dan_edge

Angie, As long as we’re outside of the Ivory Tower for the moment, I’ll make a deal with you. If it is determined that targeting civilians would be an effective tactic in the war against Islamism, and the US decides to do it, then I have to join the military and help. But if it is determined that targeting civilians would be an effective tactic in the war against Islamism, and the US decides *not* to do it, then you have to help bury all of the additional US soldiers and civilians who will die because we don’t have the moral confidence to wage Total War. And while you’re doing that, explain to their families that they died for a good cause, because civilians in the aggressor nation were allowed to live for their sacrifice. Before agreeing to this deal, you may want to “watch some footage of actual [terrorist attacks on the US and Israel] where there are visuals of kids, babies, etc., [being slaughtered by Islamic terrorists] and visualize yourself ACTUALLY being there and then ask yourself” if you can deal with the consequences of your decision. YES or NO? --Dan Edge

Angie, Your post didn’t actually contain a question, so I’ll have to guess at what your “YES or NO” question actually is. Here’s what I think you’re asking: “*If* slaughtering children at random in an enemy country were an effective military tactic for defeating an aggressor nation, and *if* doing so would be the best way to preserve the long term freedom of my country, *then* would I, personally, be willing to join the military and participate in the slaughter?” Phrased this way, my short answer would be "yes," but the question is rationalistic and wrongheaded from several angles. First off, there is no evidence that randomly slaughtering children is an effective military tactic. You may as well have asked "If it were necessary to brutally rape vegetables in the enemy country in order to acheive victory, then would you do it?" Well, yes, but the burden of proof lies with he who proposes such a tactic. The military effectiveness of targeting civilian populations and infrastructure is well documented throughout history. It's not always the best tactic to use, but it shouldn't be taken off the table either. Note that your emotionalist method of argumentation closely resembles that of the liberal preaching welfare. "But what about the children!?! Would you, personally, be willing to walk by a poor, starving child on the street and let him die? You don't hate children, do you? Just answer YES or NO!" You haven't argued at all against the principle I have offered, namely that a defending nation has a right to do anything it must to defeat an agressor nation. Nor have you argued that targeting civilians is an ineffective military tactic. In fact, you haven't dealt with my arguments at all. Your response has been to repeat the "But what about the children!" refrain. I answered your question more fully on the SOLO website. Here is a copy of my answer: The specific targeting of pre-schools would certainly be immoral and counter-productive, but not for the reasons [some] are offering. It's not wrong to bomb toddlers because we would be "violating their rights." We are no longer under any obligation to respect their rights from the moment their government attacks us. It would be wrong because it would have no military function, and would actually be counter-productive. Toddlers do not contribute to the war effort, and specifically targeting them would not frighten an enemy into submission, but more likely would encourage them to fight until the last man. My operating principle is: A defending nation has the right to do anything and everything it must to defend its citizens against attacks of an enemy aggressor nation. If one operates off of this principle, he rules out the wanton slaughter of innocents. Any decision to target enemy civilians ought to be made on the basis of military effectiveness. It must contribute to ending the war. Torturing toddlers and bombing elementary schools and raping pets and (whatever other crazy things you want to rationalistically fantasize about) are *not effective tactics for getting an enemy to stop attacking*. Brooke and Epstein made this point in their "Just War Theory" article: "If it is possible to isolate innocent individuals—such as dissidents, freedom fighters, and children—without military cost, they should not be killed; it is unjust and against one’s rational self-interest to senselessly kill the innocent; it is good to have more rational, pro-America people in the world. Rational, selfish soldiers do not desire mindless destruction of anyone, let alone innocents; they are willing to kill only because they desire freedom and realize that it requires using force against those who initiate force. Insofar as the innocents cannot be isolated in the achievement of our military objectives, however, sparing their lives means sacrificing our own; and although the loss of their lives is unfortunate, we should kill them without hesitation." I agree. --Dan Edge

My god-given name is, in fact, Daniel Edge. "Edge" is an English name, I think, though I'm unsure of the origin. --Dan Edge

Dennis, I appreciate your honesty and I think your view of the issue is 100% correct. You explain the concept better than I do, in many ways. It's good to see that I have at least one ally, even while I foray into enemy territory MSK, I'm still waiting for orders from above before I will be cleared to answer your questions. Biddle doesn't work directly for the OAC, but he is the commander of the division that Diana Hsieh is in, and she's in the OGC, so she's funtioning as my tentative direct supervisor for now. But she's a busy lady, and there's a lot of paper work to do when obtaining permission to engage with official enemies of the Evil ARI Empire. I was able to liason with former covert operative Michelle Cohen and 2-Star general Andy Bernstein yesterday at the Hero's Hike in New York, so hopefully that will expidite the process. The proper paper work is essential, because as you know the OAC does a full inquiry about one's Objecti-sect sympathies before offering scholarships, and any breach in protocal is grounds for rescinding the scholarship. Huzzah! --Dan Edge

To answer this question is a double edged sword. It's set up in a way to trap the one's responding. For one, there needs to be more context; the question needs to be broken down. This is similar to a compound question. Two questions posed as one question. No matter which way you answer it, it will only lead to confusion and misunderstandings. ... I'm wholeheartedly against targeting unarmed civilians, people that are innocent. These people may be against the war but are trapped in whatever country they are in. Context is everything. ... If the war has progressed to the point where our country, our land was on the verge of being invaded, meaning the other country on our territory and has brought the war to our own backyard--then yes, our long term freedom is definitely threatened and immediate action is needed, then bomb the hell out of the country, strategically bombing whatever they can, do what is necessary to deflect the impending invasion onto our soil. ... Angie, The question is not at all tricky; it’s meant to point out the fact that attacking non-combatants in war is not inherently immoral. What’s immoral and altruistic is refusing to use certain tactics in all contexts, even if they are effective is saving American lives. Attacking the enemy civilian population is a legitimate military tactic. The determining factor of whether or not it is a moral tactic to use is whether or not it is effective in ending a war. My point is that we can’t let our emotions run away with us and proclaim that killing civilians is always evil and that anyone who advocates it is an irrational advocate of genocide. If you disagree with Biddle that now is not the time to use this particular tactic, that it wouldn’t be effective in ending the war for this or that reason, then that is a legitimate argument. But to argue that Biddle is wrong automatically because he advocates targeting civilians is not legitimate. To argue that Biddle is a genocidal baby-killer for his view is emotionalism run rampant. Incidentally, when we dropped the bomb on Japan near at the end of WWII, the United States was certainly *not* “on the verge of being invaded.” By the standard you set, we should not have dropped the bomb. If we had invaded the island of Japan, many more American lives would be lost, but then we wouldn’t have had to kill all those civilians. If we had settled for a truce with Japan, something less than unconditional surrender, then we wouldn’t’ have had to kill all those civilians. So why did we do it, and why was it so effective? This is another question you ought to ask your self, and one that that Branden, MSK, Pross, and others ought to be asking themselves. One last point that the ARI speakers have made strongly, and that I agree with whole-heartedly: there can be no “proportionality” between individuals in an enemy aggressor nation and individuals in a free, defending nation. There is no calculus for how many Americans must die before it is appropriate to attack Iranian civilians. There is no rule for how many of theirs we can kill for each one of ours they kill. The only moral foundation for the calculus of war is this: A defending nation has the right to do anything and everything it must to defend its citizens against attacks of an enemy aggressor nation. This is the principle that my “trick” question brings to light. The question is only tricky to those who do not grasp the principle. --Dan Edge

You stated earlier: "I am—and always will be—against the specific targeting of unarmed citizens, women and children and educational establishments. Or do I have this wrong? If that is what is being proposed at the end of the day, count me out." When the US dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they were specifically targeting the civilian population. Those cities were not important military targets. The message that the US was trying to get across to Japan was that, if they did not surrender unconditionally, we would kill every last man woman and child on their island until they did. The message was received, and the war ended. Note that even though the Japanese were indoctrinated with the same suicidal mentality as the Islamists, there were no guerilla attacks in Japan after they surrendered, as has been the case in Iraq. Why do you think this was the case? Though I do not necessarily agree with Biddle's recommendation of tactics (I am not a military expert), I do not in principle oppose it. I certainly do not think he is gleefully advocating genocide and the mass murder of children, as Branden says. My earlier question was intended as a challenge, and you still haven't answered it. --Dan Edge

MSK, "Any more questions?" Yes. 1. In what context is it appropriate to specifically target civilians in war? 2. What is the essential difference between Shinto Japan during WWII and Islamic Iran present day? 3. Related question: Why do you believe that it was ethical to endorse attacks on Japanese civilians during WWII, but that one is advocating genocide to endorse the same tactics now against Iran? 4. Another related question: Under what circumstances would you advocate attacking the civilian population in Iran? 5. In the context of WWII Japan, would you have viciously denounced one who called for the bombing of Shinto temples and schools where soldiers were indoctrinated with the "kamikaze" suicide-loving mentality? 6. If “yes,” then why do you think it was ethical to destroy two large cities that did not have military significance, but is was not ethical to specifically target the Shinto schools? (To be clear, Biddle specified that he endorses bombing of massadrahs, which are universities, not elementary schools). --Dan Edge

Pross, "A question: what historical precedent would you cite where the mass killing of unarmed citizens—women and children included—would you call as being most “effective”?" The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the firebombing of Dresden, and Sherman's march through the South during the Civil War are good examples that have been cited recently. But that's not even the point here. The question is not whether or not you believe targeting civilians (to any degree) is an effective tactic in this or that context. The question is whether or not you would support it if were demonstrated to you that it *is* effective in a particular context. You still didn't answer the question. --Dan Edge

There was a question contained in my last post that I would like to see addressed by MSK, Pross, Engle, Branden, and those who share their views: *If* targeting civilians were the best way to end a war quickly and cheaply, and *if* doing so were the best way to preserve the long term freedom of our country's citizens, *then* would you support it? Yes or no? This is a question to stand up and be counted for. I'm guessing that MSK, Pross, Engle, and Branden would all answer "no" to this question. Or more likely not give a straight answer at all. As would most Libertarians and most of the TOC crowd. The ARI speakers are the only ones with the moral courage to take the proper stance on this issue. I am open to the argument that targeting civilians is not an effective military tactic in some specific contexts. I am not open to the argument that there are certain tactics we should take off the table in all contexts, in principle, even if they are the most effective means to protect *our* civilians. MSK, You say you do not count me among the lepers, but over and over you argue that anyone who takes my view is an advocate of genocide, takes pleasure in the deaths of little children, etc. This is exactly the kind of hostile, passive-aggressive method of argumentation that you have been chided for so often on other websites. I am not one of the "angry, militant" ARIans you hate so much, but I make no pretense about the fact that when I post here, I am in enemy territory. --Dan Edge

NOTES FROM A LEPER Rights are moral principles that define man's needs in a social context. A government's function is to protect the rights of its own citizens, not the citizens of other countries, and certainly not the citizens of violent dictatorships. We form a government to fulfill *our* needs (for freedom), and our nation's policies ought to function in accordance with those needs. In a domestic capacity, these needs are best served by applying the initiation of force principle through the police and court systems. The government acts to to punish or remove from society those individuals who initiate force. Since protecting the freedom of our nation's citizens is paramount, great care is taken to ensure that innocent civilians aren't significantly affected by crime. The court system helps protect the innocent from accidental prosecution. Police make efforts not to hurt bystanders when making arrests. The military doesn't bomb a city into rubble to kill a single criminal. Again, all this is done because, in a rational society based on a recognition of individual rights, *protecting the freedom of our nation's citizens is paramount.* One can apply the same principle to the context of a war. Every effort ought to be taken to protect the rights of the civilians in the home country. This means that the government ought to do whatever is necessary to defend the freedom of its citizens for the longterm, making every effort to ensure that innocent civilians (of the home country) are not significantly affected by (international) crime. But in this context, it is not necessary to make individual arrests, place individuals on trial, and make pinpoint attacks on specific targets. This is the absolute worst way to fight a war, if a nation is primarily concerned with the needs of its own citizens. Regarding how the principle of rights applies to international policy and the ethics of war, that's as far as one needs to go. Rights theory dictates the we *need* our government to defend our freedom in every way possible. When determining the morality of a particular action in war, one must only ask the question: Will this action best preserve the longterm freedom of the defending nation's citizens? If the answer is "yes," then the action is morally obligatory. Everything else is a question of military tactics. Those of you who oppose the targeting of civilians in war must ask yourselves this question: *If* targeting civilians were the best way to end a war quickly and cheaply, and *if* doing so were the best way to preserve the long term freedom of our country's citizens, *then* would you support it? If your answer is "yes," and your argument is only that targeting civilians is not an effective military tactic, then I refer you to Dr. Lewis's "Sherman" article, or to the defeat of the Japanese in WWII, or a myriad of other military examples throughout history. Based on my limited understanding of military tactics, targeting civilian populations can be *very* effective in certain contexts. If your answer is "no," then we have a fundamental disagreement. If the principle of individual rights requires that a nation frustrate the needs of its own citizens in order to protect those outside its borders, then I don't know what you're talking about when you say "rights." You've gone into another realm, the World of the Forms maybe, but you're certainly no longer talking about a philosophy for living on earth. A few ancillary issues: I would like to briefly address the question of whether or not non-combatants are morally responsible for the actions of their government. I say briefly, because my position is simple: it doesn't matter. Whether or not the civilians we target are morally guilty has no bearing on our right to target them. The question is not: "are they morally innocent?" but: "would targeting them be an effective tactic in protecting *our* morally innocent population?" If the answer to the latter question is "yes," then we have every right to target them. One last point on the effectiveness of targeting civilians: No matter whether or not civilians in an enemy country sanction the actions of their government, they fuel their country's war machine simply by living and working there. They continue to produce food, cars, fuel, and other things that are used by the enemy. And they continue to provide funds for the enemy government in the form of taxes. An enemy that is bolstered by the unfettered production of its populous is much more difficult to defeat, and has much less incentive to surrender. --Dan Edge

Cal, RE Newton's Laws: I wrote that Newton's Laws will always be true provided his context of knowledge when he discovered them. Einstein did not contradict the statement "within Newton's context of knowledge, his Laws always hold true." Remember, Objectivism holds that *all* statements made by a human being imply the preamble "within my context of knowledge." Einstein had access to and a comprehension of higher mathematics and better technology. He had a broader context. RE Concepts: Concepts do not refer to *knowledge* of entities, they refer to the entities themselves. I think this point is critical to our disagreement, but I can't tink of a good way to explain it right now. Maybe later. RE (2+2=4): I propose a thought exercise. What are the definition and referents of the concept "two?" What are the definition of referents of the concept "equals?" To what *precisely* do these concepts refer to in reality? In answering these questions, one must conclude that these concepts, like all others, are based on an individual's contextual understanding of the world, because all concepts are formed and understood contextually. --Dan Edge

One must keep in mind that Peikoff's Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy (A-S-D) is entirely based on ideas presented in Intro to Objectivist Epistemology (ITOE). A thourough, technical understanding of ITOE is critical in understanding Peikoff's essay. A-S-D is completely consistent with ITOE, and a critique of the former implies a critique of the latter. I consider this matter so important because Cal's essay was not just an attack on Peikoff, but an attack on Rand and the foundation of Objectivist principle. Cal writes: >>This [the open ended nature of concepts] is indeed a crucial part of his argument, as there otherwise would be always room for doubt, which is incompatible with an analytic deduction. This is the most important part of Cal's essay, the source of his misinterpretation of Objectivist Epistemology. A clearer presentation of the nature of truth and doubt is in order. Contrary to popular misconception, Objectivism does not accept the correspondence theory of truth. The correspondence theory states that proposition 'X' is true if it is always true, regardless of context. I call this the "omniscient standard" of truth. If one accepts this standard, then truth and certainty are impossible to attain, because man's knowledge is always contextual. Rand's revolutionary idea is that one can define truth in absolute terms within a specified context of knowledge. Truth is the recognition of a relationship between perceptions and concepts within one's context of knowledge. This is why the open-ended nature of concepts is so critical. For example, Newton's Law of Motion were true when he discovered them, and will always be true, given his context of knowledge. Einstein did not contradict Newton, he merely added to the body of knowledge subsumed under the same concepts. Understanding Einsteinian Physics would be impossible without first grasping Newtonian Physics. Now, imagine if we did not preserve an open-ended method of using concepts. Einstein could not have assumed that Newton's Laws dealt with the same category of referents that he was dealing with hundreds of years later. Einstein would have had to start over from the beginning. Concepts refer to the same category of referents no matter how much we know about the nature of those referents. This allows for an ever-expanding body of knowledge with regard to a specific set of entities. Now, to state that concepts refer to all characteristics of an entity, including those not yet discovered, does not imply an omniscient standard of truth. Whenever we make a statement about an entity, the ever-present preamble remains: "Within the context of my knowledge, 'X' is true." Using concepts as open-ended, we attach all sorts of ideas and knowledge to any given concept. Not all of this information will be included in the definition, because the function of definitions is not to present all the known information about a concept. A definition only states the epistemologically essential characteristics of a concept that separate it from other concepts. It is a handy organizational tool for those with a limited capacity for focal awareness. (To be clear, Peikoff never wrote nor implied, as Cal suggests, that a concept is interchangeable with its definition.) So, we have: 1) a concept which refers to a specified set of entities (or characteristics of entities, actions of entities, etc.), 2) a definition for this concept which distinguishes it from other concepts, and 3) a body of knowledge related to that concept. None of these things should be confused or equated with the other. Now, let us return to the "ice" example. The fact that ice floats in water is not contained in the definition of "ice," but it is factual, evidence-based information about ice related to the concept. Before I read Cal's essay, I did not know that there were forms of solid water that didn't float, and I had no evidence contradicting the statement "ice floats in water." Therefore, I would be justified in making the statement: "Within the context of my knowledge, ice floats in water." Were I to assert otherwise, I would be contradicting my current understanding of the concept "ice." Now, since Cal has educated me further about ice, and has informed me that not all ice floats, I must integrate this information with the rest of my knowledge. The additional evidence with which Cal has provided me does not contradict my former statement "Within my context of knowledge, ice floats" because my context was narrower at that time. If I refused to integrate this new information into my understanding of ice, then I would be contradicting myself, but not before. Also, note that I have maintained an open-ended perspective on the nature of concepts. Just because I have learned that some ice sinks does not mean that I was not subsuming sinking ice in my previous usage of the concept "ice". My use of the concept did include that form of ice, I was simply unaware of some characteristic of it. I can and will still apply everything else I know about ice to sinking ice, excluding the fact that it sinks. For instance, I can still assume that it is made up of water, H2O, it would nourish my body, etc. (Though, to some degree I would need to investigate the reason why this form of ice floats before I could confidently apply all the other things I know about ice to this new form.) One more note about definitions: they can not be formed arbitrarily, as Cal states. Again, a definition describes the epistemologically essential characteristics of a concept that separate it from all other concepts. We would not define "man" as the "blue's playing animal," even though men are the only entities that play the blues. The fact that man plays the blues does not give us clear, concise, essential information about man that separates him from other animals. If we formed concepts this way, we could never keep our shit straight for the long term. Read the "definitions" chapter in ITOE for more information. In fact, Cal, I *highly* recommend that you read ITOE (or re-read it) with a special focus on the nature of definitions and the open-ended nature of concepts. I think you will find that each trip through the ITOE is a fruitful one, especially if you are focused on something specific. Thanks for reading, --Dan Edge