regi

Yes, unless you lied when you said, "x exists." Did you? "Exists," means "is." If the relationship between existence and reality are a problem for you, please see: <a href="http://www.usabig.com/iindv/articles_stand/metap_1.html"><b>"Introduction to Metaphysics"</b></a> Randy

No reason to be sorry. I like blunt. I wasn't referring to any mystic idea of personhood, nor was I referring to some mystic "something" within anything, I was referring the epistemological fact of an existent's identity. Every existent's identity is whatever attributes identify it. In the case of an individual human being each has those attributes that identify them as members of the class of exitents (universal) called human (e.g living, conscious, rational, mammal, etc.) plus whatever attributes differentiate the individual from all other human beings, (specific parents, unique history and relationships, unique psychological characteristics, etc.) which is there "identity" as an individual existent. I'm not fond of the term essence, but if it has a meaning it must be the same as identity. Is that better? I'd be more blunt if I could be.

On an Objectivist forum one poster recently wrote: "Benjamin Franklin wanted to achieve moral perfection so he wrote in a journal and marked in his journal everytime he violated one of his virtues... I want to do something similar but with the Objectivist virtues ...". Objectivist Virtues Since the question concerns, Objectivist virtues, let's examine what those might be. Ayn Rand made two lists of virtues, one published in The Virtue of Selfishness, the other unpublished in her Journal, in a section called, "The Moral Basis Of Individualism." The published list of virtues includes: Reason, Purpose, Self-Esteem, Rationality, Productiveness, and Pride. The unpublished list of virtues includes: Integrity [which Rand described as, "the first, greatest and noblest of all virtues"], Courage, Honesty, Honor, Self-confidence, Strength, Justice, Wisdom, and Self-respect. What Virtues Are Virtues are the characteristics of a moral individual and a moral individual is one who lives by moral principles. Such a life will necessarily be characterized by the moral virtues. Of the two Ayn Rand lists of virtues, the unpublished one is superior, beginning as it does with integrity, which she said, "is that quality in man which gives him the courage to ... remain whole, unbroken, untouched ...," that is, to be a truly moral individual. Integrity is the virtue that makes all the other virtues possible. In an earlier version of The Moral Individual I described a moral individual as, "one who choose to take responsibility for his own life, neither desiring or seeking anything in life but what he has achieved or acquired by his own effort, fully confident in his own ability and competence to live happily and successfully in this world, gladly bearing the consequences of his wrong choices, and proudly enjoying the rewards of his right ones, neither needing nor wanting the agreement or approval of any other individuals, always seeking to be the best he can be in all things, mentally, morally, and physically." A Sparkling Life Of Achievement, Joy, And Happiness Moral or ethical principles are commonly thought of some kind of obligation, or duty imposed on individuals, but true moral principles are not limitations to life but the means to success and happiness. The article, "Principles," which lists the ten most important moral principles, concludes with these words: "Are these principles hard! Yes they're hard and yes they are demanding, as hard and demanding as life itself. To evade them is to evade life. No moral individual regards them as limits or restrictions on their life, however, because they are the means of achieving and being all that life makes possible. Living by these principles is the only way to live a life that is worth living." The Pursuit Of Virtue Virtues are not achieved by pursuing them directly. One does not learn to be honest or just or wise by attempting to practice them the way one learns to type or play a musical instrument. The moral virtues are natural consequence of living by moral principles. The moral individual is whole which is the integrity of no contradiction between any aspect of his being, his values, his thoughts, his beliefs, his choices, and his actions which all agree and spring from the same understanding of and love for reality. He is honest because he cannot be a fake or cheat denying his own nature. He is honorable because he loves the truth above all things. He is self-confident because he knows he has done everything he possibly can to learn and be competent to live his life successfully. He is strong, whether physically strong or not, he has that strength of character that comes from knowing he is right enabling him to persevere in the face of any difficulty. He is just because he allows nothing but reason to determined his judgment. He is wise because he does not allow himself to be influenced by appeals to his irrational feelings, sentiments, and desires, discerning the truly important from that which has no real significance, both immediately and long-term. His self-esteem is inevitable because he knows what his true value is. Then Why Mention Virtues? Pursuing virtues will not make an individual moral, but being moral will produce the moral virtues. Understanding what the moral virtues are cannot produce morality, but can be used as a gauge of one's own life. If one finds a lack of moral virtue in their own life it indicates something wrong which is usually a mistaken ethical view or other wrong values. If you are interested in knowing more about morality and ethics the following articles, beginning with the one mentioned above, will be helpful: Principles Ethical Principles Ayn Rand's Ethics Objective Ethics for Freedom and Happiness (The Is/Ought Fallacy)

So Wolf DeVoon is someone else today than he was yesterday, or yesteryear, or fifty years ago? Or are you still the same person? What do you think? Randy

Hi Brant, Thanks for comment. It is mostly dialogue and I understand those who do not care for it. I actually had the same impression and thought about turning it into a play, but nobody reads plays. Randy

If by "essence" is meant the identity of a particular existent or class of existents, then both concepts of particulars (individuals) and classes (universals) have an essence. An existent is identified by it's qualities (characteristics or attributes). The, "essence," of an individual is all those qulaities by which it is identified that remain the same as long as that existent exists. For example, an individual human being's identifying characteristics will change with time, but that individuals essence (his consciousness self or ego, his history and relationships) remain the same as long as he exists. For universals, the identifying qualities (essence) are all those attributes existents of the same kind must have to be the kind of existent they are, and excludes all those characteristics that differentiate individual existents of the same kind from each other. I'm afraid most of the answers you've received are both epistmological and ontological disasters. If you are interested in a clear explanation of these please see: "Concepts" http://usabig.com/hwk/6_hwk_concepts.html "Ontology—A Brief Introduction" http://usabig.com/iindv/articles_stand/incidental/ontology.html At The Moral Individual http://usabig.com/home.html Regi

Jamaica had just run out of her house to keep from crying, and she would have cried if she hadn't done it. She hated to cry. She ran to the little park and into the woods at the end of it and had almost reached the log she usually sat on when she saw someone was already sitting there. It was a boy and he was reading a book and didn't even notice when Jamaica appeared. "That's my log," she said indignantly. The boy was startled. "What?" "Your sitting on my log," she said quite forcefully. "Oh, I'm sorry," the boy said as he got up and closed his book. "You can have it. I didn't see anything that indicated it belonged to anyone." "That's because there isn't anything. It's mine because it's where I always sit," she said. The boy was about to say, "how does that make it yours," but he was suddenly aware the girl was about to cry, and he said, "is there something wrong?" "No!" she said, but at that moment her face was streaming with tears. "Please, sit down," the boy said. "I'm sorry if I did anything to upset you." Jamaica did sit and looked up at the boy standing there, noticing for the first time that he was truly concerned. "I'm sorry," she said. "It's not your fault. It's something else. I'm really OK," she said. She even managed to smile, which greatly relieved the boy. "My name is Gordon," he said, then without knowing why, he blurted out, "you're very pretty," and then he felt his face growing very hot. The girl was pretty, and she knew it, but was still surprised when Gordon said it. "You think I'm pretty? Mama says I'm too skinny." Gordon really didn't want to talk about that any more, and tried to change the subject. "Why were you crying?" The way he asked it surprised her. He sounded like he really cared, and the way he looked at her was not as though he were accusing her of something, like most people. Funny, she thought, his dark blue eyes could look sad and smiling at the same time. "I'm sorry," she said. "My name is Jamaica and I'm sorry I cried. I didn't want to cry. I never want to cry, and most of the time I don't." "But why were you crying," Gordon continued. "Were you hurt?" "Yes," she said, then, "Well no, not on the outside." That confused, Gordon. "Then something hurt you on the inside? Are you sick?" Even though Jamaica knew Gordon really was concerned, the questions were beginning to annoy her. "Of course I'm not sick," she said. "Do I look sick?" she asked a bit sarcastically. "No," Gordon admitted, bewildered by Jamaica's sudden change. "I just didn't know what you meant by hurt 'inside.'" "Well, its none of your business anyway. I didn't ask you to be sitting on my log or for your sympathy. Why don't you just leave me alone." Gordon's response was a total surprise. "I'm going fishing, want to go?" he said as though nothing at all had happened and as though they were old friends. "You aren't angry?" Jamaica asked wide-eyed. "Why would I be angry? You didn't do anything to me." "But what I said... the way I talked to you. It didn't bother you?" "Oh, it bothered me a lot. It always does when someone says things I know they don't really mean, because it means something is bothering them, but it's nothing I can do anything about, so I don't do anything." Jamaica just stared at Gordon. "You're very strange," she finally said. "So I've been told," he said. "So, do you want to go fishing?" "Your kidding, right?" she asked. "No, I mean it. I'm going fishing and you look like you need to do something, ... something different. I'd like some company, so why not go fishing with me? "Well, thank you," Jamaica said, sounding a bit confused. "... but I really can't." "Well, I didn't ask you if you could, I asked you if you wanted to go." "Are you serious?" Jamaica asked. "Yup. I'm serious." "I don't know anything about fishing. I don't have anything to fish with and my mother wouldn't let me go anyway," Jamaica said a little huffily. "Besides, I have no idea who you are." "But you still didn't say if you'd like to go," he said, ignoring her arguments. "Well, if I could go I think I might," she said, "but ...." "Well then, we'll go fishing," Gordon said. "You can do anything you really want to do, and since it's what you want, it's what we'll do." "You really believe you can do anything you want to do?" Jamaica asked astonished. "Of course, because you can. So long as it is not wrong and not physically impossible, there is always a way to do what you really want." "OK," Jamaica began a little defiantly, "how am I going to go fishing?" "Easy," Gordon said. "We'll go by my shed, pick up some fishing poles and my tackle box and the worms I dug this morning, then go to the meadow. I'll show you." "My mother will never let me go," Jamaica said. "Does your mother know where you are right now?" Gordon asked. "No," Jamaica said. "Well, you could be fishing right now. Your mother wouldn't know. There is nothing wrong with fishing. You don't have to ask your mother." "But wouldn't that be like lying?" "If you go fishing, and your mother asks you if you went fishing, it would be a lie if you said you didn't go fishing. It's not a lie if she never asks." "What if she asks where I've been." "Tell her the truth." "Tell her I went fishing?" Jamaica exclaimed. "Yes, of course," Gordon said. "Oh, she'll be so angry," Jamaica's eyes got big and serious. "Did your mother ever tell you not to go fishing?" "Well, no," Jamaica said. "But I just know she wouldn't want me to." "You don't know that unless you can read minds. If you have to tell her, and you probably won't, and she gets angry, just act surprised and say you didn't know she didn't want you to go fishing, because that will be the truth. You cannot possibly know what someone else will like or not like until they tell you." Jamaica still had her doubts, but Gordon seemed so sure of himself, and she liked the way he talked to her and was already beginning to forget all her doubts. "Which way?" she said, getting up from the log, ready to follow Gordon. Gordon walked very fast, but Jamaica had no trouble keeping up with him. "How do you know where you're going," Jamaica asked, puffing a little. "I just follow the path," Gordon said. "What path? It's nothing but brambles and cat briars. It's not a path." "It is to me," Gordon said. They finally came out into a clearing and Jamaica could see a small rickety building a little further on. "Is this where you live?" Jamaica asked Gordon, just before they reached the shed. "No, I live in that house over there," he said, nodding toward the big farmhouse. "I didn't mean do you live in the shed," she said indignantly. Gordon just laughed. Jamaica looked at the farmhouse and thought she recognized it. "Isn't this the Tarbuck farm?" "Yup," Gordon said, "and I'm Gordon Tarbuck." "Oh," is all Jamaica said. "Well ...?" "Well what?" she asked. "Well you know who I am, but all I know about you is your first name, 'Jamaica.'" "If you must know, it's Jamaica Williams." "Really?" Gordon said. "Of course," Jamaica said. "Did you think I made it up?" "Oh no," Gordon said. "It's just... do you have a brother named Jared?" "Yes, he's my oldest brother. Do you know him?" "I do, but not as well as I'd like. I met him last year at the science fair. Your brother is a genius." "Well, he certainly thinks so," Jamaica said. "Well he really is," Gordon said. "You said he's your oldest brother, do you have others?" "Only one. Tramone," she said with obvious disgust. "What's wrong with Tramone?" "Well, he'd hate it if he saw me with you." "Why?" was all Gordon could think of to ask. "Because you're white." "Oh," Gordon said. "They were both quiet for a moment, then Gordon said, "I'd like to meet Tramone." Jamaica looked shocked. "No you wouldn't. You must never meet him. He'd kill you if he could." "Just because I'm white?" "No, not just because your white, but because you are with me, and if he knew it, he'd probably kill me too." "Do your parents feel that way?" Gordon asked. "No. It's just Tramone. He didn't used to be that way either, but he got into a gang and he's changed." The inside of the shed smelled earthy and musty. "Pick up that green box over there," Gordon instructed Jamaica. It was a small tackle box, but much heavier than Jamaica expected. "What's in here, lead weights?" "Among other things," Gordon said. Gordon picked out two rods from the dozen or so that were hanging against the back wall and headed for the open door of the shed, grabbing a little net on the way. "Well, c'mon," he said to Jamaica who was standing there holding the tackle box with both hands in front of her." "Do I have to carry this?" she asked. "Of course not," Gordon said, taking the box from her, while adjusting the two rods to his shoulder. Then, "let's go," he said starting out at his fast pace. "I could carry something," Jamaica said when she had caught up with him. Gordon handed her the fish net and one of the poles. "Can you manage these," he asked with a grin. It was only about a half-mile to the meadow. There were gardens of corn, beans, tomatoes, melons, and other vegetables near the edge of the meadow. Gordon helped himself to a big tomato as they were tromping through. "Did you steal that tomato?" Jamaica asked appalled. "Nope. Just took one." "But they're not yours," Jamaica said. "Mmm, no they're nowt," Gordon mumbled around the juicy delight. "Have one yourself," Gordon said. "This is one of Sam Nesbit's gardens. He's a friend of my Dad." "Does that make it alright to take what is not yours?" Jamaica asked quite seriously. "It wouldn't be alright if Mr. Nesbit hadn't invited us kids to take whatever we liked." "He really did that?" Jamaica asked in disbelief. Gordon picked a lovely red tomato, wiped it on his shirt, and handed it to Jamaica. "He really did," Gordon said. "Taste it?" Jamaica did, and the juice of it was running down her arms and chin. "I've never tasted a tomato like that," she said, grinning. Beyond the gardens there were fields that led down to a small lake. Off to the left the hills rose into woods and at the highest point there was a granite building that stood above and adjacent to what could not be seen from the meadow, a huge round granite lined pool of water, which the older people in the area called, "the reservoir." There was a wrought-iron fence surrounding the pool and there were signs warning, "no swimming allowed." It only took a few minutes for them to reach the edge of the lake. "We'll go over there," Gordon said, pointing at what appeared to be a little peninsula of reeds. "What's wrong with right here?" Jamaica asked. "It's nice and smooth, and there's a little stream right there," she said pointing to an opening in the berm with water pouring over it." "The reason it's nice and smooth is because everyone fishes here, or used to; not many come here anymore. The ground is all tamped down by their feet. Its easy to fish here, but you don't catch any fish. It's shallow water, because everything flows here carrying all the silt and mud. "That little patch of reeds that juts out into the lake, that's were we're going to fish. It is the deepest part of the lake and where the fish are," Gordon explained." They trampled over to the patch of reeds. "Better take off your shoes. It's pretty wet," Gordon said. "Leave them up there behind us." Gordon opened the tackle box, put a bobber on the line of the Rod Jamaica was going to use, then a sinker nearer the hook. "The ground is all spongy," Jamaica said. "My feet are getting wet. Are you sure it's safe?" "Nope." Gordon said. "Not certain, but I've fished here lots of times. What you are standing on is not ground, it's dead reeds that have accumulated here. Not sure what's underneath. It may just be floating. Never had two people standing on it." "Are you trying to frighten me," Jamaica asked. "Can you swim?" Gordon asked. "Yes I can swim," Jamaica said. "Why?" "Then there is nothing to worry about," Gordon grinned. "Oh sure, nothin' to worry about except getting all wet and muddy. That would sure be fun." "It might be," Gordon grinned. "Boys!" Jamaica said rolling her eyes. Gordon showed Jamaica how to put a worm on the hook so it couldn't wiggle off but would still wiggle enough to attract the fish, then he showed her how to cast her line out into the deepest part of the lake. "Just watch the bobber," he said. "If you see it moving, it only means a fish is interested. If you see it begin to sink, give the rod a quick snap, then wait a second. If the bobber still moves on its own, you've got 'em. Just real it in." Gordon tied a lure to the end of his line and began casting and reeling it in. "Nothing's happening," Jamaica said after a few minutes. "Give it a couple more minutes, then reel it in very slowly. Jamaica started to reel the line in. When it was about half-way to shore the bobber suddenly went under water. Lift the rod quick, " Gordon said." Jamaica did. "It's pulling the line back out," Jamaica said. "You've got him," Gordon said. "Just reel it in, steady and slow, but not too slow." Keeping his eye on the line, Gordon reached for the little fish net. "I see it," Jamaica said excitedly. "Just keep reeling it in, and when it's almost to shore, lift the rod so the fish is as near the surface as you can get it, but don't lift it out of the water," Gordon instructed. "Oh that's a good one," Gordon said as Jamaica brought the fish to the surface. He scooped the fish out of the water with the net. "What is it?" Jamaica asked. "It's a pickerel. A really good size one for this little lake. They get much bigger, but this pond is too small for there to be any really big ones. Gordon laid the pickerel in front of her, and when she reached for it, Gordon warned her, "pickerel have teeth and can cut you." "Then what do I do?" she asked. "You have to take the hook out, have a good look at your fish, then put it back in the water." Gordon showed her how to hold the pickerel by the lower jaw and how to remove the hook without causing any damage, which she managed to do. "You did that like a pro, you know," Gordon complimented her. Jamaica grinned. "Then, you don't keep the fish you catch?" "If it were a trout, I would," Gordon said. "I love trout, but no one in my family will eat pickerel." "It's so pretty though with those green and black chain marks. It looks like it would be delicious," she said as she slid the pickerel back in the water. "Why doesn't it swim away? Is something wrong with it?" "It's just stunned, resting. If you try to touch it, it will swim away fast," Gordon said, but at that moment the pickerel dived and disappeared. "Does anyone eat pickerel?" Jamaica asked. "I have cousins that eat them, and an aunt that makes chowder with them." "Let's catch a trout, so we can keep him," Jamaica said. "Can't," Gordon said. "Why not?" she asked. "Because there aren't any trout in this lake." "Oh!" Jamaica sighed a little disappointed. They fished for a while longer, and Jamaica caught a couple of other small fish Gordon told her were sun fish, and one a little larger Gordon said was a perch. Gordon didn't catch anything, but was enjoying Jamaica's giggling excitement each time she caught one. "I'm hungry," Jamaica said after a while. "So am I," Gordon said. Gordon showed Jamaica how to clean up her fishing gear. Gordon threw the unused worms into the lake. "Will fatten up the fish for next time," Gordon explained. "How come I've never seen you at School, Gordon," Jamaica asked when they were on the way. "I don't go to school," Gordon said. "You don't?" Jamaica exclaimed, wide-eyed. "Why not?" "I'm too dumb," Gordon grinned. Jamaica was walking in front of Gordon, insisting she knew the way, and suddenly stopped, looking at Gordon in disbelief. Gordon almost ran into her. "You mean...," she hesitated, "are you retarded or something?" she blurted out. "Yes, that's it," Gordon said very seriously. "Retarded. I can never remember that word," Gordon confessed. But Jamaica had begun to understand Gordon. "Why are you always teasing me. You're not retarded. I saw you reading," she said. "I was just looking at the pictures," Gordon said. "There were no pictures in that book," Jamaica said firmly. "There weren't?" Gordon said as if surprised. "Then what are all those little squiggly marks? Aren't they little pictures?" Jamaica was having none of it. "Well, come on then, stupid. I want some lunch," she said turning and beginning to walk. Now Gordon was laughing and could barely blurt out, "I'm home-schooled." Gordon was now walking beside her. "Do you like that?" Jamaica asked, looking very serious. "I like not having to go to that child day-prison you have to go to, but I don't always like the studying I have to do." "I don't go to a day-prison," Jamaica said. "What an awful thing to say." "Can you leave any time you want, then?" "Of course not. How could they have a school if everyone could come and go whenever they liked?" "So you have to stay wherever they say you have to stay and you can't leave until they say you can leave and if you don't go, what happens?" "The truant officer comes and they arrest me." "Sounds like jail to me," Gordon said. When they got to the shed, Gordon took everything and put it away. Jamaica was standing outside when he came out. He was closing and locking the shed door when Jamaica said, "How do I get back. I'll never find your so-called path." "C'mon, I'll take you after lunch." "After lunch!?" Jamaica exclaimed. I have to be home for lunch. Mama will have a fit if I'm not." "I know you're hungry, but it's really not lunch time yet," Gordon said looking at his watch. "Mom will give your mother a call." "Are you sure?" Jamaica said. "Pretty sure, yeah!" Gordon said with mock doubt. "Your Mom won't mind?" "I don't know, but she won't say so if she does." "You are strange Gordon Tarbuck. I've never met anyone like you." "Well, you don't have to have lunch with me if you think I'm so strange. We can just take you home. How about that?" "It might be better," Jamaica said, sounding a bit disappointed. Gordon was sorry he said it, even though he was only kidding. "No it would not be better. I want you to meet Mom, and Joyce and Trisha." "Who are they?" Jamaica asked. "My sisters. You'll see." Jamaica did not say anything, but she was concerned about meeting all these new people. She certainly wasn't her best, still smelling a little fishy and was sure there were bits of reeds and grass stuck to her. "Oh Gordon. I'm such a mess. Do you really want me to meet your family looking like this?" "I already told you you're pretty. Let's go." She mumbled something about that not being what she meant, but she followed. Gordon led Jamaica straight to the back screen door, which he held for her, pointing her in the direction of the little hall that led to the kitchen, where they found Gordon's mother. "Mom, this is Jamaica Williams. Her brother is Jared Williams, the boy that won the science fair last year." "Oh yes, I remember," Gordon's mom said. "So you're Jared's sister," she said, holding out her hand after wiping them on her apron. "Jamaica, what a lovely name," she said. "Thank you, Mrs. Tabuck," Jamaica said after shaking her hand. "Gordon took me fishing," she added not knowing what else to say. "Oh he did! Well I hope he invited you to lunch." "He did," Mrs. Tarbuck, but I'm not sure my Mama will be happy about it. "I've met your mother, Jamaica. I don't know her very well, but I think she won't mind you having lunch with us. I'll give her a call." Jamaica gave Mrs. Tarbuck the telephone number and Mrs. Tabuck directed her to where she could freshen up. "Take your time Honey, lunch won't be ready for a few minutes." Gordon had disappeared and Jamaica assumed he had also gone somewhere to clean up. When she felt presentable she ventured her way back to the kitchen, which was now much fuller. "Oh, there you are," Mrs. Tarbuck said when Jamaica appeared in the doorway. "Jamaica, these are Gordon's sisters. Joyce ..." "Hello Jamaica," Joyce said smiling. Joyce was a lovely tall blonde whose smile said she was always comfortable and in complete self-control. "... Joyce is Gordon's older sister," Mrs. Tarbuck continued, "and this is his younger sister, Patricia." Patricia grinned, her reddish locks dancing about her face and she made what appeared to be a slight curtsey as she shook Jamaica's hand and said, "Hi! Everyone calls me Trisha." Gordon appeared at that moment. "Well I see you've met everyone." Joyce and Trisha were taking their seats at the table. "Come sit beside me, Jamaica," Trisha said. Gordon held the chair for Jamaica, then sat on the other side of her. "It's nothing fancy," Mrs. Tarbuck said. "Mostly left-overs as usual. Help yourselves," she said mostly for Jamaica's sake. The others needed no encouragement." "Did you tell them what we did?" Gordon asked Jamaica. "Do we really want to know?" Joyce asked, sarcastically. "I'll bet it was naughty," Patricia added. "Patricia," Mrs. Tarbuck said firmly. Patricia just grinned. "Gordon took me fishing. I've never been fishing before." She said. "And she caught four fish, including a good size pickerel," Gordon said. "Gordon never takes me fishing," Patricia complained. "Since when did you want to go fishing?" Joyce asked. "Well the next time we go fishing, you're going whether you want to or not," Gordon said. "You can't make me," Patricia snipped. "I'll not only make you, I'll use you for bait." "Gordon," Mrs. Tarbuck, said, without looking up. Gordon just grinned. Joyce and Patricia both giggled. The conversation totally bewildered Jamaica. It was obvious there was no bitterness or anger, and in spite of the things they said to each other, it was also obvious they were enjoying themselves immensely. After lunch Jamaica helped Gordon's sisters with clean-up, but did not feel very useful since she didn't know where anything went or how they did things. Joyce and Patricia assured her she was a big help, and anyway, "it was fun," they both said. When everything was put away, Jamaica was left alone in the kitchen. When Gordon appeared she pointed to the framed photographs on the shelf next to the doorway. I know that's Joyce, and that's you, and that's Trisha. But who's that?" she said pointing to the first picture of a very handsome young man. "That's Chink." Gordon said. "He's our oldest brother. His real name is Charles, but everyone has always called him Chink or Chinky. No one knows why." "Where is Charles now?" Jamaica asked. "I don't know," Gordon said. "He's a merchant sailor, and I think he's currently somewhere in South America, but I'm not sure." Then, "Want to have a little look around?" "Sure," Jamaica said. Gordon led her out the back door then past another shed into a lovely garden. It was a vegetable garden but looked like a flower garden. "Everything in this garden can be eaten, even the flowers," Gordon said. "It's beautiful," Jamaica said. "Dad's a genius and an artist," Gordon said. They sat on the little garden bench surrounded by flowers. "I've had a wonderful time, Gordon. Everyone was so nice to me, and I love Joyce and Trisha." "Oh, they love you too," Gordon assured her. "Are we going fishing again?" Jamaica asked. "Would you like to?" Gordon asked. "Well you told Trisha the next time we go fishing she was going whether she wanted to or not." "Oh, that was just teasing. Trisha would hate fishing. She's a musician, writer, and poet." "She is?" Jamaica said amazed. "How old is she?" "Fourteen," Gordon said, matter-of-factly. Jamaica just looked at him. "So we're not going fishing again?" Jamaica asked. "I didn't mean that," Gordon, said. "I'd love to have you go fishing with me again." "Really?" Jamaica asked. Gordon's look said, 'do I really have to answer that?' "I'm not sure I really want to go fishing again," Jamaica said. "I mean, if that's what you wanted, I would want to, but that's not what I really want." Then she looked like she wished she had never said anything. "I don't want to go home, Gordy, but it's getting late." "'Gordy?' Why did you call me that?" Gordon asked "I don't know," Jamaica said. "I'm sorry if you don't like it. I won't call you that again, ... Gordon," she emphasized. "Oh, I don't mind at all. You should hear what my sisters call me sometimes. So long as you're going to call me Gordy, I'm going to call you Jama." "I'd like that, Gordy. I like it because it's what you want to call me." Then, with obvious reluctance, Jamaica said, "I don't think I've ever had a more wonderful time... I... I wish it would never end, but I really ought to be getting home. Can you point me to your, 'path'?" "I don't think I can." Gordon said. "I'd take you, but I have a better idea. I just saw Dad's truck pull in and I want you to meet him." "Oh Gordon, I've been so much trouble already. I don't want to be more." "Let my dad decide," Gordon said, and led Jamaica inside. They found Mr. Tarbuck at the kitchen table but he wasn't eating. "Hi Dad, I want you to meet Jamaica." "Hello Jamaica," he said looking up from something he was reading. "You don't need to be introduced. Mrs. Tarbuck and Joyce have already told me about you and your adventure with Gordon. He stood and extended his hand to Jamaica. "Hello, Mr. Tarbuck. So glad to meet you," she said smiling. Mr. Tarbuck was not what Jamaica expected at all. He was bald except for a fringe of grey hair all around his head, but his eyes were an intense blue, and though they always seemed to be smiling, Jamaica had the feeling he could look right into her soul. "When you're finished, Dad, Jamaica needs a ride home." Gordon said. "I'm already finished and I have to pick up a couple things at Jose's for your mom. We can go now if you're ready, or you can take the truck." We'll go with you," Gordon said. Gordon and Jamaica rode in the back seat of Mr. Tarbuck's car. Gordon took Jamaica's hand and held it. "Do you mind?" he asked. "No," is all she said, but gave Gordon's hand a little squeeze, and looked at him with wonder. Jamaica suddenly became very serious. "Am I ever going to see you again?" Gordon laughed. "Do you want to?" "I do, Gordon, very much." "Well then, you know the answer. We can do anything we want to do as long as it is right to do. And nothing could be more right." "But how? I have school, and you don't go to my school, or any school. How will I ever see you? "How did you see me today?" Gordon asked. "That was just an accident," Jamaica said. "Yes it was, but there is no reason we cannot do it on purpose." Gordon said. Jamaica looked at Gordon doubtfully. "Don't worry, I'll call you," Gordon said. And she knew he would. When they arrived at Jamaica's home, Mr. Tarbuck told Jamaica how much he enjoyed meeting her. Gordon walked her to the door and gave her a little hug and kiss, before she went in. Gordon hopped into the front seat with his father when he got back to the car. "Pretty thing, isn't she?" Mr. Tarbuck said. "Hope we see more of her." "I'm sure you will Dad," Gordon said. They both grinned. Jamaica needn't have worried, Gordon used every excuse he could think of to see her. "Do you need any help with your homework?" Of course she did, and Gordon spent many an evening at the William's house, helping her with homework. He got to know the Williams family very well. Jamaica's younger sister, Jasmine, was in love with Gordon the moment she saw him. "If you get tired of him," she once said to Jamaica, "can I have him?" Jamaica's father, Ernest, was a stern looking man, until he smiled. He liked Gordon, with whom he was always cordial, but was naturally a taciturn man, and Gordon never pressed him for more conversation than he volunteered. Everyone called him Pop. Mrs. Ida Williams, whom everyone call Mama, including Gordon, was almost the opposite of her husband. She was always talking, and joking, and laughing. The only time she didn't seem happy was when Tramone was mentioned, though nothing specific was ever said. Gordon never really understood how serious the Tramone situation was until he was there one evening, "studying," with Jamaica. There was suddenly loud shouting and banging coming from downstairs. Gordon and Jamaica ran into the hall and could see Tramone yelling at someone, but from that point could not see who it was. "I'm proud I'm black! You are ashamed of it!" Tramone yelled. It was Pop Williams he was yelling at, and Pop was obviously exercising extreme self-control. "You have nothing to be proud of, Tramone," He was saying firmly, but without anger. "Did you choose to be black? What have you ever done to be proud of? That's the only thing one can be proud of, what he has done, what he has made of himself." "You believe all that Honky crap, Pop. I don't!" Tramone shouted. Very calmly and deliberately Mr. Williams answered, "We don't talk that racist trash in this house. You're wrong, Tramone. You've let all the racist idiots you think are your friends fill your head with lies. You think it is some kind of game to win, and that they're going to win it. Life's not a game, Tramone, and all you're going to win is jail time or death. What's wrong with you? You're not stupid. Why have you fallen for all those lies?" Tramone exploded with a single epithet, "Honky," and left. Jamaica had also become close to the Tarbucks, especially Joyce and Trisha. Trisha was a classical pianist, and on one of Jamaica's visits to the Tarbucks she told Trisha how jealous she was. "Gordon said you can play the piano," Trisha said. "We have an old piano that I like to play with, but I've never had any lessons, and I can't really read music very well. I'd love to be able to, that's why I'm so jealous of you." "Please play something for me," Trisha insisted. Gordon walked in just then. "Go ahead, Jama. Play that boogie thing you played for me." Jamaica sat down at the piano. She looked wide-eyed at Gordon, and groaned. "Do it, Jama," Gordon said and winked. Jamaica, with a big sigh of resignation, began. It certainly wasn't classical, but her fingers simply flew over the key board, and in spite of the simple three cord pattern, it was subtle, complex, and moving. The influence of blues and spirituals was unmistakable. Joyce had come downstairs as soon as she heard the music, and was wide-eyed when she saw who was playing the piano. "That was beautiful," Trisha exclaimed, when the piece was over. They all gave her a little applause. "It was wonderful, Jama. It reminds me of Gershwin or Grofé." Joyce said. "I didn't know you played." "I've never heard that piece before," Trisha said. "What's it called?" "I haven't named it yet," Jamaica grinned. "You mean you wrote it yourself?" Joyce exclaimed. "Well, no. I didn't 'write' it, because I don't really know how. I just made it up. It changes a little each time I play it." "Well I'm going to write it, and show you how, too," Trisha assured her. "Then I can play it. Joyce can play a lot of jazz as well as classical and I want to learn how to do that." "What else do you play?" Joyce asked Jamaica. "Oh mostly spirituals and blues things." "Do a little," Joyce said, and sat down beside Jamaica. Jamaica played a little and Joyce began picking out some base accompaniment. Soon they were both improvising and didn't even notice Gordon and Trisha, or Mr. and Mrs. Tarbuck who had just come home or that they were now playing for a rather large audience. "Oh, hello Mrs. Tarbuck," Jamaica said when she noticed her. "Jamaica, I think you should call me Mom. That's what everybody in this family calls me and you are certainly part of this family." "Am I?" Jamaica said with disbelief. "Anyone who plays my piano, eats my food, and is as sweet as you is part of my family, Jamaica." "Please call me Jama, Ma'am, I mean Mom. Only this family calls me that. Gordon gave me that name and when I'm here it just seems right." "Jama it is, then," Mrs. Tarbuck said. "And call me, Dad, Mr Tarbuck said, giving her a little hug. "When Mr. Tarbuck let her go he saw she was crying. "What's the matter, Darling? Did I say something wrong?" Mr. Tarbuck said. "Nothing!" Jamaica said. "Then why are you crying," Mr. Tarbuck asked bewildered. "Because I'm so happy," she sobbed. "Girls, Dad," Gordon said. "With all the girls you have around, you ought to know them by now." "Well, I know them as well as you do, young man," Mr. Tarbuck said. Gordon didn't say anything. Mrs. Tarbuck looked at Mr. Tarbuck over her glasses. "Well at least your a good man, a good husband, and a good father, you can't be expected to know everything." The girls all giggled. "I guess I better not hold your hand or kiss you anymore," Gordon said. "Why?" Jamaica asked, obviously bewildered. She was about to ask, "is there someone else," but Gordon interrupted her. "If you are my Dad's daughter, that makes you my sister, and I can't very well be dating my sister, can I?" "Gordon, you are so mean." Then, after a pause, she asked, "is that what we are doing, Gordy? Dating?" Gordon and Jamaica did not go fishing again that summer, but they did go back to "their" meadow a few times, to go blueberrying or just for a picnic. Gordon brought her up the hill to the "reservoir" one hot late summer afternoon. "I've been swimming in it, and even dived off that roof," he said pointing to the roof of the round stone building above the reservoir itself." But the signs say, "No Swimming," Jamaica pointed out. "I can't read, remember? Besides this reservoir hasn't been used for years and probably won't ever be unless there is a huge fire. The "no swimming" warning is just to protect the city if anyone should get hurt or drowned up here. "Can we go swimming, Gordon?" Jamaica asked enthusiastically. "There are two rules: only boys and no clothes," Gordon recited seriously. "You mean you swim naked?" "That's the rule." "OK! I can do that," Jamaica said. Gordon was shocked. "Jama, I couldn't do that." "Why not. You've done it before. So can I." "But it was all boys." "So what? We're just going swimming. You have sisters," she said. "We're family." Gordon was not sure what she was implying. "C'mon, let's go," Jamaica ordered. Gordon didn't move. "Well, I'm going, whether you are or not," Jamaica said, and took off her shorts, and jersey, and underwear. "You can reach the ladder there," Gordon said, intentionally not looking at her and pointing to the tiny opening in the wrought-iron fence that surrounded the reservoir. "Aren't you coming?" Jamaica said as she started down the ladder. Gordon took off his shorts, underwear and shirt and headed for the ladder. He was relieved that Jamaica never seemed to notice him. "It's cold," Jamaica said, now up to her neck in the crisp clear blue water. She let herself sink into the water, then suddenly burst out, "it's beautiful," then began swimming away from the ladder. "Jama, be careful. Don't get to far from the ladder," Gordon shouted, and scrambled down. As soon as he reached the bottom rung, Jamaica appeared from beneath, her head popping up next to him, the drops of water in her hair sparkling like little diamonds in the sun. "Oh, Gordon," Jamaica said, "This is so wonderful. But why is the water so cold?" "This water and the water in our fishing pond are always cold, because they're both fed by natural springs all around here. That's why the water is so clear, too. "This is so much fun, Gordy. You boys are so lucky." "Well, I guess you're one of the boys now," Gordon grinned. "I don't want to be a boy, Gordon, I want to be a girl doing what boys can do." "Jama, I don't want you to be a boy either, but there is no danger of that. I just want you to be able to do whatever you want," Gordon said. They swam for a little while, and splashed each other, and Gordon showed how he could swim under water almost all the way across the reservoir. Neither of them was aware of anything but the freedom they were enjoying. "I'm tired, Gordy," Jamaica said after a while, with her hand on his shoulder. "Me too," Gordon said. Jamaica climbed up the ladder quickly, and Gordon avoided watching her, then climbed out himself. Jamaica was drying herself off with her jersey, and Gordon began drying himself off with his shirt. They did not look at each other. But when they began to dress, Gordon said, "you are beautiful, Jama." Jamaica did not answer him. Instead, she dropped the shirt and the underwear she was beginning to put on and stood their smiling. "I love you, Gordy. Why shouldn't you see me? There's nothing bad about it, is there? If it were anyone but you, you wouldn't see anything. I am very modest, Gordon, and other girls make fun of me for it. But I feel as comfortable like this with you as I would alone in my room." Then they dressed. "Mama's worried," Jamaica said. "About Tramone?" Gordon asked. "No, about us," Jamaica said a bit sheepishly. "About us? Really? What does she think is wrong?" "People are saying things about us? Mama wouldn't tell me exactly what, but I know it's not because your white, but because, well, they think, we're too young," Jamaica explained. "Too young for what?" Gordon asked. "You, know. You kiss me whenever you feel like it, and no matter where we are, and you always have your arm around me, or are holding my hand," she said. "Yes, I plead guilty. I do all those things," Gordon said. "But I don't know what's wrong with any of them. Do you want me to stop holding your hand, or holding you, or kissing you, Jama?" "No I don't," Jamaica said. "But are we really old enough to be this serious?" She paused. "Please say we are," she said pleadingly. "Age has nothing to do with it, Jama. If you're old enough to be in love, then you're old enough. I know I've never said it before, because it is so trite today, but it is the right word. I love you and that is why I hold your hand, and why I hug you when I can, and kiss you whenever I want to, and I want to a lot. "I don't care what others with nasty minds think. So long as you know who and what I am, and know that I really love you, and you want me to, that is all that matters to me." Jamaica looked at Gordon for a long time. "Gordy, do you really love me?" she asked. "Of course," Gordon said. "Do I really have to say it. Don't you know from how I treat you?" "You know, Gordy, you treat all girls as though you love them." "Hmmm," was all Gordon said. "Well, do you love them too?" Jamaica insisted. "Jama, I do love all girls. If I didn't love all girls in general, how could I love one in any special way. If I didn't love girls, I wouldn't love you." "That doesn't make sense," Jamaica said. "You know some boys do not love girls, or even like them. Do you think that kind of boy could love a girl?" "You mean, like Tramone. He says he hates me because I'm a girl." "Yes. Do you think he could love a girl." "He has a girl friend," Jamaica said. "How does he treat her." "Like dirt," Jamaica said. "I feel sorry for her." "I do too, and I don't even know her. I don't understand how anyone could treat a girl like that," Gordon said. "Well, if you love all girls, why do you always want to be with me?" "Jama, I know you like to eat. When you go to a restaurant, do you order everything on the menu?" "Of course not," Jamaica said. "So, when you pick something, does that mean you didn't like anything else on the menu?" "No," Jamaica admitted. "See!? You may love everything on the menu, but you can't have everything, so you pick what you want the most, don't you?" Jamaica nodded. "That's how love works too. I admit I love girls, all girls, old, young, pretty or ugly, though I think there is something pretty about them all. Out of all the girls there are, you are the one I want to be with." Jamaica thought Gordon was changing the subject when he asked: "What do you think of Chink?" "Your brother, Charles?" "Yes. Now tell me the truth, didn't you fall in love with him the moment you met him?" Gordon could see Jamaica was embarrassed. "Well he is very handsome," Jamaica said. "It's alright, Jama. He is handsome, and charming too. If you didn't fall in love with him, there would be something wrong with you. I know you don't want to be his girl, or anything like that, but if you don't love Charles, you could never love me. You wouldn't be the kind of girl who could love me. "What would you do if he kissed you?" Gordon suddenly asked. "I think I'd die," Jamaica said. "Oh, I hope not. Now that Charles is home for a while, you'll see him a lot, and he's going to kiss you. Charles kisses all the women, and he'll definitely kiss you. But don't be disappointed, he kisses his sisters the same way." "You really don't mind that your brother will kiss me and that I'll like it." "Jama, there's something else. I love you, because you are you, and I could never want anything for you except what was truly good for you and made you happy." "Oh Gordy," I know you're only seventeen, but sometimes I think you are seventy. I'm glad you love me ..." She paused, and Gordon waited. "... I know I love you too," she said, "but I've been afraid to say it." "You said it before, you know." "I did?" "At the reservoir," Gordon said. Jamaica said nothing. "You never had to say it, Jama, I know you love me, but I'm glad you did say it." Then he held her and kissed her and thought he could not possibly be happier or ever want to be anyplace else. "Jama," Gordon suddenly said. "About those other people, the ones doing all the talking about us. Don't worry about them, they'll get used to us. You can tell Mama that too. "Oh, I couldn't," Jama said. "Then tell her not to worry about us. Tramone's the one to worry about." A couple of weeks later Jamaica was at the Williams' home. "Jared is home from school for a week and Mama wants to know if you can come to dinner Saturday," Jamaica said. "I'd love to," Gordon said. Jamaica raised her eyebrows and looked up as though pleading to the heavens about something. "What's wrong?" Gordon asked. "Tramone will be there," Jamaica said. "I don't care about him, so long as Jared is going to be there." "He's really looking forward to seeing you again, too. He couldn't believe it when I told him we were, 'dating.'" "You're his sister. Would he doubt you?" "Hmmm, he might. He doesn't think I'm too bright." "Well, then he disappoints me. He ought to be able to see how bright his sister is." "I've done some pretty dumb things Gordon. He has his reasons for doubting my ability to make choices." "Jama, I want to ask you a question. You don't have to answer it if you don't want to. It might matter if I'm going to be at your home with everyone. The first day I met you, when I was sitting on, "your log," he grinned, "you were crying. Can you tell me why? You told me you were hurt, but didn't want me to ask you about it then. I'm asking you about it now." "You can ask me anything Gordy. I didn't know you then. I was hurt. It was Tramone. He wanted me to join his gang, wanted me to think the way he does, and he wouldn't let me alone. He never physically harmed me, or threatened me, although there were hints, like I needed his protection from the gang. That day he called me a vile name, it meant a black girl who was a white boy's... toy. That's one reason I'm worried about what he'll do when he meets you." "You think he'll believe that about me?" Gordon said with disbelief. "I think he'll know it's not true, but I won't be surprised if that is what he accuses you of." "Well, he can accuse me of anything he likes. It won't bother me. It will bother me if he threatens you." "What will you do if he does, Gordon?" "I'll leave and take you with me." "Oh, Gordon, I'd go with you, but how would that solve anything?" "What is there to solve? What do you think 'solving it,' whatever 'it' is, would be?" "I suppose it would be Tramone not being a threat anymore." "Well, he's already not a threat. He can't harm us. All he can do is talk and act crazy, but that can't harm us." "Are you sure?" Jamaica asked. "I'm sure Jama, Darling," and he gave her a hug and kissed her gently. "You've never called me that before," Jama said. "Oh yes I have, you just never heard me. "Come into the kitchen," Jamaica said after letting Gordon in. "It sure smells good in here," Gordon said as they entered the kitchen. "Hello Mama," Gordon said, giving her a hug. "You picked a good one, Jamaica," she said. Both Jamaica and Gordon did not know quite how to respond to that, but fortunately Jared came into the kitchen at that moment. "Hi Jama," he said. "Jama? You never called me that," Jamaica said. "I heard someone else does. I like it," he grinned. "Hi Gordon," he said turning to him. "It's good to see you again. We sure had some fun at the science fair." "It's Gordy, these days, courtesy of your sister. It's good to see you too, Jared." "Jared, have you seen Tramone?" Jamaica asked. "Yes. But not for a couple of days. He's gotten a lot worse. Called me some names I'll not repeat." "I'm afraid of what he'll do when he sees Gordy. What do you think?" "Well, he won't do anything, at least with me and Pop here. He's even more afraid of Mama," Jared said. "He better be," Mama said. "The most he might do is say some things. He might call you," he said to Gordon, "some names and accuse you of things. He's sure you are corrupting Jama." "Well, I am, but I don't think its doing her any harm." "Oh we all feel the same way. We love having Jama so happy." Jamaica and Gordon looked at each other. Gordon knew what they meant though they probably didn't know he did. Jamaica did not cry any more. "Where's Tramone?" Jamaica asked when the were seated for dinner. "He doesn't always come to meals," Mrs. Williams said sadly. "If he doesn't want to eat with us, he might as well not live with us," Pop said. "I think this is the last straw." Mama didn't like it, but she knew Pop was serious. The stage was set for a very big surprise. Tramone suddenly appeared at the foot of the stairs. He made his way to the table and took a seat next to Jasmine. He was very subdued. "Tramone, I want you to meet Gordon," Jamaica said. Gordon stood and reached out his hand, "Hi Tramone," he said. To everyone's shock, Tramone shook Gordon's hand and said very softly, "Hello Gordon. I'm glad to meet you." Then looked away. "Please call me Gordy, its what everyone calls me around here." "OK... Gordy," Tramone said without looking up. Jamaica looked at Gordon with a big question mark on her face. In fact everyone looked like that. Everyone began handing Tramone whatever was closest to them, the ham, the sweet potatoes, and hush puppies. "They're your favorite hush puppies, Tramone," Mama said smiling. "Thank you, Mama," Tramone said. Then suddenly, he burst out, "why is everyone looking at me!?" It was a very angry outburst. Then he looked almost as if he were going to cry. "I'm sorry he said. Will you please excuse me from the table." He got up and ran upstairs. "What was that all about?" Pop burst out. Mama hushed him. "Not now, please," she said. Pop said, "Humph," and went back to eating. After dinner, Jared, Gordon and Jamaica were in Jared's room talking. Jared sat with his back to his desk. Gordon and Jamaica sat on the bed. It was mostly Gordon and Jared reminiscing about their time at the science fair, and Jared telling them what he was up to now. They were all surprised to look up and see Tramone standing in the doorway. He was obviously troubled. "I have to tell you something." He said. "Go ahead," Jared said. But he just stood there as if he were frozen. "What's wrong, Tramone?" Jamaica asked. "I'm in trouble." "We all have trouble sometimes," Gordon said. "Whatever it is, we are already on your side." Tramone looked at Gordon. "You're on my side?" "Yes, of course," Gordon said. "Well, it's not really my trouble. Its your trouble, yours and Jamaica's." "We're not in trouble, Tramone. What in the world are you taking about?" Jamaica insisted. "Oh yes you are. They're planning for something bad to happen to you and Gordon." "Who is?" Jared asked. "6DA, the Adders," Tramone said. "They told me I had to do it, but I wouldn't. They told me I had to 'kill Jamaica and that piece of white trash.' They said if I didn't, I was no longer 6DA, and that they would make me sorry." "It's the gang," Jamaica explained to Gordon. "They really do kill people," she said. "Jamaica, I'm so sorry. I didn't know it would come to this." Tramone completely broke down. "I don't know what to do." "Don't worry, Tramone. We'll think of something." Gordon said. "Maybe we should get you three away from here," Jared said. "You really think they'd come here to do something?" Gordon asked. "No, I guess I really don't." Jared said. "They're pretty cowardly, actually. They like to get somebody alone and where nobody can see what they're doing." "So let's none of us ever be where we can be caught alone," Gordon said. "What about Jasmine, and Mom and Dad, and Gordon's family? Who else have they threatened?" Jamaica asked. "It's not anybody else, really," Tramone said. "It's not even really you. It's really only me they're after. You and Gordon were only a way of testing me, and I failed the test. "So none of us are really being threatened?" Gordon asked. "I don't think they even know who you are. Oh, they'd know if they saw you with Jamaica, but otherwise they only know you're some white guy, 'using my black sister,' as they put it." "Is that what you think, Tramone?" Gordon asked him. "I've said it," Tramone admitted uncomfortably. "Well I'm sorry you ever thought that, Tramone, because it's going to be more trouble for you than 6DA will ever be. Let's see what we can do about your present problem. When do you think you're most likely to run into any of them?" Gordon asked. "Tomorrow, in school," Tramone said. "Probably nothing will happen in school. I'd pick you up after school, but that would probably make your situation even worse." "I'll pick him up," Jared said. Jamaica was at the Tarbuck's the following afternoon. Everyone but Chink was in the living room when the phone rang. "It's your Mama, Jama. She sound's distraught," Mrs. Tarbuck said handing the phone to Jamaica." "Hello, Mama. What? When? Oh, Mama! Are you OK? Oh Pop's there. Wait I want everyone here to know," as she looked up from the phone. "Tramone's been arrested," Jamaica relayed what she was being told, "and he's been charged with robbery and murder." "Of course I'm still here, Mama. Do you know any more about it?" Then after some pause, Jamaica said, "No, I'm coming right home. Love you Mama." It was all actually very confused but Jamaica told them all she knew. Some member's of Tramone's gang had apparently held up a small convenience store and a clerk had been shot and killed. There was no video or other evidence, but the gang members had been identified by another clerk who had hidden during the robbery. The gang members who were identified all said it was Tramone who had shot the clerk, though the clerk had not identified Tramone as one of the robbers. Other than that she knew nothing. Tramone swore he had not even been there, that the gang had told him to be at a certain garage for a meeting, but no one ever showed up. "Gordy," Jamaica said, "I believe Tramone. He was set up. It's how the gang get's revenge. I know he deserves what he gets but it's not right, is it? I don't know why I feel sorry for him." Gordon held her while he thought. "Want to help him, Jama?" he asked after a while. "I do, Gordy, but don't know what I can do. And I don't want you to do anything either. Please don't get mixed up in this," Jamaica pleaded. "I'm already mixed up in it, because I'm mixed up with his sister. But I'm not going to do anything, Jama. However, I think I know someone who can help." "Who," Jamaica asked. "Sam Nesbit," Gordon said. "Who's Sam Nesbit?" Jamaica asked. "You ought to know. You ate one of his tomatoes," Gordon said. "The guy that has the garden near our meadow?" "That's the one. But he's much more than a gardener. He's a kind of curmudgeon and genius. I want you to meet him." "What's a curmudgeon?" Jamaica asked. "Err, a kind of nice grouch." As they drove down the long curving driveway to Sam Nesbit's Jamaica remarked, as the home came into view, "I had no idea there was a mansion like this out here." "It is rather hidden, isn't it?" Gordon said. Sam himself answered the door. "Gordon Tarbuck," he said and immediately shook his hand, but he was looking at Jamaica. "And who is this lovely young lady?" Sam seemed like a mountain of a man to Jamaica. He was well over six feet and solidly built. Square jawed and a bit rugged looking, standing in the doorway in his dark suit he looked like a Federal Agent of some kind or a successful politician, both ideas which would have revolted Sam Nesbit. "I'd like you to meet Jamaica Williams." "This is Sam Nesbit," Gordon said turning to Jamaica." "How do you do, Sir," Jamaica said formally. "Oh, none of that, and please call me Sam," he said a little gruffly. He ignored her outstretched hand and hugged her. "Well, come in," he said backing away from the doorway." He led them through the house to a huge back veranda where they all sat, Gordon and Jamaica on a plush love seat, and Sam in a similar chair in front of them. Sam began the conversation asking Gordon about his Mom, Dad, and sisters and seemed especially interested in how Chink was doing. Then he turned to Jamaica. "Williams," he thought out loud. "Is your father Ernest Williams by any chance?" "Yes, he is," Jamaica said. "Do you know my father?" "I know who he is. He did some work for me once a long time ago, really good work. I liked him a lot. Serious but reliable. "Now what is this all about? Are you two planning to get married or something?" Jamaica was shocked, but Gordon knew Sam. "Well, not quite yet," Gordon said, which also shocked Jamaica. "We have a problem. I thought you might have some suggestions of what to do about it," Gordon said. Sam interrupted Gordon and called out, "Donna." Donna was a very pretty young girl, either Mexican or Puerto Rican Gordon guessed, who hurried into the room smiling. She walked directly up to Sam and gave him a little hug and kiss on the cheek. "Donna, would you bring us some lemonade, Honey." "Si, yes, right away," she said smiling. There was no explanation of who Donna was. Jamaica was a little bewildered but Gordon didn't seem at all surprised. Donna soon returned with the lemonade and said something to Sam in Spanish. "No. Gracias," Sam said, and she left. Sam then turned to Gordon and Jamaica. "Now what's your problem?" They explained as briefly as they could about Tramone, how he got mixed up with a gang, how he changed, the robbery, and his being accused of Murder and Tramone's claim of innocence. "Did he do it?" Sam asked. "We think he was set up and framed," Gordon said, and explained Tramone's story. Well, do you think he could have done it?" Sam asked again. "I'm sure he didn't do it," Jamaica said. "And what makes you so sure?" Sam asked her. "I know Tramone. I know he couldn't have done it," Jamaica said. "I'm sorry, Darling, but you know no such thing. I know he's your brother, but he certainly hasn't exhibited any brotherly love toward you, recently. Everything he's actually said and done is consistent with the charges against him. I see no reason he might not have made up the story of the frame. But that doesn't matter. What matters is getting him free, isn't it?" Jamaica was very confused. "If Tramone actually murdered that man, shouldn't he be punished for it?" "Oh, he will be if he's guilty," Sam replied. "You are confusing reality with the law. Reality does not allow anyone to get away with doing wrong. Laws only interfere with reality." "So what should we do, Sam?" Gordon asked. "What you should do is nothing," Sam said. "There is nothing you could do that will help, but it could do some harm. If Tramone's story is true, the gang will not look kindly on anyone's interference, because they're obviously out for revenge. "Gordy, will Sam really help?" Jamaica asked on the way back. Gordon had the truck with the old bench seat, and Jamaica was sitting as close to Gordon as she could get. "He will, Jama. You have no idea what he can do." "Oh, I believe that," she said. "I thought he could read my mind." Gordon looked at Jamaica and chuckled. "He does give one that impression doesn't he?" he said, pulling her a little closer and giving her a sideways kiss. "Gordy!" You'll get us killed. "Well at least we'll go together." Jamaica and Mama went to visit Tramone when they could. It was very difficult for Mrs. Williams. Pop refused to raise his bail or hire a lawyer and would not visit him. "If that gang were really his friends why don't they visit him, pay his bail, and hire him a lawyer," Pop said with disgust. Tramone continued to deny any part in the robbery. Even though there was no way for his, "alibi," to be verified, since there was no evidence of his taking part in the robbery and the only witnesses against him were those who had been identified, the appointed defense attorney was confident that Tramone would be acquitted. When Jamaica told Gordon what she thought was the good news, she was surprised by his reaction. "Well, if it turns out that way, it will be good, but I would never trust a lawyer's assurances, and the prosecutor is certainly going to do everything he can to get a conviction. It's OK to want Tramone to be acquitted, but I think it's a mistake to count on it, Darling." "Oh, Gordy. I was so happy. Now I'm just as worried as I was before." "Jama, I didn't say that to worry you. I want it all to turn out as you wish, but I don't want you to be disappointed. Here's something to make you worry less. Sam wants to see us this evening." "Is it good news, Gordy?" "I don't know. I don't think Sam would want to see is if it were bad news. We'll see tonight, Darling." "Who is Sam Nesbit really?" Jamaica asked on the way to Sam's that evening. "I can tell you what I've heard that I believe is probably true, but if I tell you what I know is true it won't be very much," Gordon said. "Just tell me everything," Jamaica said. "Well, first of all, he's old. Much older than you'd think. One of my uncles, who is only a little younger than my father, once worked for him on his farm, and according to him, Sam was already middle-aged. That's the uncle whose wife makes chowder with pickerel, by the way. "What I've heard is that before coming to live here he was a spy, which I doubt because he has no use for government. My father says that he was involved in, "international shipping and commerce," usually done in defiance of some government's laws, but that he only "smuggled" things that people were being deprived of. In other words he was benefitting people who were otherwise deprived of things necessary to their lives at great risk and with great courage. That's the story I don't know but believe. "The story I know, but only incompletely, is that he helps people, mostly young people that he finds promise in but he believes have been wrongly influenced or even held back by government and the social system. If you could spend some time at his estate, you'd find all kinds of people working there, most with very troubled pasts. He requires two things of those he helps—they must work at something to earn what he provides them, either farm work, or in one of his shops, or helping the others, because the other thing he requires is that they become educated while he helps them. He doesn't believe in education as a kind of institution. He has people who will help learners with different subjects but every learner is required to learn themselves, which he says is the only way anyone learns. "Remember Donna?" "The mysterious servant girl." Jamaica said. "She's no doubt a Spanish speaking homeless girl, or one who's been abused." "Like a prostitute," Jamaica said. "Very likely," Gordon said, a little surprised by Jamaica's guess. "Sam is obviously having her learn English and how to behave in decent society. He'll be very strict, and she'll love him for it." "That's about all I know about Sam Nesbit, except that he has some kind of network of individuals who seem to be able to discover anything that's going on anywhere. I think most of those informants are past workers and students he's helped." Jamaica was enthralled with Gorden's explanation. "Oh, Gordy, I love to hear you talk. Sam seems so much more real to me now. I love you, Gordy," and she and gave him a kiss. "I'm really going to have to talk to you more," he said. When they were finally seated in Sam's house, and another young lady, not Donna, had brought them coffee, Jamaica could not resist asking, "Is it good news, Sam?" Sam chuckled. "Well, I see you're not shy. It's news, and part of it is good to know, but I'm not sure how good it will be in use. I know who actually killed the clerk which means I know that Tramone did not do it. I cannot reveal how I learned this so you must not tell anyone what I have just told you. I wouldn't have told you if I had any doubts about that. That's the good news. There's more that's not so good." "Oh, Sam, thank you. I'm glad to know Tramone really didn't do it, and it gives me hope, Jamaica said. "Well, it actually doesn't change anything, except what we know. It doesn't mean he won't be convicted, it only means we have one more piece of information that eliminates other possibilities we would otherwise have had to investigate. "Gordy already explained that to me. I have to say it disappointed me, but I know you are both right." "Well, Gordon, she's not only beautiful, but bright. Are you sure your not going to marry her?" "No! Not sure at all, Gordon said." Jamaica's eyes got big and her eyebrows rose an inch. Sam continued. "The other news is not so good, and I'm not sure what it means. I've learned that Tramone's gang, 6DA, or the Adders or whatever other name they call themselves by are planning something to force Tramone to change his plea to guilty. I have not been able to learn what, exactly, but my best information is that it is probably a threat to someone close to Tramone. "I'm sorry, I do not know what to do about the threat because there are no details and I have no suggestion beyond, please be aware that something is being planned and be aware of where you and anyone else associated with Tramone are. "The best I can offer is that I'm pretty sure I'll know what the plans are and will find a way to head them off before they are carried out. The informants I have are good and very close to the source. "Was that good news or bad news, Gordy?" Jamaica asked when they were on the way to Jamaica's house. "Neither," Gordon said. "But it is always better to know than to not know." "Do you think Sam will be able to 'head off' the threat, whatever it is?" "If anyone can, it will be Sam. We'll just have to stay as alert as we can," Gordon said. "You know, Jama, I would not recognize a single member of Tramone's gang except Tramone. I'm not going to be very good at spotting anything. I think we just have to depend on Sam to let us know what is supposed to happen." Jamaica and Gordon told Jared all they could. Jared said he would pick up Jamaica and Jasmine at school the following afternoon. Then they would all stay together as much as possible. Jared was waiting in front of the school for Jamaica and Jasmine, when Jasmine showed up. "Jamaica's gabbing with a bunch of girls," Jasmine said. "They said she'd be right out." Something didn't seem right to Jared. "Did you speak to your sister?" he asked. "No," she said. "She was too busy". "Which girls was she talking to?" Jared asked. "Those girls Tramone always hangs out with," Jasmine said. "Lock all the doors, Jasmine, and don't open them for anyone until I get back. I'll only be a minute." Jared was able to get into the school through the door some others left open as they were leaving. He looked everywhere in the school, then went back outside and looked in the parking lot and everywhere else but never found Jamaica or the girls she was supposedly talking to. When he got back to the car, Jasmine unlocked the door and could tell from Jared's behavior something wasn't right. "What's wrong, Jared." "I don't know Jasmine, but I couldn't find Jamaica?" Jasmine began to cry. When Jared got home, Mama asked, "where's Jamaica?" "I don't know, Mama. She went with some girls from the school and I never saw her. Mama told him Gordon had called twice while he was out, wanting to talk to Jamaica. Jared called Gordon immediately. "Oh, Hi Jared," Gordon said when he heard his voice. "Where's Jamaica?" "Gordon, I don't know. I went to pick her and Jasmine up, but Jasmine said she went off with some other girls." "Jared," Gordon said very deliberately, "she didn't go 'off' with any girls. They've kidnapped her. Sam just called to tell me it's Jamaica they're after." It was what Jared suspected and he was completely undone by it. "Oh, Gordon I'm so sorry. I feel like it's all my fault. What can we do?" "I don't think we can do anything. Hold on a second." Jared could hear muffled conversation in the background. "Jared, is your father home yet?" "No, but he will be in a few minutes. Why?" "My father wants you all to come here as soon as you can. Everybody, Pop, Mama, Jasmine, and you of course. It's very important," Gordon emphasized. "We'll come," was all Jared said. It was a very unhappy crowd gathered in the Tabucks' living room. Everybody knew by then what had happened to Jamaica, and everybody was frustrated because everyone wanted to do something and nobody knew what to do. Pop Williams had no more use for the police than Mr. Tarbuck, but thought in this case they ought to be notified. At least they might be able to find out where they've taken Jamaica. "Ernest, we know Jamaica has been kidnapped, but we have no evidence to present to the police. All we could do is claim she's missing. They wouldn't even begin looking for her, because she hasn't been gone long enough, and no one has claimed to have kidnapped her. We don't even know why—whether it's just some kind of stupid revenge or if they have something else planned." There was a phone call for Gordon during that conversation. "Don't do anything!" Sam said. "And don't let any of the others do anything." Then with more concern, "Are you going to be OK?" "No!" Gordon said. I'm not OK. I'm furious and frustrated and helpless. Everything I want to do... I know would only make things worse." "Can you make sure no one else does anything?" Sam asked. "Yes. Actually Dad has already taken that in hand. Nobody will do anything," Gordon assured him. "I have two things to tell you. You decide how much to tell the others. "The reason they kidnapped Jamaica is to threaten Tramone. Someone inside the prison has already informed Tramone if he doesn't change his plea to guilty, no one will ever see his sister again. "Tramone has already asked to see his lawyer and is intending to change his plea and provide a confession. That part sounds worse than it is. But I'll explain that later. "I also know where Jamaica is being held, and have already made plans that I hope will lead to her rescue. You probably should not say anything about this, because I have no idea how it will go. It's going to be a bit risky for everyone. "I know everyone is frustrated and wanting to do something. Tell them they are doing something, the best thing they could possibly do, by not interfering and not providing everyone with even more to worry about. "Have to run, Gordon." Sam hung up. Early the next morning there was a fire in an abandoned warehouse. It was mostly smoke but there were lots police and fire engines. It was where 6DA was holding Jamaica. The gang fled as soon as they heard the approaching sirens, but Jamaica was in no shape to be moved, and they left her. Sam informed Gordon of Jamaica's rescue, and Gordon informed everyone else. Jamaica was in the hospital and her condition was serious, but at least she was alive and would fully recover. Jamaica slept all that day and it wasn't until that evening that she finally awoke. The first thing she saw was Gordon sitting by her bed. Jamaica's mother had insisted he to be there. "Hi Gordy," she said. She tried to smile but it didn't come out right. "Hi Jama," he said, and leaned over to kiss her cheek. "I love you, Gordy. Do you still love me?" she said weakly. "What a thing to ask. Of course I love you." "They raped me, Gordy," Jamaica said, her eyes glistening with tears. "My precious Jama, did you think that would make any difference? Don't you know that, if it did, it would only make me love you more?" "Everyone's here, Jama." Gordon moved out of the way so she could see Mama and the others. "You're going to be OK, Jama," Mama said. "We just all love you Honey," but she was too moved to say any more. Jamaica was OK, but she was in the hospital for another week, and it was another four weeks before she could begin getting around very well. She had been beaten pretty badly, and her arm was broken. "It was the girls," Jamaica told Gordon. "I mean it was the girls who beat me. They even encouraged the boys to... to do what they did to me." He listened without saying anything. It was hard to listen to her describe what they did to her, but he knew it helped her to talk about it. After the first few days, she talked less about it as other things became more important. "What about Tramone?" she asked Gordon. "Sam is certain he's going to be acquitted, but didn't explain why." "He confessed to save me, didn't he?" Jamaica said. "Yes he did. But it wouldn't have saved you. They were planning to kill you when it was all over." "Tramone didn't know that, Gordy." "No he didn't, Jama," he said while holding her. He didn't want her to see the bitterness his face would have shown her. Two weeks before the trial, Sam asked Gordon and Jamaica to visit him. Jamaica's cast was off and there were no more bandages, most of her hair had grown back, and except for two small scars under her left eye, and another under her chin which really didn't show, there were no visible signs of what had happened to her. "Jama, you're more beautiful than ever," Sam said when greeting them at the door. Jamaica hugged him and said, "thank you, Sam." "For paying you a compliment?" he asked. "No, for rescuing me," she said. "Oh, that was a necessary part of the job. I had to rescue you to do what I originally agreed to do, or have you forgotten what that was?" "No, Sam, I haven't. It was to get Tramone off." "That's right, and it looks like that will happen, but I need some information from you that might help." Sam explained. Gordon had said nothing during this exchange, and Sam noticed. "Is something wrong, Gordy?" "No. Jamaica can give you all the help she wants. I just have no interest in helping him after what happened to Jamaica." "Oh, I see," Sam said. "Do you blame him for everything, then." "It has nothing to do with blame, Sam, just the fact that if it were not for him, none of this would have happened. His father warned him, I warned him, Jared warned him, Jamaica pleaded with him. He got into trouble and caused a lot of other people trouble and real harm. I just have no interest in helping his worthless carcass, that's all. But I'd never stop Jama from helping him if she chooses to." "Well, Jama. What do you think about that." "Oh, I completely understand Gordon's view. He's actually right. None of it would have happened if it hadn't been for Tramone, and he certainly doesn't deserve anyone's help. In a way, it's not really for him I want to help, it's more because I want whatever happens to be determined by the truth, ...by reality." Sam was very impressed by Jamaica's little speech. "You certainly are a wise young lady," Sam said. "Let me tell you what I'm interested in before you decide. You might not wish to help when you know what it is, because I want to ask you something that pertains to when they were holding you, before you were rescued." "It's alright," Jamaica said. "Gordy has helped me get by all that." "What I need to know is if you were able to overhear anything they talked about, what they said to each other." "Oh yes," Jamaica said. "They talked about everything and didn't seem to care what I heard. That's probably because they were planning to kill me and didn't think what I heard mattered. I even heard the one who did the shooting bragging about it." "Well I've known for a long time who that is," Sam said. "It's someone else I'm interested in. I want the name of someone who seemed the most cowardly, one the others bullied or teased." "That would be Leo," Jamaica said. "They teased him and called him awful names all the time." "He's not one of members the clerk identified as committing the robbery," Sam said. "Do you think he took part in it?" "I know he didn't." "How?" "Because all the others were calling him, 'another Tramone,' because he was a coward and wouldn't take part in the robbery." "That's the one we need," Sam said. "Why is he important?" Jamaica asked. "Because he can be used. I don't want you to have to testify. In fact, I don't want you at the trial at all. If you were to testify everything else would probably come out and we definitely don't want that." "I don't understand," Jamaica said. "How can he be used?" Sam just grinned. "You'll just have to wait and see." Neither Gordon or Jamaica attended the trial. In fact the only one's of interest who did attend were Tramone's parents. If the others had known how it was going to turn out, everyone would probably have attended, but Sam had asked everyone else to "stay away." The day after Sam's last interview with Jamaica, Leo, the gang member, was arrested. Though he swore he had nothing to do with the robbery or killing, he was told it made no difference, because he knew about it, both before and after, and that made him an accessory, and since there was a murder during the commission of the crime he was also guilty of murder. He was easily convinced to except a plea deal. He would testify against all the others and the charge of murder would be dropped. There was also the matter of Tramone's confession and what Sam had meant about it not being as bad as it sounded. Somehow Sam was working with elements of both the prosecution and defense. He arranged to have Tramone's confession taken and recorded as evidence of his innocence. Tramone was asked about certain facts which he corroborated, but which the police knew were not true. His confession was an obvious fabrication. On the basis of Leo's testimony, the identification of the true killer, the revelation of the impossible statements in Tramone's confession, and the fact that the only ones to accuse Tramone were the gang members who really committed the robbery, Tramone was acquitted, even of perjury, because his false confession was made under duress. The six participants in the robbery were all convicted of theft and murder, and the murderer was sentenced to life in prison. The most tense moment of the trial was when the prosecution asked Tramone to explain what kind of duress had made him confess. Tramone said the gang had threatened his sister. "What kind of a threat was it?" the lawyer asked. "They threatened to kill her," he said. The kidnapping was never mentioned. Everyone expected Pop to completely write Tramone off. To everyone's surprise, he completely forgave Tramone. It was Pop who arranged with Sam Nesbit for Tramone to work for him, and there was something unspoken about that arrangement and Tramone's eager agreement to accept Sam's offer that cleared the path to their reconciliation. There were a lot of things that changed after that. The Williams decided they wanted to home school their children, and the Tarbucks offered to help them with it all they could. Both families, in fact, became very close. Any of the children from either family might be found in either home on any given day or hour. "Now that I'm not going to the day-prison anymore, I can be just as dumb as you," Jamaica teased Gordon. "No matter how hard you try Jama, you'll never be that dumb, but I'll love you anyway." "You're not happy about Tramone, are you Gordy?" Jamaica asked. "I'm happy for you, Jama. I'm happy about anything that pleases you." "Do you hate him?" "I hate what he made happen to you, but I don't hate anybody. If someone is not worth loving, they're certainly not worth hating. I might have contempt for them, but hating isn't worth the energy." "I know you don't care, Gordy, but Tramone admires you. He gives you the credit for saving his life. He says he wishes he could be like you." "Tell him he should be himself and make the best person he can of himself. If he does that, I'd appreciate him for it. Nothing can cancel the past, but if he makes something of his future, I could admire that." "You really could, Gordy?" Jamaica pleaded. "I really could. The past is the past and nothing can change it. But one is only responsible for what they can do, and that means, in the future. I want Tramone to make something of himself, and I will be happy if he does, but he has to do it before I can admire it. But if he does, I will." "I believe he will, Gordy. He tried to save my life, even if he was mistaken. Hold me, Gordy. You are so good," she said. "Gordy, do you remember when Sam asked if you were sure you weren't going to marry me and you said that you weren't sure at all?" "Yes, I remember." "Doesn't that mean you think you might be going to marry me?" "Yes, that's what it means," Gordy said. "Does that mean you are planning to marry me?" "No. It doesn't mean exactly that. It means, unless something I cannot imagine happens in the future, I'm certain one day we'll marry." "Does that mean you haven't completely examined the menu yet?" Gordon looked at her and smiled. "I know everything there is on the menu worth knowing, Jama. You are the only dish I'm interested in. It's just that I can't afford you, yet." [Originall published at The Moral Individual, http://usabig.com/iindv/articles_stand/incidental/jamaica.html.]

"So long as there are men in the world, 99 percent of them will be idiots, and so long as 99 percent of them are idiots they will thirst for religion, and so long as they thirst for religion, it will remain a weapon over them. I see no way out. If you blow up one specific faith, they will embrace another." ----H.L. Mencken While this doesn't explain why men invented religions in the first place, it certainly explains their continuance.

Michael, Glad to see you are ambitious as always. While I have some fundamental disagreements with Rand's epistemology, I still think ITOE is the clearest and most concise discussion of Objectivist epistemology. More attention should be paid to the discussions in the appendix. I found Evidence of the Senses very tedious. In the end, after discussing every other wrong theory at length, Kelley does not provide anything new that Rand had not already addressed. He like Rand and all Objectivists continuously confuse the terms "senses" and "perception," for example. I read Robins years ago. Your are right that it is from a Christian perspective, so you already know his views are mystic and subjective. I think you will be pretty disgusted with both his metaphysics and epistemology by the time your done with that book, but it is very interesting for providing a window on that kind of thinking. I wish you success with writing fiction. I think you could do very well. You have imagination, and I know you think creatively, and have a sense of humor, something witch too many authors lack, or fail to develop. Twain, Wilde, and Shaw are examples of the best of humor. "I've learned the hard way that life is short and this stuff can get awfully long." OH, yes. Good reason for me to quit here. Do make the most of everything, my friend. Randy

Regi, I only skimmed it when it arrived several months ago (and, btw, that book is way too expensive). I just pulled it out again and my reaction was the same as my initial one. After discussing Objectivist epistemology online for a few years, I can't help noticing that certain specific topics and buzzwords with roots in ITOE constantly emerge. On looking, then re-looking at How We Know, Binswanger appears to do a rehash or re-discussion of ALL of them--and he made his entire Table of Contents out of them. As he is one of the fundamentalists, I doubt he says anything in direct opposition to anything Rand said. On the contrary, I expect him to bend over backward to try to justify her more ambiguous and/or controversial assumptions/ideas. I am a bit surprised to see him include a few pictures. This is unusual for an O-fundy book on philosophy. In my previous plans, there were a few books I wanted to go more deeply into before reading this one, starting with a reread of Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, finally read The Evidence of the Senses by David Kelley, read and review some sundry studies of ITOE (mostly online, but also finish a book I once read half of that had a Christian-based critique of Objectivist epistemology and, frankly, some interesting questions to think about, Without a Prayer: Ayn Rand and the Close of Her System by John W. Robbins), and so on. I even wanted to get through The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts, which I got around the same time I bought How We Know: Epistemology on an Objectivist Foundation. I'm not dropping names here. This was my plan. But I have also taken a detour through neuroscience, modern psychology, marketing, propaganda, growth-hacking, etc. These fields--all of which are directly involved with the concept of knowledge--are currently exploding with a lot of great data-driven stuff. However, now that you have this monstrously-long thing online critiquing How We Know, I'll probably start going through both Binswanger's book and your critique. I'm working a lot on fiction material now, though--courses and works. So it might take some time before I start discussing this topic in earnest. I've learned the hard way that life is short and this stuff can get awfully long. Michael Michael, What a nice interesting reply. By the way, I'm no longer using the handle, Reginald Firehammer. I'll be Regi here I suppose because that's how I'm registered and I still get emial to that name, which I don't mind.. My real name is Randall Saunders and most of my friends and acquaintances call me Randy--except my UK friends, of course. I'm in the middle of getting dinner, but wanted to acknowledge your response. I'll try to do your repy justice tomorrow since the rest of this evening is spoken for. Thanks again. Hope this finds you happy and prosperous. Randy

Roger is exactly right, of course. If, as Ba'al said, "The way to know how we know is to study the brain in its natural mode of operation," this means that we must first know how we know what we know (in an epistemological sense) before we can claim any knowledge about the brain and its processes. If, in contrast, we must first understand neurophysiology before we can legitimately claim to know anything, then we will be forever barred from knowing anything about the brain at all, since we will be unable to distinguish true claims about neurophysiology from false claims. Ghs Sorry, sent by mistake!

Why don't you tell us how you really feel? I have Binswanger's book, but it is not high on my reading list. Since you went to all this effort, I might move it up a bit. You certainly are industrious... Michael Just curious. Did you ever read, How We Know?

For a complete analysis of Harry Binswanger's How We Know, please see the online book, How We Know.

First let me thank you for your response. I know we are not going to agree. There is no reason we have to. I'm not sure what it is you think Rand got wrong, and I do not know what you mean by "O'ism." I know you mean "Objectivism," but seem to have your own idea about what "Objectivism" is. What I mean by Objectivism is Rand's philosophy as she explicated it.<p> "If you wonder why I am so particular about protecting the integrity of the term 'Objectivism,' my reason is that 'Objectivism' is the name I have given to my philosophy--therefore, anyone using that name for some philosophical hodgepodge of his own, without my knowledge or consent, is guilty of the fraudulent presumption ... of trying to pass his thinking off as mine.... What is the proper policy on this issue? If you agree with some tenets of Objectivism, but disagree with others, do not call yourself an Objectivist; give proper authorship credit for the parts you agree with--and then indulge in any flights of fancy you wish, on your own." ["To the Readers of The Objectivist Forum,--The Objectivist Forum, Vol. 1, No. 1, ARI FAQ]<p> I am not an Objectivist, but do not use the word Objectivism for any philosophy that is not Rand's. My post was only about Rand's views within the scope of her own philosophy.<p> I think you are mistaken about the "mind/body" dichotomy, an expression, by the way, Rand did not use. Her expression was soul-body dichotomy, and what she had to say about it is greatly misunderstood. From my Desires article, "The Reason/Passion Dichotomy." There is a mistaken philosophical view the denies what it calls a "reason/passion (or mind/body) dichotomy." The basis of this is a misinterpretation of the Objectivist rejection of the soul-body dichotomy, as described in For the New Intellectual and elsewhere. For example: "The New Intellectual...will...discard the soul-body dichotomy. He will discard its irrational conflicts and contradictions, such as: mind versus heart, thought versus action, reality versus desire, the practical versus the moral. He will be an integrated man." [<i>For the New Intellectual</i>] The Objectivist rejection of the dichotomy does not mean an obliteration of the differences. The Objectivist rejection of all such dichotomies is in opposition to those philosophies that make the differences between these things irreconcilable and contradictory. It is not a denial of the differences. To simply reject any dichotomy between reason and passion is like denying any dichotomy between hands and eyes. The hands and eyes are different things but we can learn to coordinate their behavior. Reason and passion are different things, but we can learn to integrate their function. The proper coordination and integration between reason and passion cannot be achieved simply by denying there is any difference or "dichotomy" between them; it can only be achieved by identifying the differences and integrating their function objectively. Ayn Rand describes the proper relationship between reason and passion (emotion) this way: "An emotion is an automatic response, an automatic effect of man's value premises. An effect, not a cause. There is no necessary clash, no dichotomy between man's reason and his emotions--provided he observes their proper relationship. A rational man knows--or makes it a point to discover--the source of his emotions, the basic premises from which they come; if his premises are wrong, he corrects them. He never acts on emotions for which he cannot account, the meaning of which he does not understand. In appraising a situation, he knows why he reacts as he does and whether he is right. He has no inner conflicts, his mind and his emotions are integrated, his consciousness is in perfect harmony. His emotions are not his enemies, they are his means of enjoying life. But they are not his guide; the guide is his mind. This relationship cannot be reversed, however. If a man takes his emotions as the cause and his mind as their passive effect, if he is guided by his emotions and uses his mind only to rationalize or justify them somehow--then he is acting immorally, he is condemning himself to misery, failure, defeat, and he will achieve nothing but destruction--his own and that of others." ["Playboy's interview with Ayn Rand," pamphlet, page 6.] I do not expect you to agree with Rand, I certainly do not on many things, but at least we ought to know what she really said.

Psychological Flaws, Corruptions, Errors, and Wrong Premises 1/30/11 In the previous article, "My Friend, Ayn Rand," I ended by saying, "Unfortunately, almost all that goes by the name Objectivism today embraces, in some form or another, both hedonism and subjectivism." As an example of the hedonism and subjectivism being promoted by almost all so-called Objectivists today, is that particular form of subjective hedonism I characterized in the title of this piece, a paraphrase of Ayn Rand's own characterization of homosexuality: "[Homosexuality] is a manifestation of psychological 'flaws, corruptions, errors, [and] unfortunate premises' that are both 'immoral' and 'disgusting.'" ["The Moratorium on Brains," Ford Hall Forum Lecture, Boston, 1971] Every major so-called Objectivist site generally supports the normalization of homosexuality as benevolent and moral, and as far as I know there is not a single on-line site or blog that denies this view. The following all call themselves "Objectivist" something-or-other, and most disagree that the other sites are truly Objectivist, whatever that is intended to mean. They certainly do not understand Rand's philosophy. First, a couple of forums: Objectivist Living "Human homosexuality is neither moral or immoral. It simply is. It's a form of human behavior. What people do when they face it (in themselves and in others) is moral or immoral." [This is from the founder of the sight.] Rebirth of Reason—"Finding Happiness in Lesbos" [You do not need to read this. Why would you?] From the, "OjectivismOnline Forum," is this: A person who is homosexual, just as with heterosexuals, presumably cannot choose whether or not upon seeing "suitable stimuli" they experience physical attraction. Thus, the attraction is not a choice, and thus, it cannot be considered an aspect of morality. [since when are moral principles based on "presumptions?"] This whole thread is more of the same. And some "Objectivist" Writers: First, Ari Armstrong, "I suspect that homosexuality usually results from a confluence of genetics, environmental factors, and conscious choice. Yet, regardless of which of these three factors is most at play in any given case, I hold that homosexuality can be a healthy, moral path that leads to quality romance." There is Damien Moskovitz of The Atlas Society who writes: "While sexual orientations may not be chosen, in many cases, what behaviors people exhibit in response to their orientations are chosen, and such behaviors can be evaluated morally. A person who by nature, rather than by choice, is more attracted to members of the same sex than the opposite sex still has the choice to recognize and act in accordance with this fact or to repress or act against it. If a person wishes to achieve happiness and promote his life, then he must, in a realm as morally important as sex, act in accordance with his nature." [Err..., he's trying to say it would be morally wrong for someone with "homosexual desires" to not practice homosexuality. Really!] Finally, we have Edwin Locke, senior writer for the Ayn Rand Institute (ARI) who wrote: "Objectivism holds that sexual orientation is not, properly, a moral issue.... Every adult has the right to seek romantic, including sexual, satisfaction with an adult partner of their choice, assuming mutual consent, and it is really no one else's business (including the government's) but their own." Before I discuss what is so very wrong with the views of these so-called Objectivists let me say, I am in total agreement with Ayn Rand's view of homosexuality—it is an immoral practice, but so long as it is only adults who are freely engaging in those practices, what they do is nobody else's business and there must be no laws that govern what individual's choose to do privately among themselves. The issue of morality has nothing to do with politics—the purpose of moral values is to provide individuals with the principles by which they make the choices in thought and action to achieve their own success and happiness in this world. Why Objectivism Holds that Homosexuality Is Immoral According to ARI's Edwin Locke, "Objectivism holds that sexual orientation is not, properly, a moral issue." I have no idea what Edwin Locke thinks, "sexual orientation," means, but Objectivism certainly holds that sexual practices are a moral issue. Are not rape, pedophilia, promiscuity, and any sexual practices that are self-harmful or produce long-term problems moral issues? Locke is probably trying to imply what another writer I quoted wrote, "a person who is homosexual, just as with heterosexuals, presumably cannot choose whether or not upon seeing "suitable stimuli" they experience physical attraction. Thus, the attraction is not a choice, and thus, it cannot be considered an aspect of morality." You will notice that all these "arguments" are always presented in terms that are both unusual and obscure—what is an "orientation?" and what is a "physical attraction?" The words are used to hide the true meaning, which everyone actually understands but intentionally obfuscates, because it would be that much harder to put over if stated clearly and explicitly. What these words really mean and are attempts to cover up are, "feelings," and, "desires." [if that isn't what they mean, someone needs to explain what in the world they do mean.] Feelings and Desires I have written two separate articles on "Feelings" and "Desires" which go into the psychology of both subjects to a greater depth than Rand's own work addresses, but here I am only concerned with the Objectivist view presented in Rand's own words. So, according to Ayn Rand, where do our desires come from? "His [man's] first desires are given to him by nature; they are the ones that he needs directly for his body, such as food, warmth, etc. Only these desires are provided by nature and they teach him the concept of desire. Everything else from then on proceeds from his mind, from the standards and conclusions accepted by his mind and it goes to satisfy his mind—for example, his first toys. (Perhaps sex is the one field that unites the needs of mind and body, with the mind determining the desire and the body providing the means of expressing it. But the sex act itself is only that—an expression. The essence is mental, or spiritual.)" [The Journals of Ayn Rand, "13-Notes While Writing: 1947-1952."] Rand correctly uses the term "emotions" to cover all "feelings," both those which are responses to the content of consciousness like joy or anxiety, as well as the desires and passions, as they are felt, such as affection and sexual desire. All emotions and desires must be developed—none are given—none are provided by evolution, genetics, pre-natal experiences, or environmental influences. "Man is born with an emotional mechanism, just as he is born with cognitive mechanism; but, at birth, both are "tabula rasa." It is man's cognitive faculty, his mind, that determines the content of both." [The Virtue of Selfishness, "The Objectivist Ethics."] According Rand's Objectivism, all our desires and feelings, including our sexual desires, are all developed by how we use our minds, by the principles and values we hold and in terms or our understanding of the nature of the world and our own natures. [And note Rand calls "sexual desire," the "sex emotions."] "I believe that our mind controls everything—yes, even our sex emotions. Perhaps the sex emotions more than anything else. Although that's the opposite of what most people believe. Everything we do and are proceeds from our mind. Our mind can be made to control everything. The trouble is only that most of us don't want our minds to control us—because it is not an easy job. "So they drift and let chance and other people and their own subconscious decide for them. I believe firmly that everything in a man's life is subject to his mind's control—and that his greatest tragedies are from the fact that he willfully suspends that control." [The Letters of Ayn Rand, "Return To Hollywood (1944)". To Gerald Loab, August 5, 1944.] This idea, expressed in an earlier quote, "just as with heterosexuals, presumably cannot choose whether or not upon seeing "suitable stimuli" they experience physical attraction," which I must assume by, "seeing 'suitable stimuli,'" means seeing someone of the opposite sex, implying the "attraction" (sexual desire) just happens is absurd. Human beings are not born knowing what their opposite sex is, or even what that means, or even what sex is. It all has to be learned. This idea that our sexual desires are automatic, like an animals, that somehow our bodies are responsible for our desires, and not our minds was addressed by Rand too. "They think that your body creates a desire and makes a choice for you.... Love is blind, they say; sex is impervious to reason and mocks the power of all philosophers. But, in fact, a man's sexual choice is the result and the sum of his fundamental convictions. Tell me what a mind finds sexually attractive and I will tell you his entire philosophy of life." [Atlas Shrugged, Part Two--"Chapter IV, The Sanction Of The Victim."] It is not a man's body, but his mind that determines what he will find sexually attractive, and because most minds consist of a hodge-podge of eclectic non-concepts (like "sexual attraction and inborn orientation," their sex lives are equally disastrous. "Observe the ugly mess which most men make of their sex lives—and observe the mess of contradictions which they hold as their moral philosophy. One proceeds from the other." [Atlas Shrugged, Part Two--Chapter IV, "The Sanction Of The Victim."] It is exactly this view of sex that virtually all self-styled Objectivists are promoting today, and all those who succumb to this perversion of the truth will be the sufferers, and what they will suffer is all the consequences that result from surrendering one's rational control of their life to their irrational desires and passions—depriving themselves of the real joy and pleasure their sexual capacity is capable of providing. Of all people, it is those who regard themselves as Objectivists and proponents of the philosophy of Ayn Rand who would deprive men of the very moral basis for sex. In reference to the religious view that sex is evil, Rand wrote: "The twisted element of truth here is that sex has to have a high spiritual base and source, and that without this it is an evil perversion." [The Journals of Ayn Rand, "13-Notes While Writing: 1947-1952."] It is not religion, but an objective system of ethical principles that is the moral basis of sex. "The cheap little schools of "free love" attempt to glorify sex on a silly sort of materialistic basis—simply glorifying physical joy, considering themselves 'vital as animals.' They are unable to discover a moral, spiritual premise to justify sex—so they try to enjoy it without any morality, and, of course, it doesn't work, it doesn't bring them any sort of spiritual happiness, and not even much satisfaction." [The Journals of Ayn Rand, "13-Notes While Writing: 1947-1952."] Perhaps in Edwin Locke's version of Objectivism sex is not a moral issue, but in Ayn Rand's version of Objectivism it is a profoundly moral issue, and outside of the moral principles a sound and rational sexuality is based on, sex will be a source of profound unhappiness and trouble and not the reinforcing pleasure and joy it ought to be. Psychological Flaws, Corruptions, Errors, and Wrong Premises Those who reject Rand's view of sex, particularly her view of homosexuality attempt to dismiss her views as some kind of personal aversion rather than a reasoned objective opinion. That dismissal has been put over because most people do not understand the objective basis for Rand's view, though she expressed it specifically. It is obvious she regarded the view that human desires have any other source other than the mind as a "psychological flaw." To view sex as merely an animal desire produced by the body, and the gratification of that desire without moral significance is a, "corruption." To believe sexual desire just exists without reason or purpose, is a profound, "error." The premise that any human desires are preprogrammed or inborn is a, "wrong premise." I've only provided what Rand herself believed is the Objectivist view of sex and sexual desire. Those who call themselves Objectivists do not have to agree with Rand, of course, but there is something immoral about promoting themselves and what they teach as Rand's Objectivism while contradicting the very foundations of her philosophy of ethics. The issue is not homosexuality, which is just one example of the many different mistaken choices people make about how to live their lives. Promoting homosexuality as normal and moral is also not the issue, though it is immoral and flies in the face of everything Rand's Objectivism teaches. The issue is for individuals who have been mislead by the obfuscation of objective principles that no one needs to be the slave of their feelings, driven be desires they neither know the cause of or reason for; no one needs to be robbed of the choice to determine what their life will be, both long-term and short-term, determined by their own objective choice. That is the real issue. It is a matter of individual choice and liberty. An individual's life is either under the control of their own mind and rational choice or they are the slave of their subjective desires. Whether one thinks, as one quoted writer does; "I suspect that homosexuality usually results from a confluence of genetics, environmental factors, and conscious choice;" anyone who bases their choices on what they only "suspect" might be the cause of the desires and feeling, has surrendered their rational will to irrational desires. It does not matter whether the issue is sex, or any other aspect of one's life, to the extent they act on desires they do not know the source or cause of, their life will be out of control, and the consequences disastrous. "A rational man knows—or makes it a point to discover—the source of his emotions, the basic premises from which they come; if his premises are wrong, he corrects them. He never acts on emotions for which he cannot account, the meaning of which he does not understand. In appraising a situation, he knows why he reacts as he does and whether he is right. ... If a man takes his emotions as the cause and his mind as their passive effect, if he is guided by his emotions and uses his mind only to rationalize or justify them somehow—then he is acting immorally, he is condemning himself to misery, failure, defeat, and he will achieve nothing but destruction—his own and that of others." ["Playboy's interview with Ayn Rand," pamphlet, page 6.] "Sexual attraction," and "sexual orientation," are nothing but "desires whose source, nature and meaning one does not know. One whose life is guided by such desires, rather than reason, Rand describes as a mindless robot: "Emotions are not tools of cognition; to be guided by whims—by desires whose source, nature and meaning one does not know—is to turn oneself into a blind robot, operated by unknowable demons (by one's stale evasions), a robot knocking its stagnant brains out against the walls of reality which it refuses to see." [The Virtue of Selfishness, "1. The Objectivist Ethics"] Objectivism is a philosophy of individual liberty, but those who call themselves Objectivists today are propagators of a philosophy of enslavement, not of men enslaved by other men, but of individuals enslaved by their own irrational desires and mindless passions.

George, I hope you don't mind if I ask a question about the quote above. The assertion that there are "automatic" processes in human consciousness has always seemed a kind of ratioalism in both Peikoff's and Rand's writings. Rand referred to an "automatic process" that integrated sense date into percepts of entities, which was expanded by Peikoff, and your quote refers to an automatic subconscious process of "grasping" first level generalizations, in this case "causal connection." If a philosopher is going to assert there are automatic processes, isn't that philosopher obliged to explain what those automatic process are, how the automatic processes work, how he knows there are such automatic processes, and further, how he knows the product of such automatic process are valid and reliable? The problem is the very same one Rand identified regarding Kant's view, and even Plato's view of perception. If something lies between our senses and our perception of the world, some process, automatic or otherwise, unless one can explain exactly how that process works demonstrating its validity in terms of the percepts it produces, or worse, the "first level concepts" it is responsible for, there is no basis for assuming either perception or first level concepts are valid. Pleasse understand this is not a repudiation of the validity of perception, which I regard as both valid and contextually infallible, but that conviction is not based on any presumed automatic processes, but an understanding of the true nature of perception which requires no such automatic processes. As for first level concepts, they are valid only because what they identify are the entities of direct perception. There cannot be first level concepts for what can only be identified at the conceptual level, such as relationships, of which "cause" is one. My question is, why do you accept that there are such "automoatic processes" that Objectivism posits? Can you explain how you know there are such processes, how such processes work, and how you know the product of such processes are valid? By the way, I do not mean this as a challenge to your views. I am sincerely interested in your view of these things, but have no interest in changing your, or anyone else's views. Regi

I haven't had time to look through, let alone read, Regi's long discussion -- just glancing at it, it seems to me to hold promise of being a good critique of the Harriman, but that's only a cursory first impression. Meanwhile, I noticed Dennis' post and want to say something about the intent of the Harriman book being to apply AR's epistemology to the problem of induction. I agree that this is the intent of the book. However, I think that the book is NOT such an application. (I hope to spell out why not later this year, but I probably won't have time until after Thanksgiving.) The book's not being as advertised is a strong reason why I think it's so potentially damaging. ... Ellen Hi Ellen, I wish your critique were going to be sooner rather than later, because I agree with you that Harriman's thesis does not agree with Rand's epistemology as presented in ITOE. I'd love to see someone present the argument from that point of view. I do not agree with all of Rand's epistemology, but do agree with much of it, especially those aspect having to do with the coginitive role of concepts, but not her definition of concepts, so my criticism of Harriman is partly based on the errors, as I see them, of the epistemology itself. Dennis Hardin's criticism that I did not present the argument you intend to present is true enough, not because I do not understand Rand's epistemology, but because I do, and disagree with it, which is the reason I was obliged to include a brief explanation of my view of concepts. I had no intention of repudiating Rand. Looking forward to your review of The Logical Leap. Regi

I agree with you both. I did not mean the very genuine scientific enquirey into a unifying theory in physics was mysticism, but there are some who think a GUT will be the answer to everything, not just physics, though they are not themselves physicists. They are the same types that attempt to use "quantum uncertainty" as the explanation of, "volition," though they have no understanding whatsoever of quantum mechanics. The confusion is entirely my fault, because I let myself indulge in a little rhetorical license. It's probably the most non-essential statement in the entire article. It was not meant to repudiate GUT, but those who look to it as a kind of ultimate answer for everything. Regi

Michael, I only had a question, which I think you've answered. So the following is only to explain what I mean, although I think the Rand quotes above are quite clear about it. By "material" I and Rand mean physical existence--that existence we are directly conscious of, the world we see, hear, feel, smell, and taste. It is all that the physical sciences study. As I quoted Rand above: "Man is an entity of mind and body, an indivisible union of two elements: of consciousness and matter. Matter is that which one perceives, consciousness is that which perceives it." All that the sciences study can be demonstrated, and observed, directly or indirectly (by means of instruments for example), perceptually. One can examine a liver or brain, but consciousness cannot be observed, directly or indirectly. One cannot lay a fresh wet consiousness on a disecting table. One can observe the behavior of the brain, but consciousness cannot be observed at all, except by introspection. Of course consciousness cannot exist independently of the brain, anymore than life could exist independently of a physical organism, or a computer program could run independently of a computer. But a computer and a program are not the same thing and a computer does not make the program run, the program uses the computer to run itself. (This is only an analogy.) As for the supposed dichotomy between the consciousness and the physical (or mind and body) I absolutely hold that view, as did Rand. From here: The Reason/Passion Dichotomy There is a mistaken philosophical view that denies what it calls a "reason/passion dichotomy." The basis of this is a misinterpretation of the Objectivist rejection of the soul-body dichotomy, as described in For the New Intellectual and elsewhere. For example: "The New Intellectual...will...discard the soul-body dichotomy. He will discard its irrational conflicts and contradictions, such as: mind versus heart, thought versus action, reality versus desire, the practical versus the moral. He will be an integrated man." [Ayn Rand, For the New Intellectual] The Objectivist rejection of the dichotomy does not mean an obliteration of the differences. The Objectivist rejection of all such dichotomies is in opposition to those philosophies that make the differences between these things irreconcilable and contradictory. It is not a denial of the differences. To simply reject any dichotomy between reason and passion is like denying any dichotomy between hands and eyes. The hands and eyes are different things but we can learn to coordinate their behavior. Reason and passion are different things, but we can learn to integrate their function. The proper coordination and integration between reason and passion cannot be achieved simply by denying there is any difference or "dichotomy" between them; it can only be achieved by identifying the differences and integrating their function objectively. Ayn Rand describes the proper relationship between reason and passion (emotion) this way: "An emotion is an automatic response, an automatic effect of man's value premises. An effect, not a cause. There is no necessary clash, no dichotomy between man's reason and his emotions—provided he observes their proper relationship. A rational man knows—or makes it a point to discover—the source of his emotions, the basic premises from which they come; if his premises are wrong, he corrects them. He never acts on emotions for which he cannot account, the meaning of which he does not understand. In appraising a situation, he knows why he reacts as he does and whether he is right. He has no inner conflicts, his mind and his emotions are integrated, his consciousness is in perfect harmony. His emotions are not his enemies, they are his means of enjoying life. But they are not his guide; the guide is his mind. This relationship cannot be reversed, however. If a man takes his emotions as the cause and his mind as their passive effect, if he is guided by his emotions and uses his mind only to rationalize or justify them somehow—then he is acting immorally, he is condemning himself to misery, failure, defeat, and he will achieve nothing but destruction—his own and that of others." ["Playboy's interview with Ayn Rand," pamphlet, page 6.] There does not need to be any conflict or disagreement between the mind and body, between one's reason and one's feelings and passion, but that does not make them the same thing. One only needs to "observe the proper relationship," between things that are different. I really do not expect you to agree, Michael, and think you do not. But that was my question, and my only purpose. I am just curious about whether you agree or not--nothing more.

There are all sorts of genetic defects in nature. I think it is a stretch to characterize them as serving some biological function. Here is my answer to Dr. Chris Matthew Sciabarra in part of a published debate we had a few years ago: What animals do, they have no choice about, so no animal behavior can be pointed to as an example of what it is normal for human being to choose. Regi

First, I never use the expression "free will," which is loaded with religious baggage and sophistry, and by volition, I mean that aspect of human conscious that both requires and enables human beings to consciously choose all they think and do. It is isn't just that human beings can choose consciously, they must choose consciousnly, and cannot act without consciously choosing to. Since thinking is a conscious act, and every human act is chosen, there is no step in human thinking that is not a chosen one. That is my view. You do not have to agree with it. Regi

Regi, I don't know what you mean. Do you mean whether I believe that reality is limited to one reality? Or maybe limited to the part of reality we can perceive through the senses? Even though I don't know what you mean, I will still take a stab at it. I do believe there is only one reality. So do I and so did Ayn Rand, but neither of us believed that one reality is merely physical, that is, that physical properties are the only properties real existents are capable of having and that one non-physical property is consciousness, and consciousness and that which consciousness is conscious of (the physical) are not the same thing. [Rand used the word "material" to mean what is usually meant by "physical."] CUI - 24. Requiem For Man "Man's soul or spirit is his consciousness; the motor of his consciousness is reason; deprive him of freedom, i.e., of the right to use his mind--—and what is left of him is only a physical body, ready to be manipulated by the strings of any tribe." The Journals of Ayn Rand 13 - Notes While Writing: 1947-1952 "Man's consciousness is not material--but neither is it an element opposed to matter. It is the element by which man controls matter--but the two are part of one entity and one universe..." The Journals of Ayn Rand 14 - Notes While Writing Galt's Speech "Man is an entity of mind and body, an indivisible union of two elements: of consciousness and matter. Matter is that which one perceives, consciousness is that which perceives it; your fundamental act of perception is an indivisible whole consisting of both; to deny, to [separate] or to equate them is to contradict the nature of your perception ..." Atlass Shrugged, Par Three / Chapter VII "This Is John Galt Speaking" "You are an indivisible entity of matter and consciousness." The Letters of Ayn Rand The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged Years (1945-1959) To Nathan Blumenthal January 13, 1950 Dear Mr. Blumenthal: "This little question of yours would take a heavy philosophical volume to answer, so I can only indicate a brief answer. You ask, how do I reconcile my atheism with my belief in free will. Most philosophers, in effect, have offered us the choice between a universe consisting of God, or a universe consisting of blind matter. Where is man in the picture? They have figured out everything, except that they forgot the existence of man. Man is a being endowed with consciousness--an attribute which matter does not possess. His consciousness is the free, nonmaterial element in him." Sorry for that many examples (there are many more), but most people do not believe me when I say Rand believed consciousness and matter (the physical) are totally different things. One does not arise from the other. That's what I mean, Michael, the same thing Ayn Rand meant. No examination of the brain will ever reveal anything about consciousness, except perhaps how the brain behaves when consciousness uses it. I'm not making an argument for that view (I've done that elsewhere), only explaining what I meant. My question was really whether you agree with Rand's view or not. Regi

<div align="center"><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="12" border="0" width="725" style="background-color:white;font-family:times new roman;font-size:12pt;"><tr><td><div align="left" style="font-size:13pt;"> <div style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:12pt;"> <a name="top"><div align="center" style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:16pt;"><b>Saving Science</b></div></a><p> <div align="center" style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:13pt;"><b>A Criticism of the Thesis in David Harriman's<br><i>The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics</i></b></div><p> <div align="center" style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:13pt;"><b>by Reginald Firehammer</b></div><p> <hr width=95% align="center" size="1" noshade> <div align="center"><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="6" border="0" width="95%"><tr><td colspan="2"> <div align="center" style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:13pt;"><b>Contents</b></div> </td></tr><tr><td valign="top" width="300"> <b>Harriman's Thesis</b><p> <a href="#a">Cause</a><br> <a href="#b">Origin of the Concept Cause</a><br> <a href="#c">Induction Is Generalization</a><br> <a href="#d">Mathematics, The Basis of Everything</a><br> <a href="#e" >Summary</a> </td><td valign="top"> <b>Critique and True Nature of Science</b><p> <a href="#f" name="" target="">Beginning With Cause</a><br> <a href="#g" name="" target="">More Than a Semantic Difference</a><br> <a href="#h" name="" target="">Principles, not Cause</a><br> <a href="#i" name="" target="">First-level Concepts</a><br> <a href="#j" name="" target="">Identification, Not Generalization</a><br> <a href="#k" name="" target="">Mathematics is Only a Method</a><br> <a href="#l" name="" target="">Limits of Mathematics</a><br> <a href="#k1" name="" target="">Not Just Mathematics</a><br> <a href="#m" name="" target="">The True Nature Of Concepts</a><br> <a href="#n" name="" target="">Observation, Identification, and Deduction</a><br> <a href="#o" name="" target="">Deduction From Observation, Not<br> Generalization</a><br> <a href="#p" name="" target="">Scientific Method</a><br> <a href="#q" name="" target="">Heading Off Possible Criticisms</a> </td></tr></table></div> <hr width=95% align="center" size="1" noshade> <p> I have been looking forward with some anticipation to finally reading the long-promised book on induction from ARI (Ayn Rand Institute) for some time. The book has been in the works for over 10 years and has finally been published as <i>The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics</i>. David Harriman is named as the author of the book, but it is clearly a collaboration between Harriman and Leonard Peikoff.<p> [<b><i>Note:</i></b> The is not a review of the book. If it were I would have good things to say about it, especially about the well presented and very interesting examples from the history of science. In this article I only address the essential arguments for the thesis of the book.]<p> There is a widely held view that the validity of science, in some way, depends on the validity of <i>induction</i>, and this book presents arguments which are supposed to be a defense of the inductive method in science. It is those arguments I am primarily interested in.<p> The entire argument is based on three concepts, "cause," "generalization," (by induction), and "mathematics." The book proceeds by means of illustrations of its premises with many good examples from the history of science. While those examples are excellent illustrations of the validity of scientific methods, they totally fail to demonstrate that induction is the basis of those methods.<p> My intention here is to explain why the concepts the book defends are either invalid or incorrectly understood. I'll first explain what Harriman seems to mean by the three main concepts. I will follow that by my criticism which includes the correct basis for the validity and objectivity of science.<p> [All quotes and page numbers refer to Harriman's <i>The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics</i>.]<p> <div align="center" style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:13pt;"><b>Harriman's Thesis</b></div><p> <table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0" width="100%"><tr><td> <b><a name="a">Cause</a></b> </td><td align="right"><a href="#top"><b>Top</b></a></td></tr></table><p> I intend to present these concepts without bias or criticism as closely as I can to the meaning intended by Harriman.<p> Concerning cause, he writes, "The only justification for inferring the future from the actions of the past is the fact that the past actions occurred not arbitrarily or miraculously, but for a reason, a reason inherent in the nature of the acting entities themselves: i.e., the justification is that the past actions were effects of causes—and thus if the same cause is operative tomorrow, it will result in the same effect." [Page 21.]<p> This meaning of cause seems very much like the meaning Hume intended, when he described cause as a "... necessary connexion ... which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other." [<i>An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding</i>]<p> I point this out to make it clear that though Harriman admires Aristotle and credits his philosophy as the most important philosophical influence on the development of science, his meaning of cause is obviously not that of Aristotle.<p> Aristotle identified four "types" or "aspects" of cause:<p> 1. Material cause: The substance of which a thing consists.<br> 2. Formal cause: The "design" or "form" of a thing.<br> 3. Efficient cause: The agent that brings a thing into existence.<br> 4. Final cause: Reason or purpose of a thing.<p> Cause, as Harriman uses the term would only pertain to number 3, the "efficient cause," and the "agent" for Harriman would be whatever thing, event or attribute was responsible for that which is caused, that is, the effect. But Aristotle was thinking on much broader terms, and by "cause" he meant what Harriman meant when he wrote: "... actions occurred not arbitrarily or miraculously, but for a reason ...." [Page 21.] Aristotle is addressing "cause" as the "reason" for things, not just their "physical" cause.<p> Harriman's meaning of cause separates a "cause" from an "effect" as though they were two independent metaphysical existents with "cause" as the only connection between them.<p> "In seeking cause and effect, we are relating objects/attributes that are subsumed under different concepts. We are attempting to discover the effects of one type of existent on another, for example, to identify the effect of temperature on the pressure of a gas, or the effect of length on the period of a pendulum, or the effect of distance on the gravitational force between bodies." [Page 229.]<p> But, though he confuses them, there is another meaning for cause suggested by Harriman. It is included in the quote above, "actions occurred not arbitrarily or miraculously, but for a reason, a reason inherent in the nature of the acting entities themselves," and stated explicitly here:<p> "Let us start by noting that all generalizations—first-level and higher—are statements of causal connection. All assert (or imply) that an entity of a certain kind necessarily acts in a certain way under a given set of circumstances, which is the essence of the law of causality." [Page 21.]<p> Let me make the difference clear: the first meaning of cause is a description of the relationship between two different existents, the one being the cause of the behavior of the other; the second meaning of cause states that which "causes" an existent's behavior as its own nature. Harriman obviously believes these two descriptions of cause agree, perhaps even that they reinforce each other.<p> <table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0" width="100%"><tr><td> <b><a name="b">Origin of the Concept Cause</a></b> </td><td align="right"><a href="#top"><b>Top</b></a></td></tr></table><p> Harriman regards causality as a "corollary" of the axiom of identity implicit in the perception of action in the same way identity is implicit in the perception of entities.<p> "Knowledge of the law of causality is first gained by a child in implicit form, in the early, preconceptual stage of cognition; it is grasped as a corollary—a self-evident implication—of the law of identity, one of the fundamental axioms of philosophy. The law of identity states that to be is to be something in particular, i.e., to have a nature; causality is the application of identity to the realm of action, i.e. it states that an entity must act in accordance with its nature." <!--The (implicit) knowledge of both laws is necessary for any further cognitive development. Only when a man knows the law of identity can he go on to understand and ask the question: "What is this thing?" i.e., 'What is its identity?' Similarly, only when he knows the law of causality, at least in implicit form, can he go on to understand and ask the question 'Why?' i.e., 'What is the cause?'"--> [Page 22.]<p> One "possible" way a child gains knowledge of "cause," Harriman explains, is through the experience of causing things himself. He provides an example and explanation:<p> "A toddler, say, pushes a ball and it rolls away." ... the content of that concept [cause] is already present in the ... "rolling" an object. To roll an object is to cause it to roll by a certain means. The experience of rolling a ball, therefore, is the experience of causing something to happen. It is a pure experience of causation, without which the concept of "cause" could never be reached. The experience is directly perceptual. ... And if such rolling is an object of direct experience, as it clearly is, then causing, too, is an object of direct experience."<p> He then explains that this direct perception of cause is the basis of the child's first-level generalization (induction).<p> "He [the child] experiences the connection between what he does and what it makes happen. This is the basis of a child's first-level generalizations—and it gives him the explicit knowledge of "cause" necessary for further progress." [Page 22.]<p> According to Harriman, our knowledge of "cause" begins with direct perception.<p> "Armed with an explicit concept of 'cause' (of one thing 'making' another happen,) he [the child] is ready to perceive, all around him further instances of it. ... 'The wind makes the leaves flutter,' 'The fire makes the paper turn into ashes,' 'The rain makes the ground wet.' In all such cases, the causal connection is grasped from a single instance, because we directly perceive the causation as it is occurring." [Page 23.]<p> "In regard to first-level generalizations, however, direct perception of cause and effect is essential—and sufficient." [Page 24.]<p> <table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0" width="100%"><tr><td> <b><a name="c">Induction Is Generalization</a></b> </td><td align="right"><a href="#top"><b>Top</b></a></td></tr></table><p> Harriman's own definition of induction is the following:<p> "Induction is the process of inferring generalizations from particular instances." [Page 6.]<p> His meaning of generalization is this:<p> "A generalization is a proposition that ascribes a characteristic to every member of an unlimited class, wherever it is positioned in space or time. In formal terms, it states: All S is P. This kind of claim, on any subject, goes beyond all possible observations." [Page 7.]<p> The following are examples of what he means by generalization:<p> "But all of this requires that men first have the concept of 'shadow'—which depends on our ability to distinguish the dark areas behind lighted objects from the objects themselves. And how did we learn this distinction? From a wealth of earlier data, such as 'The dark areas in contrast to the objects they abut, have no tactile properties' (a generalization) and 'The dark areas appear or vanish with changes in the light source, while the objects remain constant' (a generalization). From these (along with other such generalizations), we conclude that the dark areas are not objects, but rather an effect produce when an object blocks light (a generalization)—which gives us the concept 'shadow.'" [Pages 17&18.]<p> Harriman bases his justification for this kind of generalization on what he calls, "first-level," inductions, which I suppose means the same as a child's "first-level generalizations," described above under the, "Origin of the Concept Cause."<p> "Similarly, a toddler sees a particular ball, but his identification of it is simply 'ball.' At this early stage, the child does not and cannot know any wider integration or narrower subtypes .... The same applies to the child's experience of himself as the particular pushing agent. His identification must be of 'pushing' as such .... Inherent in forming and applying a concept is the understanding that what counts cognitively is only the identity of its referents ... because the concept of an existent subsumes all instances everywhere, past, present, and future.<p> "Because of his simple, first-level conceptual structure, our inducer, in the very act of naming what he perceives, automatically drops the measurement of the perceived cause and effect and thereby gains knowledge transcending the given concrete. This is how he is able to grasp that the cause pertains to pushing as such, and the effect to balls as such, no matter where or when the ball is pushed." [Page 27.]<p> Remember, according to Harriman, all generalizations are concepts of cause:<p> "Let us start by noting that all generalizations&mdashfirst-level and higher—are statements of causal connection."[Page 21.]<p> Harriman nevertheless asserts that first-level inductions (generalizations) become concepts the moment a "word" is used to identify a "cause and effect," and this is automatic and self-evident.<p> "When the first-level inducer identifies his concrete experience of cause and effect in terms of words, his perceptual grasp of the causal relationship becomes thereby a conceptual grasp of it, i.e., a generalization. And since the application of first-level concepts is automatic and self-evident, the two aspects of a first-level generalization—the perceptual and the conceptual—are each, to a human mind, self-evident." [Page 28.]<p> Harriman makes this automatic self-evident concept of cause the basis for all knowledge of cause.<p> "How do you know that pushing a ball makes it roll? There is no answer, not even by Newton or Einstein, except this: Look and see. One cannot 'prove' such a generalization by deriving it from any abstract laws of motion. On the contrary, without a fund of such generalizations established at the outset, one could not discover or prove any laws of motion. The laws are valid only if their first-level antecedents are valid, not the other way around." [Page 18.]<p> [<b><i>Note:</i></b> On page 28, Harriman explains that a child's experience of "cause" becomes a concept when the experience is assigned a "word." On page 27, the only word Harriman gives as an example is "ball," and possibly by implication, thought not explicitly, the word "push." Harriman never gives an example of the child assigning a word to the supposed concept of cause.]<p> <table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0" width="100%"><tr><td> <b><a name="d">Mathematics, The Basis of Everything</a></b> </td><td align="right"><a href="#top"><b>Top</b></a></td></tr></table><p> Harriman reduces all universal knowledge to mathematics, basing both the nature of the metaphysical and the epistemological on it, including the nature of the human mind. It is mathematics he says, that is the means by which cause is understood.<p> Mathematics is, "the science of relating quantities to one another, quantities that are ultimately related to perceivable objects. ... it is by means of relating quantities that scientists grasp and express causal relationships." [Page 84.]<p> For Harriman, "mathematics is the language of physical science." [Page 225.]<p> "What knowledge of astronomy is possible without mathematics?" he asks. [Page 109.]<p> Harriman insists that mathematics is not a mere product of the mind without reference to the perceivable world. He comments on the wrong view of mathematics as "detached from the world, ... its source ... placed entirely within consciousness ...:"<p> "Such views about the nature of mathematical concepts led Einstein to pose the unanswerable question: 'How is it possible that mathematics, a product of human thought that is independent of experience, fits so excellently the objects of physical reality?' An answer to this question is possible only when we reject the premise that mathematics is independent of experience. Like every other science, mathematics applies to reality because it is derived from our observations of reality. It is a conceptualization of facts, which are ultimately reducible to observed similarities and differences." [Page 226.]<p> Continuing to emphasize that objectivity of mathematics, and after providing a somewhat fantastic explanation of how that method, which we call counting, was developed (as if anyone actually knows), he goes on to assert that "number concepts are integrations of similar concretes." and, "They refer to facts, as processed by our conceptual faculty; i.e., they are objective." [Page 227.]<p> He further states in this regard:<p> "Reduction to perceptual data is more complex for higher-level mathematical concepts.... If the concepts of higher mathematics are not derived from experience, however, then ... they are invalid." [Page 227.]<p> Having asserted the objectivity of mathematics, he then asks the question:<p> "Taking for granted the objectivity of mathematics, our question is: Why is it only by means of mathematics that we can gain scientific knowledge of the physical world?" [Page 228.]<p> The answer, according to, Harriman is because all our knowledge is based on the principles of mathematics, and that answer as based on Ayn Rand's "measurement omission" theory of concepts.<p> "Rand identified that the similar concretes united by a concept differed from one another only quantitatively. We form a concept by noticing that two or more existent have the same characteristic(s), but that these characteristics vary along a quantitative continuum of more or less. By omitting the implicit, approximate measurements of the characteristics, we can integrate the existent and treat them as interchangeable instances of a single concept." [Page 228.]<p> Since it is by means of measurements (or rather, ignoring them) all concepts are formed, Harriman can say "Concepts are the means by which we identify the nature of existents, and they are based on our grasp of quantitative relations among their referents. In performing such an integration, our minds grasp that the various instances we perceive are commensurable, i.e., reducible to the same unit&mdahsh;and therefore that the instances are the same except for their varying measurements. ... Thus when we say 'I know what something is,' we mean 'I know what it is through a quantitative operation my mind performs,' i.e., through grasping the quantitative connection of instances to some concrete taken as the unit—and then dropping the measurements." [Page 228.]<p> Thus, for Harriman, all knowledge, at least all scientific knowledge, is reduced to quantity, even to the working of the human mind.<p> "<i>Human consciousness is inherently a quantitative mechanism</i>. It grasps reality&mdashi.e., the attributes of entities and their causal relationships to one another—only through grasping quantitative data. In this sense, quantity has epistemological primacy over quality." [Page 231.]<p> Harriman does emphasize that the arithmetic nature of consciousness is epistemological.<p> "It is crucial to recognize that this point is epistemological, not metaphysical. Pythagoras was wrong to claim that quantity is the substance of <i>reality</i>; it is not true that "all things are numbers." Quantity is always quantity of something, i.e. of some entity or attribute. But quantity is the key to the nature of human <i>knowledge</i>. We can grasp and identify the qualities of things only through grasping quantity—and we can grasp causal relations between entities and actions only through grasping quantitative relations between them." [Page 231.]<p> <table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0" width="100%"><tr><td> <b><a name="e">Summary</a></b> </td><td align="right"><a href="#top"><b>Top</b></a></td></tr></table><p> Harriman considers induction the "compliment" of deduction, a kind of "converse" operation—induction is reasoning from the particular to the general; deduction is reasoning from the general to the particular.<p> "Induction is the process of inferring generalizations from particular instances. The complementary process of applying generalizations to new instances is deduction." [Page 6.]<p> The basis for the validity of induction, for Harriman, is the concept of cause, which is a fundamental concept of action in the same way identity is a fundamental concept of entities. Just as identity is implied by the perception of entities, cause is implied by the perception of action. Every action happens for a reason which is its cause.<p> The formation of the concept cause, "is automatic and self-evident," in the child, and is the basis of all future generalizations from particular instances, since "all generalizations ... are statements of causal connection."<p> These causal connections can be and are expressed in mathematical terms, because "it is by means of relating quantities that scientists grasp and express causal relationships."<p> Ultimately, mathematics, which is our means of comprehending quantity and quantitative relationships is the basis of all knowledge, because, "quantity is the key to the nature of human knowledge. We can grasp and identify the qualities of things only through grasping quantity—and we can grasp causal relations between entities and actions only through grasping quantitative relations between them."<p> [<b><i>Note:</i></b> This summary only addresses the concepts I am critical of. I am in total agreement or at least approving of many of the concepts in this book, specially the emphasis placed on the hierarchical nature of knowledge, that fact that new knowledge is always acquired in the context of current knowledge (which is frequently prerequisite for that new knowledge), and the non-contradictory nature of true knowledge.]<p> <div align="center" style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:13pt;"><b>Critique and True Nature of Science</b></div><p> <table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0" width="100%"><tr><td> <b><a name="f">Beginning With Cause</a></b> </td><td align="right"><a href="#top"><b>Top</b></a></td></tr></table><p> Though the stated purpose of <i>The Logical Leap</i> is to defend the validity of induction, I begin my criticism with Harriman's concept of cause, because he says, "all generalizations ... are statements of causal connection." We are not going to know what induction induces if we do not know what cause is.<p> Harriman states, "the same cause ... will result in the same effect." He also states, "In seeking cause and effect, we are relating objects/attributes that are subsumed under different concepts. We are attempting to discover the effects of one type of existent on another, for example, to identify the effect of temperature on the pressure of a gas, or the effect of length on the period of a pendulum, or the effect of distance on the gravitational force between bodies."<p> The key word in the second explanation of cause is "relating." It is obvious what Harriman means by "cause" here, is a particular kind of relationship, one in which an attribute, state, or behavior corresponds in some identifiable way to some other attribute, state, or behavior.<p> These kinds of relationships certainly exist, can be identified, and <i>are</i> identified; but why should they be called "cause?" The fact that a gas will have a higher pressure if its temperature is higher is simply a description of the relationship between two properties of a gas, not a description of a "cause." This is a good example because temperature and pressure in gasses are mutually determined. An increase in pressure produces an increase in temperature, and vice versa (so long as the volume remains constant). Which is the cause, and which is the effect?<p> The fact is, none of these are examples of one thing "causing" another. The correct explanation is given by Harriman, himself, "an entity of a certain kind necessarily acts in a certain way under a given set of circumstances ..." It is not, however, as he says, the essence of the law of causality," because an existent behaves the way it behaves because it is what it is and has the nature it has. Nothing "causes" it to behave the way it does.<p> The principle ought to be written, "the same entity in the same context always behaves the same way." An entity's context is its state and its relationships to all other things.<p> An entity is whatever all its qualities are. (By qualities I mean all of an entity's attributes, properties, characteristics, and states.) It is its own qualities that determine how it will behave in any context.<p> Now consider the examples of "cause" given by Harriman:<p> The temperature and pressure of a gas are attributes of the gas, an entity, and its behavior is determined by its own nature. It is not "caused" by something else. The fact that the attributes of pressure and temperature in a confined gas have a specific relationship is itself an attribute of gas. It does not exist in liquids, for example.<p> The length of a pendulum is a property of the pendulum. It behaves the way it does (has a specific period) because of its own attribute, length. It is not "caused" by something else.<p> Two bodies, relative to each other may be considered a system, an entity, and its behavior will be determined by its attributes, which of course includes what it consists of and the properties of those components. Otherwise each body might be considered part of the context of the other, but how each behaves in that case is determined by each body's own nature, that is, its own attributes.<p> <table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0" width="100%"><tr><td> <b><a name="g">More Than a Semantic Difference</a></b> </td><td align="right"><a href="#top"><b>Top</b></a></td></tr></table><p> There is nothing wrong with the concept "cause" meaning, as it does in common usage, the reason or explanation for a thing, usually for events, like the cause of an automobile accident or the cause of the power outage. In that sense it only means that things do not just happen, willy-nilly, but that everything happens as a consequence of some preceding conditions or events. Even though it is applied in some technical situations (looking for the cause of a circuit board failure, for example) it is not a technical term. The basis of the validity of the concept, however, is philosophical. It based on the understanding that the physical world has an objective nature, that it is what it is independent of anyone individual's knowledge or consciousness of it, and that it's nature and behavior are determined by inviolable principles.<p> It is the purpose of the sciences to discover what those principles are. While those principles are the basis for the common concept of cause, the word "cause" is inappropriate as an explanation of those principles.<p> This is much more than a semantic issue. In both philosophy and science, the word cause usually has a much narrower meaning than that of its common use, and that narrower meaning is both incorrect and misleading.<p> Consider again Harriman statement that, "the same cause ... will result in the same effect."<p> If by cause is meant the reason for any particular event, in the entire history of the world there have probably never been two identical "causes." Since events are only the behavior of entities, and since an entity's behavior is determined by its own response to its entire context, including all its relationships, identical "causes" would require identical entities in identical contexts, which is probably impossible. In the entire history of there world, there have probably never been two identical causes.<p> <table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0" width="100%"><tr><td> <b><a name="h">Principles, not Cause</a></b> </td><td align="right"><a href="#top"><b>Top</b></a></td></tr></table><p> It is obvious that Harriman is convinced the validity of science, and perhaps all knowledge, rests on the validity of the concept, cause.<p> The concept "cause," in this case, is the philosophical one, which historically has always been mistaken. Aristotle's version was really about how things came into being and are what they are, and was quite unlike what Harriman thinks cause means. I've already mentioned that Harriman's explanation of cause most resembles Hume's.<p> In fact, I think philosophers like Harriman have been fooled by Hume. Hume defined cause in a way that is easily refuted implying that since our knowledge of scientific principles rested on the concept of cause, there is no certain basis for science. The big lie that Hume subtly put over was that the validity of science rested on some philosophical notion of cause, particularly the absurdity he himself put forth.<p> Harriman is fully convinced by that lie. For example he writes, concerning Kepler's laws:<p> "He thought of his laws in the following way: First, the sun exerts a force on each planet that causes it to move in an elliptical orbit (with the sun located at a focus); second, the solar force causes each planet to move so that the line from the sun to the planet sweeps out equal areas in equal time; third, the solar force diminishes with distance in a way that causes the cube of the mean distance from the sun divided by the square of the orbital period to be constant for all planets. <i>Clearly, these are causal statements—as they must be in order to qualify as laws</i>." [Page 104.] [Emphasis mine.]<p> Each of the statements in Harriman's description of Kepler's laws containing the word "causes" is incorrect. For example, the force the sun exerts on a planet does not "cause" it to move in an elliptical orbit. In fact, the sun's force does not "cause" it to move at all. The reason the planets move is their own inertia—they were already in motion and if there is a "cause" for that it would have to be their own entire history. In response to the force the sun exerts on a planet, it accelerates toward the sun and the resulting change in the direction of its own motion results in that motion conforming to an elliptical path.<p> In attempting to illustrate that Kepler's laws are examples of, "causation," Harriman misses the true basis for scientific laws, which is the metaphysical fact that every existent has a specific nature that determines how it behaves in every context. The behavior of the planets in the context of the suns gravitational field is not "caused" by the sun or the force it exerts, it is determined by the planets own nature (it accelerates toward other masses) and state (it is in motion at a certain velocity).<p> The validity of science does not rest on the notion of cause. The concept of cause, even if it could be made "scientific", is too simple. The validity of science rests on the fact physical existence consists only of physical existents, that every existent has a specific nature that determines its behavior, and its relationship to all other existents. The whole objective of science is to discover the nature of all existents and their behavior and relationships. The nature of existents, their behavior and there relationships are absolute, the discovery and identification of those existents, their behavior and their relationships constitute the inviolable "laws" of science.<p> Science, then, consists of to two aspects: 1. the process and methods by which the laws of science are discovered and 2. the body of established laws expressed as principles by which the nature of existents, their behavior, and relationships are understood—that is, the body of established scientific knowledge.<p> <table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0" width="100%"><tr><td> <b><a name="i">First-level Concepts</a></b> </td><td align="right"><a href="#top"><b>Top</b></a></td></tr></table><p> The reason Harriman emphasizes cause as a first-level concept, derived by direct perception (ostensively), is because his whole argument for the validity of induction as generalizations from even single incidents, depends on regarding all generalizations as notions of cause, and cause as an axiomatic (or at least corollary) concept inherent in all concepts of physical relationships.<p> "Knowledge of the law of causality is first gained by a child in implicit form, in the early, preconceptual stage of cognition; it is grasped as a corollary—a self-evident implication—of the law of identity, one of the fundamental axioms of philosophy. ... causality is the application of identity to the realm of action, i.e. it states that an entity must act in accordance with its nature," he writes.<p> There is a mistake here that is identical in nature to the mistake the idea of cause always introduces. It is a kind of false dichotomy. Just as the idea of "cause and effect" separate attributes of an entity, as thought they were independent existences, Harriman separates an entity's nature from its behavior.<p> An entity does no act "<i>in accordance</i> with its nature," as though its nature were one thing and its action another; an entity's action is an aspect of its nature. But Harriman must maintain this separation to insist that what a child perceives when perceiving events is "cause".<p> When he says a toddler, "pushes a ball and it rolls away," is "a pure experience of causation," he assumes the pushing the ball and the ball's rolling are somehow separated in the toddler's consciousness, else one thing being the cause of another could not be experienced. Of course no one can say exactly what the child's conscious experience is, but from everything we know about how we perceive things, it is much more likely a child would perceive his pushing the ball and the ball rolling as one single contiguous event, not two events, one being the cause, the other the effect.<p> The same false dichotomy shows up in all of Harriman's examples. It is unlikely a child perceives 'the wind makes the leaves flutter,' and if he makes any connection at all between wind and leaves, the fluttering leaves would probably be perceived <i>as</i> the wind; and I'm certain the child does not perceive 'the fire makes the paper turn into ashes,' but, which is much nearer to the truth, that fire <i>is</i> the paper turning into ashes.<p> None of these are examples of cause in any case, but are good examples of the principle that a thing's behavior or even state, are aspects of its own nature—leaves flutter in the wind, but rocks do not because of the difference in their nature; paper turns to ashes when it burns but alcohol does not because of the differences in their natures; and the ground becomes wet when it rains but the lake doesn't because of the differences in their natures.<p> There is, in fact, no perceivable axiomatic concept of cause as described by Harriman. What is perceivable is things as they are, and the fact that they are different, which implies differences in their attributes, though the nature of those differences may not be directly perceived. It is the job of science to identify those differences, conceptually, which will explain the differences in their behavior and their relationships to each other.<p> <table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0" width="100%"><tr><td> <b><a name="j">Identification, Not Generalization</a></b> </td><td align="right"><a href="#top"><b>Top</b></a></td></tr></table><p> There is a widely held misconception clearly stated by Harriman:<p> "Induction is the process of inferring generalizations from particular instances. The complementary process of applying generalizations to new instances is deduction." [Page 6.]<p> The principles of correct reasoning first identified by Aristotle, is called logic. The process of using those principles, that is, thinking logically, is called deduction. There is no other kind of correct reasoning.<p> The principles of deductive reasoning have been formalized and are called "formal logic." Formal logic describes the principles of correct reasoning by means of strict rules and structure. It does not describe how we usually do our thinking, even when our thinking is correct, but all correct thinking can be put into the structure of formal logic, else it is not correct thinking.<p> All reasoning in formal logic is in the form of syllogisms, which all consist of three statements, call propositions. Those three propositions are called a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. A proposition is a sentence that asserts something about something else. The following is an example of a syllogism:<p> All birds have feathers. (Major premise)<br> Penguins are birds. (Minor premise)<br> Therefore, penguins have feathers. (Conclusion)<p> The conclusion of a syllogistic argument contains the "inference." In this case the inference is that penguins have feathers based on the two premises, that is, since penguins are birds (minor premise) and all birds have feathers, (major premise) penguins therefore have feathers. If either of the premises were not true, the inference or conclusions could not be known from the argument to be true.<p> According to Harriman, our knowledge that "all birds have feathers" would be a generalization from particular instances; of birds, I presume. In reality our knowledge that "all birds have feathers," is based solely on our concept of birds, which like all other universal concepts, identifies a specific category of existents in terms of their attributes—which in the case of birds includes the attribute "feathered."<p> We do not first form our concept of birds from the observation of birds, and afterwards discover they have feathers— we form our concept of birds because we discover creatures that have feathers and choose to name our identification of them "birds."<p> Harriman's description of generalization ignores the nature of concept formation:<p> "A generalization is a proposition that ascribes a characteristic to every member of an unlimited class, wherever it is positioned in space or time. In formal terms, it states: All S is P. This kind of claim, on any subject, goes beyond all possible observations," Harriman wrote.<p> Well, of course, if I observe a feathered animal, even if only one, and name it a bird, because it is feathered, every animal I discover after that which is feathered is a bird. The process is not generalization, it is identification, the identification of a thing's attributes, and the identification of entities in terms of those attributes. This is exactly how concept formation of universal concepts works. It is the identification of existents in terms of their attributes that make them the kind of existent they are. [Please see "The True Nature Of Concepts" below.]<p> So to say "all birds have feathers" is not based on a generalization, but a definition—"a bird is a feathered animal." If after seeing a bird fly, I say "all birds fly," <i>that</i> is a generalization, and of course it is wrong. (The penguin and ostrich do not fly.) An equally bad generalization would be that all flying animal's have feathers from observing flying birds, which do have feathers. (Bats and flying insects do not have feathers.)<p> Now consider Harriman's description of the concept of "shadow."<p> "And how did we learn this distinction? From a wealth of earlier data, such as 'The dark areas in contrast to the objects they abut, have no tactile properties' (a generalization) and 'The dark areas appear or vanish with changes in the light source, while the objects remain constant' (a generalization). From these (along with other such generalizations), we conclude that the dark areas are not objects, but rather an effect produce when an object blocks light (a generalization)—which gives us the concept 'shadow.'"<p> In each case where Harriman writes, "a generalization," it is actually, "an identification," specifically of an attribute, and what we mean by a "shadow" is something with all those attributes.<p> There is an oddity in this example of his idea of generalization as well. Remember, he wrote, "... all generalizations ... are statements of causal connection." Perhaps he would consider "the dark areas appear or vanish with changes in the light source," an example of a, "causal connection," but how can, "the dark areas in contrast to the objects they abut, have no tactile properties," be construed as causal?<p> No such thing as induction, in the sense of generalizing from some limited number of instances, can possibly be valid. The source for universal concepts is observation and identification of existents in terms of the qualities (attributes and properties) that are their nature. Conceptualization of an existent, even if only one has ever been observed, is as valid as it would be if an indefinitely large number had been observed.<p> This process is not inductive, not a complimentary process of deduction, but in fact a <i>deductive</i> process. (This will be more fully explained in terms of "The True Nature Of Concepts.")<p> <table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0" width="100%"><tr><td> <b><a name="k">Mathematics is Only a Method</a></b> </td><td align="right"><a href="#top"><b>Top</b></a></td></tr></table><p> While I believe Harriman's view of mathematics is badly mistaken, almost mystical, I do agree that mathematics is firmly rooted in objective reality, derived from observation and not some kind of disconnected abstraction of the mind. Beyond that, there is not much agreement between Harriman's view of mathematics and my own.<p> Before I discuss my view, however, I want to emphasize the fact that I fully agree that the use of mathematics in science is an invaluable and totally valid tool that has made it possible to discover the true nature of many things and relationships between them that would have been impossible without mathematics.<p> I've already provided what I think is a fair description of Harriman's understanding of mathematics. I do not intend to burden the reader with a description of my entire view of mathematics, but to understand my criticism of Harriman's view and use of mathematics, an understanding of what I regard as the limits of mathematics will make it easier to understand. The following is adapted from another work in progress.<p> <table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0" width="100%"><tr><td> <strong><a name="l">Limits of Mathematics</a></strong></a> </td><td align="right"><a href="#top"><b>Top</b></a></td></tr></table><p> <div align="center"><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0" width="85%"><tr><td> There is in many people, maybe even most, an overwhelming desire for some one single ultimate answer or explanation for everything. That desire is born of an irrational fear of the unknown. For some, the ultimate answer for everything is God, for others it is the illusive Grand Unified Theory (GUT) of physics. All such ultimate answers, however, are really a kind of mysticism, and those who accept some supposed ultimate answer, whether God, or GUT, or something else, embrace it with religious fervor.<p> Perhaps the most fervent of "true believers," are those who embrace what I call the Pythagorean fallacy or superstition. It is the belief that number or mathematics is, in some profound way, the ultimate answer or explanation for everything.<p> Pythagoras said, "all things are numbers." Modern Pythagoreans do not say all things are numbers, but do believe everything can ultimately be understood in terms of numbers or explained by mathematics. When the ancient Pythagoreans discovered incommensurables, some of them committed suicide, because that discover showed that all they believed, the very basis of meaning in their lives, was wrong. I hope the modern Pythagoreans will not react to what I have to say with similar despair.<p> <b>Objective Base of a Method</b><p> Mathematics, like conceptualization and language, is a method, a human invention with the purpose of dealing with certain specific attributes of the perceived physical world. All of what is called mathematics begins with the concept of numbers. At some level, the field of mathematics merges with geometry and some aspects of logic as well, but the strictly mathematical part of even the advance mathematical fields of trigonometry and the calculus, for example, depend on the concept of numbers.<p> The objective attribute of the world which numbers pertain to is multiplicity—that is, the fact existence consists of multiple discrete entities. That is the objective foundation of all mathematics.<p> Numbers are the conceptual tool of counting. Before men learned how to count, or even today where primitive tribes do not have that skill, there is no certain way to determine the quantity of things, such as how many cattle one has, or how many people there are in the village.<p> We do not know who the genius was who discovered that using a set of different symbols, always recited or recorded in the same order, assigning a different symbol to each item in a collection, the last symbol used would indicated the total number of items in that collection. The symbols that were assigned to each item are what we now call numbers or numerals. The process of assigning the names to items, we call counting. That discovery, wherever it has been passed on, has transformed the world, and nothing in the civilized world would be possible without it.<p> All of mathematics is an extension of that basic method of determining the number of things by counting. Addition and subtraction are just shortcuts for counting and "counting backwards." Multiplication and division are shortcuts of addition and subtraction. Fractions and decimals are shortcuts of division and methods of notation.<p> <b>Measurement</b><p> Another unknown genius of ancient history discovered that numbers could also be used to identify other characteristics of things, such as length, weight, or speed, as well as relationships between things, such as distance. The technique is called measurement.<p> Obviously this discovery has been just as important to the development of the civilized world as counting itself. Unfortunately, it also led to one of the first great mistakes in philosophy of which philosophy has never thoroughly rid itself.<p> Measurement uses the method of counting to determine a "measurable" attribute. All measurement requires "a unit of measure" commensurate with the attribute to be measured. If the attribute to be measured is length, for example, the unit of measure must be some length that is chosen as a "standard" length. If the attribute to be measured is weight, the unit of measure must be some standard weight.<p> The method of measurement is counting, and what is counted is the number of "units of measure" that equal the measure of whatever characteristic is to be determined. If we use length as an example, one way to measure it would be to take a small stick, as the unit of measure. The stick could be laid out on the length to be measured, starting at one end, then placing it next where it last ended, repeating this process, counting each time the stick is laid down until the end of the length being measured is reached. If the stick is laid down 10 times, the measured length is "10 'sticks' long."<p> While a stick is a metaphysical existent, and has length as an attribute, and its own length is a metaphysical fact, and it's length is being used as the "unit of measure" to measure something else, it is an <i>arbitrary</i> unit. As a concept for a "unit of measure" it is only a concept, there is no metaphysical existent, "stick-length."<p> When counting entities, counting is absolute. If there are thirty seven entities, counting will tell you exactly how many there are, that is, 37—and there are 37, absolutely.<p> When measuring something, the number of "units of measure" that are "counted" may, or may not be the exact measure of a thing, and in fact will almost never be perfectly exact.<p> The main reason for this is because units of measure are discrete; they are concepts and all concepts are discrete. But concepts have no physical existence, only mental or conceptual existence. There are no metaphysical inches, pounds, or minutes, there are only length, weight, and time, and they are all <i>analog</i>.<p> For any discrete unit of length conceived, there may be existents it can exactly measure, but there are, potentially, an infinite number of existents it cannot exactly measure. This is true of all units of measure. To suppose that everything can ultimately be known in terms of mathematics forgets that mathematics is only a method, a method of determining the numbers of things adapted as a method for dealing with measurable attributes of existents and their relationships. Measurement is only the application of the method of counting to that which cannot truly be counted, but with the invention of, "units of measure," some of the attributes of the physical can be treated as though they had "parts" that can be counted, which metaphysically, they do not.<p> <b>Pythagoras' Devastating Discovery</b><p> The disillusionment of the ancient Pythagoreans followed directly from Pythagoras' greatest discovery that, where <em>a</em> and <em>b</em> are the legs (sides next to the right angle) of a right triangle, and <em>c</em> is the hypotenuse, (side opposite the right angle), <em>a</em>² + <em>b</em>² = <em>c</em>². This led immediately to the discovery that in an isosceles right triangle, where <em>a</em> = <em>b</em>, there is no commensurate unit of measure that can measure both a leg of an isosceles right triangle and the hypotenuse.<p> Today many such "irrational" (no ratio) relationships are known, and very close approximations, such a pi, are used in calculations where such relationship need to be measured. It is difficult not to have the impression that irrationals, like pi, actually do have a value if one could just carry it out far enough. The ancient way of describing these irrational relationships is much clearer in demonstrating there is no such value.<p> Suppose the sides of an isosceles right triangle are one inch long. Let the length of the hypotenuse be represented by <em>m</em>/<em>n</em>. Since <em>a</em>² + <em>b</em>² = <em>c</em>², substituting 1 for both <em>a</em> and <em>b</em>, and <em>m</em>/<em>n</em> for <em>c</em>, yields <em>m</em>²/<em>n</em>² = 2. Divide out any common factor in <em>m</em>/<em>n</em>, now either <em>m</em> or <em>n</em> must be odd (because if both are even there is still the common factor 2).<p> Multiply both sides of the equation, <em>m</em>²/<em>n</em>² = 2, by <em>n</em>² to get <em>m</em>² = 2<em>n</em>². Therefore, <em>m</em>² is even; therefore <strong><em>m</em> is even</strong>. Suppose <em>m</em> = 2<em>p</em> (if m is even it must be 2 times something). Substituting 2<em>p</em> for <em>m</em> in the equation, <em>m</em>² = 2<em>n</em>², yields 4<em>p</em>² = 2<em>n</em>². Dividing both sides by 2 yields <em>n</em>² = 2<em>p</em>2, therefore <strong><em>n</em> is even</strong>.<p> If there were a unit of measure that could measure both a leg and hypotenuse of an isosceles right triangle, the length of the hypotenuse could be represented as<i> m</i>/<i>n</i> units, and either <i>m</i> or <i>n</i>, reduced to lowest terms, would have to be odd. Since both <i>m</i> and <i>n</i> can be demonstrated logically (or mathematically) to be even, there can be no unit of measure that can measure both a leg and hypotenuse of an isosceles right triangle.<p> This discovery was enough to demonstrate to the ancient Pythagoreans that not only is, "all things are numbers," not true, all things cannot even be described by numbers. It is even worse than that, however, for the modern Pythagoreans.<p> <strong>Mathematically Unknowable</strong><p> There is a class of physical events described by a set of concepts called "chaos" or "fractals" or "Lorenz attractors." The peculiar thing about such events is that they are determined, not randomly as chaos might imply, but by strictly in terms mathematical functions, though the actual mathematical function for any real chaotic event or process can never be discovered, and the actual behavior of chaotic events and processes are impossible to predict (which is the real reason they are called "chaos").<p> True natural "chaos" events and phenomena are analog, not discrete, in nature, but scientists can simulate such events with digital computers using what are called iterative functions. The technology is too complex to describe here.<p> There are many aspects of the real world, however, that are examples of "chaos" theory. The human heart beat, for example, is never absolutely even, because the electronic nature of the heart behaves, apparently, like a Lorenz attractor. It is a feedback mechanism (like taking the output of one equation and using it as the input of the next). In fact, if the heartbeat were perfectly symmetrical, it would race uncontrollably, a condition which does happen called fibrillation.<p> The almost endless patterns of snow flakes are examples of fractals. Each is completely different, because the physics that forms them, though identical, begins with a different value for each snow flake (because the particles of dust all snow flakes form on are slightly different).<p> Ferns are another an example. While ferns all look very similar, they are never identical. Broccoli exhibits the same fractal characteristics. There are, in fact, chaotic characteristics in all life. The venous and arterial systems in a human kidney, flowers, and trees are all examples, and DNA clusters form shapes that resemble Julia sets. Non-living examples include clouds, frost and ice formations, lightning, galaxies, and ocean currents.<p> Perhaps the most interesting

Thanks, Michael, but I don't think I'll learn anything about philosophy from the Harvard University Psych department. I agree with Rand that the mind and consciousness cannot be studied "empirically." Neurology can, of course, but consciousness is not physical. So I have a question. It sounds as though you are a physicalist, which I was not aware of. Are you a physicalist, Michael? Do you think consciousness is something that somehow just "emerges" from the activity of the brain, for example? Regi

Regi. Actually I disagree with this, ... I know you do, Michael, but then how do you know if your disagreement is something you have rationally chosen, or something one of those things you think determine your choices has made you think? If your every thought and choice is not volitional, and some are "determined" by something, how can you ever know the difference? How can you ever be sure that what you think is the result of your best reasoning and not just caused by whatever it is you believe causes those choices that are not volitional? I'm not challenging you, my friend. It is a serious question. I really do not understand how someone can hold the view that they are not totally volitional. (I do agree that most people have surrendered their volitionality to superstition and feelings, which is a different thing altogether.) Regi