Robert Campbell

Kat, I've flown into John Wayne Airport (SNA) before. It may be a little more expensive than flying into LAX, but it will be much more convenient. Robert Campbell

Moral perfection is going to have to matter to Rand scholars, because Rand believed in some form of it, and the scholars will have to grapple with that But those who aren't doing Rand scholarship are better off chucking the whole notion right away. I agree with Dragonfly that it's an anti-concept, in Rand's sense--a holdover from religion, and/or ways of thinking about morality that Rand was trying to replace. The very idea of moral perfection contradicts the supposed meaning and purpose of the Objectivist ethics. It suggests that we human beings exist to serve a moral code--instead of needing a moral code to help identify what's good for each of us. I agree with Paul that "excellence" is a much better word than "perfection" for what we ought to be striving for. In fact, the Greek word arete, which is most often translated "virtue," can also be translated as "excellence." And that takes us right back to Aristotle... Robert Campbell PS. Whatever the immediate provocation on SOLOP, doesn't this thread belong under Ethics, instead of under Rants?

In her discussion of moral perfection, Tara Smith cites an essay by Harry Binswanger titled "The Possible Dream." It appeared in the February and April 1981 issues of The Objectivist Forum. I didn't subscribe to TOF, or read it regularly. Does anyone on the board have a copy of these issues? Robert Campbell

I'm going to be on the road for a few days, so an essay--even a mini-essay--on this vexed subject of moral perfection will have to wait a while. Here are two quotations from Peikoff that I had in mind. First: The second passage is longer, running to 4 paragraphs on pp. 339-340. The whole thing needs to be read and thought about--these are just highlights: Robert Campbell PS. The second quotation, in particular, lends credence to the suggestion that I've heard occasionally--that, primarily in her novels, Rand's moral thinking moved a good deal closer to Stoicism than she acknowledged. And the Stoics had a thing about moral perfection.

Michael, To be fair to Rand, she tried to avoid the static implications of moral perfection by (sometimes) emphasizing the process of living by a rational code of ethics. Her characterization of pride as "moral ambitiousness" (in "The Objectivist Ethics") is an example. It's the "moral ambitiousness" that Tara Smith wants to emphasize in her defense of moral perfection (pp. 236-243 in Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics). Leonard Peikoff insisted in OPAR that moral perfection means being another John Galt or Howard Roark. Smith sheds the references to Roark and Galt, and she tries to shed the fire-and-brimstone rhetoric that Peikoff relies so much on. I think a close comparison of Smith and Peikoff will prove interesting. Frankly, though, Peikoff looks to me to be closer to Rand on this particular issue than Smith is. In Ayn Rand Answers, we can see that Rand defended moral perfection during a question and answer period after one of Peikoff's 1976 lectures. But in the same answer, she emphatically rejects the idea of perfect knowledge. It's also worth noting that her Ford Hall Forum 1971 answer that included a famous outburst (on how if you depart from total acceptance of Objectivism, "the contradictions will be yours") was in response to a question on whether Objectivism puts forth an ideal of sainthood. In other words, it was about moral perfection. Robert Campbell

Michael, As it turns out, I posted to RoR on moral perfection yesterday evening. Here's the link: http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/PollDiscu...0112_3.shtml#77 More about all of this later... Robert

Fran, Thank you for posting this wonderful piece. I really enjoyed reading it. Robert Campbell

Ellen said of posting on SOLOPassion: I think my experience and, more recently, Phil's both amply document this. Nor do I see that Chris Cathcart (despite his more positive views of Ms. Hsieh and the Ayn Rand Institute) is doing a whole lot better. The SOLOPers are beginning to feel deprived of "enemies of Objectivism" to gang up on. One sign is Jim Valliant's recent appearance on RoR (which his ally Mr. Perigo still calls the "TOC fRoRd board" and claims not to read). See http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/PollDiscu...0112_1.shtml#31 Robert Campbell

Technically, as I'm sure the orthodox will hasten to remind us, Charles' essay is incorrect: Objectivism makes a distinction between honest error and dishonest error (evasion). If you take Peikoff's treatment of certainty seriously, you'll even conclude that it's possible to be certain about something while (honestly) wrong. The problem is that Objectivism lacks a philosophy of science. In fact, it doesn't include an account of reasoning and decision making in any complex, real-world domain. Which, in turn, encourages a lack of recognition of how easy it is to be mistaken about a lot of things. So the moralizing tendency takes over, and makes most errors out to be willful. Such articles as Peikoff's notorious "Fact and Value" come perilously close to treating all significant errors as willful. And it doesn't help that in the standard Objectivist presentation (including David Kelley's...) perception is held to be error-free because it is automatic or non-volitional. Adhering to Objectivism does not guarantee correct decision making about most issues. It can't be a "deadman's throttle." How could it? Too many factors have to be taken into account, in a given context, that the philosophy of Objectivism doesn't encompass. I've been interested, in reading Tara Smith's book Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics, to see how she handles that temptation to deal the Immorality Card. It's particularly worthy of note because I've found only two disagreements between her and Leonard Peikoff concerning substantive points in normative ethics (neither of them is announced in her book). Smith succesfully avoids most of the rhetoric that in parts of OPAR leads the reader to envision abysses of irrationality, arbitrariness, and immorality cracking open ahead, behind, and to both sides, all at once. But not entirely--I'm still finding traces here and there. Robert Campbell

Rich, The giveaway that the quoted screed was by Fred Weiss (or someone like him) was the running together of Ayn Rand, the Ayn Rand Institute, and Objectivism, as though they are one big insoluble lump with no discernible distinctions. Mr. Mazza has used the same rhetoric on his blog. I'll believe that the Peikoff-Binswanger-Schwartz culture at ARI has changed when ARIans start criticizing Weiss in public. None of them dares to criticize P, B, or S in public. But Weiss holds no leadership position at ARI, so he ought to be a much safer target--yet none of them dares to tell him to take a hike. Robert Campbell

Rich, Well, let's just say that Orion Reasoner's piece exhibited psychological reasoning of poor quality. I'd really like to see the term "psychologizing" retired, on account of its non-objectivity. Robert

Michael, I think there's a genuine question in here, as to why Objectivism appeals to some individuals with narcissistic personalities. But I don't see that Orion Reasoner did a decent job of either framing the question, or providing the elements of an answer. In fact, as you pointed out after rereading his piece, OR strikes his own narcissistic pose ("misunderstood genius" or "martyr for truth"). Nor do I see how all artists are narcissistic. Narcissists, as Barbara said, are constantly seeking to elicit admiration from people they despise. Let's pick this one up again when you've gotten some sleep. Robert

Not all made up, apparently. Here's what Lindsay Perigo now has to say about the matter. Why he sat on the news for 10 days is unclear to me, but according to Mr. Perigo, Tibor Machan was asked by Nathaniel Branden not to post to SOLOP any more, and when Tibor continued to do so, he was "blackballed" by Nathaniel. If the SOLOP interface is working properly (it does so only intermittently), you should be able to go to Mr. Perigo's comment titled "New Twist" at http://www.solopassion.com/node/893#comment-8946 Assuming that the story is true, all I can say is: (1) I have had no exchanges whatsoever with Nathaniel Branden about posting to SOLOP. My decision to post at SOLOP for a fairly brief time was mine, and mine alone--I planned in advance to keep my engagement limited. (2) I have no interest in further posting to SOLOP while it is dominated by Mr. Perigo's claque, Mr. Valliant's claque, and Ms. Hsieh's claque, because I do not believe that any of these folks are primarily motivated by an interest in ideas, Randian or otherwise, or in genuine dialogue concerning those ideas. I have made my opinion publicly and (sometimes) privately known. But I would not refuse to speak to anyone because that person was posting on SOLOP. I really hope NB and TM can sort this one out. Robert Campbell

Roger, Thanks for posting this. Overall, I think it's a very good piece. My only objection is to the long subsection on "The Moral and the Practical." Binswanger is able to argue that open immigration (minus the exceptions he mentions) is not just a policy consistent with individual rights--it will also be economically beneficial to the average American. But the length of "The Moral and the Practical," and its placement, suggest a lack of confidence in his ability to argue that opening up immigration will have positive consequences--and a desire to close off discussion by wagging the finger at anyone who asks what the consequences of recognizing individual rights will be, in this case. It would have been more effective to run through the positive consequences and then, briefly, remind the reader that recognizing and respecting rights are, in fact, good for everyone. Robert Campbell

Jenna, No need to plunk down $80 on Smith's book when you've read Rand, and have read, or are going to read, Peikoff, Nathaniel Branden, and other authors. The Nicomachean Ethics might be more of a priority as well... Smith's new book can wait, if you can't find a copy in a library right away. For Rand, "just knowing" meant "knowing without knowing how you know." Some aspects of wisdom may be conscious and deliberative, without all of them being either of those things. Robert Campbell PS. I don't know the particular book by Ken Wilber that Rich recommended (and if I tried to read everything by Wilber, I'm not sure how much time I'd have to read anything else!), but I've found the two of his books that I've read to be well worth the investment.

Jenna, The notion of subconscious mental processes isn't all that old, at least in the Western tradition. When Leibniz challenged Locke (who had argued that any purported innate ideas would have to be conscious), his suggestion that there could be unconscious "ideas" was pretty shocking. Since Freud, the notion of subconscious mental processes has been rather widely accepted (though you'll find a few holdouts--John Searle doesn't seem terribly comfortable with it). So if it's part of "folk psychology" now, it's a relatively recent addition. What I take to be your wider point, though, is our understanding of other people's actions (our manner of describing them, etc.) necessarily involves inferences or attributions of motives, including subconscious motives. So what Rand says we ought to do, in the conclusion to "The Psychology of Psychologizing"--"It is only with a person's conscious mind that one can deal, and it is only with his conscious mind that one can be concerned"--is advice that no one can follow. (For that matter, it is harder to judge people's conscious motives than Rand often seemed to think.) I have some reservations about the notion of folk psychology. Philosophers talk about it much more often than psychologists do; the whole "belief-desire" thesis is more of an analytic philosopher's stylized version of everyday thinking about human cognition and motivation than a straight report of what people normally do. Also, some who talk about "folk psychology" (e.g., Paul Churchland, in his earlier work) see it as something that must be overthrown entirely, in some kind of "transvaluation of all values." (Churchland used to suggest that neuroscience would ultimately replace even such notions as truth and falsity.) I see everyday thinking about thinking and motivation as in need of revision and supplementation through scientific research, but as unlikely to be completely overthrown by it. Robert Campbell

Jenna, Roger made some good suggestions. Leonard Peikoff can be highly variable, from one context to another: Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand is much different in tone, sometimes in substance, from LP's 1976 lectures on Objectivism; apparently the lecture on Judging, Feeling, and Not Being Moralistic is at variance with "Fact and Value." One type of wisdom was important to the ancients, to Aristotle in particular. The Greek word for it was phronesis, which lacks a standard translation--I've seen it rendered as prudence, practical intelligence, or practical wisdom. Aristotle thought that practical wisdom was an intellectual virtue, and that the moral virtues weren't worth a whole lot without it, because practical wisdom is needed to assess and weigh what's relevant in a particular context and make the choice that fits it best. There is no notion of practical wisdom in the Objectivist ethics. I'm not completely sure why, although I'm pretty sure that Rand's distrust of "just knowing" played a role. I've been flagging every reference to moral principles in Tara Smith's new book, because she talks about them a lot. I'm trying to figure out what Smithian principles are in Cognitive Science terms--and how they might relate to action. I've also been flagging every passage (there are fewer of these) where Smith seems to be assimilating something like practical wisdom to Rand's conception of rationality. A good recent book on practical wisdom is The Virtue of Prudence, by Doug Den Uyl. (The writing is rather dry, but I'm sure you've encountered much drier stuff in neuroscience articles.) Den Uyl gives both a historical sketch (how prudence was once a virtue but is now put aside as "non-moral" by most moral philosophers) and an account of how prudence functions. Knowing how to weight competing goals and values, or competing demands on one's time and energy, is what Den Uyl understands practical wisdom to be. Robert Campbell

Ciro, Thank you for including the link to the interview with Paul Ekman. He is one of the top researchers on emotions today. Robert Campbell

Ellen and Roger, The difficulty here is that, in one sense, "Dialectical Dishonesty" had been in the works since April 2004, if not earlier. Many observers had correctly predicted a denunciation of Chris Sciabarra, sooner or later. Joe Duarte put it very well here: http://joeduarte.blogspot.com/2006/05/my-boy.html Of course the actual writing was done much closer to the date of release. Both the "Comrade Sonia" remark and the naming of an ARI scholar provided material for the piece. Whether they actually "inspired" the writing is another matter. Mr. Mazza had been trying to get names of ARI scholars who privately communicated with members of the JARS editorial board since October 2005, when I had a couple of sharp exchanges with him on the matter. Ms. Hsieh had been looking more recently. Ms. Hsieh's alliance with Mr. Perigo can be confidently dated to late February 2006, when she began appearing on SOLOP (it could have begun even earlier). Mr. Valliant had been allied with Mr. Perigo since October or November 2005; his search for an excuse not to publish in JARS began after Mr. Perigo had his final falling out with Chris Sciabarra, which was also somewhere around late February 2006. Since none of these folks want to talk about their behind-the-scenes activities, we may never know just when "Dialectical Dishonesty" was written, whether comments were sought from allies before posting, etc. Robert Campbell

Michael and Ciro, (1) Howard Roark had a friend named Kent Lansing, without whose diplomatic skills he would not have landed a couple of corporate clients. (2) Would judgments of people's motives based on their body language be considered "psychologizing"? Tara Smith's new book endorses Rand's prohibition on psychologizing, though she relegates it to a footnote. TS's attempted definition is "judging a person's moral character on the basis of inferences about his subconscious that are not based on his actions, statements, and conscious convictions" (p. 153, n. 33). So unless body language counts as an action... Robert Campbell PS. Is it always so easy to know another person's conscious convictions?

Jenna, You said: When I was a Randroid, I was essentially trying to identify myself with a system of ideas (Objectivism). Threats to the validity or credibility of those ideas came across threats to me, personally. I never worshipped Ayn Rand, as some do. I'd formed an impression of her personality from reading her writings and talking them over with high school friends, before any of us met up with "organized Objectivists," and some of that impression was negative (that she had a bad temper and was too caught up in asserting authority). So it wasn't disillusionment with Rand the person that brought an end to my Randroidism. It was realizing that there was much more to the world--even to the world of ideas--than Objectivism could encompass. That, and becoming a lot more tolerant of error. Robert Campbell

Ellen and Roger, I don't know the exact timing of all of these events, though it is clear that the banning of Regi Firehammer from NoodleFood on April 6 involved cooperation among Ms. Hsieh, Mr. Valliant, Mr. Maurone and others--and could hardly have displeased Mr. Perigo. "Dialectical Dishonesty," by my estimate, would take roughly a month to write. It appeared on April 25. (It took me two weeks, off and on, to write "Fractious Factions," which is a good deal shorter.) As to whether it's wise for a grad student to put so much effort into an extracurricular project when the Spring semester is winding up, Ms. Hsieh did rack up incompletes during the Spring of 2004, when she denounced David Kelley and aligned herself with the Ayn Rand Institute. Robert Campbell

If you check the archives of Mr. Mazza's now-suspended blog, Passing Thoughts, you'll see (1) A comment by Diana Hsieh on April 3, 2006, asking for Mr. Mazza's email address: http://passingthoughts.blogsome.com/2006/0...on-solopassion/ and (2) Mr. Mazza's reference, on April 7, 2006, "a little tidbit that I’ve been itchin’ to make public, but I promised my source that I wouldn’t steal their thunder." (His source was Ms. Hsieh.) http://passingthoughts.blogsome.com/2006/0...he-smackdown-2/ In between, on April 6th, Mr. Mazza participated in denouncing Regi Firehammer when the latter made the mistake of commenting on Ms. Hsieh's blog, and was promptly banned. See the comments starting at http://www.dianahsieh.com/cgi-bin/blog/com...0811947135693#7 Robert Campbell

For some background on Mike Mazza's antipathy to Chris Sciabarra's work, and his reliance on Greg Salmieri as a source, see http://www.dianahsieh.com/cgi-bin/blog/com...689500290317#18 and http://passingthoughts.blogsome.com/2005/0...a-package-deal/ As a bonus, Mr. Mazza's now-classic description of The Russian Radical as "arbitrary gibberish" can be seen at http://passingthoughts.blogsome.com/2005/10/05/63/ Robert Campbell

Mike Lee, The announced hiatus at NoodleFood is temporary. And Ms. Hsieh routinely shuts down the comment function when she won't be around to monitor and respond to comments. Robert Campbell