How would distinguish conceptual behavior?

[dan2100]

This question arises time and again in discussions of animal minds -- often enough in Objectivish circles discussing what makes humans different from other animals. I've suggested, in one ethics discussion here, a means to test whether an animal -- including a human - -is exhibiting conceptual behavior. The test is not original one; I'm not suggesting I came up with it. It's basically to set up situations where the animal would have to rely on some ability to abstract to perform some behave. The example I gave was teaching an animal to associate something -- e.g., such as a spoken word, a picture -- with roundness and have the animal pick out round objects from a pile of other objects.

For example, let's say there's a dog named Rex that's believed to have such a conceptual ability. Somehow, Rex has acquired -- let's assume it's acquired and not innate, but it shouldn't matter for this test -- a concept of roundness and associates this concept with the spoken word "round." Imagine placing three round objects -- say, different sized, colored, scented, hardness, weight, and patterned balls (all dependent on Rex's abilities to perceptually discriminate) -- in a pile with boxy chew toys, blocks, sticks and the like. Let's say one ball is green and so are some of the non-round objects. And some of the non-round objects share other traits with the balls -- so that roundness is being isolated. A successful hit with this test might be Rex upon hearing "round" fetches one of the balls.

In order to make Rex isn't merely remembering the three balls, one might then change them for other round things of different colors, sizes, etc. in different piles. The expectation would be that if Rex has this conceptual ability (and also can make the association), he will fetch the round and only the round objects. Also, one might try a pile with no round objects or only round objects. The expectation in the former would be that he fetches no objects or looks confused. The expectation in the latter might be that he fetches one of the objects.

Note that the idea here is not merely to open the floodgates or allow subjective interpretation much leeway. To evince conceptual behavior, certain tests must be passed. Failing them means, at a minimum, that conceptual behavior for that test was not detected. This, of course, doesn't mean conceptual behavior is not there. It could be, as my parenthetic comments mention, that Rex lacks or has a perceptual ability that might go unrecognized by the tester or hasn't made the association with the word "round." (By "has a perceptual ability," imagine Rex can detect some other trait that the tester doesn't realize the objects she's using shares. For instance, imagine they were all sitting next to her lunch and Rex is actually associating "round" with the odors of the lunch.) One would suspect, though, that repeating the test using different traits, different objects, and other variations would eventually add up to detecting conceptual behavior -- or making its likelihood seem so low as to almost rule it out.

The tests are also trying to isolate from simple associations, such as Rex might have for his favorite ball -- which he just remembers the perception of and does not really do, what is believed to be, any conceptual work. As a sort of analogy, imagine a person you believe understands the concept of prime number, but, in truth, he has merely memorized the first 100 primes. He could never tell you what the 101st prime is -- save by luck -- or what makes a number prime (much less extend this notion to things like "relatively prime" numbers). Note that in this case, though, he's still evincing some conceptual behavior by likely understanding what numbers are to some degree. My point is, though, he really has no concept of prime -- aside from a list of 100 numbers. (Is such a set a concept? If it is, it's certainly of a different kind than what might be called a classical concept.)

Finally, these kinds of tests are not here to prove how special humans are or to knock out any other animal from the running of using concepts. I actually do expect most animals, especially vertebrates and some mollusks, to exhibit some level of conceptual behavior -- given my readings in ethology. (Also, similar tests have been done already and seem to show some ability to apply abstractions, ergo, some conceptual ability. I'm mainly bringing this up to focus discussion here -- rather than to shock the world with evidence for concepts in dogs, cats, parrots, and rats.)

Any comments on this?

[tjohnson]

The tests are also trying to isolate from simple associations, such as Rex might have for his favorite ball -- which he just remembers the perception of and does not really do, what is believed to be, any conceptual work. As a sort of analogy, imagine a person you believe understands the concept of prime number, but, in truth, he has merely memorized the first 100 primes. He could never tell you what the 101st prime is -- save by luck -- or what makes a number prime (much less extend this notion to things like "relatively prime" numbers). Note that in this case, though, he's still evincing some conceptual behavior by likely understanding what numbers are to some degree. My point is, though, he really has no concept of prime -- aside from a list of 100 numbers. (Is such a set a concept? If it is, it's certainly of a different kind than what might be called a classical concept.)

Again, I am using 'conception' differently. You mention that he just remembers the perception but I would call this 'remembering' a kind of conceptual thinking. If you prefer not to use 'concept' for this then fine. In GS, this perception and remembering of the object is called 'objective level abstractions'. Even if a dog could abstract on a higher level, like your test above, there will be a limit sooner or later. Humans, however, know no such limit and are able to abstract in indefinitely many orders.

[dan2100]

The tests are also trying to isolate from simple associations, such as Rex might have for his favorite ball -- which he just remembers the perception of and does not really do, what is believed to be, any conceptual work. As a sort of analogy, imagine a person you believe understands the concept of prime number, but, in truth, he has merely memorized the first 100 primes. He could never tell you what the 101st prime is -- save by luck -- or what makes a number prime (much less extend this notion to things like "relatively prime" numbers). Note that in this case, though, he's still evincing some conceptual behavior by likely understanding what numbers are to some degree. My point is, though, he really has no concept of prime -- aside from a list of 100 numbers. (Is such a set a concept? If it is, it's certainly of a different kind than what might be called a classical concept.)

Again, I am using 'conception' differently. You mention that he just remembers the perception but I would call this 'remembering' a kind of conceptual thinking. If you prefer not to use 'concept' for this then fine. In GS, this perception and remembering of the object is called 'objective level abstractions'. Even if a dog could abstract on a higher level, like your test above, there will be a limit sooner or later. Humans, however, know no such limit and are able to abstract in indefinitely many orders.

Leaving aside general semantics, I'd be more interested in if the distinction (between remembering and conceptuality) makes sense -- in other words, is a "natural" distinction. I think there might be some overlap, but I'm not sure if remembering is necessarily conceptual. (Also, there might be many cases where remembering is not the case. The outward behavior would be that the animal does some action when there's a trigger. Is remembering in the sense of, say, the fish remembering the reward last time triggering the action to go to the top of tank when it sees your hand moving up there or is it something else, such as just an unconscious reaction and the fish's mind, if we could peer into it, would have no remembering going on?)

And, again, my point here is not to say the dog -- or person or fish -- doesn't have concepts for such and such, but to find out how one would be able to unambiguously detect them. (Here I'd likely agree that human conceptuality is much better than that of a dog's and the former does seem limitless, but the issue is who or what has conceptuality -- not the limits of the sort of conceptuality they have.)

[tjohnson]

but the issue is who or what has conceptuality -- not the limits of the sort of conceptuality they have.)

Well, that may be your issue. I personally find it more instructive using the latter method.

[dan2100]

but the issue is who or what has conceptuality -- not the limits of the sort of conceptuality they have.)

Well, that may be your issue. I personally find it more instructive using the latter method.

I actually think until you settle the former, the latter issue should be on hold.

Also, the idea of no limits on here sounds like it might be no more than a platitude... If you don't have a clear definition of the problem or of the question, then of what use or instruction is it to praise human abilities? It sounds to me more like just patting oneself on the back -- rather than making a valid or sane point. Don't you agree?

[Christopher]

Rather than philosophize, we can simply use the knowledge humans already know.

Conceptual thinking is exclusive to primates, mostly humans, some evidence in monkeys. Of course all mammals learn to some degree, but this learning is not considered "conceptual" knowledge, it is considered and observed to be "associative" knowledge.

A dog learns to fetch a blue ball. According to psychological research, the dog has not created a concept of "blue" or "ball." Rather, the dog has identified an object and associated it to a certain motivation (stimulus-response behavior).

Humans of course have both conceptual and associative knowledge.

Christopher

[anonrobt]

Rather than philosophize, we can simply use the knowledge humans already know.

Conceptual thinking is exclusive to primates, mostly humans, some evidence in monkeys. Of course all mammals learn to some degree, but this learning is not considered "conceptual" knowledge, it is considered and observed to be "associative" knowledge.

A dog learns to fetch a blue ball. According to psychological research, the dog has not created a concept of "blue" or "ball." Rather, the dog has identified an object and associated it to a certain motivation (stimulus-response behavior).

Humans of course have both conceptual and associative knowledge.

Christopher

'some evidence in monkeys'?? sure? or maybe ye confusing with apes - they both primates, but they not the same...

[DavidMcK]

N. Branden endorses the concept of perceptual abstraction from a book 'The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes' Mortimer Adler...that was a long time ago and I don't know if contemporary psychologists and philosophers have pursued it. The stimulus response model has been severely criticized beyond repaid by n.b. among others.

[tjohnson]

Rather than philosophize, we can simply use the knowledge humans already know.

Conceptual thinking is exclusive to primates, mostly humans, some evidence in monkeys. Of course all mammals learn to some degree, but this learning is not considered "conceptual" knowledge, it is considered and observed to be "associative" knowledge.

A dog learns to fetch a blue ball. According to psychological research, the dog has not created a concept of "blue" or "ball." Rather, the dog has identified an object and associated it to a certain motivation (stimulus-response behavior).

Humans of course have both conceptual and associative knowledge.

Christopher

Perhaps it would be clearer to say "categorical thinking", rather than "conceptual thinking". So the dog is able to think about different objects but he not able to categorize them.

[dan2100]

Rather than philosophize, we can simply use the knowledge humans already know.

Obviously, some of us don't know this. Would you cite where this knowledge is stored?

Also, I was suggesting we look to ethological studies of animals -- not just sit back in the armchair and speculate -- if that's what you mean by "philosophize." (That said, though, from the armchair, one can try to be clear about what means by "concept" and related ideas.)

Conceptual thinking is exclusive to primates, mostly humans, some evidence in monkeys. Of course all mammals learn to some degree, but this learning is not considered "conceptual" knowledge, it is considered and observed to be "associative" knowledge.

A dog learns to fetch a blue ball. According to psychological research, the dog has not created a concept of "blue" or "ball." Rather, the dog has identified an object and associated it to a certain motivation (stimulus-response behavior).

Humans of course have both conceptual and associative knowledge.

I don't believe that claim is true -- if you mean only humans have conceptual knowledge. I've read studies with parrots and other animals that seem to show some ability to abstract -- which, seems to me, to be evidence for having concepts even if these are of a limited sort. Think of tests with Alex, the African Grey Parrot, who seemed to understand concepts like same/different, larger/smaller, and numbers up to six, if my memory's correct. (Don't you agree on the last being a conceptual ability? If some organism can be shown to understand, say, five of any object -- I think with Alex, they even used musical tones -- then you've demonstrated an ability for that organism to abstract "five" from all else.)

[tjohnson]

but the issue is who or what has conceptuality -- not the limits of the sort of conceptuality they have.)

Well, that may be your issue. I personally find it more instructive using the latter method.

I actually think until you settle the former, the latter issue should be on hold.

Also, the idea of no limits on here sounds like it might be no more than a platitude... If you don't have a clear definition of the problem or of the question, then of what use or instruction is it to praise human abilities? It sounds to me more like just patting oneself on the back -- rather than making a valid or sane point. Don't you agree?

You asked to leave general semantics out of this but to answer this question I need to refer to it. In general semantics it is theorized that man can abstract in higher and higher orders indefinitely. Roughly, this mean that there is no limit to our possible knowledge, for no statement may be construed as the final statement on any given topic. In this analysis, statements are considered as abstractions somewhat as follows.

object => label => description => inference => inference of inference => etc.

In contrast, an animal would at most be represented like this;

object => label

The whole idea of what animals can conceive (or if they can at all) is speculative because one can't "see" what the other organism is imagining. Without language only the simplest concepts could be learned but once we introduce language then you can explain more complex concepts, inferences, etc. So the fundamental difference, in this analysis, is the complexity of relations and structure that animals can understand versus what humans can through their advanced language and highly developed cerebral cortex. Does this seem like a platitude?

[dan2100]

but the issue is who or what has conceptuality -- not the limits of the sort of conceptuality they have.)

Well, that may be your issue. I personally find it more instructive using the latter method.

I actually think until you settle the former, the latter issue should be on hold.

Also, the idea of no limits on here sounds like it might be no more than a platitude... If you don't have a clear definition of the problem or of the question, then of what use or instruction is it to praise human abilities? It sounds to me more like just patting oneself on the back -- rather than making a valid or sane point. Don't you agree?

You asked to leave general semantics out of this but to answer this question I need to refer to it. In general semantics it is theorized that man can abstract in higher and higher orders indefinitely. Roughly, this mean that there is no limit to our possible knowledge, for no statement may be construed as the final statement on any given topic. In this analysis, statements are considered as abstractions somewhat as follows.

object => label => description => inference => inference of inference => etc.

In contrast, an animal would at most be represented like this;

object => label

The whole idea of what animals can conceive (or if they can at all) is speculative because one can't "see" what the other organism is imagining. Without language only the simplest concepts could be learned but once we introduce language then you can explain more complex concepts, inferences, etc. So the fundamental difference, in this analysis, is the complexity of relations and structure that animals can understand versus what humans can through their advanced language and highly developed cerebral cortex. Does this seem like a platitude?

In regards to platitudes, I meant more when someone throws out a conclusion that she or he seems to find pleasing and then is unwilling to back it up. It seemed to me, earlier, you were doing that in regards to human conceptual abilities.

Regarding the above view of conceptuality, I don't think it's a view general semantics has a unique claim to. In fact, my guess is something like it would inform most post-Fregean or post-Russellian thinking on the subject.

And, here, Rand would not break too from the pack. Her notion of "abstractions from abstractions" would, in my opinion, easily mesh with this. Also, Rand and many of her followers tend to see humans as clearly radically different from all other animals in terms of conceptuality. See the essays in her Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, either edition, for more on this.

Now, as to the content of your statement, this is actually somewhat close, too, to my view of the matter, though I'm looking for ways to test this. What I want to avoid is something I've read about in older books on or mentioning non-human animal behavior in contrast to human behavior. The general view seems to have been, long ago, that only humans use tools. That view seems not quaintly part of the past -- with not only the results of chimpanzees and macaques using tools, but even dolphins, elephants, crows, and octopodes using tools. And some of this use involves planning, such as gathering the tool for later use or forming some object into a tool -- rather than, say, immediate using any object at hand. This, to me, seems to reveal some level of conceptuality above merely attaching labels to things.

In this vein, I think what might really be going on involves stepping back and speculating a little on why concepts would be needed in the first place. As you're probably hinting with regard to humans, this does give a greater level of control over the world for humans: they can make longer chains of predictions or make finer predictions because of them possessing conceptual abilities -- whether this ability is truly boundless or just extremely great in terms of anything else now known. This would seem to give an advantage in survival or, at least, in successful behavioral outcomes. E.g., if you can make inferences about how certain types of rock can be used to make better stone axes, then you might use this to find those types of rocks, avoid others, and make the better stone axes -- which presumably make for better outcomes where a stone axe is needed. (This actually seems to be the case with some early hominins that seemed to know things like a fracture in a certain stone would result in a worse axe. So, in quarries used by this animals, we find what look like reject piles -- where they broke off a piece of stone, finding it had a flaw, and then rejected it, likely getting another, better piece to work with.)

If this is so -- and I haven't shown any way to verify or test this; I'm just placing it here for consideration -- then might not lower levels of conceptual ability have some role to play in behavior that has a survival advantage? (Of course, it could be that, say, dogs living in the strange environment of the human home evince really weird yet low level conceptual abilities -- stuff they'd never show in the wild. I believe that unlikely and actually think the opposite might be true: pets might exhibit lower levels of abilities that'd only be fully used in the wild simply because the human home is a less intellectually taxing environment. If Rex, Fluffy, or Fido, e.g., don't use all their cognitive muscle , it's unlikely the end result, in someone's home, is going to be them dying.) I think the same sorts of advantages -- ability to predict future outcomes -- would be at play and that this might explain why even lower levels of these abilities might exist in non-human animals, including not just other primates, but also even some mollusks.

Of course, this is a speculation on my part and it also depends on me being right about non-human animals actually having conceptual abilities -- even if extremely poor ones compared to the human average. That said, though, and again, I think there is some evidence for some level of such abilities in non-human animals.

Regarding language, I agree this makes conceptual abilities much easier to use and to detect. I think the jury still out on this in non-humans in general. I also think the jury is still out on non-linguistic inferences. I'd lean toward them being possible because tool use in non-humans seems to demonstrate the ability to make inferences -- even if only very short ones... Maybe like Rand's "abstractions from abstractions," most or all other extant animals can't make inferences from inferences or be aware that they're making inferences -- in other words, they can't make the leap from this or that inference to the general notion of inference much less make ever expanding chains of inferences. (This might, too, not be so much a function of lack of linguistic abilities or lack of a conceptual ability as a lack of memory or of a certain type of memory. After all, longer chains of inferences require, it seems, more memory -- and part of the function of concepts seems to be using this memory more efficiently. After all, possessing concepts allows on to store more in memory and have to rely on less perceptual awareness. E.g., if you know the concept of "dog," each dog you meet is not a totally new experience and need only remember it's a dog -- just like all the others -- and maybe focus on a few of its different features.)

Finally, yeah, you can't see conceptuality in anything -- human, chimpanzee, parrot, whatever. All you can do is see behavior that might evince conceptuality. That's what kicked off this topic.. Remember I gave it the label "how to distinguish conceptual behavior" not "how to see concepts floating around in brain tissue."

[Christopher]

N. Branden endorses the concept of perceptual abstraction from a book 'The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes' Mortimer Adler...that was a long time ago and I don't know if contemporary psychologists and philosophers have pursued it. The stimulus response model has been severely criticized beyond repaid by n.b. among others.

... for human, yes. We're talking about animals though.

As for the other comments, I think Rand would argue that conceptual and categorical thinking cannot be divorced (there is no conceptual thinking that is not inherently categorical).

I looked into Alex the African parrot. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alex_(parrot)

That is quite a story, I had no idea, and the evidence seems reasonable to conclude that animals have some conceptual ability. There is also the research that shows a crow can create a hook out of metal wire to fish out food from a test tube without prior exposure to creating hooks. There is also Tollman's work on mental mapping, which of course functions outside of the stimulus-response model. Hard to say whether a mental map is a "concept" in the general sense since it is function-specific. Also hard to say whether creativity such as demonstrated by crows comes from "conceptual" knowledge per se.

Whether I would reduce more than say a few % of an animal's actions to the abilities demonstrated by Alex, that's another story. Rand once commented that animals can hold up to five instances of events in thought at one time, which means that it seems quite plausible an animal could identify a fixed number of units without the help of concepts. There are so many function-specific modules in the mind that it makes it even harder to determine whether animals could possibly be conceptualizing versus merely leaning on a hard-wired automated mental system

[tjohnson]

most or all other extant animals can't make inferences from inferences or be aware that they're making inferences -- in other words, they can't make the leap from this or that inference to the general notion of inference much less make ever expanding chains of inferences.

This statement caught my eye because i think this is the fundamental difference between man and animal. Even if we grant that animals can think conceptually, make simple abstractions, etc. they can never know that they are doing so. In other words, animals abstract information from their environments but to them this information is their environment, for all practical purposes. They do not, and cannot, know about the deeper level of their environment, the levels that we humans infer like in physics, chemistry, biology, etc. So animals are severely limited to the information their own senses give them whereas humans have developed extra-neural means to gain and store information from one generation to the next.

[dan2100]

most or all other extant animals can't make inferences from inferences or be aware that they're making inferences -- in other words, they can't make the leap from this or that inference to the general notion of inference much less make ever expanding chains of inferences.

This statement caught my eye because i think this is the fundamental difference between man and animal. Even if we grant that animals can think conceptually, make simple abstractions, etc. they can never know that they are doing so. In other words, animals abstract information from their environments but to them this information is their environment, for all practical purposes. They do not, and cannot, know about the deeper level of their environment, the levels that we humans infer like in physics, chemistry, biology, etc. So animals are severely limited to the information their own senses give them whereas humans have developed extra-neural means to gain and store information from one generation to the next.

I think you're looking at a consequence not a cause of a higher level or broader conceptual ability with regards to information storage. Also, were you to go back a few tens of thousands of years -- maybe a bit longer actually, since it's hard to pinpoint when humans first started using "extra-neural" information storage -- the telling difference between humans (and probably other hominins, as Neanderthals probably had similar conceptual abilities) and other animals would not have to do with storing information outside the brain.

Also, the ability to pass information between organisms does not seem exclusive to humans -- as seen from imitative learning in other primates and in octopodes. I think it's this ability that leads to extra-neural information storage -- the ability to pass non-genetic or non-chemical information from one organism to another, though, I admit, this is more a speculation on my part and I won't go to the barricades over it.

[dan2100]

N. Branden endorses the concept of perceptual abstraction from a book 'The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes' Mortimer Adler...that was a long time ago and I don't know if contemporary psychologists and philosophers have pursued it. The stimulus response model has been severely criticized beyond repaid by n.b. among others.

... for human, yes. We're talking about animals though.

As for the other comments, I think Rand would argue that conceptual and categorical thinking cannot be divorced (there is no conceptual thinking that is not inherently categorical).

I looked into Alex the African parrot. http://en.wikipedia....i/Alex_(parrot)

That is quite a story, I had no idea, and the evidence seems reasonable to conclude that animals have some conceptual ability. There is also the research that shows a crow can create a hook out of metal wire to fish out food from a test tube without prior exposure to creating hooks. There is also Tollman's work on mental mapping, which of course functions outside of the stimulus-response model. Hard to say whether a mental map is a "concept" in the general sense since it is function-specific. Also hard to say whether creativity such as demonstrated by crows comes from "conceptual" knowledge per se.

Whether I would reduce more than say a few % of an animal's actions to the abilities demonstrated by Alex, that's another story. Rand once commented that animals can hold up to five instances of events in thought at one time, which means that it seems quite plausible an animal could identify a fixed number of units without the help of concepts. There are so many function-specific modules in the mind that it makes it even harder to determine whether animals could possibly be conceptualizing versus merely leaning on a hard-wired automated mental system

Regarding the statement by Rand, that was, if my memory's correct, the famous "crow epistemology" comment and was about crows only being able to hold a limited number of concretes. The specific example was actually taken from an earlier thinker Rand failed to cite. The example shows, however, not so much that the crows don't have concepts as the limits of perceptual awareness. Rand admitted, too, humans probably have similar low limits on perceptual awareness -- i.e., only so many percepts one can hold in one's mind at a given time. (Recall the famous Miller paper from the 1950s -- which Rand probably either of knew of or heard about indirectly as this paper was famous even back then -- "The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information.") Rand explains that having concepts allows one to transcend these perceptual limits... A bird that can count like humans can, e.g., can simply count the number of people going into a wood -- as the crows seemed to do perceptually -- and hold that number in mind and subtract from it as people leave that wood.

[tjohnson]

I think you're looking at a consequence not a cause of a higher level or broader conceptual ability with regards to information storage. Also, were you to go back a few tens of thousands of years -- maybe a bit longer actually, since it's hard to pinpoint when humans first started using "extra-neural" information storage -- the telling difference between humans (and probably other hominins, as Neanderthals probably had similar conceptual abilities) and other animals would not have to do with storing information outside the brain.

Also, the ability to pass information between organisms does not seem exclusive to humans -- as seen from imitative learning in other primates and in octopodes. I think it's this ability that leads to extra-neural information storage -- the ability to pass non-genetic or non-chemical information from one organism to another, though, I admit, this is more a speculation on my part and I won't go to the barricades over it.

Actually, when I say 'extra-neural', I mean as in books, computers, cd's, and other storage media and the structure of the theories, inferences, relations, etc. This is exclusive to humans and it is much newer than tens of thousands of years - more like a thousand or two.

[dan2100]

I think you're looking at a consequence not a cause of a higher level or broader conceptual ability with regards to information storage. Also, were you to go back a few tens of thousands of years -- maybe a bit longer actually, since it's hard to pinpoint when humans first started using "extra-neural" information storage -- the telling difference between humans (and probably other hominins, as Neanderthals probably had similar conceptual abilities) and other animals would not have to do with storing information outside the brain.

Also, the ability to pass information between organisms does not seem exclusive to humans -- as seen from imitative learning in other primates and in octopodes. I think it's this ability that leads to extra-neural information storage -- the ability to pass non-genetic or non-chemical information from one organism to another, though, I admit, this is more a speculation on my part and I won't go to the barricades over it.

Actually, when I say 'extra-neural', I mean as in books, computers, cd's, and other storage media and the structure of the theories, inferences, relations, etc. This is exclusive to humans and it is much newer than tens of thousands of years - more like a thousand or two.

I know that you meant books, etc. I was merely speculating that that capability might have arisen from the ability to imitate -- or, at least, the ability to communicate conceptually. (The imitation idea is probably not an original one; much work on mirror neurons seems to lead to this conclusion, no?)

Also, I'm not sure the "structure of the theories, inferences, [and] relations" would count here -- save in cases where these are too long to be remembered.

Also, extra-neural storage probably has a longer past than you think. Humans might have been using some form of marking things tens of thousands of years ago -- probably revealing that some form of symbolism was in play at that time. And certainly they were using some form of writing probably more than 7,000 years ago. Remember, too, the earliest detected instance of something -- writing, using stone tools, or eating clams -- is likely not to be the earliest instance of such. Of course, such writing was likely of extremely limited range and use, though this is a speculation.

Finally, if one looks at oral culture, I think much of what's needed for other forms of storage are already there. For instance, it's likely bards passed along Homeric epics for generations without the ability to write. So, this kind of "time-binding" -- i.e., transferring information across generations -- seems outside the need for clay tablets, cave paintings, or books. The latter certainly improve it, but the ability to do the former -- to exchange information in the first place -- seems the foundation for the latter, don't you think?

And, if this is correct, what you have to look for is not other animals reading books or using mobile to text their homies, but whether they can communicate concepts to others -- presuming of course that if they can communicate to others that they can also understand the communications back. From this, I think, there's the leap to associating some other external symbols with the communications and then you have some form of writing or, at least, of symbolic representation that can lead to writing.

[Christopher]

Regarding the statement by Rand, that was, if my memory's correct, the famous "crow epistemology" comment and was about crows only being able to hold a limited number of concretes. The specific example was actually taken from an earlier thinker Rand failed to cite. The example shows, however, not so much that the crows don't have concepts as the limits of perceptual awareness. Rand admitted, too, humans probably have similar low limits on perceptual awareness -- i.e., only so many percepts one can hold in one's mind at a given time. (Recall the famous Miller paper from the 1950s -- which Rand probably either of knew of or heard about indirectly as this paper was famous even back then -- "The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information.") Rand explains that having concepts allows one to transcend these perceptual limits... A bird that can count like humans can, e.g., can simply count the number of people going into a wood -- as the crows seemed to do perceptually -- and hold that number in mind and subtract from it as people leave that wood.

It's interesting you reduced my post to the single crow-counting comment. But the point of this was simply that there are ways "counting" can occur that is theoretically non-conceptual. The fact that Alex the Parrot had a very small counting limit (7 I think) suggests that his counting ability is non-conceptual, otherwise there wouldn't be this rather arbitrary limit which basically matches amount of perceptual information that can be held by a mind. Very suspicious indeed, Alex!

[DavidMcK]

Actually, the stimulus-response model is under question for animals too. N.B. referenced a work by a biologist...sorry I can't recall his name or the reference and my copy of 'The Psychology of Self-Esteem' isn't here in NY; but I actually spent the time to look up and read the biologists account and found it interesting and worth reading. Sorry to have such an inconclusive post but almost all my books are elsewhere.

[dan2100]

Regarding the statement by Rand, that was, if my memory's correct, the famous "crow epistemology" comment and was about crows only being able to hold a limited number of concretes. The specific example was actually taken from an earlier thinker Rand failed to cite. The example shows, however, not so much that the crows don't have concepts as the limits of perceptual awareness. Rand admitted, too, humans probably have similar low limits on perceptual awareness -- i.e., only so many percepts one can hold in one's mind at a given time. (Recall the famous Miller paper from the 1950s -- which Rand probably either of knew of or heard about indirectly as this paper was famous even back then -- "The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information.") Rand explains that having concepts allows one to transcend these perceptual limits... A bird that can count like humans can, e.g., can simply count the number of people going into a wood -- as the crows seemed to do perceptually -- and hold that number in mind and subtract from it as people leave that wood.

It's interesting you reduced my post to the single crow-counting comment.

You believe I "reduced" here? I see it more as I selected a point for comment. I merely wanted to bring up perceptual limits on consciousness and how Rand believed such limits are what conceptuality, considered as a tool for dealing with the world, overcomes. To wit, if there were no such limits, I suppose, then there would be much less or no need for conceptuality.

But the point of this was simply that there are ways "counting" can occur that is theoretically non-conceptual. The fact that Alex the Parrot had a very small counting limit (7 I think) suggests that his counting ability is non-conceptual, otherwise there wouldn't be this rather arbitrary limit which basically matches amount of perceptual information that can be held by a mind. Very suspicious indeed, Alex!

I don't think that's exactly the case -- that there are non-conceptual means of counting. Rather, what's happening seems to be either there is a low counting ability -- which some humans have as well -- or there's no counting ability -- in which case, the bird (or other animal) doesn't really have a concept of this or that number, but is merely remembering all the things perceived and then seeing there's a thing removed or added. On the latter, an analogy might prove helpful. Imagine looking at a dinner table with four place settings and then the same table with only three. You might not count the setting, but just notice one is missing -- as it's likely your perceptual consciousness can hold in awareness four settings and three settings and make the comparison.

Having a concept for a number -- and not necessarily for all numbers or for any number -- would, rather, involve being able to recognize that, sticking to the analogy, that there's something similar between four place settings, four musical notes, four people, four clouds, and so forth -- something similar that's different than three or five of each of these.

Let me be clear about this too -- without defending or reject the Alex case. I do think it's possible to have a concept of certain numbers -- such as one, two, and three -- without necessarily having concepts of other numbers -- four, five, six, etc. -- or abstracting to a general concept of number. And I think the way to test for this would be to see if the test subject can arrive at the same number across different percepts and maybe do some very simple arithmetic with even the few numbers.

Of course, that said, one might ask, as it seems you're hinting, whether even these more sophisticated tests might not so much reveal conceptual abilities as just really complex perceptual ones. I reckon that's possible and this is where theory and experiment would have to cross-fertilize to come up with ever better tests -- which might result in some surprises, such as, perhaps, as Branden and Rand hinted (if my memory's correct), there's some middle ground between concepts and percepts... I think they called this "perceptual abstractions." Perhaps some counting involves that, though I wouldn't be quick to jump on that train just yet.

[tjohnson]

Of course, that said, one might ask, as it seems you're hinting, whether even these more sophisticated tests might not so much reveal conceptual abilities as just really complex perceptual ones. I reckon that's possible and this is where theory and experiment would have to cross-fertilize to come up with ever better tests -- which might result in some surprises, such as, perhaps, as Branden and Rand hinted (if my memory's correct), there's some middle ground between concepts and percepts... I think they called this "perceptual abstractions." Perhaps some counting involves that, though I wouldn't be quick to jump on that train just yet.

So why not dispense with the language of perceptions vs. conceptions and simply call them all 'abstractions'? Is this distinction necessary? If so, why?

[dan2100]

Of course, that said, one might ask, as it seems you're hinting, whether even these more sophisticated tests might not so much reveal conceptual abilities as just really complex perceptual ones. I reckon that's possible and this is where theory and experiment would have to cross-fertilize to come up with ever better tests -- which might result in some surprises, such as, perhaps, as Branden and Rand hinted (if my memory's correct), there's some middle ground between concepts and percepts... I think they called this "perceptual abstractions." Perhaps some counting involves that, though I wouldn't be quick to jump on that train just yet.

So why not dispense with the language of perceptions vs. conceptions and simply call them all 'abstractions'? Is this distinction necessary? If so, why?

As you might guess from a closer reading of my passage above, I not only put a "perhaps" in there, I also stated "I wouldn't be quick to jump on that train just yet."

Add to this, there would be a difference, in my understanding, between a concept as abstraction and a perceptual abstraction. The latter would be much more limited and not able, in my understanding, to be further abstracted -- whereas with the former there's no inherent limit to the level of abstraction, hence Rand's "abstraction from abstractions" phrase.

Finally, whether these are real distinction is open to discussion and experiment. I wouldn't close this off merely by applying the label and overlooking any real differences. This might be akin to saying valleys and mountains don't seem to have a clear demarcation and so just calling them all "geography" ignoring that there are some real and important differences, in many contexts, between valleys and mountains.

[tjohnson]

Add to this, there would be a difference, in my understanding, between a concept as abstraction and a perceptual abstraction. The latter would be much more limited and not able, in my understanding, to be further abstracted -- whereas with the former there's no inherent limit to the level of abstraction, hence Rand's "abstraction from abstractions" phrase.

I see. Well, the way I look at it is that a perception is an abstraction and these abstractions may be grouped or classified (abstracted further). So in my view, concepts are already abstractions of abstractions.

[Christopher]

Let me be clear about this too -- without defending or reject the Alex case. I do think it's possible to have a concept of certain numbers -- such as one, two, and three -- without necessarily having concepts of other numbers -- four, five, six, etc. -- or abstracting to a general concept of number. And I think the way to test for this would be to see if the test subject can arrive at the same number across different percepts and maybe do some very simple arithmetic with even the few numbers.

There are some cultures that have numbers of 1, 2, and many (more than 2), but no other numbers. In this case, the teaching is culturally bound. This could probably be avoided by teaching methods, but just throwing it out there.

GS, As for abstractions, I think there is a big difference between abstractions that we have control over and 'abstractions' that are automatically generated below the threshold of consciousness and cannot be regulated. For example, the Mcgurk Effect:

There is a world of difference between perceptual abstractions and conceptual abstractions, and no doubt all mammals have the former. The question I think is whether they have the latter.