The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics

[Ellen Stuttle]

But it is possible to learn words and not concepts. I can memorize a passage from a book on surgery but I would have little or no concept of what the surgery entails. If Objectivism insists that these are the same then you are going to have a great deal of trouble getting the majority of the population to understand you.

Sure it's possible to learn words and not concepts. Not only does Objectivism *not* insist these are the same, ITOE clearly distinguishes them. Words are labels for concepts, but they aren't the concepts.

If this is the case, what word to you use to represent the visual idea that words bring to mind when you read or hear them?

I wonder if you characteristically think visually. I generally don't have "visual idea" coming to mind when reading or hearing words. However, I've heard and read reports from people who say that they do.

Ellen

[Ellen Stuttle]

--Ellen [#1], in this kind of informal context, words and concepts are used as synonyms.

You mean *you're* using them as synonyms? If they're used thus in this context -- attempting to clarify "space," "time," "space-time" -- confusion is merely worsened.

Ellen

[merjet]

--Merlin [#6(ii)], this is simply an extension of the points I've made in reply to Baal and GSem. First, words can have different meanings. One needs to define (or at least have clearly in mind) EXACTLY which sense is being used in all of the words in both the subject and predicate of a proposition. That's what makes (or ought to make) all your porpositions or all the ones a thinker utters have an exact meaning. Second, once the context is clear (among all men, among basketball players), the term 'tall' is clear and correct or incorrect (or borderline). But that is not the kind of situation Francisco was talking about--see below.

Fine, but I didn't really need to learn that. Also, my context in post #336 was obviously broader than Francisco's at the moment. I plead guilty for taking it more broadly than what you believe he meant.

--Merlin [#6(i)], here's the exchange:

"I want to be prepared to claim the greatest virtue of all--that I was a man who made money."

"Any grafter can make money."

"James, you ought to discover some day that words have an exact meaning." [AS, Part I, Ch. V]

Francisco's first statement summarizes his earlier points when he discussed why he was studing mining and why he was studying electrical engineering and why he was studying philosophy, all so that he can be a better head of his company. And when he said he intends to raise the production of d'Anconia Copper by one hundred percent.

His first statement above is about "making money" in the sense of creating wealth: producing value, not stealing it. Words have an exact meaning is a simple reproach to James for twisting the -concept- by using it in the sense of theft.

No, "graft" does not mean "theft."

graft -- the act of taking advantage of one's position, esp. a political position, to gain money, property, etc. dishonestly (source)

You should learn to use words more exactly. There are other ways to "make money" as well. I bet you have experienced or at least heard about auto repair shops charging for and doing unnecessary repairs. And then there are those people who work at several mints and the Bureau of Engraving & Printing.

Edited August 1, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[BaalChatzaf]

But it is possible to learn words and not concepts. I can memorize a passage from a book on surgery but I would have little or no concept of what the surgery entails. If Objectivism insists that these are the same then you are going to have a great deal of trouble getting the majority of the population to understand you.

Sure it's possible to learn words and not concepts. Not only does Objectivism *not* insist these are the same, ITOE clearly distinguishes them. Words are labels for concepts, but they aren't the concepts.

It is rather ironic that you are telling a General Semanticist that the word is not the thing.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Brant Gaede]

Indeed, that is what he meant. However some words are inherently fuzzy (i.e. do not have an exact meaning). Give me an exact meaning for the word "tall" or "short". I bet you can't.

"Tall" is not "short" and "short" is not "tall."

--Brant

keep it simple

A circular definition is not definition at all. Try again.

Ba'al Chatzaf

A boy just wants to have fun!

--Brant

[Xray]

quoting Xray: Rand often made the mistake of presenting as "objective" definition what was in fact her personal association/connotation with a term (as e. g. with "sacrifice").

If physicists can redefine words, then why can't philosophers?

From a discussion between you and DF about the same topic on another thread:

Ghs: As for Rand supposedly being excused for using idiosyncratic definitions, do you excuse her? Have others on OL excused her? On the contrary, she has often been criticized for this practice, and I have been among the critics.

My problem with Rand is not that she uses her own definitions - everyone is free to give his own definitions - but her claim that these are the only true definitions, claiming that the arguments of people who don't use her definitions are therefore wrong.

Ghs,

Imagine someone had spoken to Rand about sacrificing the queen in a chess game as part of a strategy to win the game (= obtain the higher value) - this would of course go against her own ('only true') definition of "sacrifice", and going by her premise, the chess player would have been "wrong" in calling it a sacrifice.

If she had stated: "To me , sacrfice is ..." this would clearly mark it as her mere subjective connotation/association, but Rand claimed "objectivity". Here's the wrinkle.

Ye Gods!

Xray cracked open ITOE!

Now if she'll only read it, she'll find her questions answered in the text.

But hell... let's be grateful for one miracle at a time...

Michael

I have read ITOE, but don't recall (my memory may fail me) any passage which answers this question. Maybe you or any of the others I asked (George H. Smith, Ellen Stuttle, Philip Coates) can help and direct me to a page?

Here is the question again: In ITOE, p. 13 Rand states: "A concept is a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted."

So what are the "two or more units" of e. g. the concept "selfishness" (one of the Objectivist virtues)? And what "particular measurements" are "ommitted" in that concept?

Edited August 1, 2010 by Xray

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Xray,

If you actually have read ITOE (which your post shows clearly that you have not), then you would have read Chapters 3 and 4.

Thus you would have understood what I call Rand's epistemological "sleight of hand" where the determining characteristics of constituent concepts are treated as measurements and then omitted.

Then you would have understood what Rand meant by teleological measurements (ordinal, not cardinal, measurements).

And you would have understood that teleological measurements are usually made in complex contexts where there are many different relationships.

And you would have understood that goals and values (which are measured by teleological measurements, and the measurements later omitted in order to make wider abstractions) are represented by abstract principles in any moral code such as selfishness--and that such principles (which are also measured by teleological measurements) are some of the units integrated into the concept of a moral code like selfishness.

And you would have understood that any such principle can be traced down through the conceptual hierarchy until it gets to something quite concrete, like individual living human beings.

But since, judging from your comments, you haven't a clue about such things, I say you haven't read ITOE.

I suggest you get reading if you truly want to understand this stuff.

Michael

[merjet]

Thus you would have understood what I call Rand's epistemological "sleight of hand" where the determining characteristics of constituent concepts are treated as measurements and then omitted.

Oh, my. Such blasphemy!

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Merlin,

LOL...

I thought you, of all people, would enjoy that.

But Rand's teleological abracadabra is a drastic shift in the middle of the stream, no matter how you look at it.

Michael

[merjet]

But Rand's teleological abracadabra is a drastic shift in the middle of the stream, no matter how you look at it.

Then about midway through Chapter 4, Concepts of Consciousness she even abandons omitting ordinal or teleological measurements. About concepts pertaining to the products of psychological processes, such as knowledge, she says these concepts are formed by retaining their distinguishing characteristics and "omitting their content" or "omitting the particular fact(s) involved" (ITOE2, 35).

Edited August 2, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Merlin,

If there is a crack in Rand's theory of concepts, this is it. I have only seen Rand supporters get this part, hardly ever Rand's critics. However, I believe if we rework the words used a little, Rand was on to something.

Still, this sleight-of-hand development she used is very confusing.

It reminds me of a passage from God's Little Acre by Erskine Caldwell. (That's my affiliate link, by the way--meaning if anyone buys the book by clicking on it to get to Amazon, I will get a few pennies.)

In Georgia, Ty Ty had been digging up his entire farm for years looking for gold that never appeared. But he kept one piece of land marked off in his mind as sacred. He refused to dig on it since he said he gave it to God out of gratitude. He called it "God's little acre." Eventually as the story went on, Ty Ty had dug up everywhere. Then someone told him that for sure the gold was in God's little acre. And after all these years they deserved to dig it up, but if they did that, the preacher would get the gold since God was not in need of it. Here is Ty Ty's response about moving the digging operation for the umpteenth time. Pluto is a fat country-bumpkin sheriff.

"All right, boys," Ty Ty agreed. "I'll move it again, but I ain't aiming to do away with God's little acre altogether. It's His and I can't take it away from Him after twenty-seven years. That wouldn't be right. But there ain't nothing wrong with shifting it a little, if need be. It would be a heathen shame to strike the lode on it, to be sure, the first thing, and I reckon I'd better shift it so we won't be bothered."

"Why don't you put it over here where the house and barn are, Pa?" Griselda suggested. "There's nothing under this house, and you can't be digging under it, anyway."

"I'd never thought of doing that, Griselda," Ty Ty said, "but it sure sounds fine to me. I reckon I'll shift it over here. Now, I'm pretty much glad to get that off my mind."

Pluto turned his head and looked at Ty Ty.

"You haven't shifted it already, have you Ty Ty?" he asked.

"Shifted it already" Why sure. This is God's little acre we're sitting on right now. I moved it from over yonder to right here."

"You're the quickest man of action I've ever heard about," Pluto said, shaking his head. "And that's a fact."

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

Erskine Caldwell lived for a few years in Tucson, AZ after WWII where my Father had some contact with him as a reporter for the local newspaper. Tucson was then about 1/20th the size population-wise as today (+1,000,000 metro-area).

--Brant

[merjet]

If there is a crack in Rand's theory of concepts, this is it. I have only seen Rand supporters get this part, hardly ever Rand's critics. However, I believe if we rework the words used a little, Rand was on to something.

I agree. If on page 12 she had written 'A concept is a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular differences omitted', I think it would have been fine. Of course, this would have entailed many changes elsewhere to make the text consistent.

Was she "on to something"? Yes and no. With her example of length, she even said the specific lengths of the pencil, stick and match differ and "The difference is one of measurement" (ITOE2, 10). This is true, but it can't be extrapolated to all differences of all concepts. I said 'no' because the idea was not historically original. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke wrote:

9. General natures are nothing but abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones. That this is the way whereby men first formed general ideas, and general names to them, I think is so evident, that there needs no other proof of it but the considering of a man's self, or others, and the ordinary proceedings of their minds in knowledge. And he that thinks general natures or notions are anything else but such abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones, taken at first from particular existences, will, I fear, be at a loss where to find them. For let any one effect, and then tell me, wherein does his idea of man differ from that of Peter and Paul, or his idea of horse from that of Bucephalus, but in the leaving out something that is peculiar to each individual, and retaining so much of those particular complex ideas of several particular existences as they are found to agree in? Of the complex ideas signified by the names man and horse, leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ, and retaining only those wherein they agree, and of those making a new distinct complex idea, and giving the name animal to it, one has a more general term, that comprehends with man several other creatures. Leave out of the idea of animal, sense and spontaneous motion, and the remaining complex idea, made up of the remaining simple ones of body, life, and nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehensive term, vivens. http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/johnlocke/BOOKIIIChapterIII.html

I enjoyed the story about Ty Ty.

Edited August 2, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[Xray]

Xray,

If you actually have read ITOE (which your post shows clearly that you have not), then you would have read Chapters 3 and 4.

Michael,

The evidence of my having read ITOE can be studied right here on OL, which contains numerous posts in which I quoted from the book, discussing various passages. For example, if you search for Xray and the term "teleological", it will take you to a recent discussion I was having here on this thread with Ghs and Merlin, which is from the very same chapter 4 of ITOE you mentioned in your above post. http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8903&st=160&p=102907entry102907

Another recent discussion I was having with Merlin about Rand's stating in ITOE, p. 11, that a child is able to grasp the concept lenght before having knowledge of words. http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=6591&pid=103526&st=40entry103526 (see post # 48).

Thus you would have understood what I call Rand's epistemological "sleight of hand" where the determining characteristics of constituent concepts are treated as measurements and then omitted.

I do understand and completely agree. Your calling it "teleological abradacadra" is very apt.

MSK: But Rand's teleological abracadabra is a drastic shift in the middle of the stream, no matter how you look at it.

When one reads Rand's teleological measurement "abracadabra" attentively, it becomes clear that she at this point, let her morality slide into her epistemology:

"A man may love a woman, but yet may rate the neurotic satisfaction of sexual promiscuity higher than her value to him. " (ITOE, p. 34).

Suddenly it is about the hierarchy of the 'right' moral values, and that really cuts a hole into her epistemological ship already having enough trouble in steering a clear course.

But Rand's teleological abracadabra is a drastic shift in the middle of the stream, no matter how you look at it.

Then about midway through Chapter 4, Concepts of Consciousness she even abandons omitting ordinal or teleological measurements. About concepts pertaining to the products of psychological processes, such as knowledge, she says these concepts are formed by retaining their distinguishing characteristics and "omitting their content" or "omitting the particular fact(s) involved" (ITOE2, 35).

The epistemological chaos in ITOE is hard to miss.

Rand's definition of concept can only be applied to categories of conrete countables like e. g. 'table':

"A concept is the mental integration of of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristics, with their particular measurements omitted."

(ITOE, p. 13).

This definition already fails when it comes to uncountables (like e. g. 'honey'), nor can it be applied to abstract concepts like 'selfishness', 'pride', 'joy' etc.

Edited August 2, 2010 by Xray

[tjohnson]

GS,

A concept in Objectivism is a mental category based on a hierarchy of abstract components (ultimately rooted in the senses if you go down the hierarchy). Rand calls the category and components integrations and units (and units can also be integrations themselves), but call them what you will. The important part is that components with specific identities are grouped into a hierarchy.

To say it differently, the components are isolated according to their most fundamental characteristics (the units are identified) and integrated (grouped) into a hierarchy.

You keep using image as basis. Images are included in many concepts, but they are components, not concepts themselves. Also, there are other senses: sound, touch, taste, smell (and even others if you accept other criteria like gravity awareness).

As a minor point and to be precise, there are countless perceptual instances and lower level "integrations" that make up a concept, most of which are not consciously identified, but they can be identified if focused on. And their position can be located within the hierarchy (if focused on).

That is a concept in Objectivism.

It's a kind of mental awareness shorthand for a vast array of things, experiences and ideas--but an organized one.

Another important point is that each concept is a sort of virtual (or mental) entity with its own identity, albeit one that is interconnected all over the place with countless other concepts and abstractions.

You constantly use the word "concept" as if no hierarchies are involved.

Maybe that will help you understand why this confusion keeps on happening..

Michael

When I use the word 'image' I mean it in the broadest sense - very similar to what would be called a 'mental integration', which you use. I don't think we are very different here but I suspect we are quite different in out view about hierarchies. I get the feeling that you accept that hierarchies exist independent of the observer whereas I maintain that they coexist. This is not to say that they are arbitrary but yet they do depend on the observer to some extent.

[merjet]

The epistemological chaos in ITOE is hard to miss.

Rand's definition of concept can only be applied to categories of conrete countables like e. g. 'table':

"A concept is the mental integration of of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristics, with their particular measurements omitted."

(ITOE, p. 13).

The pot calls the kettle black. The epistemological chaos in your posts is hard to miss.

Ayn Rand wrote "measurements omitted", not "counts omitted." Counting and measuring partly overlap, but they are quite distinct.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I'm kind of getting a kick out of Xray this go-around. But first, let me say that it's worse than I thought if she really did read ITOE. (I no longer read her posts, so I missed the discussions she mentioned.) So I take back what I said about her not reading it. If she quoted it several times, that's not really proof (since getting stuff from the CDROM is easy), but it's good enough to, at least, claim she read it. I'll give her the benefit of the doubt.

But, having read it, what she displays as her understanding of Rand's meanings is woeful. It would have been better had she not read it. For instance, teleological measurement is one of Rand's cornerstones for normative abstractions, yet Xray bashes Rand for using teleological measurement for normative abstractions and calls this "epistemological chaos."

Speaking of epistemological chaos and Xray's posts...

nah...

I won't go there...

Now for the comic part. I get her message as taking my criticism of ITOE as an endorsement for her positions, as if saying: "You see, you see, I was right all along and you agree with me."

Then she goes merrily on her way getting Rand's meanings all wrong...

I find this entertaining in a weirdly tender sort of manner, like watching a very young little girl with an expression of serious concentration stumble about while trying to walk in her father's house shoes.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

How can a layperson having only little or no knowledge in a physicist's field of expertise assess that the physicist "speaks nonsense"?

Use the same standards that you would apply to anyone else. For example, you don't need to be an expert in physics to realize that attributing "free will" to subatomic particles is nonsense.

George,

Surely you will remember the detailed discussion about this issue on the Science & Mathematics thread. http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?app=forums&module=post&section=post&do=reply_post&f=30&t=386&qpid=99292

Excerpts from your posts and the responses you received:

When Conway says that a "particle has a choice," is it also a mistake to take this literally? Is Conway capable of speaking in anything other than fanciful metaphors?

The article characterizes Conway's position as follows: "The gist of it is this: They say they have proved that if humans have free will, then elementary particles -- like atoms and electrons -- possess free will as well."

This sounds like much more than a "mathematical theorem" to me; it sounds like a muddled philosophical conclusion based on a mathematical theorem. And I don't care how great of a mathematician Conway is; this is nonsense, pure and simple. Mathematicians and scientists are as capable of speaking philosophical gibberish as anyone else.

Did you read the article? Speaking about particles that possess free will is no more nonsense than speaking about "the virtue of selfishness" or "the benevolent universe". But Rand is always excused when she uses her own ideosyncratic definitions, the argument being that as long as she gives a clear definition of her own terms, there's nothing wrong with it. So why not apply that same principle when mathematicians and physicists use their jargon with its typical definitions? If you can tell us why the conclusions in that article are wrong, using the definitions given in that article, then I'd like to hear that. When scientists talk about "no free lunch theorems", "cosmic censorship", "God playing or not playing dice", or "color", "flavor", "charm" when talking about quarks, you shouldn't interpret them literally in the everyday sense either.

"Conway and Kochen do not prove that free will does exist. The definition of "free will" used in the proof of this theorem is simply that an outcome is "not determined" by prior conditions, and some philosophers strongly dispute the equivalence of "not determined" with free will." (quoted from the Wiki article on the Free Will Theorem)

I see no problem with this. Do you?

(bolding mine):

Please explain how this talk of "free decisions" by the universe (such terminology recurs throughout the paper) follows from the "mathematical result" of the paper. Do you think the universe makes decisions?

That's the same thing as blaming Einstein for using the phrase "God doesn't play dice" by taking it literally, while it was obviously a metaphor. When Conway writes about the universe making decisions he means of course just that what happens in the universe at a certain event in space-time, whether that depends on the information of the past light cone of that event. Such anthropomorphizing terms are quite common in science, like particles that "see" something or atoms that "want" something, etc. Nothing to get excited about.

Yes, I read the article. Have you?

Sure.

[Ghs]: If you think I have been unfair to Conway, then state what you think is his basic argument (regarding his use of terms like "free will"), and I will respond.

He discusses experiments with spin 1 particles, measuring the square of the spin component of the particles in a certain direction, where the assumption is that the choice of these directions by the experimenter is independent of the information available to him, the information in his past light cone (that is his definition of free will). He then proves that if that assumption is true, the response of those particles in the experiment is also independent of the information that is available to those particles, i.e. the information in the past light cone of those particles. By analogy of the independent decisions of the experimenter he calls that property of the particles then the "free will" of the particles. This is a purely physical definition that has nothing to do with treating particles as conscious entities. That is for example similar to use the term "design" in biology, which does not imply that biological structures are designed by some conscious entity (what the ID proponents of course claim, after all they use the term intelligent design).

Commenting on this exchange, which I didn't see on the other thread:

Unlike Dragonfly, I find the use of "free-will" in the context misleading and unwise. Such usages get even physicists muddled about the nature of "free-will" -- or, as I would say, "volition."

However, the physics conclusion is correct. If a human or other creature acts volitionally affecting the position of particles, then there's non-determinacy in the state history of those particles. This can include widely separated particles, if quantum entanglement is true.

(George, it's exactly because of the physics situation described that Dennis May gets the weebie-jeebies over any thought of effective volition. He sees nightmarish (to him) prospects of deuces wild in the laws of physics as a result of any effective volition.)

Ellen

Edited August 2, 2010 by Ellen Stuttle

[George H. Smith]

Unlike Dragonfly, I find the use of "free-will" in the context misleading and unwise. Such usages get even physicists muddled about the nature of "free-will" -- or, as I would say, "volition."

However, the physics conclusion is correct. If a human or other creature acts volitionally affecting the position of particles, then there's non-determinacy in the state history of those particles. This can include widely separated particles, if quantum entanglement is true.

What do you mean by "non-determinacy," in this context? Do you mean our inability to measure or predict, which are epistemological problems? Or do you mean some kind of metaphysical indeterminacy?

Ghs

[Philip Coates]

> Has anyone here, aside from me, read Penrose's massive tome -- the one abounding in equations, the one that might as function as a grand tour of mathematics? [Da, 7/14]

> I read the Big Penrose Book. It is loaded to the gills with equations some of them involving tensors and other linear forms. [baal]

> "The Road to Reality". I think it's a fairly good mathematical introduction to physics, including some recent theories (he doesn't just end with "and them came quantum weirdness"). [Dan]

> "The first half of this extremely challenging book takes the reader through huge swathes of mathematical territory - hyperbolic geometry, complex numbers, complex calculus, Riemann surfaces, n-manifolds and many more topics are covered." [amazon.com]

I just ordered "Road to Reality" from amazon.

This is going to be brutal. (And slow going).

Edited August 2, 2010 by Philip Coates

[Brant Gaede]

I just ordered "Road to Reality" from amazon.

This is going to be brutal. (And slow going).

We know, Phil, we all know. Courage.

--Brant

[Philip Coates]

I'll need strong drink during the differential geometry parts.

[BaalChatzaf]

I'll need strong drink during the differential geometry parts.

Make sure your head does not explode.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Ellen Stuttle]

Unlike Dragonfly, I find the use of "free-will" in the context misleading and unwise. Such usages get even physicists muddled about the nature of "free-will" -- or, as I would say, "volition."

However, the physics conclusion is correct. If a human or other creature acts volitionally affecting the position of particles, then there's non-determinacy in the state history of those particles. This can include widely separated particles, if quantum entanglement is true.

What do you mean by "non-determinacy," in this context? Do you mean our inability to measure or predict, which are epistemological problems? Or do you mean some kind of metaphysical indeterminacy?

I mean the state of the system at time t_1 not uniquely determining the state of the system at time t_2. We could predict the position of the particles thenceforward to the same extent we could have predicted up to our interference. (For simplicity of description, consider the interference only instantaneous; continued interference would produce a series of states of the particles, each not uniquely determined by the previous.) The non-determinacy of the particles would have resulted from our non-determinacy of action. I'm not meaning a metaphysical indeterminacy of the particles without our interference. I carefully use "non-determinacy" instead of "indeterminacy" trying to avoid implying a position on quantum indeterminacy. (Dennis does likewise. He's adamantly of the opinion that quantum indeterminacy is wrong. I think it is, but wouldn't go into a tizzy if it isn't. I consider quantum indeterminacy, whether true or false, irrelevant to volition -- unlike Penrose and others, who try, in my opinion wrong-headedly, to get volition from quantum indeterminacy.)

Ellen

[Philip Coates]

> Make sure your head does not explode.

I have background in math and physics, so I may survive.