merjet

Really? Does it include any differences? For example, are your hands and feet different?

I can't help you. A solipsist is on his own, by his nature.

How does one distinguish between an actual difference and a perceived difference? Well, since Merlin didn't answer I will. There is no such thing as an "actual difference" . Differences are manufactured in our nervous system and when people have similar abstractions we attribute the characteristics to "the object". How do you know that there is no such thing as an "actual difference"? If differences are "manufactured" in our nervous system unconnected to "the object", then you have no basis for claiming anything about "actual difference". Unless you claim you have some means of cognition that most of us don't.

Daniel, please forgive me for lack of clarity. By common words I meant "essence" and "essential". Or was Popper not writing about them?

This sounds like fiction, a twisted version of H. G. Wells' The Time Machine.

I decided to look up "essentialism" in Objective Knowledge. To my surprise Popper described his own position as "essentialist", but called it "modified essentialism" (pp. 194-7). More word games. More taking common words and using them in arcane way.

Here is an example of confusing words with what they represent. A concept is NOT a word. I have asked people what a 'concept' refers to and nobody seems to know yet they will talk about them and write volumes about them. I did a brief search in ITOE. I did not find what you quoted and trust it's there. She could have used better words at times. However, there are other places in ITOE that should not be ignored. "Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e., that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind" (p. 10). "So the word is not the concept, but the word is the auditory or visual symbol which stands for a concept" (p. 163) Italics mine. It's clear that she didn't always confuse words and concepts.

I think you need a better understanding of Objectivism. Such learning rests on the actual differences between red spruce and black spruce.

General semanticist seems to subscribe to the view that perception is a kind of representation. I'm not yet convinced of it, but what he has written gives indications. The view is quite common. I wrote a short article about it and posted it to Rebirth of Reason here.

I imagine general semanticist (GS) on the witness stand in a trial being questioned by an attorney or judge (Q). Q: Did you see the car? GS: Well, my brain created an image in my visual cortex. There were neurons firing and producing lower order abstractions. Q: Well, did you see all this activity in your brain? GS: Well ... uh ... no. More seriously, here is a snip from her Playboy interview. RAND: It begins with the axiom that existence exists, which means that an objective reality exists independent of any perceiver or of the perceiver's emotions, feelings, wishes, hopes or fears.

Yes. In regard to definitions "essential" doesn't carry the metaphysical connotations (despite Popper).

I reordered the quotes - the last is first in your post - and take the last as an allusion to Ayn Rand, given what you say in the other two. I don't regard someone using an unconventional meaning for a given word as irrational per se. There may be an excellent reason for doing so. It can be a good way to make one's point, to better communicate one's ideas. This wasn't done just by Ayn Rand (or Stein, for whom I'll take your word), but a number of times in history. Darwin redefined "species" from a creationist one (and similarity) to one based on ancestry (and similarity). In the history of chemistry the meaning of "acid" was changed more than once. (It's detailed in Paul Thagard's Conceptual Revolutions, p. 37-39). There are more. You can say these differ much from Rand's case or Stein's, but they were still cases of new and unconventional meanings. By the way I much recommend Conceptual Revolutions. Its analysis is epistemological rather than the sociological kind of Thomas Kuhn's famous book.

Porpoises. Ha-ha. We have not been distinguishing between them. But I don't think it has led to confusion or us astray. Both are part of meaning, which has been the topic. Words have referents and words have definitions. If the definition, more exactly the definiens, does not capture the essential characteristics of the intended referents of the definiendum, then that's a huge disconnect. Correct thinking and good communication require they be linked. Or saying it another way, the intension and extension should correspond. (See "definition" in Wikipedia.)

Heh. I can just hear it coming. Michael With the same humor and good Will as Mr. Rogers said the above: "Number is the abstraction of the process of abstraction." - Journals of Ayn Rand, p.700.

Because Rand did not deal with it. Why do you continue claiming she did? This quote you supply is a perfect example of her not dealing with it. I can't see how you think it does. Let's review it: Rand:"Who decides, in case of disagreements? As in all issues pertaining to objectivity, there is no ultimate authority, except reality and the mind of every individual who judges the evidence by the objective method of judgment: logic." All Rand does is, not untypically, make a handwaving assertion, with nothing to back it up. On examination, this superficially plausible assertion turns out to be a fallacy. What do you think she meant by "logic"? A reasonable hypothesis is "non-contradictory identification". Identification of what? Of reality. Thus "non-contradictory identification of reality." In other words, his solution is to dissolve or dismiss it. I await your response to my questions in post #76. Then we can get to the question of whether or not the emperor (Popper) and empress (Rand) wear any clothes. Let's hope from different empires! Meanwhile, I continue my fishy story. If lost in a Popperian infinite regress you missed my point, it was this. Conventionally, a whale is not a kind of fish. Warm-blooded vs cold-blooded. Live birth vs lay eggs. Breathe air vs gills. Yet an unconventional person insists that a whale is a kind of fish, due to its shape, it lives in water and swims, has fins and tail, and whatever else. Pointing out the differences fails. How does "mutual convention" solve it?

What exactly do you mean by not in fact logically decidable? What exactly do you mean by in fact logically decided? Examples would probably help. What are said reasons? At college a guy who lived in the same house as me was on the college rugby team. He was about 5'6", 215 lbs, v-shaped, with hardly any fat. He and his teammates would often party at our house. They were a rowdy bunch. I bet you've seen one of these.

That sounds very familiar. You have good company. John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Bk. 3, Chap. 3): 12. Abstract ideas are the essences of genera and species. The next thing therefore to be considered is, What kind of signification it is that general words have. For, as it is evident that they do not signify barely one particular thing; for then they would not be general terms, but proper names, so, on the other side, it is as evident they do not signify a plurality; for man and men would then signify the same; and the distinction of numbers (as the grammarians call them) would be superfluous and useless. That then which general words signify is a sort of things; and each of them does that, by being a sign of an abstract idea in the mind; to which idea, as things existing are found to agree, so they come to be ranked under that name, or, which is all one, be of that sort. Whereby it is evident that the essences of the sorts, or, if the Latin word pleases better, species of things, are nothing else but these abstract ideas. For the having the essence of any species, being that which makes anything to be of that species; and the conformity to the idea to which the name is annexed being that which gives a right to that name; the having the essence, and the having that conformity, must needs be the same thing: since to be of any species, and to have a right to the name of that species, is all one. As, for example, to be a man, or of the species man, and to have right to the name man, is the same thing. Again, to be a man, or of the species man, and have the essence of a man, is the same thing. Now, since nothing can be a man, or have a right to the name man, but what has a conformity to the abstract idea the name man stands for, nor anything be a man, or have a right to the species man, but what has the essence of that species; it follows, that the abstract idea for which the name stands, and the essence of the species, is one and the same. From whence it is easy to observe, that the essences of the sorts of things, and, consequently, the sorting of things, is the workmanship of the understanding that abstracts and makes those general ideas. 13. They are the workmanship of the understanding, but have their foundation in the similitude of things. I would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that Nature, in the production of things, makes several of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, especially in the race of animals, and all things propagated by seed. But yet I think we may say, the sorting of them under names is the workmanship of the understanding, taking occasion, from the similitude it observes amongst them, to make abstract general ideas, and set them up in the mind, with names annexed to them, as patterns or forms, (for, in that sense, the word form has a very proper signification,) to which as particular things existing are found to agree, so they come to be of that species, have that denomination, or are put into that classis. For when we say this is a man, that a horse; this justice, that cruelty; this a watch, that a jack; what do we else but rank things under different specific names, as agreeing to those abstract ideas, of which we have made those names the signs? And what are the essences of those species set out and marked by names, but those abstract ideas in the mind; which are, as it were, the bonds between particular things that exist, and the names they are to be ranked under? And when general names have any connexion with particular beings, these abstract ideas are the medium that unites them: so that the essences of species, as distinguished and denominated by us, neither are nor can be anything but those precise abstract ideas we have in our minds. And therefore the supposed real essences of substances, if different from our abstract ideas, cannot be the essences of the species we rank things into. For two species may be one, as rationally as two different essences be the essence of one species: and I demand what are the alterations [which] may, or may not be made in a horse or lead, without making either of them to be of another species? In determining the species of things by our abstract ideas, this is easy to resolve: but if any one will regulate himself herein by supposed real essences, he will, I suppose, be at a loss: and he will never be able to know when anything precisely ceases to be of the species of a horse or lead. Michael Ayers, Locke: Epistemology and Ontology, Vol. 2, p. 68: But the Lockean nominal essence is intrinsically an epistemological essence and nothing more, a criterion by reference to which we mark off the members of the species. The boundary marked is a precise one which owes its existence to our drawing it: reality itself simply could not, in Locke’s view, supply such a boundary. Reality can supply resemblances, but resemblances do not constitute natural boundaries. Resemblances do not draw lines.

I hear nothing, but then I am some way from Fenway Park... You could have turned on the TV, or don't they air the World Series where you are? Ahem, it is the World Series. TKD = "Two Kinds of Definition". My "first draft" follows. Don't expect a 2nd. I read TKD again, copied a few passages, and wrote comments on them. It is not polished. Its organization simply follows TKD. I didn't proofread other than spelling and grammar. I don't wish to discuss it. This site's main purpose is discussing Ayn Rand's philosophy, not Popper's. I'm being generous. (At least that's my view.) This overlooks or dismisses perceptual knowledge. The essentialist method of Aristotle, as Popper describes it, is simply words. Yet when Aristotle wrote anything, his highest authority was reality. Essences pertained to the nature of particulars found by observation (perception). This skirts perceptual knowledge again. This skirts perceptual knowledge again. There is no infinite regress when reality is the ultimate authority, only when words are taken as the ultimate authority. Play dough! Forms to Aristotle and Plato were worlds apart. Mere verbalism; a distinction without a difference. Yes, there are two kinds of definitions, but Popper misses the boat. The second kind is ostensive. Popperycock. The symbols or labels represent the referents of ostensive definitions. They are extremely important, otherwise we don't know what we are talking about. A blatant contradiction to the previous quote. How can they not play an important part and be of the greatest usefulness? The so-called undefined terms are symbols or labels introduced in ostensive style or by example or refer to things already commonly understood by people in the target audience, e.g. distance, minute, weight, etc. The purpose of a definition is to specify what one is talking about. That can be done by either verbally (verbal definitions) or non-verbally (giving the symbol or label and pointing, or depending on the audience knowing what the referents of the symbol or label are). The success of physics has relied much on quantification, via numbers and formulas. These are the most precise symbols we have. Philosophy relies on words, rarely quantification (excepting 'all', 'some', and 'none'). So it can't attain the kind of precision that numbers and formulas allow. Also in philosophy key terms used often have very wide application and the different meanings people have for them can vary widely. In physics the opposite is true. (The application may be wide in a spatial sense or cover a wide range of phenomena, but it doesn't pertain to nearly as many aspects of reality and experience as philosophy does.) Edit: I think another factor is that physics has dealt with simpler things, whose behavior is easier to describe and far more uniform, than what philosophy deals with. To illustrate compare the complexity and uniformity of the motions of classical physical objects to that of human behavior. See my previous comment.

Why do you keep bringing this up as if Rand never dealt with it? And did Popper solve it? No, to the best of my knowledge, but you're the Popper fan. At best he dissolved it like he did induction, by dismissing it. Yet you insist the essentialist (or Randian) method of definition solve it to prove its worth. Rand dealt with it regarding 'objective definition' on p. 46 of ITOE: "Who decides, in case of disagreements? As in all issues pertaining to objectivity, there is no ultimate authority, except reality and the mind of every individual who judges the evidence by the objective method of judgment: logic." If somebody insists on calling a whale a literal "fish", despite all the evidence of differences against that, then there is nothing one can do short of preventing him from talking or ignoring him. Your conclusion that convention is needed is bogus. Fine, it might solve the one you raise, but convention as a general method fails. It doesn't recognize reality -- except what people say or happen to point to -- as the ultimate authority.

Of course not. Whatever gave you that idea? I even said "a talent few people have". Ditto to you. Of course, what you imagine she wrote is designed for ridicule. I noted the gaffe you quoted from "The Comprachicos" a long time ago but didn't remember it. It is inconsistent with ITOE. I have a bound volume of The Objectivist, which includes "The Comprachicos", found the passage, and saw I put a question mark by it years ago. Of course, if you look close enough at any philosopher's output, you can find gaffes. For example, there are plenty of howlers in Objective Knowledge and LSD, but I expect you'd have a very difficult time finding them. And the many howlers I find in "Two Kinds of Definition" are so loud they could be heard in Fenway Park right now. I've made criticisms of Rand's philosophy on several matters, not just the cognition of children. Have you not paid attention or did you merely leap to another unjustified conclusion? No, it's your straw woman. I ask you for evidence to back it up, you provide nil, and, again, your assertion is utterly incoherent with other things she wrote. Nonsense, without evidence. See post #37.

I'm not skilled enough at using the site's software, especially when I want to quote bits and pieces and there are embedded quotes. So I sometimes copy stuff into Notepad (maybe Word would be better), which is primitive font-wise, and work with that, then copy the result to the site. Sometimes I forget to reset the fonts in quoted stuff.

I see a large discrepancy between what you're saying there and what she writes -- with considerable explicating -- in her chapter "Definitions" about the cruciality of and the possibility of forming a "true" definition. You make her sound as if she's proposing a view of optional definitions. She is not proposing that. When she says the definition might change with changes in the context of knowledge, she is still saying that at any given stage of advancing knowledge there is a "right," a "true" definition. In all but the 4th sentence I wasn't trying to speak for Rand. I wasn't even using her idea of contextually valid. Maybe I should have made "if" caps, huge, and bold. Does that clarify? No, she doesn't explicitly say that an "invalid" definition could still be true. She explicitly says that the earlier definition, if it was correctly identifying "the facts of reality," was valid in the given context. You are correct she wasn't explicit in what I quoted. However, she was elsewhere, even in what you quoted just before. ""Expanding" does not mean negating, abrogating or contradicting; it means demonstrating that some other characteristics are more distinctive of man than rationality and animality--in which unlikely case these two would be regarded as non-defining characteristics, but would still remain true" (p.47). I don't agree with it for all cases, but she did say it for this case, and arguably for all (p. 43). I agree, and believe I've said so on this forum, that this by itself is an exaggeration. Such conclusions, etc. rest on the non-definitional meaning of a concept sometimes and ultimately on reality. Yet I think there is a big core of truth in what she says, especially with more abstract concepts. "When working high up on a ladder, be careful." And to her credit, she wrote only one page before: "A definition is the condensation of a vast body of observations -- and stands or falls with the truth or falsehood of those observations" (ITOE, p. 48). Yes about ITOE. I agree but don't recall implying she would have. I was addressing Barnes' example and speaking for myself. Tentatively, this is another case of her exaggerating, but there is a big core of truth in it. Consider two definitions of mathematics I gave on another thread, the first my own and the second I like from a dictionary. 1. the science of quantity and quantifiable structures 2. the group of sciences (including arithmetic, geometry, algebra, calculus, etc.) dealing with quantities, magnitudes, and forms, and their relationships, attributes, etc., by the use of numbers and symbols I think they are both essential, have the same referents, and are suitable to my context. The first is more compact and likely better understood by somebody with a high level of math knowledge. The second is more detailed and likely better understood by somebody with nearer an average level of math knowledge. The difference is level of abstraction. No, she doesn't explicitly say that an "invalid" definition could still be true. She explicitly says that the earlier definition, if it was correctly identifying "the facts of reality," was valid in the given context. You are correct she wasn't explicit in what I quoted. However, she was elsewhere, even in what you quoted just before. ""Expanding" does not mean negating, abrogating or contradicting; it means demonstrating that some other characteristics are more distinctive of man than rationality and animality--in which unlikely case these two would be regarded as non-defining characteristics, but would still remain true" (p.47). I don't agree with it for all cases, but she did say it for this case, and arguably for all (p. 43).

Like has already been done on RoR, we could debate what Rand thought or meant by "talent" for a long time, especially when she put it in quotes. I doubt it would lead to progress. http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDi...725_8.shtml#163 Here on July 7, 2006 you say: "Rand seems to have thought it was possible to raise your IQ from 110 to 150." http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/in...ost&p=15621 Here on Dec 29, 2006 you say: "It also squares with her idea that people can raise their own IQ by 40 points, just by choice." You move from "seems to have thought" to "her idea and just by choice" in 5+ months, and to "she really thought and just by choice" 10 months later. Do you have a citation from Rand herself about raising one's IQ 40 points? I'll bet Cassius Clay could have raised his IQ score by 40 points just by choice if he knew the 1st test was for the Army and the 2nd test wasn't. Edit: Disregard my request. It's in Ayn Rand Answers, p. 179. In response to a question about writing a revised edition of ITOE for people with an IQ of 110, instead of people with an IQ of 150, she replies: "I'd prefer that people raise their IQ from 110 to 150. It can be done." Maybe a joke, and doesn't mean anybody could. It doesn't apply to somebody with an IQ of 105.

This replies to post #29. Regarding "inborn talents" in the Forward of "We The Living", it wasn't well-known to me. I wasn't involved in and haven't read the lengthy thread (32 pages!) about talents on this forum. Two common dictionary meanings of talent are: 1. any natural ability or power; natural endowment 2. a superior, apparently natural ability in the arts or sciences or in the learning or doing of anything I took her point to be that being a talented writer takes much learning and practice, a talent few people have and they aren't born with it. She even put "talent" in quotes, indicating a restricted meaning. You conveniently omit the quotes in post #29. I doubt that Rand was denying the existence of natural abilities in the way you seem to take it. Do you really think she was denying natural abilities like to walk or jump high (like many basketball players) or see as well as Ted Williams did? I don't. Methinks you just found another opportunity to ridicule Rand. Thank you for the fine example of how far you go to make and burn a straw woman. ;) You have a point there. She "winged it" quite a bit in coming to her ideas about the cognition of children. If an entity has attributes at the perceptual level, it does not lose all of them upon abstraction to the conceptual level, upon making it a unit of a similarity class. If it did, there would be nothing left to regard as similar. Do you really believe Rand thought all the attributes were lost? If 'yes', what is your evidence? How is similarity retained? Moreover, it conflicts with so much she said elsewhere. "Existence is identity." "The attributes are the entity, or an entity is its attributes." (ITOE, p. 266) You confound an entity (concept) having no attributes with the attributes not being mentally separable. Like I said earlier, a more reasonable interpretation is that the child in the first stage does not conceptually distinguish between an entity and its attributes. They are united. It mattered to her in the sense that she didn't like the attitudes and actions that went along with such definitions. I will respond to #30 and #31 hopefully later today.

Apology accepted. I didn't take your post on the sculpture thread very personally or for long. I concluded I was probably one of the least of your targets. I also apologize for my sarcasm. If you were a scientist, I hope it would be with enthusiasm. I don't know Hong very well. But she is a scientist and likely a better source to ask about taking art versus science personally.