Rand's notions of Kant and Hume

[George H. Smith]

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy==> "A large part of Kant’s work addresses the question “What can we know?” The answer, if it can be stated simply, is that our knowledge is constrained to mathematics and the science of the natural, empirical world. It is impossible, Kant argues, to extend knowledge to the supersensible realm of speculative metaphysics. The reason that knowledge has these constraints, Kant argues, is that the mind plays an active role in constituting the features of experience and limiting the mind’s access only to the empirical realm of space and time."

What is so objectionable about about Kant's claim that we cannot "extend knowledge to the supersensible realm of speculative metaphysics"? "Supersensible" means "beyond or above perception by the senses (American Heritage). Would Rand have argued that we can claim knowledge of things that are beyond or above sense perception? Of course not.

The same encyclopedia you quoted also says this:

"Kant has rejected the dogmatic metaphysics of the Rationalists that promises supersensible knowledge. And he has argued that Empiricism faces serious limitations. His transcendental method will allow him to analyze the metaphysical requirements of the empirical method without venturing into speculative and ungrounded metaphysics." (My italics.)

Kant rejected the speculative metaphysical claims of traditional Rationalism, because he regarded them as dogmatic and unfounded, but he did not reject metaphysical investigations altogether. Indeed, the point of his "transcendental method" was to uncover the metaphysical presuppositions in various spheres of knowledge.

If you take Peikoff's wonderful History of Philosophy courses (most of you haven't), this is exactly the point he lays out in, if I recall, well over an hour...and thus in greater detail than you will find by combing the Q&A's.

I listened to the entire course many years ago, but one needn't listen to those lectures to understand Peikoff's perspective on Kant. One need only read The Ominous Parallels, which discusses Kant in some detail. Although Peikoff's understanding of Kant is somewhat better than Rand's, it also contains significant inaccuracies, including some of the same howlers.

Taking these courses -- two series of twelve lecture courses, one course on Ancient Philosophy, one on Modern Philosophy -- lets you see the Objectivist view of the history of ideas in full context. It also allows qualification of too sweeping statements (such as presenting the idea that a thinker's philosophy may have changed across his life - which is point P sometimes doesn't have time to make outside of the great length of these courses.) It is sometimes stated too tersely even by R and P "standing on one leg" in short answer sessions: As I often point out, to give someone a charitable reading, you look for their most careful and detailed formulations -- where they deal with something in the most thoughtful or extended manner.

You have no business lecturing me about "full context." I have forgotten more about the history of philosophy than you will ever know, and I am very familiar with how both Rand and Peikoff approach the history of philosophy.

As for charitable readings, do you think for a moment that either Rand or Peikoff did a "charitable reading" of Kant? Do you think they searched Kant's writings for his "most careful and detailed formulations" before condemning him as an enemy of reason and as the most evil man in the history of western civilization? To ask such questions is to answer them.

I have no interest in defending most of Kant's ideas. There is very little in his metaphysics or epistemology that I agree with, though there is much that is worthwhile in his defense of the moral autonomy and rights of individuals, and in his conception of a free society as a "kingdom of ends," in which every person is treated as an end in himself rather than as a means to the ends of others.

Kant believed there were two worlds, the *noumenal* world - which is real reality --- and the *phenomenal* world, the world 'as processed' by out filters, our categories...which is the only world we know. Reason is thus fundamentally severed from reality, in the sense of being able to know it, to have fundamental certainty.

Your last sentence is nothing more than a caricature.

Rand often said that perception requires a means of perception, and that there is no way to know reality apart from these means. How we perceive reality depends on the nature of our sense organs. Rand also maintained that sensations are automatically integrated into percepts, according to the physical characteristics of our brains and sensory organs.

In this sense, Rand agreed with Kant that we cannot somehow know reality apart from our specific means of perceiving it. So do you think that this position committed Rand to denying the efficacy of reason? She didn't think it did, and neither did Kant.

What, exactly, is the alternative to knowing reality as it appears to us? Knowing reality as it does NOT appear to us?

Reason has already been cut off at the knees in the Critique of Pure Reason [which is what the IEP is referring to above]. Don't be fooled by K's use of the word 'reason' or a 'rational foundation' with regard to ethics or anything else. What he means by 'reason', if you grasp what he has said in CPR, is not at all what an Oist or an Aristotelian would mean.

I'm not fooled by Kant because I've actually read him. Have you?

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Kant believed there were two worlds, the *noumenal* world - which is real reality --- and the *phenomenal* world, the world 'as processed' by out filters, our categories...which is the only world we know. Reason is thus funamentally severed from reality, in the sense of being able to know it, to have fundamental certainty.

Compare Phil's Randian interpretation of Kant with this brief account by Roger Scruton, in his book Kant (Oxford, 1982):

Neither experience nor reason are alone able to provide knowledge. The first provides content without form, the second form without content. Only in their synthesis is knowledge possible; hence there is no knowledge that does not bear the marks of reason and experience together. Such knowledge is, however, genuine and objective. It transcends the point of view of the man who possesses it, and makes legitimate claims about an independent world.

No serious Kantian scholar would disagree with this summary. It is quite uncontroversial. Moreover, when considered in very general terms, it is not far removed from Rand's position. Both Kant and Rand attempted to bridge the gap between traditional Rationalism and Empiricism.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

A little while ago, after mentioning Rand's comment that Kant was the most evil man in the history of western civilization, I was reminded of the same type of evaluation that was made by a professor of ancient history at the University of Arizona. I took several classes from this excellent teacher during the late 1960's.

One day, in response to a question, the professor listed three thinkers as having had the most evil influences on the course of western civilization. They were St. Paul, Augustine, and Calvin.

I thought this was a credible list when I first heard it, and I still do. It sure beats any list that includes Kant.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

If you take Peikoff's wonderful History of Philosophy courses (most of you haven't) ....

I haven't. I preferred sex. I still do.

--Brant

after giving a lecture on sex and romantic love--something like that--Nathaniel Branden got on an elevator with the epitome of a spinster-type woman who had attended. She indicated that she had liked the lecture, but that she preferred the rapturous music of Leonard Bernstein to romantic sexual love. Inexact quote: "As most of you know I'm seldom at a loss for words, but I couldn't think of a single thing to say!"--NB (Laughter.)

[Brant Gaede]

A little while ago, after mentioning Rand's comment that Kant was the most evil man in the history of western civilization, I was reminded of the same type of evaluation that was made by a professor of ancient history at the University of Arizona. I took several classes from this excellent teacher during the late 1960's.

One day, in response to a question, the professor listed three thinkers as having had the most evil influences on the course of western civilization. They were St. Paul, Augustine, and Calvin.

I thought this was a credible list when I first heard it, and I still do. It sure beats any list that includes Kant.

Ghs

The real difference seems to be not ideas as such, but that these three were in the trenches, so to speak, and Kant was an academic. Or, the three were retail and Kant was wholesale.

--Brant

[Ellen Stuttle]

As for John Hospers' recollections of Rand's speech on "Faith and Force: The Destroyers of the Modern World," didn't she take that speech on the lecture circuit for a while, giving it on multiple occasions in 1960 and 1961? It could be that she gave it at Brooklyn College and Hospers later remembered a broadcast from a different occasion (such as the presentation at Purdue University that is now for sale at the Ayn Rand Bookstore).

Robert Campbell

Except that the reference George quoted to a radio broadcast was from Rand's letter to Hospers dated April 17, 1960.

[....]

The earliest mention of Kant by Rand that I can find on the CD-ROM appears in a letter to John Hospers (April 17, 1960).

This letter responds to a letter that Hospers wrote after listening to one of Rand's radio broadcasts: "I was pleased that you heard my last radio broadcast, but I am puzzled by your comments on it." Later, Rand says:

"I did not caricature Kant. Nobody can do that.'

Thus Rand obviously mentioned Kant in her radio broadcast.

Ghs

[Ellen Stuttle]

A little while ago, after mentioning Rand's comment that Kant was the most evil man in the history of western civilization, I was reminded of the same type of evaluation that was made by a professor of ancient history at the University of Arizona. I took several classes from this excellent teacher during the late 1960's.

One day, in response to a question, the professor listed three thinkers as having had the most evil influences on the course of western civilization. They were St. Paul, Augustine, and Calvin.

I thought this was a credible list when I first heard it, and I still do. It sure beats any list that includes Kant.

Ghs

I've never bought the idea that Kant himself was "evil" -- and I still wish that someone (hint, hint, George) who has the CD-ROM would search Rand's items in The Objectivist Newsletter to see if my recollection is right that there's a comment about Kant by her in which she says that "in terms of his influence," or very similar wording, she'd evaluate Kant as the most evil man in philosophy's history.

Where I do think she has a kind of case about Kant is in philosophy's being sent careening on a disastrous detour post-Kant.

Henry Veatch, from whom I took a course on ethics in either '64 or '65 at Northwestern (the occasion when I first read Kant's works on the subject; I read them again a few years later, but haven't re-read them since), used to speak of "the Kantian swerve" in philosophy. I think there was a "swerve," most of all because of the botched job in answering Hume re certainty. Popper's eventual answer (we don't need certainty) I think is basically right, but meanwhile....many very bad developments, even amongst scientists, which are still with us.

Granted, Rand misinterpreted Kant in multiple ways. Nonetheless, I think she was onto something accurate in pointing to Kant as the watershed sending the "river," so to speak, of Western philosophy into a swamp.

I haven't read most of the posts which have accumulated since I last signed on. This is just a quick comment on the respect in which I think Rand was correctly discerning the wide view, despite her exaggerated drawing of the picture, in her belief that Kant marked the start of a destructive turn in philosophy's history.

Ellen

Edited May 11, 2010 by Ellen Stuttle

[Neil Parille]

George,

I don't believe that Paul, Augustine and Calvin have had evil influences on history. In particular, consider the countries that have been influenced by Calvinism such as the US, England, the Netherlands and Switzerland. They have had among the highest standards of living in the world and more stable political systems. The Calvinists (or their descendants) in France are still to this day dominant in banking and business (or so I read).

-Neil Parille

[George H. Smith]

George,

I don't believe that Paul, Augustine and Calvin have had evil influences on history. In particular, consider the countries that have been influenced by Calvinism such as the US, England, the Netherlands and Switzerland. They have had among the highest standards of living in the world and more stable political systems. The Calvinists (or their descendants) in France are still to this day dominant in banking and business (or so I read).

-Neil Parille

Considered in terms of their influence, Paul and Calvin probably wouldn't qualify for my personal Trinity of Evil Geniuses -- Hegel would certainly earn a spot and so, perhaps, would Marx -- but Augustine certainly would. He provided the rationale for religious persecution that dominated European thinking for well over a thousand years; and his theory of "righteous persecution" (i.e., using force against people for their own good) has continued to exert influence in secular forms, such as anti-drug laws. (See my essays "Philosophies of Toleration" and "The Righteous Persecution of Drug Consumers and Other Heretics" in Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies.)

My professor included Paul because of his essential role in integrating the notion of original sin into Christianity -- a process that would be finalized by Augustine. Centuries later, after original sin had lost much of its punch in Catholic theology -- thanks largely to the efforts of Aquinas --it was revived by Luther, but even Luther did not drive the doctrine home with the vengeance and systematic obsession of Calvin.

Calvin also defended "predestination," one of the most peculiar doctrines in the history of ideas. (This doctrine, again, goes back to Augustine; in many ways the Protestant Reformation was a regressive victory of Augustine over Aquinas).

The belief that God has predetermined who will be saved (the "elect") and who will be damned, and that human beings can do absolutely nothing to alter their eternal fates, might lead us to suppose that Calvinism would have instilled a passive attitude in its adherents. But as many historians (Max Weber being the most famous) have noted, belief in predestination had precisely the opposite effect. In an effort to convince themselves that they were numbered among the elect, Calvinists devoted themselves to good works and a "vocation," the latter of which has become known as the Protestant work ethic. This kind of psychological twist is what makes the history of ideas so fascinating.

"Calvinism" is a broad and ambiguous label. Calvinism morphed into a variety of forms, depending on the country and culture in which it took root. For example, when Calvinists held the reins of political power (e.g.., in Geneva and Scotland), they were as viciously repressive as Catholics had ever been; but when they were themselves a persecuted minority, they sometimes developed theories of religious toleration (typically quite limited), along with theories of legitimate resistance and revolution (even though Calvin, like Luther, had largely preached passive obedience to the State).

My point here is that Calvinism did have good effects in some countries, but, for the most part, those effects were not a logical outgrowth of Calvinist doctrines per se. This is but one example among many that illustrates why the Randian notion that "premises will out" in the history of ideas is deeply flawed.

I am writing this post shortly after waking up, so I reserve the right, later on, to repudiate or explain away anything I have said above.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Since this thread is getting into the subject of Christianity, OLers may be interested in this article on "Christianity and Liberty" that I wrote for the Acton Institute many years ago. The opening remarks that I quote from Acton have obvious relevance to my longstanding dislike of the Randian approach to history.

http://www.acton.org/publications/randl/rl_article_66.php

Ghs

[Robert Campbell]

Except that the reference George quoted to a radio broadcast was from Rand's letter to Hospers dated April 17, 1960.

[....]

The earliest mention of Kant by Rand that I can find on the CD-ROM appears in a letter to John Hospers (April 17, 1960).

This letter responds to a letter that Hospers wrote after listening to one of Rand's radio broadcasts: "I was pleased that you heard my last radio broadcast, but I am puzzled by your comments on it." Later, Rand says:

"I did not caricature Kant. Nobody can do that.'

Thus Rand obviously mentioned Kant in her radio broadcast.

Ghs

OK, I missed that. So there was a broadcast in April 1960 where she talked about Kant. Possibly another rendition of "Faith and Force," possibly something different.

No one seems to have been tracking Rand's radio broadcasts with much care while she was making them. And the archives of the relevant stations or networks are not always in the best of shape.

Robert Campbell

[George H. Smith]

I've never bought the idea that Kant himself was "evil" -- and I still wish that someone (hint, hint, George) who has the CD-ROM would search Rand's items in The Objectivist Newsletter to see if my recollection is right that there's a comment about Kant by her in which she says that "in terms of his influence," or very similar wording, she'd evaluate Kant as the most evil man in philosophy's history.

There are only five references to Kant in "The Objectivist Newsletter," and none of them corresponds to your recollection.

She does of course mention Kant's influence -- e.g.: "Our age is witnessing the ultimate climax, the cashing-in on a long process of destruction, at the end of the road laid out by Kant."

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Where I do think [Rand] has a kind of case about Kant is in philosophy's being sent careening on a disastrous detour post-Kant.

Henry Veatch, from whom I took a course on ethics in either '64 or '65 at Northwestern (the occasion when I first read Kant's works on the subject; I read them again a few years later, but haven't re-read them since), used to speak of "the Kantian swerve" in philosophy. I think there was a "swerve," most of all because of the botched job in answering Hume re certainty. Popper's eventual answer (we don't need certainty) I think is basically right, but meanwhile....many very bad developments, even amongst scientists, which are still with us.

Granted, Rand misinterpreted Kant in multiple ways. Nonetheless, I think she was onto something accurate in pointing to Kant as the watershed sending the "river," so to speak, of Western philosophy into a swamp.

I haven't read most of the posts which have accumulated since I last signed on. This is just a quick comment on the respect in which I think Rand was correctly discerning the wide view, despite her exaggerated drawing of the picture, in her belief that Kant marked the start of a destructive turn in philosophy's history.

No historian of ideas would contest the claim that Kant marked a turning point in the history of modern philosophy, but historians often focus on different aspects of his influence. And depending on their focus, they see his influence as largely good or as largely bad.

Those who see Kant's influence as detrimental often focus (as Rand and Peikoff do) on subsequent developments in German Idealism, especially on the ideas of Hegel. But it is problematic to what degree Hegel and other Idealists, such as Fichte, should be regarded as Kantians.

There are so many features to Kant's philosophy that it was an easy matter for subsequent philosophers to pick and choose which ones to isolate and run with. For example, although the "thing-in-itself" in Kant's noumenal world played a relatively minor role in Kant's technical philosophy -- it mainly served as a refuge for free will, God, and immortality -- subsequent Idealists became professional hunters for the elusive Ding-an-sich and thereby transformed metaphysics into the intellectual equivalent of a Snipe hunt.

To what extent we can hold Kant responsible for these unfortunate developments is frankly a judgment call. But there is little doubt in my mind that he would have been horrified by Hegel's metaphysical mumbo-jumbo, since it was precisely that kind of reckless speculative metaphysics that Kant had attempted to abolish with his "critical" method.

On the good side, Kant was an important figure in the German Enlightenment. He defended the supremacy of reason -- as evidenced by the title of his most important book on religion, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone -- and his call for independent judgment was stunning. Consider, for example, these opening paragraphs from "What is Enlightenment?" (1784):

Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! [dare to know] "Have courage to use your own understanding!"--that is the motto of enlightenment.

Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so great a proportion of men, long after nature has released them from alien guidance, nonetheless gladly remain in lifelong immaturity, and why it is so easy for others to establish themselves as their guardians. It is so easy to be immature. If I have a book to serve as my understanding, a pastor to serve as my conscience, a physician to determine my diet for me, and so on, I need not exert myself at all. I need not think, if only I can pay: others will readily undertake the irksome work for me. The guardians who have so benevolently taken over the supervision of men have carefully seen to it that the far greatest part of them (including the entire fair sex) regard taking the step to maturity as very dangerous, not to mention difficult. Having first made their domestic livestock dumb, and having carefully made sure that these docile creatures will not take a single step without the go-cart to which they are harnessed, these guardians then show them the danger that threatens them, should they attempt to walk alone. Now this danger is not actually so great, for after falling a few times they would in the end certainly learn to walk; but an example of this kind makes men timid and usually frightens them out of all further attempts.

Thus, it is difficult for any individual man to work himself out of the immaturity that has all but become his nature. He has even become fond of this state and for the time being is actually incapable of using his own understanding, for no one has ever allowed him to attempt it. Rules and formulas, those mechanical aids to the rational use, or rather misuse, of his natural gifts, are the shackles of a permanent immaturity. Whoever threw them off would still make only an uncertain leap over the smallest ditch, since he is unaccustomed to this kind of free movement. Consequently, only a few have succeeded, by cultivating their own minds, in freeing themselves from immaturity and pursuing a secure course.

But that the public should enlighten itself is more likely; indeed, if it is only allowed freedom, enlightenment is almost inevitable. For even among the entrenched guardians of the great masses a few will always think for themselves, a few who, after having themselves thrown off the yoke of immaturity, will spread the spirit of a rational appreciation for both their own worth and for each person's calling to think for himself. But it should be particularly noted that if a public that was first placed in this yoke by the guardians is suitably aroused by some of those who are altogether incapable of enlightenment, it may force the guardians themselves to remain under the yoke--so pernicious is it to instill prejudices, for they finally take revenge upon their originators, or on their descendants. Thus a public can only attain enlightenment slowly. Perhaps a revolution can overthrow autocratic despotism and profiteering or power-grabbing oppression, but it can never truly reform a manner of thinking; instead, new prejudices, just like the old ones they replace, will serve as a leash for the great unthinking mass....

There are many other admirable features of Kant's philosophy that had salutary effects, but I will cite just one more example. The following passage from Kant's "Theory and Practice" could almost have been written by Rand:

I express the principle of one's freedom as a human being in this formula: No one can compel me (in accordance with his beliefs about the welfare of others) to be happy after his fashion; instead, every person may seek happiness in the way that seems best to him. If only he does not violate the freedom of others to strive toward such similar ends as are compatible with everyone's freedom under a possible universal law (i.e., the right of others).

Kant's individualism had a huge impact on German liberalism, e.g., on the ideas of Wilhelm von Humboldt, author of the classic libertarian book, On the Limits of State Action (1792).

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

I wondered where the term "go-cart" came from. Now I know!

--Brant

[Robert Campbell]

Calvin also defended "predestination," one of the most peculiar doctrines in the history of ideas. (This doctrine, again, goes back to Augustine; in many ways the Protestant Reformation was a regressive victory of Augustine over Aquinas).

The belief that God has predetermined who will be saved (the "elect") and who will be damned, and that human beings can do absolutely nothing to alter their eternal fates, might lead us to suppose that Calvinism would have instilled a passive attitude in its adherents. But as many historians (Max Weber being the most famous) have noted, belief in predestination had precisely the opposite effect. In an effort to convince themselves that they were numbered among the elect, Calvinists devoted themselves to good works and a "vocation," the latter of which has become known as the Protestant work ethic. This kind of psychological twist is what makes the history of ideas so fascinating.

"Calvinism" is a broad and ambiguous label. Calvinism morphed into a variety of forms, depending on the country and culture in which it took root.

George,

To follow up a little on this, Islam is also heavily predestinarian. I doubt that there was much of an influence, even a highly filtered one, of Augustine on Muhammad, but the theological "logic" of predestination is thoroughly developed in the Qur'an—to the point that God occasionally threatens to harden the hearts and stop the ears of the kuffaar, so they will be incapable of embracing Islam, and will, thus, be guaranteed a one-way ticket to the Fire.

The predestinarian aspects of Islam did not lead to any sort of work ethic. Instead, they seem to have promoted fatalism—"It is written," "Allah has not willed it"—or at least reinforced pre-existing cultural tendencies toward it.

Robert Campbell

[Robert Campbell]

In response to Phil

What is so objectionable about about Kant's claim that we cannot "extend knowledge to the supersensible realm of speculative metaphysics"? "Supersensible" means "beyond or above perception by the senses (American Heritage). Would Rand have argued that we can claim knowledge of things that are beyond or above sense perception? Of course not.

The same encyclopedia you quoted also says this:

"Kant has rejected the dogmatic metaphysics of the Rationalists that promises supersensible knowledge. And he has argued that Empiricism faces serious limitations. His transcendental method will allow him to analyze the metaphysical requirements of the empirical method without venturing into speculative and ungrounded metaphysics." (My italics.)

Kant rejected the speculative metaphysical claims of traditional Rationalism, because he regarded them as dogmatic and unfounded, but he did not reject metaphysical investigations altogether. Indeed, the point of his "transcendental method" was to uncover the metaphysical presuppositions in various spheres of knowledge.

George,

I'm not in the habit of claiming knowledge of anything "supersensible." Neither, I am quite sure, was Rand.

But Kant's formulation was loaded (as his presentations of problems so often were).

It's not just God and immortality of the soul whose fates Kant believe ought not to be decided by speculative metaphysics or its "dogmatic" rejection. For Kant, the question whether the universe is ultimately deterministic or not is a matter of speculative metaphysics. Many of the metaphysical hypotheses incorporated into scientific theories would be "speculative" in Kant's sense.

Robert Campbell

[9thdoctor]

My point here is that Calvinism did have good effects in some countries, but, for the most part, those effects were not a logical outgrowth of Calvinist doctrines per se. This is but one example among many that illustrates why the Randian notion that "premises will out" in the history of ideas is deeply flawed.

I’m not entirely clear on your critique of Rand’s view of history here. Her view was that philosophical principles drive history, I don’t see how that’s refuted by the fact that, for example, Calvinists qua persecuted minority (Huguenots) worked towards religious toleration in France, surviving (and succeeding) by the skin of their teeth. There’s plenty of comparable historical cases where the result was bloodshed with no redeeming historical development as result, I’ll cite the Cathars as an example since they were also French. When the irrational conflicts with the irrational, the result is unpredictable. What do you mean by “premises will out”? That no positive developments can result from the conflict of irrational idealogical movements? I’m not sure that was Rand’s position, I wouldn’t agree if so. The only example I can think of was her favoring letting the Nazis and the Soviets destroy each other, which isn't a very illuminating case.

I do, however, think that Rand can be accused of having a hammer, and treating everything as a nail when she discussed history, particularly in For the New Intellectual.

Since this thread is getting into the subject of Christianity, OLers may be interested in this article

Also worthwhile is Rothbard’s Economic Thought Before Adam Smith, which is available free from Mises.org, and features the sonorous baritone of one Jeff Riggenbach. Calvinism is discussed in one of the later chapters.

http://mises.org/media.aspx?action=category&ID=206

[George H. Smith]

George,

I'm not in the habit of claiming knowledge of anything "supersensible." Neither, I am quite sure, was Rand.

But Kant's formulation was loaded (as his presentations of problems so often were).

It's not just God and immortality of the soul whose fates Kant believe ought not to be decided by speculative metaphysics or its "dogmatic" rejection. For Kant, the question whether the universe is ultimately deterministic or not is a matter of speculative metaphysics. Many of the metaphysical hypotheses incorporated into scientific theories would be "speculative" in Kant's sense.

Robert Campbell

I'm afraid I don't understand your point. Kant was a great admirer of Newton, and one of his purposes in writing Critique of Pure Reason was to vindicate the metaphysical presuppositions of Newtonian science. This is why he targeted Hume's denial of necessary causation. Kant attempted to prove that our experiences would be unintelligible and chaotic without presupposing necessary causal relationships. As he put it in the Critique, "Experience itself...is thus possible only in so far as we subject the succession of appearances, and therefore all alteration, to the law of causality...." (Trans. Norman Kemp Smith, p. 219).

Kant did not regard his defense of causality and other scientific (and mathematical) principles as speculative. He believed that his defense was based on a rational analysis of experience, and that it therefore departed from the Rationalist method of appealing solely to reason and a supersensible reality. (Leibniz's theory of "windowless" monads is one rationalistic doctrine that Kant specifically attacks in the Critique.)

I apologize if this response doesn't address your point, but, as I said, I'm not sure what your point is.

[George H. Smith]

What do you mean by “premises will out”?

I don't have much time right now, so I will focus on this one question and address your other points later.

What I mean by "premises will out" can be illustrated by some passages in Peikoff's The Ominous Parallels. (There may be better examples, but these are the first I happened across.) Peikoff writes:

"If we view the West's philosophic development in terms of essentials, three fateful turning points stand out, three major philosophers who, above all others, are responsible for generating the disease of collectivism and transmitting it to the dictators of our century. The three are: Plato—Kant—Hegel."

Now, considering that Kant was a liberal individualist, to target him as responsible for collectivism and modern dictatorships seems rather peculiar, to say the least. But Peikoff is referring to Kant's (alleged) epistemological and metaphysical principles, not to his moral or political principles. Now we come to a key remark by Peikoff:

"It is Kant who made possible the sudden mushrooming of the Platonic collectivism in the modern world, and especially in Germany. Kant is not a full-fledged statist, but a philosopher's political views, to the extent that they contradict the essentials of his system, have little historical significance. Kant accepts certain elements of individualism, not because of his basic approach, but in spite of it, as a legacy of the Enlightenment period in which he lived. This merely suggests that Kant did not grasp the political implications of his own metaphysics and epistemology."

The perspective is a leitmotif of the Randian approach to history. If a philosopher defended an incorrect epistemological or metaphysical theory, then it is that theory, and not his moral and political principles, that will ultimately influence the course of political events. This is what I meant by attributing to Rand the view that "premises will out."

As I said, I'm in a hurry, so all I will say about this for now is that it is a priori history at its worst.

Ghs

[Robert Campbell]

I'm afraid I don't understand your point. Kant was a great admirer of Newton, and one of his purposes in writing Critique of Pure Reason was to vindicate the metaphysical presuppositions of Newtonian science. This is why he targeted Hume's denial of necessary causation. Kant attempted to prove that our experiences would be unintelligible and chaotic without presupposing necessary causal relationships. As he put it in the Critique, "Experience itself...is thus possible only in so far as we subject the succession of appearances, and therefore all alteration, to the law of causality...." (Trans. Norman Kemp Smith, p. 219).

George,

The Critique of Pure Reason includes the Third Antinomy, which pertains to free will vs. determinism. That is a matter that many of today's theories make claims about, but that for Kant is either speculative, and therefore to be avoided, or involves an "idea of pure reason," and therefore will never have a known resolution.

That Kant believes we can't help presupposing casual relationships is clear enough. Whether we ought to be presupposing them, and on what grounds, is a lot less clear. It would be highly speculative, by his lights, to say that there is any grounding for our judgments of causality in the properties of things as they are. Consequently, one has to wonder whether Newton, faced with Kant's theory, would have considered it a vindication.

Kant actually built enough of the basic claims of Newtonian physics into his account of how we can't help avoiding perceiving space and time and unity and multiplicity and causality, etc., that the neo-Kantian school went through a crisis in the decade after 1900. For if the basic structure of the human mind makes us unavoidably perceive things in a Newtonian way, how could Einstein have even come up with his theory, let alone rationally persuaded anyone else that it was better than Newton's?

Meanwhile, Kant presumes to know that perception, without the mediation of the forms and categories, would give us a series of snapshots or "heaps" of unintegrated material. How did he know such things? How did he avoid speculation in drawing such conclusions?

Kant did not regard his defense of causality and other scientific (and mathematical) principles as speculative. He believed that his defense was based on a rational analysis of experience, and that it therefore departed from the Rationalist method of appealing solely to reason and a supersensible reality. (Leibniz's theory of "windowless" monads is one rationalistic doctrine that Kant specifically attacks in the Critique.)

I apologize if this response doesn't address your point, but, as I said, I'm not sure what your point is.

His proposed rational analysis of experience is neither old-fashioned armchair introspection nor any sort of modern psychology. What exactly is it?

After he broke away from Leibniz and Wolff, Kant did not regard any of his own analyses or arguments as speculative. But I don't think we're obliged to understand what he was doing the way he understood it—or wanted to understand it.

Robert Campbell

[9thdoctor]

The perspective is a leitmotif of the Randian approach to history. If a philosopher defended an incorrect epistemological or metaphysical theory, then it is that theory, and not his moral and political principles, that will ultimately influence the course of political events. This is what I meant by attributing to Rand the view that "premises will out."

John Locke’s epistemology would be classified in the “Hume-Kant” axis, if we grant that there is such a thing. Yet he stands as a key figure in the development of classical liberal politics. Did his politics contradict the “essentials of his system” per Peikoff? This may be the wrong place to ask, but does anyone know how Peikoff answers that?

I haven’t looked at The Ominous Parrallels in a long time, though I do have a copy. I mentally separate Rand and Peikoff, though in this case, given the tales of her editing/critiquing of that book, it probably does reflect her thoughts late in life. Nevertheless, these excerpts read like…words fail, time for an image:

If he’s got to have a threesome, why not Plato-Rousseau-Hegel?

[Philip Coates]

> the Randian approach to history. If a philosopher defended an incorrect epistemological or metaphysical theory, then it is that theory, and not his moral and political principles, that will ultimately influence the course of political events. This is what I meant by attributing to Rand the view that "premises will out." As I said, I'm in a hurry, so all I will say about this for now is that it is a priori history at its worst. [GHS]

I realize you're in a hurry, but when you get around to it, you will need to word the FPTEP [fundamental philosophy trumps ethics and politics] doctrine more fully so that you won't be attacking a straw man:

The philosopher's influence would have to have: i) not merely "defended" an epistemological or metaphysical theory, ii) *successfully* changed the whole course of thinking in those disciplines, iii) the change would have to have *fundamental* ethical and political implications.

And finally, all this only applies: i) given lack of censorship, ii) given time to permeate and be absorbed by the civilization's intellectual gatekeepers and influences, and iii) given opportunity (publicity, inclusion in the major "great conversations") and iv) the absence of unusual freak circumstances that are sufficiently devastating or prolonged as to prevent the normal spread and diffusion*** of ideas (economic collapse, plague, war, starvation, hyperinflation).

*** for how ideas "diffuse", a number of world histories (and histories of civilization and culture) offer insight. William McNeill's "The Rise of the West" and J.M. Roberts "History of the World" in particular have a lot on the non-philosophical factors that push history. But more work needs to be saidon what 'trumps' what. And under what circumstances.

( PS, the question of whether other major ideas -- such as economic and psychological theories and attitudes -- can override basic philosophical theories and attitudes or are conditioned and determined by them...is an interesting one.)

Edited May 12, 2010 by Philip Coates

[George H. Smith]

George,

The Critique of Pure Reason includes the Third Antinomy, which pertains to free will vs. determinism. That is a matter that many of today's theories make claims about, but that for Kant is either speculative, and therefore to be avoided, or involves an "idea of pure reason," and therefore will never have a known resolution.

It is free will, not determinism, not causes Kant a lot of problems. It is free will that Kant relegates to his noumenal world.

Whatever the merits of his arguments, Kant believed he had proven that our knowledge of causation is at once synthetic (i.e., based on experience rather than on an analysis of concepts) and a priori (i.e., necessarily true).

That Kant believes we can't help presupposing casual relationships is clear enough. Whether we ought to be presupposing them, and on what grounds, is a lot less clear.

Kant's argument is epistemological, not psychological. He is not merely saying that we cannot help believing in causation; he is saying that causation is a necessary precondition of our empirical knowledge. His argument, stripped to its bare essentials, is similar to the "fallacy of the stolen concept" argument popular among Objectivists; i.e., if you deny the validity of A, then you cannot coherently speak of X, Y, and Z -- for these latter concepts logically presuppose A.

It would be highly speculative, by his lights, to say that there is any grounding for our judgments of causality in the properties of things as they are. Consequently, one has to wonder whether Newton, faced with Kant's theory, would have considered it a vindication.

I don't know much about Newton's metaphysical proclivities, so I don't know what his reaction would have been to Kant's vindication of him. I do know, however, that the distinction between primary and secondary sense qualities -- i.e., attributes of an entity that exist per se versus attributes that are generated by the particular properties of our sense organs -- was upheld by Galileo and was later popular among pro-Newtonian philosophers, such as Locke, so I wouldn't be surprised if Newton accepted that dichotomy as well. And lurking in the distinction between primary and secondary attributes is a distinction between the nature of something in itself versus how we perceive it.

As for Kant's application of causation to "properties of things as they are" (i.e., the noumenal realm), this of course is a serious weakness of Kant's approach in many areas. His distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal realms is simply not tenable. Having said this, however, we should should keep in mind that when Kant speaks of "appearances," he does not mean illusions or distorted knowledge. He simply means reality as we perceive and understand it. And the point of his technical and often tedious investigations into the "forms of perception" and "categories of understanding" is to figure out the role played by the human mind in its acquisition of knowledge.

Kant actually built enough of the basic claims of Newtonian physics into his account of how we can't help avoiding perceiving space and time and unity and multiplicity and causality, etc., that the neo-Kantian school went through a crisis in the decade after 1900. For if the basic structure of the human mind makes us unavoidably perceive things in a Newtonian way, how could Einstein have even come up with his theory, let alone rationally persuaded anyone else that it was better than Newton's?

Attempts have been made by Kantians, such as Ernst Cassirer, to reconcile modern physics with Kant's epistemology, but as a non-Kantian, I am not disposed to defend those attempts.

Meanwhile, Kant presumes to know that perception, without the mediation of the forms and categories, would give us a series of snapshots or "heaps" of unintegrated material. How did he know such things? How did he avoid speculation in drawing such conclusions?

The answer to that lies in The Critique of Pure Reason. Here again, we might draw an analogy between Kant and Rand. How did Rand "know" that certain concepts are axiomatic and presupposed by all knowledge? Well she analyzed the nature of concepts and knowledge and then extracted what she believed to be their essential presuppositions.

His proposed rational analysis of experience is neither old-fashioned armchair introspection nor any sort of modern psychology. What exactly is it?

In some respects Kant's method was "old-fashioned armchair introspection." After all, we cannot directly experience the perceptions or concepts of other people, so we must rely on our own. And when we analyze these perceptions and concepts, we assume that other people will understand what we are talking about, based on their own introspection. This isn't the whole story, obviously, but I've already made this post longer than I wanted to.

After he broke away from Leibniz and Wolff, Kant did not regard any of his own analyses or arguments as speculative. But I don't think we're obliged to understand what he was doing the way he understood it—or wanted to understand it.

This is essentially to say that we don't agree with Kant. I don't in most cases, but I admire his attempt, and I have learned many things in the course of reading Kant, even when I have rejected his conclusions. The real point of philosophy is not whether or not we agree with someone; it is how much we can learn from him or her.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

> the Randian approach to history. If a philosopher defended an incorrect epistemological or metaphysical theory, then it is that theory, and not his moral and political principles, that will ultimately influence the course of political events. This is what I meant by attributing to Rand the view that "premises will out." As I said, I'm in a hurry, so all I will say about this for now is that it is a priori history at its worst. [GHS]

I realize you're in a hurry, but when you get around to it, you will need to word the FPTEP [fundamental philosophy trumps ethics and politics] doctrine more fully so that you won't be attacking a straw man:

I don't have to do any such thing, especially since neither Rand nor Peikoff ever developed a philosophy of history. Per the Peikoff passages I quoted earlier, they merely assert or imply, time and again, that fundamental epistemological and metaphysical principles are the ultimate determinants in the history of ideas, including the ideas of political philosophy.

This is clearly evident in Rand's repeated assertions that Aristotle's epistemology and metaphysics, generally speaking, led to pro-freedom developments, whereas Plato's ideas led to collectivism and statism. There are tons of problems with this historical claim, but the key point is that Rand didn't arrive at this conclusion from a careful study of history. Instead, to put the matter crudely, she began with the assumption "Aristotle, good; Plato, bad," and she then attributed historical developments that she liked to Aristotle and historical developments she didn't like to Plato.

Now, a reasonable case can be made for the favorable influence of Aristotle in some political developments, but this case is heavily dependent on certain aspects of Aristotle's political theory, such as his distinction between a "good citizen" and a "good man." But Aristotle's influence was also horrific in other instances, as we see with the many defenders of slavery who cited him as an authority. When the Randian is confronted with these counter-instances, he typically explains them away by claiming Aristotle's political beliefs were not fundamental, and that, regardless of how Aristotle viewed the matter, his defense of slavery was incompatible with his defense of reason. Well, maybe so, but the fact remains that Aristotle's defense of slavery exerted a considerable influence on that institution for many centuries.

Just a couple more brief comments and then I'll stop.

First, Plato's influence on the Renaissance was profound, as was his influence in some aspects of the development of modern science, e.g., with Kepler and Galileo. The sweeping "Plato, bad" theory simply doesn't fit the facts of history. There are too many variables involved.

Second, the development of pro-freedom ideas owed more the the revival of Stoicism and Epicureanism (and even Greek skepticism) in post-Renaissance Europe than it did to either Plato or Aristotle. For example, Jefferson did not declare himself an Aristotelian; rather, he said, "I am an Epicurean." And Jefferson knew what he was talking about.

To conclude: a priori reasoning about what should have happened historically is frequently at odds with what actually did happen. Perhaps the most famous practitioner of a priori history was Hegel, and it didn't work any better for him than it did for Rand. If you want to know who or what caused a historical event, you actually have to study history to find out. You cannot spin such information out of your head. (This is not to deny the role of theory in historical interpretations, but that is a topic for another discussion.)

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

I don't have to do any such thing, especially since neither Rand nor Peikoff ever developed a philosophy of history. Per the Peikoff passages I quoted earlier, they merely assert or imply, time and again, that fundamental epistemological and metaphysical principles are the ultimate determinants in the history of ideas, including the ideas of political philosophy.

Well, in the development and validation of a philosophy--Objectivism--these principles might be more correctly identified as first determinants with the ultimate ones being out of consequent empirical work. This formalism, however, is not the reality of course. It is not the history of this philosophy, which hangs on the supposed needs of a so-called "ideal man."

--Brant