Daniel Barnes

Before we get to the practical aspects of this - obviously no-one can go on to infinity in practice - and also the ins and outs of Rand's approach, I suppose we should get the non-Objectivist theoretical side cleared up. Do you agree that trying to prove all propositions in theory leads to an infinite regress? That is, to prove one proposition, we need to introduce another proposition: to justify p we need p1. But to justify p1 we need p2. And to justify p2 we need p3. Etc on to infinity. I would have thought this was an uncontroversial result. Certainly you don't need to accept Objectivist or Popperian doctrine to agree, it was known long before either. Likewise, then, as Popper points out, defining a term requires the introduction of at least one other term. So to define t, we need t1. To define t1, you need t2. To get t2, you need t3. To get t3, you need t4. Etc. on to infinity. Do you accept this in principle? I don't see anything wrong with it myself. If so, then we can perhaps move to the possible consequences of this.

That is a nice passage concerning Locke. I'm not sure Popper said the difference in definitions was the only reason for the success of science. It doesn't sound like the sort of thing he would say. He does think it is an important, and overlooked one however. His point was rather that the stress on the importance of definitions was a pathway to deadlocks such as the one you describe Why might "working from radically different definitions...indicate that further argument is pointless..."? This would only be true, surely, if the debaters choose to cling to their own radically differing definitions, thinking that they are far too important to give up. Then you are right: discussion would break down. However, if they want debate to continue, they could come to a mutual compromise, or even give up their definition, and adopt the other's. But to do that, it seems to me that they would be implicitly deciding that their definitions are not of fundamental importance - that words can be used loosely, and useful debate can still be had. Further, in my experience, it seems to me that where the doctrine of the fundamental importance of definition is accepted, this kind of breakdown is quite common - and not just restricted to radically different definitions, but subtly different ones too. And, of course, subtly different definitions that are presented by their possessors as radically different ones! It seems to me I have encountered this sort of thing a great deal over the years, and seen it break down a lot of discussions. Hence I agree with Popper that it is a problem, and that it can be overcome by adopting his principle of treating arguments over the meanings of words as an issue of minor importance. I do not think Popper argues that his approach solves all problems with arguments, just as inventing the starter motor didn't solve all problems with cars. But it can solve the source of some of them.

Absolutely. Cars break down sometimes too, and sometimes they don't. Normally if they break down consistently in a particular fashion, we take a look under the hood to see what might be causing this problem. You've described one way arguments can consistently break down: when two people dogmatically cling to two radically different definitions of a term, each refusing to budge. Popper is suggesting ways we might decrease such breakdowns. This is a good point against Popper.

Bad idea. Popper doesn't use "concept" and "theory" interchangeably. In his chart on pg. 19 (or thereabouts, if in a different edition than I have), he uses "designations," "terms" and "concepts" interchangeably -- which differs from Rand, for whom the word isn't the concept. He distinguishes "designations or terms or concepts" (left side of the chart) from "statements or propositions or theories" (right side). His arguments about an infinite number of possible implications *of a theory* involves the infinite series of natural numbers. It doesn't apply, even as he uses "concept," to concepts. Ellen Actually, as I can see hopscotching between the two systems, not to mention participants own interpretations of them, and my interpretations of those... will inevitably cause a few problems, let me try a different tack. Ellen, you have Popper's little chart to hand. What practical problem(s) do you think Rand's approach solves that Popper's doesn't? What theoretical problems? (other than the problem of universals, which we'll park for now )

And this clinging to radically different definitions might be the right procedure, even though the cost is that discussion breaks down? This is exactly what Popper condemns about this approach.

Actually, as Chapter 11 OSE and Chap 7 UQ try to make clear, he argues that "definitional analysis" is responsible for long running dysfunction in philosophical arguments. That's the point of his comparison of the output of philosophy (and the social sciences) in the past 500 years or so and the output of natural science - which, he claims, is largely due to the degree from which natural science has departed from Aristotle's doctrine. He claims that's why most philosophy is still mired in Scholasticism while natural science races ahead in leaps and bounds. This is one of the things that has made Popper rather less popular with the academic community than the science community. All this is of course up for debate. But that is his point. Once again apologies for brevity.

This is all good, wish I had time to reply more fully. Have you seen the chart Ellen is referring to in UQ? If you don't have it I will post it in order to clarify this very point.

I was doing it for the sake of argument, actually. I am quite aware of the difference, as anyone who has seen that chart is. It's just that as you'd equated definitions, and I presumed, perhaps wrongly, the concepts behind them, with hypotheses (which Popper uses interchangeably with theories), this would be ok with you for now. Popper also talks about replacing the analysis of concepts with the testing of theories. I was going to save the concepts vs theories discussion till later, as I hoped my remark about a "sidetrack" made clear.

In turn, I don't see why it's a "bizarre" at all. If "concepts" are true things we can know, and their number is finite and not infinite, then this entails that we might one day run out of new truths to know. In which case we might know everything, in which case we one day might be omniscient. (And this is without touching on the issue of false concepts, or anti-concepts). In contrast to this, I would maintain that this is unlikely; that there are a potentially infinite number of possible new concepts (which to for now to avoid being sidetracked I will use interchangeably with the term theories), hence we, either individually or collectively, can never come even close to being omniscient. And of course this also tracks with the idea of undetermination of of theories, which has a number of good arguments supporting it. So I put it to you that far from being "bizarre", you may want to consider that such a claim is no more outrageous than the contrary proposition; in fact probably far less so. So it seems a reasonable basis to proceed from. Obviously it seems we have quite a bit to thrash out about just how good Popper's theory is before we can even try to see if it applies to Rand. But can I just say that I feel we are off to a promising start now, after a bit of argy-bargy to begin with. I would also like to thank you for your recent thoughtful responses. This is in fact one of Popper's most enduring, and least known dogmas. He was still propounding it in Unended Quest. (Actually, if you have a moment, and UQ, I suggest you might have a look at his presentation there in Chapter 7 as I recall. That, combined with the Aristotle chapter in OSE, are I think the clearest statements of his argument. Ellen, if you are reading this, I suggest you have a re-read of the UQ chapter as it might explain some of what you're seeing as a clash in Popper's pronouncements. If necessary I will also post some of the relevant UQ arguments.). If it turns out the old dog was wrong, so much the better. I also propose we put Phil out of his misery and move it to another thread? If you agree I will start another shortly. I will also point out that here it is Monday, and I am now back at work, so my replies may be necessarily piecemeal, such as this one, and I apologise in advance.

Well, excellent! That's where we should be starting. And if Popper's argument survives a good bashing - I'm just considering GHS's response now - then we'll consider how or if it really applies to Rand. I think it is 1) sound and 2) applies to Rand. But I could be entirely wrong on both counts, so have at it!

LOL. I read the section using Amazon's "look inside" feature. Popper was about 15 years old. He had already concluded that words and their meanings are unimportant, i.e. his anti-essentialism. His failure was merely to convince his father that his anti-essentialism is correct. If his admission had been much later and that his anti-essentialism, i.e. the Barnes-vaunted essay Two Kinds of Definitions, is one big train-wreck, it may have been worth reading. That not being the case, it is another Barnes bluff. If I hadn't been going to bed at the time, Merlin, I would have pointed that out myself. Incidentally, that's why i thought it funny - the apparent clash. But no, you think it's a "bluff". And of course you forget the three examples I had already easily provided. And I could offer plenty more, but GHS had already asked me to stop. Why you think that I would try to "bluff", when I know for a fact Ellen has UQ and GHS most likely has it (hence why I thought he too would take it with a small smile) I can only attribute to your tendency to read everything I write with the least sympathetic interpretation possible. As I've tried to point out to GHS, this attitude is hardly justified by the fact that you think I do it to Rand. All you do by this, even by your own estimation, is lower yourself to my level...;-)

So in the prior post we already have the first example, found almost by opening one of his books at random. Now here's two more, both found in a few minutes: "I offer my theory with many apologies. It has taken me a long time to think it out fully, and to make it clear to myself. Nevertheless I still feel far from satisfied with it...I blush when I have to make this confession; for when I was younger, I used to say very contemptuous things about evolutionary philosophies. When twenty-two years ago Canon Charles E. Raven, in his Science, Religion, and the Future, described the Darwinian controversy as "a storm in a Victorian teacup," I agreed, but criticized him for paying too much attention "to the vapors still emerging from the cup," by which I meant the hot air of the evolutionary philosophies (especially those which told us that there were inexorable laws of evolution). But now I have to confess that this cup of tea has become, after all, my cup of tea; and with it I have to eat humble pie." [Popper, OK 1972] And later: "The fact that the theory of natural selection is difficult to test has led some people...to claim that it is a tautology. . . . I mention this problem because I too belong among the culprits. Influenced by what these authorities say, I have in the past described the theory as "almost tautological,"....I have changed my mind about the testability and logical status of the theory of natural selection; and I am glad to have an opportunity to make a recantation." [Popper, 1978] More to follow, as soon as I can be bothered with the sure-to-be-thankless task of looking them up. You don't need to provide any more examples. Popper's remarks are admirable. Popper definitely had a leg up on Rand in this department. Oh just one more, which I found just as I was heading off to bed. Mainly because I laughed out loud when I recalled it, and I think you'll find it amusing. Chapter heading from Unended Quest, p 13: MY FIRST PHILOSOPHICAL FAILURE: THE PROBLEM OF ESSENTIALISM.

Now THAT's more like it. Just quickly however, for now: I don't think you are correct in thinking the number of terms are necessarily finite. There are neologisms for example. And the number of possible new concepts (or theories) around any fact or set of facts are infinite. So I'm not sure it is a blunder. Or perhaps I have missed your point. Anyway will consider the larger part of your remarks and reply soon.

So in the prior post we already have the first example, found almost by opening one of his books at random. Now here's two more, both found in a few minutes: "I offer my theory with many apologies. It has taken me a long time to think it out fully, and to make it clear to myself. Nevertheless I still feel far from satisfied with it...I blush when I have to make this confession; for when I was younger, I used to say very contemptuous things about evolutionary philosophies. When twenty-two years ago Canon Charles E. Raven, in his Science, Religion, and the Future, described the Darwinian controversy as "a storm in a Victorian teacup," I agreed, but criticized him for paying too much attention "to the vapors still emerging from the cup," by which I meant the hot air of the evolutionary philosophies (especially those which told us that there were inexorable laws of evolution). But now I have to confess that this cup of tea has become, after all, my cup of tea; and with it I have to eat humble pie." [Popper, OK 1972] And later: "The fact that the theory of natural selection is difficult to test has led some people...to claim that it is a tautology. . . . I mention this problem because I too belong among the culprits. Influenced by what these authorities say, I have in the past described the theory as "almost tautological,"....I have changed my mind about the testability and logical status of the theory of natural selection; and I am glad to have an opportunity to make a recantation." [Popper, 1978] More to follow, as soon as I can be bothered with the sure-to-be-thankless task of looking them up.

No, I was the one who talked about Popper's logical arguments. You then avoided discussing them, and talked about some other complaints you had with his piece. I then gave you an example of one of them: the infinite regress of definitions. You then claimed that this has nothing to do with Rand. Well, we can get to that in a moment, but might I first extract from you whether you think this particular argument of Popper's is a fallacy or not - and if so, why? Well I can't really win now, can I, with this. On the one hand I have Phil Coates complaining I'm clogging up the board with responses, on the other you're complaining that I don't answer every trivial little question. However, I will nonetheless try. Here is an example of Popper admitting error (Objective Knowledge Chapter 2 note) my book happens to fall open at: "I am indebted to John Watkins who has read through an earlier version of the essay and who pointed out to me a serious error, which fortunately proved not to be relevant to my main argument. David Miller has...repeatedly saved me not only from at least three similar errors, but also from countless minor muddles of matter and style." I am sure there are plenty of other places Popper says he was confused and/or mistake about this or that, but I frankly don't have time to read through all of Popper, which is considerable, to extract such thrilling confessions for your benefit. Perhaps I will take a look at Unended Quest tonight and a few others if I have time. And of course, as far as him admitting he "didn't understand the implications of his theories" goes, as a matter of fact that is an inevitable consequence of Popper's own theory of objective knowledge - that our theories stand outside ourselves as partly independent creations, and thus contain implications that we cannot foresee. If you knew as much about his theories as you claim you would surely know that. So, as such I doubt that it will take me very long to find a quote to that effect when I get a moment. So much for that. And of course you've evaded plenty of questions yourself - like this one. Now, moving to this: This is more childishness. As I said early on, I know from people who actually worked with the man as to what a deeply unpleasant fellow he could be. I've given important examples of where Popper was shown to deeply and profoundly wrong, and further I've more said kind things about the very people who shot him down - Bartley and Miller. The fact that you would even suggest a Randroid might say equivalent things about Rand - that a Randroid might call Rand deeply unpleasant, or that some of her most famous and dearly held theories are wrong - just shows how you are now reduced to saying just about something - anything, no matter how witless and spurious - to try to score a point. Sit down man, you're a bloody tragedy. Edit: Oh, and just when I'd written you off, you go out of polemical mode and write something interesting and intelligent. It goes to show you never can tell...;-)

Do you agree that Rand thought is was vitally important to first and foremost precisely define your terms - that, supposedly, if you did not start from this secure foundation, all your subsequent knowledge must be erroneous? Nope. I don't agree that this was Rand's position. So much for the rest of your argument. Ghs Flat denial usually signals its it's agree-to-disagree time. Looks like I won't be thrilling the Critical Rationalism world with your exposition of Popper's logical errors in Chapter 11 then after all, despite the fact that your claim it is "very weak" and "one of the worst things Popper ever wrote". Pity. But then I somehow I kinda suspected I wouldn't be.

Nowhere does Miller argue that Popper was an "accidental skeptic." You are getting so all turned around in this it's just not funny. Yes, Rand defended certainty. But I suggest the means she adopted, "contextual certainty" accidentally undermines her goal. So you continually wheeling out the fact that Rand's intention was to defend certainty is just as continually beside the point. I'm not sure I even follow why you now think I'm saying Miller's saying Popper's an "accidental skeptic"! Perhaps you are making some convoluted point of your own, perhaps you're just misreading again, who knows and increasingly, who cares!

Do you agree that Rand thought is was vitally important to first and foremost precisely define your terms - that, supposedly, if you did not start from this secure foundation, all your subsequent knowledge must be erroneous? One of Popper's key arguments is that while Rand and many others believed this, unfortunately it logically entails an infinite regress of definitions - one analogous to the infinite regress of statements Aristotle was well aware of. This has the effect of unintentionally ham-stringing discussion with what are, in effect, eternal preliminaries, and is responsible for what he sees as the Scholastic turn into pedantry and irrelevance. It results in "always sharpening one's pencil, but never writing anything." We might discuss what the consequences might be of adopting this doctrine for Objectivism a little later, but for the time being, if you think Popper's logic is fallacious can you explain how so?

I would agree the exchange between GHS and I is well into unproductive territory. However to try and get some kind of closure, I've given him as clear and direct a shot at destroying my (and Popper's) line of argument as I can. He's also claiming this is a particular field of expertise of his, so I can hardly see how I can make it easier for him to wrap it all up once and for all.

Yes, I did notice that you were discussing Bacon's ideas. No, I did not misunderstand what you wrote. However I will apologise anyway, specifically for calling it a "dire, Rand-lite caricature". That was unfair of me, and I regretted it once I wrote it. Thanks for the opportunity to apologise. My reply to you is simple, and rather like your comment to me about Bacon: if "contextual certainty" means Rand isn't a skeptic, then neither are Critical Rationalists! This is an evasion, not a reply. You have simply ignored the points I made about the distinction, both theoretical and historical, between fallibilism and skepticism. (Don't you just love the pretentious label "Critical Rationalists"? This stands in contrast to what? -- uncritical rationalists?) Even so, it does not follow that "if 'contextual certainty' means Rand isn't a skeptic, then neither are Critical Rationalists!" Are you saying that Popper had a theory of contextual certainty? If so, where does this appear? In an earlier post where you mentioned Popper's skepticism, you linked an article by the Popperian David Miller to support your claim. And as I pointed out in an earlier post, Rand clearly does not meet Miller's conception of a skeptic, viz: I concluded: Rand defended the kind of "justificationism" that Popper rejected. The differences between them are substantial, though I will concede that Popper employed term "justification" in an idiosyncratic and highly misleading manner, so some of the differences may not be as serious as they first appear. (It's a good thing that Popper didn't do the same thing with the word "selfishness," or you would be on him like a fly on shit.) I have read all (or nearly all) of Popper's major works, and I never pegged him as a "skeptic." Rather, I viewed him as a very confused contextualist who did not understand the historical development of his own approach (as illustrated by his sloppy and inaccurate rendering of Bacon.) But Miller knows more about Popper than I do, so I will defer to his judgment, at least until I reread some pertinent material by Popper. So, yes, Popper may be a skeptic, but, no, Rand was not. I am glad that after you have consulted David Miller, you and I can agree on what "skeptic" means. So now, what part of "accidental" are you not getting??? No doubt this is due to your incredible ignorance of the history of philosophy etc etc etc....It is quite impossible that you might have there an interesting or original point of view!...;-)

I pull this quote out because I admit I am increasingly confused. Are you being facetious here, or do you really not know why Critical Rationalism is so named? What it stands in contrast to? If this is intended to be a bad parody of me, then you will note I at least give you the benefit of the doubt, rather than simply leaping to the assumption that you don't know what you're talking about...;-)

Oh, you're appealing to the hapless Gardner already (eyes rolled). Wot, no Nick Dykes? Or maybe that's the ace up your sleeve. LOL. Not a very promising start. But now perhaps I've clarified how and where I'm using Popper to critique Rand, you could channel your energies in the right direction.

Isn't this really rather childish? Why would you bother put all that time and energy into writing a bad parody of me? I can do that myself for free...;-) Actually, what I suggested here was this: "Popper's arguments against the Aristotelian method, in that chapter and its lengthy notes, are primarily logical.... Just explain where his logic goes awry, and I'll take you seriously." I then wrote: "But far from arguing over the meaning of words, which is boring, I am suddenly getting interested in your criticism of Popper's criticism. It would really rock a few CR forums if Popper turned out to be wrong on this particular dogma!...Destroy his arguments effectively and I will be only too happy to push your critique out to the Critical Rationalist community." Now, I was presenting you here with a clear, straight shot at one of the main roots of my criticism of Rand - her seeming adoption of Aristotelian methodological essentialism, and its at first quite plausible prejudice about the vital importance of precisely defining words (I have basically just applied the relevant part Popper's logical critique to Objectivism - minus his attack on intuitionism, obviously). All you have to do is take the key logical arguments from that essay - you should know what they are, as you claim you taught this chapter and know all about what is wrong with it - and demonstrate why they are fallacies. (Of course, one of the main reasons Popper's criticism is so effective is that he applies Aristotle more consistently than Aristotle does...) Furthermore, if your demonstration is successful, you would have publicly smashed to the ground one of my favourite hypotheses to the resounding applause of this particular forum at least...;-) But far more than that you will have done major damage to one of Popper's most enduring dogmas. In which case, in the spirit of open criticism, I once again offer to send your refutations to some of my contacts in the Critical Rationalism community - I assure you this will create quite a bit of a ripple of interest if they are any good. I've looked at your remarks above, which have not yet addressed this. But I'm sure you're planning to do so. So now you have my full attention.

Hi Ellen, As I mentioned a few posts back, this seems to create the same problem all over again as to the status of non-scientific knowledge. It's a bit back-to-square-one. Which is why I think you should just go all the way with it...;-)

There is no doubt that Popper was sometimes very confused, and often didn't understand the full implications of his own theories. He even said so himself sometimes, so this is hardly a very cutting criticism or something a typical Popper fan is unlikely to acknowledge. Funnily enough, I don't remember Rand making too many remarks of this type however. And I wish I could say the same thing about a typical Rand fan. As I'm about to get a taste of the quality of your Popper criticism, we'll soon see if a Three Worlds thread is going to be a waste of both of our times or not.