A Critique of Ayn Rand's Contextual Theory of Knowledge

[George H. Smith]

Before we compare Peikoff too unfavorably to Popper perhaps we should start a thread on Popper's defense of a "third world" of knowledge -- i.e., "knowledge in the objective sense [of] knowledge without a knower " -- "that has admittedly much in common with Plato's theory of Forms or Ideas, and therefore also with Hegel's Objective Spirit...." (From "Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject," in Objective Knowledge.)

I have been reading Popper for many years, and I like him a great deal in some areas, but a few of his articles in Objective Knowledge are as indefensible as anything Peikoff ever wrote.

I'd be delighted to. As it happens, I first encountered Popper via the "3 Worlds" conjecture; in an article in the New York Review of Books as I recall. The article was highly negative. But I thought the ideas being dismissed sounded more interesting than the person doing the dismissing, so I looked further.

I agree that the points Popper makes in developing his case for a Third World of knowledge -- by which he doesn't mean all knowledge but mainly scientific theories -- are highly interesting. I would add highly suggestive as well. But he wavers between treating this Third World as an analogy and imparting an "ontological" status (his word) to it. I have no serious problem with the former view, only the latter.

So I'd be happy to defend it, although I am aware it is hardly flawless. In fact it's a pretty soft target. And I am sure Merlin has his World Series Edition baseball bat standing by...;-) The only issue is that I am off to Europe shortly, and am rather busy before then. So if you want to attack it amongst yourselves and be content with my acerbic one-liners now and then via iPhone from some airport somewhere, then fine. Otherwise it will have to wait.

I have a very high regard for Popper, so I would never criticize any of his ideas with acerbic one-liners. He is one of those thinkers from whom I invariably learn something, even when I don't agree with him. I own quite a few of his books, and I have read most of them several times.

My original point in comparing Popper to Peikoff was essentially this: In developing his notion of a Third World, Popper takes some sound ideas and marches them a bridge too far. This is also what Peikoff does with Rand's contextualism. (I would never place Peikoff in the same intellectual league as Popper, of course.)

A thread on Popper's Third World wouldn't do much good without a Popperian to explain and defend it, so it would be best to wait until you have the time.

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

I have a very high regard for Popper, so I would never criticize any of his ideas with acerbic one-liners.

Oh, just in case you misunderstood, I meant my acerbic one-liners, not yours...

I'd be happy to drone on at length about Worlds 1, 2 & 3 on my return, sounds like fun.

I am probably too hard on Peikoff, there is no doubt something he has written somewhere that is worthwhile. But reading him reminds me of Pauline Kael's remark about "Heaven's Gate", which was something like: "I could see what you would cut. I just couldn't see what you'd keep."

[merjet]

I suspect Daniel is referring to this and this, which is about Popper's views on definitions, not "3 Worlds".

Sorry, I meant that you seemed to have a low opinion of Popper in general.

No, not in general. Your remark is likely based only on the parts of Popper's philosophy we have discussed. I haven't read much Popper in many years. As I recall, I liked his advocacy of an open society and criticisms of historicism, but not so much his views of science and some of his epistemology.

Popper is one of the few philosophers of science that practicing scientists have any respect for.

Perhaps this is because of Popper's high regard for science rather than his analysis of science.

[George H. Smith]

I suspect Daniel is referring to this and this, which is about Popper's views on definitions, not "3 Worlds".

Sorry, I meant that you seemed to have a low opinion of Popper in general.

Not that there's anything wrong with that...;-)

Popper is one of the few philosophers of science that practicing scientists have any respect for.

It bears mentioning that Popper, in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, rejects the argument that metaphysical indeterminism follows from Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. (Here he was in agreement with Einstein, Max Planck, Ernest Rutherford -- the "father" of nuclear physics -- Bertrand Russell, and others.)

Popper points out, for example, that Heisenberg "tries to give a causal explanation why causal explanations are impossible" by showing "that causality breaks down owing to our interference with the observed object, i.e., owing to a certain causal interaction" (p. 249). Popper goes so far as to say that "Heisenberg's comments have had a crippling effect on research" (p. 248).

Although Popper later embraced a type of indeterminism (e.g., in "Of Clouds and Clocks"), he did so for other reasons.

Popper also understood that a good deal of early theorizing about Quantum Mechanics was based on a postivistic theory of meaning -- something that he rejected as well. The notion that empirical verifiability is an adequate criterion of meaning is now viewed by philosophers rather like alchemy is viewed by modern chemists. The theory was pretty much dead as a doornail even by the time that Brand Blanshard dissected it, piece by gory piece, in 1962, in his Reason and Analysis.

Ghs

[Selene]

George:

Wow!

Brand Blanshard. I have not heard that name in a long while.

To those of you who are not familiar with him:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brand_Blanshard

Adam

[merjet]

This is an aside. Since Ernest Rutherford was mentioned, there is a BookTV video about a biography of Rutherford. I also read the book and much enjoyed it.

[tjohnson]

A fundamental obligation of every parent is to teach a child how to assess his or her own knowledge, to praise children when they are sure they are right and are right, to correct children when they make an error and teach them how to correct errors, to guide them in judging the quality of their own knowledge, helping them to understand when they can be sure.

Emphasis mine. Speak for yourself.

[Selene]

A fundamental obligation of every parent is to teach a child how to assess his or her own knowledge, to praise children when they are sure they are right and are right, to correct children when they make an error and teach them how to correct errors, to guide them in judging the quality of their own knowledge, helping them to understand when they can be sure.

Emphasis mine. Speak for yourself.

Agreed GS.

My children. My house.

Mi casa. Mi ninos. Mi escopeta.

Adam

[George H. Smith]

George:

Wow!

Brand Blanshard. I have not heard that name in a long while.

To those of you who are not familiar with him:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brand_Blanshard

Adam

Everything that Brand Blanshard wrote is worth reading, but two works in particular stand out as masterpieces. One is Reason and Analysis, and the other is his earlier two-volume work, The Nature of Thought (1939).

In addition, Blanshard was a master of English prose, writing in a graceful, lucid style that is unfortunately all too rare among philosophers. (Sociologists tend to be even worse. On the whole, I would say that historians write better that any other group in the humanities.)

Blanshard wrote an excellent monograph titled On Philosophical Style. The text is available online at:

http://www.anthonyflood.com/blanshardphilostyle.htm

Ghs

[Selene]

George:

Thanks. I was chuckling to myself and I only read the first three paragraphs.

As a person who studied the Art of Rhetoric as well as the "techne," having tripped over many a trope, I get extremely perturbed when someone claims that your response to their "argument" is mere rhetoric.

There is nothing mere about the study and use of rhetoric. Additionally, it makes me appear much much smarter than I really am, lol.

Thanks for the essay.

Adam

[George H. Smith]

Blanshard wrote an excellent monograph titled On Philosophical Style. The text is available online at:

http://www.anthonyflood.com/blanshardphilostyle.htm

I wasn't familiar with the anthonyflood.com site before I located the Blanshard article mentioned above. Many other articles by Blanshard are available on this site as well. See:

http://www.anthonyflood.com/blanshard.htm

You should also take a look at the main page. Articles by many authors, such as Rothbard and Barnes, are available.

http://www.anthonyflood.com/indexofauthors.htm

Lastly, two book reviews by yours truly might interest some readers on OL. One is a review I wrote in 1977 (and had completely forgotten about) of Blanshard's book The Uses of a Liberal Education:

http://www.anthonyflood.com/smithblanshardeducation.htm

The other is a review I wrote in 1990: Nathaniel Branden's Judgment Day: Reviewing the Reviewers.

http://www.anthonyflood.com/smithbranden.htm

Ghs

[Alfonso Jones]

Blanshard wrote an excellent monograph titled On Philosophical Style. The text is available online at:

http://www.anthonyfl...dphilostyle.htm

I wasn't familiar with the anthonyflood.com site before I located the Blanshard article mentioned above. Many other articles by Blanshard are available on this site as well. See:

http://www.anthonyfl...m/blanshard.htm

You should also take a look at the main page. Articles by many authors, such as Rothbard and Barnes, are available.

http://www.anthonyfl...exofauthors.htm

Lastly, two book reviews by yours truly might interest some readers on OL. One is a review I wrote in 1977 (and had completely forgotten about) of Blanshard's book The Uses of a Liberal Education:

http://www.anthonyfl...rdeducation.htm

The other is a review I wrote in 1990: Nathaniel Branden's Judgment Day: Reviewing the Reviewers.

http://www.anthonyfl...mithbranden.htm

Ghs

George -

Thanks for sharing the meta-review (review of the reviewers of Judgment Day). I missed that the first time. I'm glad I've read it.

NB did a lot of things which he now regrets, and he has said so, in print. How many of his critics have engaged in similar behavior?

Bill P

[George H. Smith]

George:

Thanks. I was chuckling to myself and I only read the first three paragraphs.

I hadn't read On Philosophical Style in years, so after posting the link I read it again. It's even better than I remember. Blanshard's advice applies to writers outside the realm of philosophy.

I found this passage especially amusing:

"Barrett Wendell, in his admirable book on writing, points out that clearness and vividness often turn on mere specificity. To say that Major André was hanged is clear and definite; to say that he was killed is less definite, because you do not know in what way he was killed; to say that he died is still more indefinite because you do not even know whether his death was due to violence or to natural causes. If we were to use this statement as a varying symbol by which to rank writers for clearness, we might, I think, get something like the following: Swift, Macaulay, and Shaw would say that André was hanged. Bradley would say that he was killed. Bosanquet would say that he died. Kant would say that his mortal existence achieved its termination. Hegel would say that a finite determination of infinity had been further determined by its own negation."

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

I found this passage especially amusing:

That's one of my favourites too.

[Brant Gaede]

George:

Thanks. I was chuckling to myself and I only read the first three paragraphs.

I hadn't read On Philosophical Style in years, so after posting the link I read it again. It's even better than I remember. Blanshard's advice applies to writers outside the realm of philosophy.

I found this passage especially amusing:

"Barrett Wendell, in his admirable book on writing, points out that clearness and vividness often turn on mere specificity. To say that Major André was hanged is clear and definite; to say that he was killed is less definite, because you do not know in what way he was killed; to say that he died is still more indefinite because you do not even know whether his death was due to violence or to natural causes. If we were to use this statement as a varying symbol by which to rank writers for clearness, we might, I think, get something like the following: Swift, Macaulay, and Shaw would say that André was hanged. Bradley would say that he was killed. Bosanquet would say that he died. Kant would say that his mortal existence achieved its termination. Hegel would say that a finite determination of infinity had been further determined by its own negation."

Ghs

Funny.

No one wanted to hang Major Andre but that didn't stop them. I think Washington signed off on it. I've visited the site of the hanging many times as it was on a route I commonly travelled through Tappan, NY when I lived in New Jersey.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

George -

Thanks for sharing the meta-review (review of the reviewers of Judgment Day). I missed that the first time. I'm glad I've read it.

NB did a lot of things which he now regrets, and he has said so, in print. How many of his critics have engaged in similar behavior?

Bill P

If I were to write a book titled Regrets, it would take at least two volumes.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

No one wanted to hang Major Andre but that didn't stop them. I think Washington signed off on it. I've visited the site of the hanging many times as it was on a route I commonly travelled through Tappan, NY when I lived in New Jersey.

--Brant

Technically, Washington was correct, since Andre had been captured in civilian attire and was therefore executed in the manner of a common criminal. Andre wanted to face a firing squad instead -- the honorable death befitting a soldier -- and, as I recall, a number of Washington's subordinates wanted to afford him this measure of respect. But Washington was a stickler for details; and his demeaning treatment of Andre (who was admired even by his enemies) became widely regarded as a blot on Washington's reputation.

Ghs

[tjohnson]

My 4 year old grandchild readily knows the meaning of truth. When she hears something she knows is a falsehood, she emphatically states "that's not true." She has become so sophisticated that when she suspects I'm kidding her about something she will say "For Real!?" I hope that drive to know survives the onslaught those who find truth "problematic" and think "structural similarity" can equally serve the cause of knowing.

I think RH's comment here nicely demonstrates a key confusion that a dose of Popper can quickly clear up.

This confusion arises between the meaning of the word "truth", and a criterion, or reliable indication of or test, for truth.

RH claims, quite rightly, that most people, even 4 year olds, know, roughly, the meaning of the word "truth." Thus the issue of meaning is not "problematic".

The "problematic" part is finding a criterion of truth.

Let's use a simple analogy. We know what we mean, roughly, by "cancer". However, what's much harder is discovering a reliable indication or test for cancer -a criterion for cancer, if you like. In fact it might require a battery of such tests before a diagnosis can be made, and even then it might be uncertain.

So now you can see there are really two issues here conflated in comments like the above.

1) The meaning of the word, "truth", which of course most 4-year olds know, so can't be considered a real problem.

and

2) A criterion or reliable test for truth. This is far more difficult, unless we think 4 year olds somehow just "know" how to tell truth from falsehood. It's this part that is "problematic", and with no real solution in sight.

I think we can all agree that we would like our children to "tell the truth" and know the difference between tellings lies and telling the truth but, as I think Daniel is saying, this is different than believing in Truth with a capital 'T'. Since our knowledge is being continually updated and often depends on an observer's perspective we have to keep in mind that our statements need to be qualified, ie. Truth needs to be degraded to 'structural similarity'. In other words, the correspondence theory of truth should not be interpreted as meaning an exact correspondence, only approximate.

[George H. Smith]

Truth needs to be degraded to 'structural similarity'.

What are the structural similarities between the proposition "A cat is on the mat" and the fact (assuming it is a fact) that a cat is on the mat?

In other words, the correspondence theory of truth should not be interpreted as meaning an exact correspondence, only approximate.

Should we understand your theory of truth to be only an approximation of the real nature of truth? And if it is only an approximation, is it not possible that truth claims should be regarded as more than approximations in some instances?

Ghs

[tjohnson]

Truth needs to be degraded to 'structural similarity'.

What are the structural similarities between the proposition "A cat is on the mat" and the fact (assuming it is a fact) that a cat is on the mat?

In other words, the correspondence theory of truth should not be interpreted as meaning an exact correspondence, only approximate.

Should we understand your theory of truth to be only an approximation of the real nature of truth? And if it is only an approximation, is it not possible that truth claims should be regarded as more than approximations in some instances?

Ghs

Well, the cat example is rather trivial. How about "the length of the house is X ft.". This statement contains structural information which can be verified by actually going out and measuring. I may not get exactly the same answer but I will be able to determine how similar it is and whether or not the difference is significant.

You are invoking the vicious circle fallacy. When one makes a statement about knowledge it does not apply to itself.

[George H. Smith]

Well, the cat example is rather trivial. How about "the length of the house is X ft.". This statement contains structural information which can be verified by actually going out and measuring. I may not get exactly the same answer but I will be able to determine how similar it is and whether or not the difference is significant.

My example was simple, not trivial. If your theory of knowledge cannot even explain simple assertions of fact, then it isn't much of a theory. Most of our knowledge claims do not involve measurements of the sort you mentioned.

You are invoking the vicious circle fallacy. When one makes a statement about knowledge it does not apply to itself.

This self-exemption may prove convenient for you, or for anyone else who wishes to present an arbitrary and unjustified theory of knowledge -- but if your knowledge claims about knowledge cannot satisfy your own epistemological criteria, they should be rejected for that reason alone.

Ghs

[merjet]

Well, the cat example is rather trivial. How about "the length of the house is X ft.". This statement contains structural information which can be verified by actually going out and measuring. I may not get exactly the same answer but I will be able to determine how similar it is and whether or not the difference is significant.

Huh? By your own words, the house, X feet and "structural similarities" are merely abstractions produced by your nervous system. Link.

[tjohnson]

My example was simple, not trivial. If your theory of knowledge cannot even explain simple assertions of fact, then it isn't much of a theory. Most of our knowledge claims do not involve measurements of the sort you mentioned.

Well, if you insist, one could plot the position of the cat and the mat and define what "on" means in terms of intersection of sets and then determine either graphically or analytically whether or not the cat is in fact on the mat. Also, much of our "knowledge claims" are mere noises without structure. This is what Popper was getting at with his falsification criteria.

[Dragonfly]

For the validity of such metastatements we only need to suppose that man is not omniscient, see here.

[George H. Smith]

My example was simple, not trivial. If your theory of knowledge cannot even explain simple assertions of fact, then it isn't much of a theory. Most of our knowledge claims do not involve measurements of the sort you mentioned.

Well, if you insist, one could plot the position of the cat and the mat and define what "on" means in terms of intersection of sets and then determine either graphically or analytically whether or not the cat is in fact on the mat.

And you really think all this would be necessary to determine the truth of the proposition "The cat is on the mat"? For once I am nearly speechless.

Also, much of our "knowledge claims" are mere noises without structure. This is what Popper was getting at with his falsification criteria.

No, that is not what Popper was getting at with his criterion of falsifiability. He used it as a line of demarcation between scientific and metaphysical claims, and he never suggested that the latter are "noises without structure." You are confusing Popper with logical positivists, a misrepresentation he protested numerous times.

Ghs