bmacwilliam

Damn!

It's been a while since I dug into this stuff, but I suppose it's good for me. Nothing helped me understand physics concepts more than when I had to teach it (and anticipate tough questions), but it's been a while and the gears are rusty, but let me try to dig deep and remember here....

So, if I get something wrong, please correct me. Here goes:

If a simple theory predicts a huge range of observed phenomena then that's a good theory. If a simple law can predict a huge range of data we have a good law - like Newton's laws - the simpler the better. They predict/explain a whole lot of stuff. In this sense they are good laws.

In what's called algorithmic randomness, there is no "law" or explanation, or formula, or "algorithm" that is substantially simpler than the data. This is an english summary of a precise mathematical definition of algorithmic randomness that I once understood. I think I have this right so far. There's no way I could remember the math, but I don't think it's important right now. Basically, what we have is a situation where nothing simpler than the data explains what's going on. In other words, nothing that could be called a "law" explains what's going on. That is randomness - the mathematically and fundamentally unexplainable.

Here's the kicker. Quantum randomness is not a mathematical deduction of the standard model of QM. So we're left with trying to figure out what the nature of the randomness is. If I remember correctly, we have no mathematical proof that the randomness is algorithmic but we do have tons of data. Some good arguments conclude that quantum randomness is algorithmic. Or in other words, physical reality is irreducibly random. Of course there is opposition to this too.

That's about all I remember right now. So it's a long winded explanation of what I mean by causality and randomness (the real kind) are not compatible concepts. Fundamental causality goes out the window if quantum randomness is algorithmic.

Comments?

Bob,

Let me try again from another angle. The axioms I described are not supposed to mean much. Merely that your mind is competent to deal with the issues. You even use your mind to question this. Axioms are not about reality only. They are a logical connection between a conscious mind and reality. That is all they are for. If you try to force them to be physical evidence only and ignore their role in logic, they become meaningless. If you try to impose them on reality by making the act of thinking superior, they become tremendous rationalizations.

They need both mind and observed reality. They are merely a conceptual interface.

At this point then, quite honestly, I do not have any significant disagreement with what you wrote above.

You wrote:

Randomness at the fundamental level (not just in macroscopic behaviour) is a at odds with anything that is said to have something resembling a direct cause.

Why? If it is observed, randomness certainly should be considered as a possible attribute of an entity. Maybe it is and maybe it isn't. You're the scientist. You tell me from experiments and theorizing. Why would you rule it out a priori?

Michael

No no, I'm not ruling out anything. It's a definition thing.

A little misunderstanding I think. What I maybe explained better in another post and that it's just that you can't have it both ways. I don't mean this personally. I mean that one cannot entertain any type of deterministic causality notion and smuggle randomness in there. This is not the seemingly random motion of gas particles for example. REAL randomness has bigger implications.

Randomness, to a scientist is sometimes defined as WITHOUT cause. This does depend on context though. Random atomic decay times are not the same as random genetic mutations say. Different concepts, same word, confusing.

Maybe you can see then why I see a compatibility problem. In this case, the concept of randomness is one that is fundamentally acausal.

My concept of God can't be atheistic.

Bob

Bob,

Which article did you get that quote from?

Michael

Axioms: The Eightfold Way

by Ron Merrill

Bob

Why can't randomness just be part of a thing's identity? How that thing acts is randomly. Just like another thing acts in a standard manner. That is what it does. When we deal with the random thing, we take randomness into consideration because we have to. We observe it. Randomness is part of its identity. That goes for causality too. That thing, which has a specific identity, will cause a random effect because that is what we see it do.

I don't see the need to throw out the axioms here. (Incidentally, I don't like the term "determinism" as this implies someone who, or something that, "determines," thus implies that causality is separate from identity rather than one aspect of the same thing.)

This is just one example of how axioms are misused. There are many.

Thanks Michael,

I'll reply to other things later...

For now, as I outlined in another thread here, I think the above idea you outline is a concept of identity/causality that is either too vague or open-ended to have any meaning, or at worst self-contradictory. Randomness at the fundamental level (not just in macroscopic behaviour) is a at odds with anything that is said to have something resembling a direct cause.

Bob

The italicized excerpt is from an essay on axioms from the RoR site.

Third, we have the axiom of causality. This may be taken to state that everything in the universe has a cause in the general Aristotelian (rather than the limited modern) sense. If some particular entity has certain characteristics at a given point in time, or some particular event occurs, there is a reason for it. It doesn't "just happen." This is equivalent to saying that the contents of the universe are related, that they in some way interact. Of course, if they do, they must do so in accord with logic, that is, there must be a reason for the behavior to occur as it does. Just as the axiom of identity asserts that logic applies to the properties of entities; so the axiom of causality asserts that the laws of logic apply to the properties of change. Again this is undeniable and inescapable; for if anything could become anything else without restriction, no entity could have an identity. (Cf. Rand 1961, 188.)

(We need not necessarily exclude the possibility of "metaphysical chance"; it is conceivable that causality may apply stochastically. For instance, there might be no specific cause for the decay of a particular radium atom, but a cause for the decay of radium atoms as a class which inclusively causes the decay of each one at some random time.)

I'm thinking the second paragraph would be arguable to Objectivists no, but that's not my point here.

A) "If some particular entity has certain characteristics at a given point in time, or some particular event occurs, there is a reason for it."

It is clear from the context that the statement could have swapped "cause" for "reason" to illustrate my problem clearer. Either way though, the meaning doesn't change. So we'd have...

A) "If some particular entity has certain characteristics at a given point in time, or some particular event occurs, there is a cause for it."

B) "For instance, there might be no specific cause for the decay of a particular radium atom"

My question is how can these two statements be reconciled??

Now, the second part of the B sentence goes on to say "but a cause for the decay of radium atoms as a class which inclusively causes the decay of each one at some random time"

No way, these two paragraphs describe causality in totally incompatible terms. Cannot have it both ways.

So, my point is that IF this is in fact the Objectivist view of causality (although I'm not asserting that this is the "official" view), then it is self-contradictory.

Bob

But there is nothing strange about anti-matter, it's as real and physical as "ordinary" matter; the latter is only "ordinary" while there happens to be far more matter than anti-matter in the universe.

Antimatter is real and physical sure, but the fundamental nature of what "physical" means is indeed strange to me when collisions in one case behave like Newtonian billiard balls but in another case annihilation happens with only perfectly opposing photons remaining.

Like Objectivist factions the two can't exist peacefully together, but annihilate each other when they come into contact.

What's left after the incident though?

Bob

Paul,

Interesting and thoughtful post.

"you would have distrust for the imagination as a tool of knowledge when not tied directly to the evidence and mathematics."

I would say yes, I do have a distrust for imagination and intuition. I feel it is too anthro-macro-centric (if you know what I mean) and biased to be reliable. This is not to say that new, improved intuition cannot develop with a deeper understanding of reality, it certainly can. Our intuition/imagination is notoriously wrong and/or incomplete - to me this is essentially axiomatic.

"you want to work from the inside-out by constructing a view of existence from fundamental principles and fundamental particles."

No, I don't think so. I would say we should be guided from the outside in according to evidence and logic/mathematics. Fundamental principles are actually the endpoint in this case. That's why, I think, it's a tough problem. Preconceptions could lead to failure to understand.

"What then are the concepts of identity and causality to work from?"

Again, I think we're trying to work to these concepts, not from them in this case.

"Causality becomes– what a thing does is determined by the actions and interactions of its physical components."

Too vague for me. There's more than one view of causality of course. Another one (roughly) is that for each set of initial conditions, there exists only one possible future. Yet another is fundamentally randomness based. I don't believe nor eliminate any (other than the simple Newtonian/Clockwork idea doesn't look good right now). I think that we need to figure it out. That's what fundamental physics is seeking. You can probably see now why it can get under my skin a bit when I think about these great minds investigating these deep fundamental questions in their labs, and an Objectivist says it's a waste of time because he's got it all figured out axiomatically! That doesn't work for me at all.

"In short, to exist a thing must be physical."

Ok, but we don't know what "physical" really means do we? For example, what's anti-matter? It certainly exists, beyond doubt. We use it in medical imaging applications all the time. It follows that there is a deeper, perhaps quite strange reality of what "physical" really means.

"One of the biases I had gained by abstracting from my experience is the idea that there can be no unextended entities nor disembodied actions."

Sure, we all have these biases, but I contend, and I think you agree, that this type of experience is not good enough to form any conclusions about the subject matter at hand. I would go as far as to say it looks like this bias works against deeper understanding of reality.

"This is the nature of the models I build in my head. I am not saying this IS representative of reality. "

Right. Well said.

"This view of identity and causality, and the model of existence that is fashioned from them, need to be tested against the evidence and assessed relative to other models. A process of reevaluation is always necessary because we are dealing here with a posteriori epistemological principles. "

Exactly.

"This is where a number of Objectivists get it wrong. They confuse a posteriori principles with a priori axioms "

Bingo. That's the way I see it too.

Bob

I however, tend to be Bohr-leaning.

Bob

I've noticed, you and Dragonfly both. If we can be open minded-- not tie ourselves too tightly to our personal worldviews, I think we might have some interesting discussions. Evidence and reason must come even before our allegiance to our own points of view. I get the feeling you would agree with this.

Paul

Yep, totally.

Bob

Paul,

Great post!

"As epistemological principles identity and causality are a posteriori concepts not a priori axioms. The principles of identity and causality have to be abstracted from the particulars in our experience of reality. We have to look at the evidence to figure out what are things and why they behave as they do. Our statements about identity and causality have to be precisely defined to not allow into our models elements not supported by the evidence and must be inclusive enough to not leave out any aspect of reality. “What a thing is determines what it does,” does not go far enough."

I very much agree with this. Very well put.

I however, tend to be Bohr-leaning.

Bob

Bob,

Have I seen your writing elsewhere? I have spent almost no time on other Objectivist sites, ever. I did take a little tour of RoR some time ago. I remember coming across a thread on quantum physics I was very tempted to join. Did I see your name there? Regardless, welcome. I do enjoy your comments, your tone, and the glimpses I am getting of your particular slant on the world. I'm interested to see what you have to say about where the fault lies in the standard view of causality. I wonder if you have another concept of causation to propose. How would another concept of causation change our interpretation of the evidence provided by science?

Paul

Yes, I was participating for a while on RoR and got bent out of shape over this issue. I'm glad you enjoyed what I had to say. My trouble there was what I perceived to be an attitude that reality must conform to certain preconceptions and an unwillingness to question these preconceptions. I say PREconceptions because at the fundamental sub-atomic level we are just beginning to discover what's going on all we have is preconceptions of our macroscopic world and millions of years of evolution to work with. Our conceptions need to be open to change as we probe deeper. Reality is not required to conform to how we think it should or must behave.

I wish I had another concept of causation to propose. At this point I simply suspect that we will eventually discover many new counter-intuitive truths. In fact I think we need to actively suspend this "Newtonianish" (for lack of a better word) intuition to improve our understanding. Replacing an old intuition with a new one (for me it was relativity that did this) is one of the most rewarding things one can do intellectually.

Bob

On the axiom level, there must be reliability. Either the mind is made for thinking or it isn't. If it isn't, then don't think with it! Use something else to think with if you can find it...

After the axiomatic level is in place (usually in early infancy, which is why axioms are boring), you go to the next level: performing with the mind. That's where all hell breaks loose.

Why Rand was so adamant about stressing axioms is that certain philosophies were popular at the time she wrote that stressed that nothing could be known. Ever. She went into denounce mode against them and then it was hard to pull herself out. Even after the problem was no longer a danger and other problems appeared.

The true believers wish to emulate her, relive the glory and kill the bad guys (the ones who are no longer around). Not having a bad guy for real around, any old guy then has to do...

Michael

I think I understand the axioms on their own. What I do not understand is why reliability is a requirement though. I am willing to keep an open mind about it and will try my best to understand the arguments.

At this point the argument that if you have no certainty then you cannot be certain you have no certainty either and this is a contradiction - I do not buy this. Certainty is not a black or white concept in practice.

"Coherentism" makes sense to me in this way, although I do not agree with it completely.

Any comments on my identity conundrum???

Bob

Paul wrote:

"I think a causal account and an intuitive/experiential account of quantum reality is possible. I also think an intuitive/experiential account of relativity is possible with the right principles. But I tend to be a bit of a dreamer."

Maybe. I also think intuition growth and adjustment is possible but not always. I have a somewhat intuitive grasp of special relativity at least, but no matter how hard I try I can't grasp 5 dimensions like Dragonfly said.

You may feel that a causal account of QM is possible and there certainly have been opposing viewpoints to the Copenhagen interpretation (some crazier than others), but the jury is still out as far as I know.

I wanted to clarify a bit what I meant about faulty reasoning. When we find out that a theory that fits well with reality but defies a basic tenet of our reasoning framework, either the theory is flawed or the logical framework and/or reasoning is flawed. Since I question the strict requirement of our intuitive, or let's say "standard" causality model, I do not rule out the possibility that our "rationality" is faulty in this way.

Bob

BUT

Is you mind a valid and reliable faculty to judge what you do know - even judge your uncertainty?

The answer to that question is the reason for the existence of axioms.

Like I said: nothing more.

(You unfortunately have engaged people who are very confused about this.)

Michael

The way I see it is that we do not need perfect reliability to function.

Bob

""Do you mean to say that you can never know? Ever? That your faculty os reason is incapable of knowing anything at all?"

No.

Let me clarify this. When I examine more closely how I really feel about this I find that it's more accurate to say that in some cases, the level of uncertaintly is so small that I am comfortable dismissing it.

Certainty, perhaps a bad choice of words, is not 1 or 0. It is a continuum. In ones thinking there are degrees of certainty in most, if not all cases.

Can you be certain beyond any doubt whatsoever of anything? Tough question. I think we can maybe, but not about most things at least - but that's OK, this doesn't break anything for me. Am I certain that we cannot be certain? Not completely ;-)

Bob

"Do you mean to say that you can never know? Ever? That your faculty os reason is incapable of knowing anything at all?"

No.

"Or do you mean to say that according to what you do know, you have to revise it periodically with new discoveries? And that some of the discoveries will show a deficiency of mental and/or sensory processing? "

Yes, basically.

"Be careful here, because if the answer to this last is yes, in order to know that a new discovery has invalidated the previous information or understanding, you need to use your reason. You either use it or you don't. You can't use it and not use it at the same time and claim any kind of logical validity. The whole method of falsifiability is predicated on this."

Disagree. Or maybe I agree - not sure. What I disagree with is the notion that since we do not have perfect reliability that what we have is useless. Science progresses quite well with senses and reasoning that is "good enough". Improvements seem to be inevitable.

"Are we on the same page?"

Yes, I think so.

Bob

Emphasis mine...

What is being addressed is that we observes that all things have a separate singular essence that we can examine, being that this essence cannot contradict itself (for example exist and and not exist at the same time) without invalidating our reason.

Nothing more.

[reponse]

The about question/comment and answer/reply helps me tremendously work through everyday dialogs I am involved with. In my conversations with individuals of different persuasions I at least want the other party to walk away with well supported reponses to think about. Michael you seem to have the ability to do this well... and Victor also. Dialog between the two of you is interesting and instructive. I need better disapline and tools for sorting out issues as both of you seem to have.

Well, if it helps you that's great, but it doesn't help me. I know just enough about physics to be inclined to conclude that it is probably our reason that is lacking.

Bob

Here's an identity conundrum - for me at least.

My coffee mug has an identity. I say (coffee mug)=(coffee mug) from day to day. In other words, it's the same mug it was yesterday - same matter, same atoms. It doesn't matter whether I observe it or whether I live or die.

Now, when it comes to people (and consciousness) things get really messy. I am Bob today, I was Bob yesterday, and hopefully I'll be Bob tomorrow, but why? Certainly not for the same reason. My physical matter has totally changed multiple times in my lifetime. It partially changes every day. I am most certainly NOT 3-year-old Bob in any physical way at all. Well, then why am I Bob? What about psychological continuity? I "am" the same person as 3-year-old Bob because of psychological continuity, I mean what else is there? But wait, that doesn't work either...

Now lets say I am on the starship enterprise and I get transported to the surface of a planet. My atoms are disassembled and put back together the same way, so to me I'm fine and off I go. What if they were only copied? Well the guy on the surface wouldn't know, he'd have total continuity but he wouldn't really "be" me would he? What about the guy left behind he would really "be" me right? But they BOTH have psychological continuity and good luck convincing the guy on the surface that he's not me. In a psychological sense they are both "me". But not physically, but then physicality(matter) doesn't matter for people (at least sometimes) - problem here.

So that doesn't work either (continuity) when it comes to consciousness/people. So when it comes to people and consciousness how and when is Bob=Bob??? The answer just ain't that simple is it?

This is certainly not the only identity problem either.

Bob

Victor Wrote:

"Philosophy is primary".

I do not agree, not always. When a concept in philosophy seems to contradict reality, it's time to check premises. There is absolutely nothing wrong with philosophy, especially a reality-based philosophy, using advances in science to improve/re-examine itself. Using science to validate philosophical concepts is just as valid as the other way around. Often the line between the two is very blurry anyway, especially in fields like basic physics.

Bob

"Hi Bob, welcome on this forum; here you won't be immediately burned at the stake if you have some disagreements with Objectivist theory, there are more heretics here."

Although my feet are still smoking, I do think I have much to learn and hopefully something to contribute as well, so I'll try again.

I have no need, I suppose, to nag at the law of identity, so I'll let it be unless in the midst of an argument it gets pulled out in "support" or to "refute" an idea. This is when people (OK, I) get bent out of shape.

Bob

Thanks Michael,

I do think I essentially understand the assertion(s). Understanding, however, does not bring me into agreement. Something is not sitting well with me. I will try to explain, but am having trouble right now not coming off sounding like a hardcore skeptic. Since I am indeed not a skeptic in this way, I'll need to chew on this a bit more until I can describe my hesitations accurately.

Bob

Hey Bob,

Welcome aboard! I hope you like it here in Objectivist civility-land.

I have had this discussion with Dragonfly before. Too many online Objectivists use the fundamental axioms for more than they are supposed to be used.

Michael

Yes, I agree with this. Also, I have seen argued that the law of causality follows directly from the law of identity. I do not accept this at this point.

Also, I have a hard time understanding how the law of identity has any real meaning at all. Since there is no restrictions on what something could be, there is nothing that something cannot be - know what I mean. If something can be anything other than what it's not, then I don't see how that's any different than saying "Something can be anything" and I get no meaning out of it.

Bob

Here's another in the "wacky" column. Forgive me (and correct me) if my physics is rusty - it's been a while.

According to QM, an electron exists as a "probability distribution" around a nucleus. This is not like a 'normal' orbit - there's nothing round or spherical here. Think of a three-dimensional "figure 8" as an example. There is a non-zero probability of the electron existing anywhere in either lobe, but a zero probablility of it existing at the centre. That totally doesn't make sense. How can it be on either side of the bridge (and go to the other side freely) but can never actually cross the bridge?

Or a better question is: What is it that it can do this?

The lesson here is that I think it's a big mistake to assume macroscopic intuition is reliable. To assert anything is true microscopically based on macroscopic evidence (or axioms and deductions for that matter) is questionable.

Edit: To be more clear, intuition is not immutable. We can learn new truths and our intuition can grow and improve. Special relativity was just amazing, personally, for me in this regard. At first it doesn't make sense, but eventually it does and it's a moment of intellectual growth. A simpler example is Aristotelian vs Newtonian ideas of motion. What if Aristotle had got it right?

Bob

When quantum theory states that quanta change due to observation, perhaps they do. Does that change their nature? Does that mean that reality is subjective and not objective. I don't think so.

The exact experiment escapes me at the moment, but there's evidence to suggest that an outcome of an experiment can depend on whether or not ONLY the possibility of observation exits, not whether it is observed or not. QM has deep, strange, and other not-too-well-understood (at least by me) implications.

I have a background in physics and it makes my head ache. Although I must say there's a certain value in doing the math (literally). When I read the text-only versions of QM in popular books I wonder how totally whacky it must appear to the non-physicist. The math helps one understand a little better I'd say, but it's tough to put into words.

Bob