidating my inner world, accusing me of being the deluded evader and all that. This too I find a bit arrogant and dismissive. This too scares me. I trust moralists when they report their introspections on this issue. Why don't they trust me back? He he. Well, obviously I've gone way past giving you an answer to your question and have started ranting about some emotionally laden issues on top of the answer I offer. Oi. Sorry. I hope it entertains you anyway. -Luke-

Yes. Does your "yes" answer depend on the axiomatic status of volition? -Luke-

Now THAT is a real answer. So this answer essentially says: "No. I can't imagine an alternative to morality, and you can't either. EVERYONE already is a moralist by absolute necessity." I take this to be your essential answer. Don't you? -Luke-