Mindy Newton

This is a first-rate challenge, deserving close attention, because one of the great gaps in Objectivism is its lack of a fully-developed philosophy of mind. Rand's ~Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology~ is a brilliant contribution, but it is only 80-odd pages and is merely an ~introduction~ to ~but one~ area of epistemology, albeit a central one, the theory of concepts. Of the two points raised above, the first is the juicier. The senses are not used in introspection, so how do we integrate into concepts the results of introspection? I think Rand provided the answer. Didn't she say we examine introspections ~as if~ they were external concretes? Thus the 'mind's eye' integrates lower order observations of internal states into wider abstractions in the same manner that it integrates lower order external perceptions into higher order abstractions. So lack of appetite, absence of motivation, flatness of spirit and indifference to values becomes 'I'm depressed', just as observing thousands of varieties of amphibians and reptiles becomes 'herpetology.' The process is similar when we consider the introspections of others. Their words, their mannerisms, their gestures, their reactions are treated as perceptions which we integrate into conceptual judgements about their inner states -- which we cannot observe directly. We proceed, however, ~as if~ we could, though much more cautiously, because our conjectures depend for confirmation on the person under study. 'As if' is of course merely a starting point, much more analysis and demonstration is required. But Le chaim29 is certainly correct to challenge the O'ist definition of reason. For, while reason does indeed integrate the material provided by the senses, it does other important things which are not immediately implied by the definition. I take a look at some of these topics in the chapter on the faculty of reason in my recent book, ~Old Nick's Guide to Happiness~. For instance, how does one advocate and defend 'volitional consciousness' when it is evident that much of our thinking is done quite unconsciously by the subconscious mind? We shouldn't worry about these things. Objectivism is in its infancy. So is the science of psychology, and that's been around a heck of lot longer. There's just an awful lot more work to be done. Nicholas Dykes Isn't it the means of achieving that lowest level of self-observation that is at issue? Aren't we already introspecting when we conclude that our appetite has changed, that our usual motivations are weaker, etc.? I agree that the self-diagnosis of depression is the use of reason, and that the data it comprises are introspective, however, it doesn't, I think, get us any closer to understanding introspective self-observation. --Mindy Isn't all data partially represented by numbers? --Brant No. Numbers can be assigned to whatever can be conceived as a multiple or quantity of some kind. None of our sensory data comes to us in the form of numbers. As far as translating everything into a measurement of some sort, note that not even all lengths are commensurable. Ilove scallops. The taste of scallops doesn't involve any numbers. It involves the operation of things which could be numbered, as in how many taste buds react to the chemical stimuli of scallops...but the taste of scallops isn't given in numbers at all. For "number-metaphysicians" note that numbers, counting, and measurement are all secondary to and dependent on some prior classification. A one-to-one correspondence between, e.g., sheep and pebbles depends on having conceptualized sheep and having conceptualized pebbles. Numbers are derivative on concepts, not the other way around. --Mindy

This is a first-rate challenge, deserving close attention, because one of the great gaps in Objectivism is its lack of a fully-developed philosophy of mind. Rand's ~Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology~ is a brilliant contribution, but it is only 80-odd pages and is merely an ~introduction~ to ~but one~ area of epistemology, albeit a central one, the theory of concepts. Of the two points raised above, the first is the juicier. The senses are not used in introspection, so how do we integrate into concepts the results of introspection? I think Rand provided the answer. Didn’t she say we examine introspections ~as if~ they were external concretes? Thus the ‘mind’s eye’ integrates lower order observations of internal states into wider abstractions in the same manner that it integrates lower order external perceptions into higher order abstractions. So lack of appetite, absence of motivation, flatness of spirit and indifference to values becomes ‘I’m depressed’, just as observing thousands of varieties of amphibians and reptiles becomes 'herpetology.' The process is similar when we consider the introspections of others. Their words, their mannerisms, their gestures, their reactions are treated as perceptions which we integrate into conceptual judgements about their inner states -- which we cannot observe directly. We proceed, however, ~as if~ we could, though much more cautiously, because our conjectures depend for confirmation on the person under study. ‘As if’ is of course merely a starting point, much more analysis and demonstration is required. But Le chaim29 is certainly correct to challenge the O’ist definition of reason. For, while reason does indeed integrate the material provided by the senses, it does other important things which are not immediately implied by the definition. I take a look at some of these topics in the chapter on the faculty of reason in my recent book, ~Old Nick’s Guide to Happiness~. For instance, how does one advocate and defend 'volitional consciousness' when it is evident that much of our thinking is done quite unconsciously by the subconscious mind? We shouldn't worry about these things. Objectivism is in its infancy. So is the science of psychology, and that's been around a heck of lot longer. There's just an awful lot more work to be done. Nicholas Dykes Isn't it the means of achieving that lowest level of self-observation that is at issue? Aren't we already introspecting when we conclude that our appetite has changed, that our usual motivations are weaker, etc.? I agree that the self-diagnosis of depression is the use of reason, and that the data it comprises are introspective, however, it doesn't, I think, get us any closer to understanding introspective self-observation. --Mindy

Quote of Paul Mawdsley: Science has done a wonderful job with local causation as its guide but the best I can gather is that we lack a mechanism for non-local causation. I have been playing around with a causal mechanism for nonlocal causation--i.e.: a physical mechanism that produces an effect on an entity's behaviour without acting on it with some type of force. In essence it works by the subtraction of force that is otherwise constant, or it can be stated positively as the change in the degrees of freedom available to an entities action potential. Would dissipation of heat, by a heat-sink, be an example of "an effect on an entity's behavior without acting on it with some type of force?" --Mindy