The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Actually it is an incorrect definition and you make it a straw man.

No, there is nothing incorrect in that definition.

Dragonfly,.

There certainly is according to the Objectiviest method of definition.

But let's take your standard at face value. According to you, God exists by definition. Correct?

Here is the same methodology.

"A unicorn is a horse with a horn on its forehead."

"God is the spirit that created the universe."

Since you are positing that observed existence is not fundamental to a definition, I have no idea how you intend to distinguish between real and unreal.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

But let's take your standard at face value. According to you, God exists by definition. Correct?

Watch out for equivocation. Something can exist as an abstract concept or as an entity in reality. The concept "God" certainly exists and can be defined, but that doesn't necessarily imply that "God" exists in reality. "Nothing" also exists as a concept, but does that imply that "nothing exists"?

Here is the same methodology.

"A unicorn is a horse with a horn on its forehead."

"God is the spirit that created the universe."

Since you are positing that observed existence is not fundamental to a definition, I have no idea how you intend to distinguish between real and unreal.

Simply by talking about the thing, discussing the evidence for or against its reality. We can define the Higgs-boson. Does it exist? We don't know yet. In 1930 Pauli proposed for theoretical reasons the existence of a electrically neutral particle, zero or near-zero mass and spin 1/2, later called the neutrino, that was undetected at the time. So it was defined, but it was unknown whether it really existed. In 1956 the neutrino was experimentally detected and since then known to exist. So what's really the problem?

[Philip Coates]

Subject: Is there always one best definition? How is it made and defended? Why and when is it mandated?

Phil's first rule of definition: In identifying a thing's essence, one should use as a touchstone Aristotle's four causes (explanations, actually). If one's context of knowledge is such that one knows these or some of them, it is highly likely that they (or some of them) will be a mandatory part of the definition.

Phil's second rule of definition: Definitions should be useful. In a technical context, one might use a longer, more detailed definition. It could run much longer than a paragraph. In an everyday or casual context, one might use something which is a short sentence or phrase. One purpose of definitions is to distinguish from other objects of thought. And in some contexts, less is needed to distinguish because there are fewer objects of thought to be confused with.

Phil's third rule of definition: Even within one context (e.g., technical or everyday), it is sometimes possible for one to state a valid definition in more than one way. Stressing certain essential characteristics more in one than in another. But if one is more essential than the others, that is to be preferred.

Phil's fourth rule of definition [this may overlap with Rand's rules; I would have to check]: Finding the most essential characteristic can be tricky and can validly be arguable. Especially in the case of a complex phenomenon. Essentiality can be assessed in several ways: In addition to Aristotle's causes, one must consider explanatory power in other ways. Brevity is a virtue in definition, but longer can often be more precise or more full. There is often a tradeoff.

Phil's fifth rule of definition: Sometimes there is one best objective definition, either at one cognitive stage of development or in the fullness of human knowledge [e.g., man is the rational animal]. But, based on the above four rules or principles, it cannot yet be said with certainty that this is always the case.

Phil's sixth rule of definition: Definitions are metaphysical: They are necessary to distinguish between things which are actually out there in the world. Definitions are epistemological: They are needed to distinguish and to organize what we have in our own head which, hopefully, pretty well corresponds to metaphysical reality, but will be less in content and extent and clarity than what is out there. In other words, they are rooted in both domains. This is related to why Rand says definitions are objective, a dual status. It follows that definition is a vital skill.

Phil's seventh rule of definition: Most of the definitions a human being uses are implicit, not fully conscious, not fully drawn out. We simply hold as clearly as we need to the ways in which x is different from y or in which x unifies and distinguishes all the z's that fall under it. In most of our life, that is all we need. Or have time for.

Phil's eighth rule of definition: On the other hand, because of the importance of understanding and organizing our mental content, when a definition is important in order to prevent confusion and to arrive at clarity, a definition should be made explicit. Written form, obviously, is best for this.

,,,,,,,,,,,,

[This is not a complete list of rules of definition: See a logic text, see ITOE, etc. These are simply some observations off the top of my head (and subject to revision) of some points that need to be added to (or drawn out more explicitly from) the usual discussion of what definitions are and how they need be formed in order to be proper ones.)

Edited August 10, 2010 by Philip Coates

[BaalChatzaf]

Is being imaginary part of the definition of a unicorn?

Ba'al Chatzaf

Yes, until such time as there is a unicorn to observe.

That would indicate being imaginary was an accidental property of the unicorn, not an essential property.

If being imaginary were an essential property of being a unicorn, then no non-imaginary unicorns could exist. A horse like critter with a horn in the middle of its forehead (if it physically existed) would not be a unicorn which is (by definition) imaginary.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Watch out for equivocation. Something can exist as an abstract concept or as an entity in reality.

Dragonfly,

I agree with this.

So what would make you think that a unicorn is anything other than an abstract concept--to the extent that you want to exclude this from the definition?

Do you believe in unicorns?

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Daniel, have we not long ago established that "contextual certainty" doesn't mean "certainty" by any customary meaning of "certainty"?

Intend to reply to your longer post - briefly, you will be relieved to know...;-) - when I get a moment.

However, let me put it this way for now.

Rand says her philosophy is certain, and that's one reason why you should adopt it rather than other philosophies. However, in the fine print it turns out that she doesn't mean "certain" in any customary meaning of the word.

So she uses it as a brand differentiator, but it's the philosophical equivalent of misleading advertising - simply, it's doubletalk. For example:

John says that his shop has fresh fish, and that's why you should shop there rather than at other fish shops. However, he doesn't mean "fresh" in any customary meaning of the word.

Sheila says her new drug is safe, and that's why you should buy it rather than other drugs. However, she doesn't mean "safe" in any customary meaning of the word.

Your lawyer says the contract she's drafted up for you to sign is legal. However, she doesn't mean "legal" in any customary meaning of the word.

And so forth. We wouldn't take it from a lawyer, a chemist, or even a fishmonger. Why should we consider it acceptable from a philosopher?

[Xray]

Question to Objectivists: what specifically do you consider as evidence supporting the claim that Objectivism is "based on reality and reason"?

It says it is and I've always taken it at its word.

But merely stating that Objectivism "says it is" based on reality and reason, and that one has always taken it at its word is not the same as providing evidence.

So by the very essential nature of the philosophy dogma must be excluded as not congruent with Objectivism, notwithstanding the abundance of dogmatic Objectivists.

Are there really no dogmatic elements included in O’ism?

Most people don't understand how simple the philosophy really is.

Objectivism is simple indeed.

I also have a lot of questions pertaining to so-called "objective" reality.

I'll start with a simple example: Imagine a human individual sniffing at a piece of paper and smelling nothing specific. When you let a dog sniff at the same paper, the dog will recognize smells a human nose can't detect. Whose perception of "reality" here is (more) "objective" - the human's or the dog's?

I don't understand your question. Dogs don't have a philosophy. "Objective reality" is merely reality rationally identified and understood.

I did not claim that dogs have a philosophy.

I wrote about a dog’s perception of “reality” differing from our perception.

So in the case of the piece of paper, one can’t say that there is 'objectively' no smell on it, for a dog’s nose can perceive smell where we can’t. “Something exists which one perceives” Rand said, imo implying that what we perceive (given that our senses work properly) is ‘objective reality’.

I wonder what Rand would have replied if asked whether a dog’s perception of smell is more “objective” than ours ...

That an argument has been "pointed out" as "fallacious" says nothing about whether it IS fallacious.

Your saying something is fallacious or not says nothing about whether it IS or IS NOT fallacious.

Correct. Which means that if person P claims his/her statement to be true, the burden of proof is on P. What is your point?

Xray: Indeed, to Rand, concept = category (subsuming multiple concretes).

Not always.

Rand’s own words: ITOE, p. 10:

"Every word we use with the exception of proper names is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e., that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind.".

If you think you have found passages in ITOE where Rand’s contradicts her own idea of concept “standing “for an unlimited number concretes of a certain kind", you can list them here.

Xray: Merlin, the issue was not about whether mucus can be called a material. It was about Rand's claim that every material exists only in the form of specific entities. She needed that idea (see ITOE, p. 16) to keep up her 'measurements ommitted' stuff with uncountables.

Merlin: Oh, do you deny that a drop of water or ocean of water is an entity? Do you deny that mucus is comprised of molecules and atoms, which are entities?

Rand did not have molecules and atoms in mind when she spoke of material existing only in the form of specific entities:

Materials exist only in the form of specific entities, such as a nugget of gold, a plank of wood, a drop or an ocean of water. (Rand, ITOE, p. 16).

She then goes on to explain that for the formation of the “concept” of a material, ['wood' for example], the “measurements” of the objects (= the “entities” consisting of the material like e. g. a “plank” of wood), are omitted.

Since the measurements of an entity in which a material can exist (like sugar in the form of a cube) or in which it is contained (like sugar contained in a bowl) are of no relevance in forming the concept of the material anyway, there is no need to introduce those entities as factors at all.

It’s as superfluous as pointing out that in order to fly, one doesn’t need to buy a railway ticket.

What’s more, the whole entity thing in that context is questionable in itself. What do you consider to be the “entity” of e. g. mucus or blood in a person’s body? .

Xray: She needed that idea (see ITOE, p. 16) to keep up her 'measurements ommitted' stuff with uncountables.

Hogwash. Her "measurements omitted" idea is not restricted to entities.

That exactly what I was saying: she tried to transfer her “measurement omitted” idea to all kinds of terms: countables, uncountables, abstract terms. Whether this worked is another question.

Like I've already said, her primary example, length, is not an entity. You are mangling Rand's words again. "Countable" and "uncountable" do not even appear in ITOE.

I didn’t claim anywhere that the terms "countable" and "uncountable" appear in ITOE.

I said that her definition of "concept" only works with countable concretes, like e. g. table.

A concept is the mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristics, with their particular measurements omitted. (Rand ITOE, p. 13 )

Try for example to apply this definition to an abstract term and you will see it does not work. If you think it does, feel to demonstrate it here with. e. g. “assumption”.

Edited August 11, 2010 by Xray

[Dragonfly]

Watch out for equivocation. Something can exist as an abstract concept or as an entity in reality.

So what would make you think that a unicorn is anything other than an abstract concept--to the extent that you want to exclude this from the definition?

I don't want to exclude it from the definition, you can always make a definition more detailed to narrow down the concept, but that doesn't make the simpler definition wrong.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Watch out for equivocation. Something can exist as an abstract concept or as an entity in reality.

So what would make you think that a unicorn is anything other than an abstract concept--to the extent that you want to exclude this from the definition?

I don't want to exclude it from the definition, you can always make a definition more detailed to narrow down the concept, but that doesn't make the simpler definition wrong.

Dragonfly,

Within the context of our knowledge and taking into account the historical sources of our knowledge of unicorns, it is wrong not to claim they are imaginary. Being made up as a myth is how it happened. In your way, we would have to say that Mickey Mouse should not be considered as not being a real mouse just because you want to leave the door open to the possibility. And you want to do that in the definition.

But new knowledge is able to be added in Objectivist concept formation. The door stays open in the concept and you change the definition to suit the new knowledge. You don't impose a definition on reality, like what you are proposing. (Actually, concepts can be expanded and made more detailed. New knowledge can be added both ways, broader and narrower. And the altered definition has to reflect that.)

But returning to your comment. It also applies to the concept, God. Right?

I don't mean the God who is an "abstract concept." I mean the old man in a flowing robe with a long beard. The concrete. Like the horse with a horn on its forehead. You want to make sure your definition does not exclude that God from possibly existing. Isn't that what you are saying?

Michael

[Xray]

Ellen:

IIRC, you mentioned in a recent post that "Larry" was the question-asker "Prof M." in one of (or in all?) the Q&A sessions. Is it possible for you to ask Larry if the Q&A section in ITOE accurately renders the questions he asked and the answers aswers he received? TIA for your help.

As best both of us recall -- we talked a lot at the time about what was going on in the Workshops -- what he asked and what she answered are as written, maybe with some grammar corrections, but not changes of meaning. There might have been more than is included in the book.

Obviously, in general, there was quite a bit more than is included in the book. Each Workshop was multiple hours. As Harry Binswanger says in his Preface, a full transcript would have run to triple the length.

Judging from other comments you've made, you have the book, so you can read the Preface, wherein the editing policy is described. I have no reason to think that anything was done with the text other than what Harry Binswanger says was done with it. I'm aware of the extreme suspicion attached to material edited under ARI auspices. But I think that Rand's answers would be found to be reliable reports of what she said.

As Harry indicates, he compressed some of the questions. However, I don't think he compressed the ones recorded which Larry asked. Larry jotted down his questions during the session and wrote out full versions afterward himself while he still remembered details. He wasn't happy with his wording on the main one, and said so back then.

Ellen

Thanks Ellen for answering my question. Putting together all this info, it seems that Rand's words in the "answer" sections have not been altered by the editors. I'll continue to use them as primary source then.

(The example Xray gave of two different meanings of "gravity" isn't pertinent to Rand's "contextually absolute.")

Why do you think it isn't?

In ITOE, p. 85, Rand wrote: "Definitions are "not changelessly absolute, but contextually absolute" (ITOE, p. 85)

The combination "contextually absolute" can be regarded as an oxymoron, since the essence of "absolute" is the absence of contextuality, and vice versa.

But since "absolute(ly)" can also be used rhetorically as emphasis ("the defense's lawyer's was absolutely ingenious"), I suppose Rand used "absolute" to stress the emphasis of "contextual". In case you disagree with my assessment here, please explain why.

To get back to your your point of disagreement:

From my post:

The contextuality of a term's usage (and hence its varying definitions depending on the context) rarely poses a problem in communication. Every competent speaker of the English language will know e. g. what is meant when the word gravity is used in the context of speaking about an object falling to ground, and what is meant by gravity when speaking about the 'gravity' of a crime.

Do you believe Rand discovered anything here that was really new?

When speaking of the "gravity" of a crime, the context in which the audiovisual symbol is used leaves no doubt as to what is meant.

So as for my example where I used the audiovisual symbol, the word "gravity" - if you would please provide a definition of the "concept" 'gravity' the audiovisual symbol refers to and also explain what exactly Rand would consider as "contextually absolute" in your definition.

All the ballyhoo Rand made about "concept" formation is about something very simple: forming classes and sub-classes. If she had used "class" instead of the more ambiguous term "concept", she would have created less confusion.

"A concept is the mental integration of of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristics, with their particular measurements omitted." (ITOE, p. 13)

So e. g. two or more units (possessing the same distinguishing characteristics) can be subsumed under e. g. the class "table". "Table" in turn is a subclass of "furniture". That's all there is to it. Such classifying is accomplished effortlessly in the course of learning one's native language.

Edited August 11, 2010 by Xray

[Xray]

Here's more evidence that Rand used concept as synonym for "class":

"Every word we use with the exception of proper names is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e., that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind." (Rand ITOE, p, 10)

So per Rand, EVERY word we use refers to a class.

Another thing Rand completely left out is more complex issues like phrases. Imagine the difficulties her approach of classifiyng single terms faces when it comes to analyzing phrases like e. g. "That's a pretty kettle of fish" ...

(Replying to Dragonfly):

But returning to your comment. It also applies to the concept, God. Right?

I don't mean the God who is an "abstract concept." I mean the old man in a flowing robe with a long beard. The concrete. Like the horse with a horn on its forehead. You want to make sure your definition does not exclude that God from possibly existing. Isn't that what you are saying?

Michael

Michael,

To conclude that a "definition" of this or that automatically implies the possibility of this or that 'existing' in reality would be a non-sequitur.

Santa Claus for example can be defined pretty precisely as well.

Edited August 11, 2010 by Xray

[Brant Gaede]

Here's more more evidence that Rand used concept as synonym for "class":

"Every word we use with the exception of proper names is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e., that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind." (Rand ITOE, p, 10)

So per Rand, EVERY word we use refers to a class.

Another thing Rand completely left out is more complex issues like phrases. Imagine the difficulties her approach of classifiyng single terms faces when it comes to analyzing phrases like e. g. "That's a pretty kettle of fish" ...

So she didn't adequately deal with modifiers, it seems, but those modifiers do belong with what is being modified.

What I want to know is when you have deconstructed ITOE and reconstructed it to be without errors, what are you going to use it for? (This is the same question I've been asking about ITOE as is.)

--Brant

Edited August 11, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[Brant Gaede]

Thank Galtness it doesn't matter in the least if Xray treats ITOE as edited by Peikoff and Binswanger as primary source material or not.

--Brant

primary source my sweltering posterior!

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

To conclude that a "definition" of this or that automatically implies the possibility of this or that 'existing' in reality would be a non-sequitur.

Santa Claus for example can be defined pretty precisely as well.

Xray,

Or, say, a unicorn?

Talk to Dragonfly about it.

This is his idea of definition, not mine.

I was merely extending his notion by way of example.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

Within the context of our knowledge and taking into account the historical sources of our knowledge of unicorns, it is wrong not to claim they are imaginary. Being made up as a myth is how it happened. In your way, we would have to say that Mickey Mouse should not be considered as not being a real mouse just because you want to leave the door open to the possibility. And you want to do that in the definition.

No, it is not wrong not to claim that they are imaginary, you only leave that question open. If a concept belongs to the set of only abstract concepts, it automatically belongs to the larger set of (only abstract concepts ∪ concepts of real entities). That doesn't mean that there must be real representations of that concept, the latter set may be the empty set. A concept defined by a narrow definition always belongs to a wider definition that encompasses the narrower definition. If the narrower definition is "correct", so is the wider definition. The narrower definition may be more useful as it gives more details, but a definition doesn't have to be exhaustive.

But new knowledge is able to be added in Objectivist concept formation. The door stays open in the concept and you change the definition to suit the new knowledge. You don't impose a definition on reality, like what you are proposing.

I do no such thing.

But returning to your comment. It also applies to the concept, God. Right?

I don't mean the God who is an "abstract concept." I mean the old man in a flowing robe with a long beard. The concrete. Like the horse with a horn on its forehead. You want to make sure your definition does not exclude that God from possibly existing. Isn't that what you are saying?

Not at all. It is not a question of one definition being correct and the other one being wrong, they're all correct, even if one may be more specific than the other one. "Less specific" is not the same as "incorrect", however.

[Ellen Stuttle]

Rand's "contextual certainly" comes down to being "scientific skepticism."

Research question interjection.

I shouldn't have said "Rand's" in that statement, since I don't think "contextual certainty" (oops, I'd misspelled it as well) was ever used by Rand. I think that's Peikoff later.

MSK or George (if George is still reading this thread), could one of you do a search on the CD-ROM for "contextual certainty" and "contextually certain" to see if either appears in Rand's own writing?

I think this question has come up before and was answered in the negative, but I'm not certain.

Ellen

[Dragonfly]

Rand's "contextual certainly" comes down to being "scientific skepticism."

Research question interjection.

I shouldn't have said "Rand's" in that statement, since I don't think "contextual certainty" (oops, I'd misspelled it as well) was ever used by Rand. I think that's Peikoff later.

Now you mention it, the phrase does have a distinctively Peikovian ring to it. It's also significant that in the AR Lexicon the entry for "certainty" is dominated by a Peikoff quote with two minor quotes from Rand herself (one of which doesn't even mention certainty!), which strongly suggests that they couldn't find much in Rand's writings about that subject. Another word that sounds much more Peikoff than Rand is "arbitrary", so I looked that also up in the Lexicon and Bingo! It surely starts with a large Peikoff quote (614 words) in which the word "arbitrary" can be found 16 times, followed by a small Rand quote (101 words, with only once "arbitrary").

BTW, it's rather funny that they've put Peikoff's texts in the Ayn Rand Lexicon. As far as I know Peikoff wasn't Rand and the book was not called The Objectivist Lexicon. Apparently Peikoff knows what Rand should have said.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

It is not a question of one definition being correct and the other one being wrong, they're all correct, even if one may be more specific than the other one.

Dragonfly,

Here we have a problem. What you are calling a definition in Objectivism is simply a general description.

Concept formation in Objectivism is hierarchical and starts from reality as the most fundamental and goes to the abstract. If something is born in the abstract and merely puts pieces of other reality together, sort of like the Frankenstein monster, say, a horse with a horn on the forehead, that is not a concept of a whole corresponding to a whole referent in reality. This part of the whole referent being born in the abstract is fundamental to the concept. A unicorn is something imagined, not something observed. The referent is imaginary.

Leaving out that part might describe one facet of a unicorn, but it does not define a unicorn in the hierarchical knowledge manner that definitions need to follow in Objectivism.

It is sort of like "defining" water as a wet substance. That describes water in a general way. it doesn't define it.

If I understand your last comment correctly (in Post 540), you would consider "an old man in a flowing robe with a long beard" as a "correct definition" of God, albeit "less specific." That seems like a stretch to me even according to your method of defining terms.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

Rand's "contextual certainly" comes down to being "scientific skepticism."

Research question interjection.

I shouldn't have said "Rand's" in that statement, since I don't think "contextual certainty" (oops, I'd misspelled it as well) was ever used by Rand. I think that's Peikoff later.

MSK or George (if George is still reading this thread), could one of you do a search on the CD-ROM for "contextual certainty" and "contextually certain" to see if either appears in Rand's own writing?

I think this question has come up before and was answered in the negative, but I'm not certain.

Ellen

I found no references by Rand on the CD-ROM where she uses "contextual" or "contextually" in regard to certainty. However, in ITOE (p. 47, 68, 85), she refers to "contextually absolute" definitions, e.g.: "Definitions are not changelessly absolute, but they are contextually absolute."

Rand also uses "contextually" in regard to essential characteristics: "Essential characteristics are determined contextually (p. 102)." And she speaks of concepts as being contextual: "all conceptualization is a contextual process" (p. 43). And: "Just as the process of concept-formation is contextual, so all definitions are contextual" (p. 85).

In other sources, Rands uses "contextual" in regard to "judgment," "cognition," and "values."

I first heard of "contextual certainty" in the late 1960s, while I was attending the University of Arizona. A friend gave me a set of detailed notes of Peikoff's course on Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge. (I don't recall if this was the exact title.") Those notes contained the same basic material that Peikoff later incorporated into OPAR. I therefore seriously doubt if the notion of contextual certainty was a Peikovian gloss. The idea is clearly implied in some of Rand's published comments, and I'm sure the ideas that Peikoff expressed in those early lectures had to pass muster with Rand.

I disagree that Rand's theory of contextual certainty amounts to "scientific skepticism." She uses her theory of knowledge to argue that science is open-ended and "progressive." No person can claim omniscience or infallibility, so there always is the possibility that later knowledge will require revisions of our current scientific theories. But this doesn't amount to skepticism.

Ghs

[James Heaps-Nelson]

Rand's "contextual certainly" comes down to being "scientific skepticism."

Research question interjection.

I shouldn't have said "Rand's" in that statement, since I don't think "contextual certainty" (oops, I'd misspelled it as well) was ever used by Rand. I think that's Peikoff later.

MSK or George (if George is still reading this thread), could one of you do a search on the CD-ROM for "contextual certainty" and "contextually certain" to see if either appears in Rand's own writing?

I think this question has come up before and was answered in the negative, but I'm not certain.

Ellen

I found no references by Rand on the CD-ROM where she uses "contextual" or "contextually" in regard to certainty. However, in ITOE (p. 47, 68, 85), she refers to "contextually absolute" definitions, e.g.: "Definitions are not changelessly absolute, but they are contextually absolute."

Rand also uses "contextually" in regard to essential characteristics: "Essential characteristics are determined contextually (p. 102)." And she speaks of concepts as being contextual: "all conceptualization is a contextual process" (p. 43). And: "Just as the process of concept-formation is contextual, so all definitions are contextual" (p. 85).

In other sources, Rands uses "contextual" in regard to "judgment," "cognition," and "values."

I first heard of "contextual certainty" in the late 1960s, while I was attending the University of Arizona. A friend gave me a set of detailed notes of Peikoff's course on Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge. (I don't recall if this was the exact title.") Those notes contained the same basic material that Peikoff later incorporated into OPAR. I therefore seriously doubt if the notion of contextual certainty was a Peikovian gloss. The idea is clearly implied in some of Rand's published comments, and I'm sure the ideas that Peikoff expressed in those early lectures had to pass muster with Rand.

I disagree that Rand's theory of contextual certainty amounts to "scientific skepticism." She uses her theory of knowledge to argue that science is open-ended and "progressive." No person can claim omniscience or infallibility, so there always is the possibility that later knowledge will require revisions of our current scientific theories. But this doesn't amount to skepticism.

Ghs

I've always found the "contextual certainty" formulation to be strange. Why not simply say: with the available data, conclusion X follows. There are things we can be quite certain of and there are physical systems whose behavior is most likely inherently unpredictable. To say we are "contextually certain" implies that it is a good thing to expect not to be surprised. Well, we can generalize based on experience until an exception presents itself.

Jim

[Ellen Stuttle]

George,

Thanks very much for doing the CD-ROM search.

I first heard of "contextual certainty" in the late 1960s, while I was attending the University of Arizona. A friend gave me a set of detailed notes of Peikoff's course on Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge. (I don't recall if this was the exact title.") Those notes contained the same basic material that Peikoff later incorporated into OPAR.

I think you have to be off by a good number of years in your dating. Peikoff didn't give any course on "Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge" in the late 1960s. [EDIT: Yes, Peikoff did. See my next post.] His first course specifically on Objectivism -- I always forget what it was titled -- was given I believe starting in 1976. I took part of that but couldn't attend all of it. I don't recall the term "contextual certainty" being used in the part I heard. There was a course which I think was called "Objectivism Through Induction" which was after AR's death.

I disagree that Rand's theory of contextual certainty amounts to "scientific skepticism." She uses her theory of knowledge to argue that science is open-ended and "progressive." No person can claim omniscience or infallibility, so there always is the possibility that later knowledge will require revisions of our current scientific theories. But this doesn't amount to skepticism.

Neither does "scientific skepticism" amount to skepticism about truth. Your two-sentence description I'd take as a good summary of "scientific skepticism." Or, as my husband expressed it in a conversation with Ed Hudgins -- topic, claims by global-warming alarmists that "the debate is over" -- "In science the debate is never over."

Ellen

Edited August 12, 2010 by Ellen Stuttle

[Ellen Stuttle]

ADDENDUM to my post next above.

I first heard of "contextual certainty" in the late 1960s, while I was attending the University of Arizona. A friend gave me a set of detailed notes of Peikoff's course on Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge. (I don't recall if this was the exact title.") Those notes contained the same basic material that Peikoff later incorporated into OPAR.

I think you have to be off by a good number of years in your dating. Peikoff didn't give any course on "Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge" in the late 1960s.

Possibly you're mixing up teachings on the difference between "epistemological" and "metaphysical" possibility with "contextual certainty." Peikoff did talk about the former (epistemological vs. metaphysical possibility) on occasions when AR was in the audience, possibly as early as Q&As in his history of philosophy courses. (I don't recall when was the first time I heard him talk about that, except that it had to be in the '70s and in a live-lecture setting, since I never heard any of his taped courses from before the split.)

I mixed up the issue of epistemological vs. metaphysical possibility with "contextual certainty" myself in an initial answer on a thread started here January 11, 2007, titled "Question for old-timers: Peikoff's view on certainty." Happening later to re-look at that thread, I noticed and corrected my goof, thus:

link

I happened to re-read this brief thread a couple nights ago, in connection with a question raised on William Scherk's blog about Rand's views of statistics. I don't know where my mind was the night I posted the response to Shayne -- half asleep I suppose. Leonard Peikoff indeed did analyze the "Could this airplane crash?" and similar examples in terms of "metaphysical" vs "epistemological" possibility, as Peter Reidy describes. Insofar as I recall wide awake he didn't, contrary to my report, bring in the idea of "contextual certainty" there. I'm not sure when the idea of "contextual certainty" began to be talked about.

Ellen

EDIT:

Looking further, I found a post by Roger Bissell which contradicts what I said about Peikoff's not teaching a course on "Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge" in the late 1960s. Roger says he did; I'll check for announcements in The Objectivist:

link

Peikoff first discussed "contextual certainty" in his course "Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge," which was delivered initially in the Fall of 1965 at the University of Denver, then in over 25 cities via tape transcription, under the auspices of the Nathaniel Branden Institute, from 1966 to 1968. He also discussed "the arbitrary" in these lectures. Actually, both ideas were discussed in lecture #8, on knowledge.

I did not hear these lectures, but I came into possession of two different sets of notes, and I compiled a side-by-side display of the two sets in one file, for study and as a check on the dependability of the notes.

[....]

EDIT TWO: Ok, there was such a course. Here's an announcement in the August 1966 The Objectivist:

The Objectivist

Volume 5, Number 8, August 1966

Objectivist Calendar

pg. 16

On Friday, October 7, Dr. Leonard Peikoff will deliver the opening lecture of a ten-lecture course being given for the first time in New York City: "Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge." (This course was offered at the University of Denver in the fall of 1965.) Time: 7:30 P.M. Place: Sheraton-Atlantic Hotel, 34th St. and Broadway. Visitor's admission: $3.50. For further details, contact NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE, 120 East 34th St., New York, N.Y. 10016.

Edited August 12, 2010 by Ellen Stuttle

[Daniel Barnes]

No person can claim omniscience or infallibility, so there always is the possibility that later knowledge will require revisions of our current scientific theories. But this doesn't amount to skepticism.

Popper, Miller, Bartley etc hold exactly this view.

They are indeed called skeptics - even absolute skeptics.

We can describe it simply as "We know p, but p may be false."

It seems odd to deny this amounts to skepticism.

Edited August 12, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Ellen Stuttle]

AND....ta-ta.

I found an official answer to a question on which there have been varying reports:

When did Leonard Peikoff return to New York City from Denver?

The Objectivist

Volume 5, Number 5, May 1966

Objectivist Calendar

pg. 16

Dr. Leonard Peikoff will leave the University of Denver in June; in September, he will assume the position of Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, in Brooklyn, New York.

There's also this announcement:

The Objectivist

Volume 5, Number 5, May 1966

Objectivist Calendar

pg. 16

On Thursday, June 30, NBI will begin a ten-lecture course on "Contemporary Philosophy," to be given by Dr. Leonard Peikoff in New York City. Time: 7:30 P.M. Place: Sheraton-Atlantic Hotel, 34th St. and Broadway. Visitor's admission: $3.50, payable at the door.

Ellen

Edited August 12, 2010 by Ellen Stuttle

[BaalChatzaf]

No person can claim omniscience or infallibility, so there always is the possibility that later knowledge will require revisions of our current scientific theories. But this doesn't amount to skepticism.

Popper, Miller, Bartley etc hold exactly this view.

They are indeed called skeptics - even absolute skeptics.

We can describe it simply as "We know p, but p may be false."

It seems odd to deny this amounts to skepticism.

Better still: We believe that p but p may turn out to be false.

Ba'al Chatzaf