A Critique of Ayn Rand's Contextual Theory of Knowledge

[tjohnson]

Knowledge of knowledge is not the same as knowledge of something. If I say knowledge of nature is only approximate this does not necessarily apply to knowledge of knowledge. Look at this example - hate of hate is certainly not the same as hate of something.

[George H. Smith]

Knowledge of knowledge is not the same as knowledge of something. If I say knowledge of nature is only approximate this does not necessarily apply to knowledge of knowledge. Look at this example - hate of hate is certainly not the same as hate of something.

I stand in awe of your rigorous argument from analogy.

Ghs

[tjohnson]

And you really think all this would be necessary to determine the truth of the proposition "The cat is on the mat"? For once I am nearly speechless.

Well, I said it was a trivial example - I would hardly characterize "the cat is on the mat" as knowledge. You know what they, garbage in garbage out.

No, that is not what Popper was getting at with his criterion of falsifiability. He used it as a line of demarcation between scientific and metaphysical claims, and he never suggested that the latter are "noises without structure." You are confusing Popper with logical positivists, a misrepresentation he protested numerous times.

I am not an expert on Popper (where's Daniel?) but I was taught in QM that unless the opportunity of verifying a given statement with measurements presents itself then the statement is meaningless in physics. It may, however, mean something in science fiction or psychiatry.

[DavidMcK]

I can't resist stating that I would never recognize George from his picture on the link above..my memory of him is from the Tom Snyder program....many moons ago.

[tjohnson]

I stand in awe of your rigorous argument from analogy.

Ghs

I categorically deny each and every one of your allegations.

[George H. Smith]

Well, I said it was a trivial example - I would hardly characterize "the cat is on the mat" as knowledge. You know what they, garbage in garbage out.

That's a neat trick: When you encounter a simple knowledge claim that your theory cannot adequately explain, simply define it out of existence.

I am not an expert on Popper (where's Daniel?) but I was taught in QM that unless the opportunity of verifying a given statement with measurements presents itself then the statement is meaningless in physics. It may, however, mean something in science fiction or psychiatry.

That's what you get for attempting to learn philosophy from physics. A theory of meaning is philosophical, not scientific. A statement that cannot be quantified may be irrelevant to physics, but that doesn't make it meaningless.

As for Popper, he discusses his line of demarcation in various places, but all you need do is read Chapter 1 of The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Popper (p. 34) states his agenda as follows:

"The problem of finding a criterion which would enable us to distinguish between the empirical sciences on the one hand, and mathematics and logic as well as 'metaphysical' systems on the other, I call the problem of demarcation.

After rejecting the claim that "metaphysics by its very nature is nonsensical twaddle," Popper (p. 37) concludes:

"In contrast to these anti-metaphysical stratagems -- anti-metaphysical in intention, that is -- my business, as I see it, is not to bring about the overthrow of metaphysics. It is, rather, to formulate a suitable characterization of empirical science, or to define the concepts 'empirical science' and 'metaphysics' in such a way that we shall be able to say of a given system of statements whether or not its closer study is the concern of empirical science."

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

I stand in awe of your rigorous argument from analogy.

Ghs

I categorically deny each and every one of your allegations.

Is this another "trivial" assertion? Or do I need to plot it on an imaginary graph to determine if it is true or not?

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

I can't resist stating that I would never recognize George from his picture on the link above..my memory of him is from the Tom Snyder program....many moons ago.

I sometimes don't recognize myself either. After I hit 50, I acquired the vampirish trait of avoiding mirrors whenever possible. I avoided crosses long before that, and I have always been a late-night person. If I could only develop a taste for human blood, along with a severe allergic reaction to garlic, I might stop aging altogether.

Ghs

[tjohnson]

I stand in awe of your rigorous argument from analogy.

Ghs

I categorically deny each and every one of your allegations.

Is this another "trivial" assertion? Or do I need to plot it on an imaginary graph to determine if it is true or not?

Ghs

No, it was just a silly statement in response to your silly statement. I am starting to think that you feel compelled to turn to sarcasm when you have nothing intelligent to say.

[George H. Smith]

No, it was just a silly statement in response to your silly statement. I am starting to think that you feel compelled to turn to sarcasm when you have nothing intelligent to say.

The silly statements that you intend to make don't pose a problem. It's the silly statements that you don't intend to make that cause problems.

Your dogmatic proclamations -- I have yet to see anything from you that resembles an argument -- do not merit serious consideration. You don't even seem to grasp the most fundamental problems of epistemology. Responding to every problem with a Classic Comics version of Korzybski won't do.

I say all this without a hint of sarcasm.

Ghs

[Robert Campbell]

General Semanticist,

As George Smith has noted, Karl Popper never subscribed to the Logical Positivists' conception of metaphysics, according to which metaphysical claims are meaningless.

Over time, Popper also drew back from his project of definitively separating science from metaphysics.

In Realism and the Aim of Science (published in 1983, but written in the late 1950s), Popper acknowledged that scientific theories often rely on "metaphysical research programmes." In physics

[A]tomism is an excellent example of a non-testable metaphysical theory whose influence upon science has exceeded that of many testable scientific theories. Another grand theory of this kind was Descartes' clockwork theory of the world […] interpreting the physical world in terms of extended matter in motion. But the latest, and so far the greatest, was the programme of Faraday, Maxwell, Einstein, de Broglie, and Schrödinger, of conceiving the world—the atoms as well as the void—in terms of continuous fields. (Realism and the Aim of Science, p. 192)

Robert Campbell

[Daniel Barnes]

Over time, Popper also drew back from his project of definitively separating science from metaphysics.

For those not familiar with the details, Popper got badly shot down by his student, Bill Bartley, on this. Ultimately, however, this was one step backwards, three steps forwards.

He had the good fortune to have critical students, even if he found their criticism hard to take. Popper's beloved theory of verisimilitude was shot down by David Miller (who is still probably overall his staunchest defender).

For a comparison of critical cultures, imagine the DIM Hypothesis being destroyed by, I don't know, Andrew Bernstein or someone.

In Realism and the Aim of Science (published in 1983, but written in the late 1950s), Popper acknowledged that scientific theories often rely on "metaphysical research programmes."

And attacks on the Logical Positivist doctrine of the meaninglessness of metaphysics can be found in his The Open Society And Its Enemies from the '40s. He's been on at them ever since the LScD.

Apropos of nothing, it looks like Lakatos ripped off Popper's "MRPs" for his own "Research Programs".

Edited March 4, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Robert Campbell]

Apropos of nothing, it looks like Lakatos ripped off Popper's "MRPs" for his own "Research Programs".

Well, Bill Bartley made this charge explicitly.

I find it plausible, even after making allowances for Bartley not liking Lakatos one little bit.

Lakatos's ideas about "scientific research programmes" were in vogue in psychology during the 1970s and 1980s; they still resurface occasionally.

I see Lakatos as trying to bring metaphysics back into science without quite admitting that he's doing it—and without really addressing how to evaluate metaphysical claims.

But, yes, despite not speaking to Bartley for 12 years, Popper did take his criticism seriously. Nothing remotely analogous has happened in the ARI orbit.

Robert Campbell

PS. In Peikovian epistemology, arbitrary assertions occupy roughly the same place that metaphysical statements did for the Logical Positivists.

[George H. Smith]

For those not familiar with the details, Popper got badly shot down by his student, Bill Bartley, on this. Ultimately, however, this was one step backwards, three steps forwards.

I met Bartley a few times during the 1980s, while I was lecturing for IHS summer seminars at the College of Notre Dame in Belmont, Ca. (not far from Stanford). He would typically show up on the last day during the poolside picnic, dressed in a three-piece suit while everyone else was in swim attire.

Bartley was very pleasant and obviously highly intelligent, but rather shy. We had a few conversations, but for the life of me I can't recall what they were about in any detail. I know we talked about religion on at least one occasion, but in a very general way. I had read Bartley's Retreat to Commitment, but I wasn't in the mood to engage in a serious discussion of the book --I may have been too distracted by all the college women running around in bikinis -- and neither, I suspect, was he.

Ghs

[tjohnson]

Responding to every problem with a Classic Comics version of Korzybski won't do.

I say all this without a hint of sarcasm.

Ghs

Well you obviously don't know what 'sarcasm' means. Maybe you've been arguing philosophically so many years you don't know the difference anymore.

[BaalChatzaf]

Responding to every problem with a Classic Comics version of Korzybski won't do.

I say all this without a hint of sarcasm.

Ghs

Well you obviously don't know what 'sarcasm' means. Maybe you've been arguing philosophically so many years you don't know the difference anymore.

That last is sarcastic. Even a mind-broken overage Aspie like me can see that.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[George H. Smith]

Responding to every problem with a Classic Comics version of Korzybski won't do.

I say all this without a hint of sarcasm.

Ghs

Well you obviously don't know what 'sarcasm' means. Maybe you've been arguing philosophically so many years you don't know the difference anymore.

Did it occur to you that my final line was also sarcastic? That would explain not only the line you quoted but my sarcastic first paragraph as well.

Ghs

[rhartford]

A fundamental obligation of every parent is to teach a child how to assess his or her own knowledge, to praise children when they are sure they are right and are right, to correct children when they make an error and teach them how to correct errors, to guide them in judging the quality of their own knowledge, helping them to understand when they can be sure.

Emphasis mine. Speak for yourself.

Agreed GS.

My children. My house.

Mi casa. Mi ninos. Mi escopeta.

Adam

GS and Adam have told me a fundamental obligation of every poster is to speak for himself or herself. (emphasis mine) I agree. I spoke my best judgment of what every parent ought to do. You may disagree with what I spoke, but I did speak my judgment of truth. You spoke for yourselves in telling me that I ought to "speak for myself" and that is what I did.

[bmacwilliam]

I hope no one on this list would try to teach a child that was sure of her knowledge not to be so sure. A fundamental obligation of every parent is to teach a child how to assess his or her own knowledge, to praise children when they are sure they are right and are right, to correct children when they make an error and teach them how to correct errors, to guide them in judging the quality of their own knowledge, helping them to understand when they can be sure.

To do otherwise, to "[teach a child] not to be so sure of [his or her self]" when that sureness is warranted, would be a gross immorality and a tragedy.

Very very interesting. First of all I find the two sentences in the first paragraph at least somewhat contradictory, but I get the point.

However, I completely disagree. I think it's much more important for a parent to teach a child that if pusuit of truth is valuable, then not being so sure, or at least never fearing honest evaluation of criticism of one's positions is a true virtue. Anything else is the real immorality and tragedy.

[George H. Smith]

I hope no one on this list would try to teach a child that was sure of her knowledge not to be so sure. A fundamental obligation of every parent is to teach a child how to assess his or her own knowledge, to praise children when they are sure they are right and are right, to correct children when they make an error and teach them how to correct errors, to guide them in judging the quality of their own knowledge, helping them to understand when they can be sure.

To do otherwise, to "[teach a child] not to be so sure of [his or her self]" when that sureness is warranted, would be a gross immorality and a tragedy.

Very very interesting. First of all I find the two sentences in the first paragraph at least somewhat contradictory, but I get the point.

However, I completely disagree. I think it's much more important for a parent to teach a child that if pusuit of truth is valuable, then not being so sure, or at least never fearing honest evaluation of criticism of one's positions is a true virtue. Anything else is the real immorality and tragedy.

I'm with Robert Hartford on this one. Nothing he says about warranted certainty is incompatible with teaching a child to deal with criticisms in an honest manner. Robert obviously does not believe that certainty presupposes infallibility, and neither do I.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

I hope no one on this list would try to teach a child that was sure of her knowledge not to be so sure. A fundamental obligation of every parent is to teach a child how to assess his or her own knowledge, to praise children when they are sure they are right and are right, to correct children when they make an error and teach them how to correct errors, to guide them in judging the quality of their own knowledge, helping them to understand when they can be sure.

To do otherwise, to "[teach a child] not to be so sure of [his or her self]" when that sureness is warranted, would be a gross immorality and a tragedy.

Very very interesting. First of all I find the two sentences in the first paragraph at least somewhat contradictory, but I get the point.

However, I completely disagree. I think it's much more important for a parent to teach a child that if pusuit of truth is valuable, then not being so sure, or at least never fearing honest evaluation of criticism of one's positions is a true virtue. Anything else is the real immorality and tragedy.

The pursuit of truth, taught to a child, is a psychological virtue. The tentativeness of knowledge is a philosophical virtue and comes somewhat later. Mix them up too soon and you could ruin him for life because he needs a good, psychological foundation for everything to come.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

The pursuit of truth, taught to a child, is a psychological virtue. The tentativeness of knowledge is a philosophical virtue and comes somewhat later. Mix them up too soon and you could ruin him for life because he needs a good, psychological foundation for everything to come.

--Brant

Suppose you teach a child that it is wrong to steal, or that he shouldn't start fights with other children. Would you also recommend that these be taught as tentative moral principles?

Ghs

[tjohnson]

The pursuit of truth, taught to a child, is a psychological virtue. The tentativeness of knowledge is a philosophical virtue and comes somewhat later. Mix them up too soon and you could ruin him for life because he needs a good, psychological foundation for everything to come.

That makes sense. Later on when they are in court they will have to swear to tell the Truth, the whole Truth, and nothing but the Truth and feel good about it.

[tjohnson]

GS and Adam have told me a fundamental obligation of every poster is to speak for himself or herself. (emphasis mine) I agree. I spoke my best judgment of what every parent ought to do. You may disagree with what I spoke, but I did speak my judgment of truth. You spoke for yourselves in telling me that I ought to "speak for myself" and that is what I did.

You're right, I was reacting emotionally to my perception of dogmatism on your part. Universals like 'every', 'all', 'always', etc. sometimes set off semantic reactions like that in me. These are "dirty words" in general semantics. :0

[bmacwilliam]

I'm with Robert Hartford on this one. Nothing he says about warranted certainty is incompatible with teaching a child to deal with criticisms in an honest manner. Robert obviously does not believe that certainty presupposes infallibility, and neither do I.

Ghs

Well, splitting hairs now maybe, but there's great virtue in teaching that ones knowledge self-assessment should almost NEVER be complete.

Certainty should be based upon a logical examination of relevant facts. I'm saying it's much more important ultimately, to be accepting of new relevant facts than it is to be 'certain'.

Bob