Settling the debate on Altruism

[dan2100]

But this isn't really relevant to the discussion of evolutionary explanations. These would apply to all organisms provided they can die and can reproduce -- and that they have differential survival and reproductive success. It doesn't matter whether they have technology, science, and the like. The explanations would still apply.

But that's just it, our science has a tremendous effect on our reproductive success, in particular, our survival no longer depends primarily on "physical" prowess, etc. but is increasingly dependent on "mental" ability.

Did anyone here say that survival or reproductive success only depended on '"physical" prowess'? It seems to me that you were starting with a very narrow notion of these ideas... Let me be clear. In an evolutionary explanation, one is not limited to explaining survival or reproductive success via only physical prowess. In fact, to me, the only limits on an evolutionary explanation, at least in the Darwinian or neo-Darwinian sense, would be that whatever does the explaining is variable in the population and can impact survival and reproductive. This would, naturally, NOT exclude '"mental" ability.' Why would you think it would?

Edited March 5, 2010 by Dan Ust

[tjohnson]

In fact, to me, the only limits on an evolutionary explanation, at least in the Darwinian or neo-Darwinian sense, would be that whatever does the explaining is variable in the population and can impact survival and reproductive. This would, naturally, NOT exclude '"mental" ability.' Why would you think it would?

Perhaps the problem is I'm am not coming at this from a Darwinian or Neo-Darwinian sense. I am very wary about theories formed from observations of animals and then applied to man with the expectation that they will work just fine there as well. How would evolution explain it if mankind wipes himself out with a massive nuclear war? In the entire history of life on earth there has never been the possibility of an organism causing himself to go extinct. As I said before, evolution by natural selection may explain how we got where we are but we need something more general to predict where we might be heading.

[Selene]

Why do we "need" that crystal ball?

[dan2100]

In fact, to me, the only limits on an evolutionary explanation, at least in the Darwinian or neo-Darwinian sense, would be that whatever does the explaining is variable in the population and can impact survival and reproductive. This would, naturally, NOT exclude '"mental" ability.' Why would you think it would?

Perhaps the problem is I'm am not coming at this from a Darwinian or Neo-Darwinian sense. I am very wary about theories formed from observations of animals and then applied to man with the expectation that they will work just fine there as well. How would evolution explain it if mankind wipes himself out with a massive nuclear war? In the entire history of life on earth there has never been the possibility of an organism causing himself to go extinct. As I said before, evolution by natural selection may explain how we got where we are but we need something more general to predict where we might be heading.

This is simply not true. Any species can cause itself to go extinct, according to evolutionary theory, by having the wrong traits -- i.e., traits that don't suit its conditions. In fact, an evolutionary biologist might argue that the record of evolution from the species perspective just that: a record of species going extinct.

Also, evolutionary theory in its broadest sense attempts to find evolutionary mechanisms that apply to life forms -- not limiting itself merely to non-human animals. Of course, there might be reasons to limit particular mechanisms to particular kinds of living things, but there's no reason to start out with and it doesn't seem defensible at this point to state that there are two types of life: human and non-human and evolution theory only applies to the latter. (I'm not sure why you bring up non-human animals here. Do you think evolutionary theory thus far has only dealt with other animals -- leaving out plants, fungi, bacteria, etc.?)

Now, that said, I wouldn't rule out a priori that there might be some differences and wouldn't want to rule these out from the start. I've voiced the opinion elsewhere (and even here to some extent) that evolutionary psychology (which seems to me just the heir to sociobiology -- sociobiology for the 21st century?) is often applied sloppily -- as in someone observing some behavior in some other animal, coming up with some hypotheses explaining it, doing a tiny amount of testing, and then applying it to humans. That things happens much more often with amateurs applying the ideas far and wide -- whereas many workers in the field of, say, ethology, tend to make the conventional narrow claims and leave it to others to [over-]generalize.

In other words, there are genuine valid concerns here. But just saying you don't like this is not much of an argument. (It almost sounds like people who argue for rent control or minimum wage laws because they still believe it'll give them what they want -- when, in fact, economic law reveals to us it won't work and will only make things worse.)

In closing, too, it's unlikely a massive nuclear war would wipe out humans. This is not to say they might not invent other technologies that could wipe them out, but current nuclear stockpiles simply aren't large enough to do the job.

[tjohnson]

This is simply not true. Any species can cause itself to go extinct, according to evolutionary theory, by having the wrong traits -- i.e., traits that don't suit its conditions. In fact, an evolutionary biologist might argue that the record of evolution from the species perspective just that: a record of species going extinct.

Now that's an interesting thought! If humans cannot stop fighting amongst themselves and it eventually leads to their extinction then one could say we had "the wrong traits". What might these wrong traits be under those circumstances?

[Dragonfly]

Perhaps the problem is I'm am not coming at this from a Darwinian or Neo-Darwinian sense. I am very wary about theories formed from observations of animals and then applied to man with the expectation that they will work just fine there as well. How would evolution explain it if mankind wipes himself out with a massive nuclear war? In the entire history of life on earth there has never been the possibility of an organism causing himself to go extinct.

Countless species already have caused themselves to go extinct. Not by using intelligence in the human sense, but by failing to adapt to changing circumstances (which they may have contributed to themselves) or to compete successfully with other species. Human intelligence is just another feature that has evolved, which has its positive, but also negative effects. We may hope that we can neutralize the negative effects, but there is no guarantee. We may laugh about those antiquated dinosaurs as symbols of failure, but so far we're just an ephemeron compared to those extremely successful animals and I wonder if the existence of intelligence is not some inherently unstable factor that cannot survive in the long run (like a hundred million years for example - in the very long run all life on earth will of course disappear).

[tjohnson]

Countless species already have caused themselves to go extinct. Not by using intelligence in the human sense, but by failing to adapt to changing circumstances (which they may have contributed to themselves) or to compete successfully with other species. Human intelligence is just another feature that has evolved, which has its positive, but also negative effects. We may hope that we can neutralize the negative effects, but there is no guarantee. We may laugh about those antiquated dinosaurs as symbols of failure, but so far we're just an ephemeron compared to those extremely successful animals and I wonder if the existence of intelligence is not some inherently unstable factor that cannot survive in the long run (like a hundred million years for example - in the very long run all life on earth will of course disappear).

So, assuming we are not adapting well in this regard, what are we failing to adapt to? Our own intelligence?

[Christopher]

I think it's silly to reduce natural selection to either competition or cooperation. Natural selection is denoted by an organism's ability to fulfill it's needs within a given environment. This success can come from either competition or cooperation. If monkeys stand on each other's shoulders to pull down a pile of bananas, are they competing with trees? How about giraffes that live 10,000 miles away? If man can change his environment, then such behavior should be viewed through the lens of man achieving need fulfillment, not competition or cooperation... either path is ok so long as the needs are met.

Competition is too simple a reduction.

[dan2100]

I think it's silly to reduce natural selection to either competition or cooperation. Natural selection is denoted by an organism's ability to fulfill it's needs within a given environment. This success can come from either competition or cooperation. If monkeys stand on each other's shoulders to pull down a pile of bananas, are they competing with trees? How about giraffes that live 10,000 miles away? If man can change his environment, then such behavior should be viewed through the lens of man achieving need fulfillment, not competition or cooperation... either path is ok so long as the needs are met.

Competition is too simple a reduction.

What I wrote was: "... in mainstream evolutionary theory, competition is more fundamental than cooperation. If you're looking at the world through Darwinian or even neo-Darwinian lenses, then when you see any piece of cooperation, the immediate question is what competitive advantage does this yield. Using the same lenses to see a competitive situation, you don't need to appeal to a cooperative advantage to explain competition."

I was not so much reducing "natural selection" to competition, but saying cooperation can be explained in terms of competition but the reverse is not true.

By the way, the standard definition of natural selection is something like the process whereby organisms that are better adapted to their conditions survive and thrive better than those less adapted to their conditions -- the latter tend to increase their numbers while the former decrease. This process has competition baked in. If everyone does well and everything stays the same, then, according to natural selection, there'd be no evolution. (To be sure, one might argue that natural selection simply kept things as they are. Modern theories are a little more nuanced here and would argue that natural selection is when the traits are selected for environmental adaptation while neutral selection and other effects can still impact evolution. This is where things like drift plays a role.)

Remember, too, the full title of Darwin's famous work: On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. Note the use of "struggle" in there.

Now, of course, that this is what he meant and what many others mean doesn't, again, mean that this is the way the actual process works or that it's the only process at work. I just want to be clear here about what's meant and not

[Christopher]

Remember, too, the full title of Darwin's famous work: On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. Note the use of "struggle" in there.

I read struggle here to be a struggle with the environment - including weather etc., but that aside...

Competition exists to the degree that resources are limited, so I completely agree that competition is a fundamental part of natural selection. I don't agree that cooperation can be completely explained within a perspective of competition since hypothetically cooperation can access and generate resources for which there is no competition. In either case, competition itself depends more fundamentally on the context of need-fulfillment. As cooperation aims to fulfill needs as well, I'm seeing cooperation in a hierarchical chain of dependencies branch off from the needs-context rather than the competition-context. We're probably splitting hairs either way!

[dan2100]

Remember, too, the full title of Darwin's famous work: On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. Note the use of "struggle" in there.

I read struggle here to be a struggle with the environment - including weather etc., but that aside...

Competition exists to the degree that resources are limited, so I completely agree that competition is a fundamental part of natural selection. I don't agree that cooperation can be completely explained within a perspective of competition since hypothetically cooperation can access and generate resources for which there is no competition. In either case, competition itself depends more fundamentally on the context of need-fulfillment. As cooperation aims to fulfill needs as well, I'm seeing cooperation in a hierarchical chain of dependencies branch off from the needs-context rather than the competition-context. We're probably splitting hairs either way!

I think it's all dependent on what context you're using these terms and most of the problem for me here is crossing over from one context to another. Competition in the Darwinian/neo-Darwinian sense has a certain taint and I think that makes people react to the term a certain way.

I have nothing against you talking about fulfilling needs, but then I think you're leaving aside the Darwinian/neo-Darwinian setting. (And that's fine by me -- just as long as it's clear the context has changed.)

In fact, my earlier comments on this topic were warnings about using evolutionary explanations. (I still have to respond more fully to Bob on this -- as I only gave a brief response yesterday and wanted to elaborate what I meant, where I feel I've been misunderstood.)

[Christopher]

I have nothing against you talking about fulfilling needs, but then I think you're leaving aside the Darwinian/neo-Darwinian setting. (And that's fine by me -- just as long as it's clear the context has changed.)

I think we're both in total agreement, but the discussion of context had me research evolution. According to what's written online, need is more fundamental than competition:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Introduction_to_evolution#Darwin.27s_idea:_evolution_by_natural_selection

Natural selection is commonly equated with survival of the fittest, but this expression originated in Herbert Spencer's Principles of Biology in 1864, after Charles Darwin published his original works. Survival of the fittest describes the process of natural selection incorrectly, because natural selection is not only about survival and it is not always the fittest that survives.

Parry, thrust... haha!

[dan2100]

I know this hasn't become a 'what if' scenario (yet!), but to supply just one emotional factor/for instance - I think I would find value in rescuing a stranger from a river.

On two counts - human empathy, and not wanting to face myself later for not rising (diving) to the situation.

(Though if it were the Zambezi in torrent, I'd weigh the odds, likely hold back, and just have to live with the decision.)

The reason I raise this is to illustrate that 1. this doesn't necessarily constitute self-sacrifice (unless I die in the attempt), and is actually motivated by self-interest 2. more importantly, I don't think a SINGLE ACTION represents altruism... or egoism, for that matter.

Therefore, one who is a lifelong egoist by conviction can easily, on conditional occasions, make an unselfish act,or an apparently sacrificial act.

Is there a contradiction with Objectivist ideology? To quote the Galt Oath, "I will never live for the sake of another man..." I think that 'LIVE' answers the question.

In my opinion Objectivism's view on Emergency Situations is weak, but judge for yourself.

I feel it'd be good starting place to evaluate whether Rand's view on the "ethics of emergencies" is really consistent with the rest of her views here -- rather than just accepting it as part of Objectivism. (And, in my mind, Objectivism is completely open to revision -- as is any philosophical system. Deciding whether the outcome of any revision is still Objectivism depends on what one means by the term. And all such systems and movements face issues of identity and integrity -- i.e., what alterations are possible that remain inside the pale and which ones push one definitely outside it. I don't have an easy formulaic answer for this... Of course, regardless, I think you'd want to know what the correct position to take on this -- rather than what's the Objectivist one, especially given your comments on this being a "weak" part of the system.)

Wow, there's alot in there. First of all, I think that pretty much always, conscious human action is motivated by self interest and might be altruistic/sacrificial or not. For me, it is not a self interest OR altruism binary situation. Without this, whYNOT and others run the risk of getting muddled in terminology before meaningful discussion happens.

I believe I do know the correct position to take on this. I can arrive at this based largely on Rand's type of logic, but with one small but critical difference, leading to a very different outcome. However, projecting this outcome as objective and universally applicable is a leap I can't take.

Anyway, I believe I can quite justifiably paint a more accurate picture of what 'qua man' is. Without getting into too much detail, evolutionary biology quite clearly tells us that altruism (close enough to Rand's version) is built right into us for the most part. We are hard wired to struggle with often competing forces of selfish and altruistic drives.

In this situation, a "normal" person morally without question should indeed risk their own life to help. How much risk? Well that's an excellent question. Same thing with the starving child, yes we DO have an obligation to help. Altruism is part of what we are, it helped create who we are, it is part of "qua man".

Of course I cannot provide an objective basis of why this should apply to everyone without exception. There are strategies that co-evolve that might be in conflict and their morality is as objective as mine - in other words not objective at all. But I can say at least the vast majority would be described by what I'm saying.

Bob

Regarding "conscious human action" (a redundancy in Misesean terms: human action is chosen/purposive behavior as opposed to the rest of behavior), I disagree. The problem here is the need to specific what's meant by self-interest. Without specifying that -- and Rand does have her particular means of specifying it -- one can't tell what any particular action is. And in her view, there is a clear difference between self-interest and self-sacrifice: though it could be that particular actions fall somewhere along an extreme, in her view the more self-interested some action is, the less self-sacrificial and vice versa. (I'd add to this that Rand allows little or no scope to actions that are neutral here: either the action is directed toward self-interest or it's directed against it or some mix of the two, but there's nothing that doesn't fall under this, I think, in her ethics.)

I agree that this is Rand's view and it's not shared by everyone. And I also that those who use the terms differently might come up with not see self-interest/altruism as a dyad or dichotomy. Yet even in that case the problem then becomes are these views meaningful and consistent. Often enough what I see is the sort of vacuous definition of "self-interest" as people doing what they want -- in which case, almost anything anyone does is self-interest and the concept is of little value. One might as well as say, "His actions were actions done by him."

"Altruism" also is often defined as merely doing something good for others. This does fall under charity or benevolence in Rand's terms -- and it's not a reverse Scotsman in my opinion. Why on the latter? Because there's a definite distinction to be made between doing good things for others when this doesn't involve self-sacrifice or is not counter to one's self-interest versus doing good things for others when this definitely does involve self-sacrific and is counter to one's self-interest -- using "self-interest" here in Rand's sense.

Also, with regard to charity, there are definite strictures in Objectivism on this, according to a talk Peikoff once gave. True charity, in this view, is not supposed to involve self-sacrifice, is supposed to go to worthy people, and does not earn any moral street cred. On the first, this means, again, it doesn't harm oneself by doing it -- in Rand's sense of self-interest and self-sacrifice. On the second, by "worthy people," I believe he meant that tt doesn't go to people who are NOT reformable and who willfully caused their plight. In this way, it's very different from the usual picture of Christian charity. (To be certain, in practice, most Christians usually were and are stingier with their charity than their rhetoric would have us believe.) On the last, one isn't, according to Peikoff at least, a better person for giving charity. I'm not saying I agree with all this -- just relating his view because I think it might prove helpful here.

But there can still be an issue here. Most people tend to use "altruism" to mean what Rand means by charity or benevolence -- and not to mean what she means by self-sacrifice. To be sure, it seems many would praise the kind of self-sacrifice she'd be against, though their moral views tend to differ with hers. For instance, in their view, making the "ultimate sacrifice" might not consistently be seen as a sacrifice if one believes that, say, individual lives are means to an end -- and that end is aside from the individual lives.

I admire your caution here. I do think there's a tendency -- and I'm not free of it -- of making bold statements about what's objective and universal. That said, I don't think there no objective and universal principles, but I think one should be careful in attempting to arrive at and apply them.

Regarding evolutionary biology, I posted something earlier today on this here:

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8353

I'd be a little more cautious here about defining just what man qua man means. Also, many things appear to built right in, but might either not be or be something open to choice. I'm skeptical of claiming too many things are "hard wired" especially when the field of evolutionary psychology -- which I'd distinguish from evolutionary biology -- is relatively new and hasn't had the kind of successes some seem to believe. (In fact, from my studies, it appears to mostly just be sociobiology 2.0.)

[Christopher]

Regarding "conscious human action" (a redundancy in Misesean terms: human action is chosen/purposive behavior as opposed to the rest of behavior), appears to mostly just be sociobiology 2.0.)

I think it is a very unique and astute perspective to bring in a "Mises" view. I acknowledge I am not familiar with it. You mention that Mises argued all human action is value-action, regardless of whether the action was consciously intentional or not. Does this assertion conflict with your statement that "conscious human action" is a redundancy?

One aspect of Objectivism I've never understood is how conscious and nonconscious values interact. Are nonconscious values even acknowledged?

[dan2100]

Regarding "conscious human action" (a redundancy in Misesean terms: human action is chosen/purposive behavior as opposed to the rest of behavior), appears to mostly just be sociobiology 2.0.)

I think it is a very unique and astute perspective to bring in a "Mises" view. I acknowledge I am not familiar with it. You mention that Mises argued all human action is value-action, regardless of whether the action was consciously intentional or not. Does this assertion conflict with your statement that "conscious human action" is a redundancy?

One aspect of Objectivism I've never understood is how conscious and nonconscious values interact. Are nonconscious values even acknowledged?

I'm not an expert on Mises, but in my understanding of his view, human behavior can be split into action and the rest. The former is purposive and directed toward some goal -- i.e., it's the result of choice and seeks a chosen end. So a behavior that's not consciously intended is not really action. Think of the classic knee-jerk response. This is, in my understanding, not considered action by Mises or his followers.

Regarding values in Objectivism, values per se need not be conscious. According to Rand, if I understand her correctly, all living things have values, but not all values are chosen. (Her definition is, if my memory's correct, that a "value is that which one acts to gain or keep." Now here I don't think she was using "act" in the Misesean sense and, given her other comments on value, that this would be applied to all behavior and would applied to non-human living things as well, including bacteria, plants, fungi, and the like.) Also, she has a view of objective values -- which, in the case of humans, must be discovered, selected, and acted upon.

Of course, the kind of values implied in behavior -- such as a tree's sending out roots to obtain water -- are not exactly the same as consciously selected values, but they're still values -- they are pursued, in a manner of speaking, or something the organism in question is trying to gain or keep -- such as getting water in my tree example.

[Dragonfly]

"Altruism" also is often defined as merely doing something good for others. This does fall under charity or benevolence in Rand's terms -- and it's not a reverse Scotsman in my opinion. Why on the latter? Because there's a definite distinction to be made between doing good things for others when this doesn't involve self-sacrifice or is not counter to one's self-interest versus doing good things for others when this definitely does involve self-sacrific and is counter to one's self-interest -- using "self-interest" here in Rand's sense.

But "sacrifice" doesn't have to be extreme, like giving your life for someone else (the soldier who throws himself on a live grenade to save his companions). Even a small amount of money spent for someone else means that you cannot spend that amount for yourself. Rand herself gives such examples, for example that the choice of not buying a hat to save your child can be a sacrifice if you value the hat more than the health of your child (I'll ignore here the contradictions in her examples, which have been discussed earlier). There is a whole range from a small and negligible discomfort to a large discomfort and worse. Is there some kind of demarcation line where "benevolence" turns into "real altruism"? I think such a division would be arbitrary and quite personal and that it is more logical to call all behavior altruistic that improves the well-being of someone else while decreasing the well-being of the actor with at least some amount, small or large. But that would of course be denied if one insists that all altruism must be bad, therefore the true Scotsman is invoked.

[dan2100]

Competition may have gotten our genes this far but I think cooperation is going to be required in the next step of man's evolution. I'm not sure how 'altruism' fits in to this but I get the impression that 'altruism' means a sort of "forced cooperation" - but in this case the force is achieved through invoking feeling of guilt, duty, etc.

GS,

What are you envisaging - Utopia? Anyway, entering evolution and genetics into ethical debates is pointless, since they need huge time-frames to 'take.'

In the meantime, Man is what he is, and can best move forward individually,and by volition.

Co-operation is not the opposite of competition. The trader principle - trade of thoughts and, yes, emotions - is unsurpassed for its benefits to mankind, and the individual.

It's the advocacy of altruism that does all the damage, politically, socially and psychologically. To hell with duty, or the expectation of it.

Tony

I agree about being cautious about "entering evolution and genetics into ethical debates" on ethics, morality, and politics. People tend to draw simple conclusions and take rather shakey positions -- and the science isn't settled. That said, though, evolution or genetic change don't take all that long to happen -- and there's no set rate. In fact, some recent studies seem to show genes taking and spreading in human populations on the order of maybe hundreds or thousands of years. Yes, this is still long by the standard of an individual life and I doubt someone is going to make many ethical choices based on when and where the blond hair gene or such evolved. In many cases, this stuff is simply not germane to discussions of ethics and the like.

However, I think the others who were invoking it were not so much worried about what rate evolution moves, but rather at the results -- the particular results of importance being just what sorts of behavior are wired into humans. I think that can and should be discussed, but I would be cautious about drawing too many conclusions from this. (In fact, to me, history and biography should also be entered into the discussion. Both have as much to offer in terms of insight -- though they, too, must be used judiciously.)

[dan2100]

Competition may have gotten our genes this far but I think cooperation is going to be required in the next step of man's evolution. I'm not sure how 'altruism' fits in to this but I get the impression that 'altruism' means a sort of "forced cooperation" - but in this case the force is achieved through invoking feeling of guilt, duty, etc.

Cooperation was clearly part of our past evolution and I agree will continue as we go forward. Altruism is different, altruism means performing an act that confers a survival advantage to another person or people at the cost of a survival disadvantage to the actor. Taking a risk to help someone falls into this category.

and to respond to Dan...

"I think the jury still out and this field changes so much, especially in terms of looking into human behavior, in recent years, that I'd be careful in drawing too many conclusions of what's wired in or where certain behaviors or beliefs come from."

Sure, things will change, ideas will develop, but evaluating human behaviour against this backdrop has the distinct advantage of being rational, evidence-based, testable and scientific. Evolution itself could easily be thrown into the junk bin if a fossil record contradicts it - hasn't happened yet. Any scientific idea is immediately at risk/toast as soon any verifiable data doesn't fit. Find just one human skeleton inside the belly of a T-Rex of identical age and we're back to the drawing board.

But I think it makes a whole lot of sense to hypothesize that the forces that created our bodies and minds (evolution) would create our behaviour too. Sure this could be wrong, but we can test it.

How does evolution explain altruism? Mathematical/game theory models can explain how it could develop. Also, we have measured physiological responses to altruism behaviour in both humans and animals and neural reward pathways get activated almost universally (not across all species of course, but within).

You (Dan) wrote " though this would need to be tested and not merely proclaimed, no?"

Well yes indeed!! It's the Evolutionary Biologists that are hypothesizing and testing, while Rand did the 'merely' proclaiming.

That's the definition of altruism inside biology -- though it's not too far from Rand's view of it.

Regarding evolutionary theory, I was talking more specifically about evolutionary psychology. What I've seen in that field is much more heat than light. And the view that science self-corrects is not necessarily true. Incorrect theories sometimes have staying power. In fact, to me, from my studies, much evolutionary psychology just looks like warmed over sociobiology. Of course, the jury's still out.

[dan2100]

"Altruism" also is often defined as merely doing something good for others. This does fall under charity or benevolence in Rand's terms -- and it's not a reverse Scotsman in my opinion. Why on the latter? Because there's a definite distinction to be made between doing good things for others when this doesn't involve self-sacrifice or is not counter to one's self-interest versus doing good things for others when this definitely does involve self-sacrific and is counter to one's self-interest -- using "self-interest" here in Rand's sense.

But "sacrifice" doesn't have to be extreme, like giving your life for someone else (the soldier who throws himself on a live grenade to save his companions). Even a small amount of money spent for someone else means that you cannot spend that amount for yourself. Rand herself gives such examples, for example that the choice of not buying a hat to save your child can be a sacrifice if you value the hat more than the health of your child (I'll ignore here the contradictions in her examples, which have been discussed earlier). There is a whole range from a small and negligible discomfort to a large discomfort and worse. Is there some kind of demarcation line where "benevolence" turns into "real altruism"? I think such a division would be arbitrary and quite personal and that it is more logical to call all behavior altruistic that improves the well-being of someone else while decreasing the well-being of the actor with at least some amount, small or large. But that would of course be denied if one insists that all altruism must be bad, therefore the true Scotsman is invoked.

I believe this is where Rand can invoke her view of objective values and objective self-interest. That might not settle the issue, but, were it to work, it would reduce the number of cases that are fuzzy -- that fall under the true Scotsman argument. By this I mean there would be, per Rand, cases where you might not value say your child more than a new hat, but, on an objective value scale, you should value the child more so choosing the immediately easy path of buying the hat is the morally wrong thing to do.

[anthony]

Dan,

You say :

"Often enough what I see is the sort of vacuous definition of "self interest" as people doing what they want..."

Definitely; and this only serves to muddy the water and reduce the importance of self interest to its most mundane levels. At times I think, any half-conscious 'choice' can be rationalised/justified later as 'self interest'. However, to counter this, I suppose it could be said that done with full awareness, even buying that metaphorical (damned!) hat can have its place in the hierarchy of a person's value system.

GS,

You say :

"So, assuming we are not adapting well in this regard, what are we failing to adapt to? Our own intelligence?"

And earlier you invent the term "UNnatural selection." (Applied to humans.)

YES. This is the direction I am moving as well.

Tony

[dan2100]

Dan,

You say :

"Often enough what I see is the sort of vacuous definition of "self interest" as people doing what they want..."

Definitely; and this only serves to muddy the water and reduce the importance of self interest to its most mundane levels. At times I think, any half-conscious 'choice' can be rationalised/justified later as 'self interest'. However, to counter this, I suppose it could be said that done with full awareness, even buying that metaphorical (damned!) hat can have its place in the hierarchy of a person's value system.

GS,

You say :

"So, assuming we are not adapting well in this regard, what are we failing to adapt to? Our own intelligence?"

And earlier you invent the term "UNnatural selection." (Applied to humans.)

YES. This is the direction I am moving as well.

Tony

The vacuous definition of self-interest doesn't so much muddy the waters as make them appear clear when they're not. Also, the vacuous definition doesn't so much "reduce the importance of self interest to its most mundane levels" as it virtually eliminates the distinction between self-interest and non-self-interest to the point that it becomes nearly impossible to imagine an action that's not self-interested. This is similar to coming up with the distinction of "bachelor" -- to divide between married and unmarried men -- and then telling us all men, including married ones, are really bachelors. In other words, the term becomes meaningless as it no longer adds anything to the discussion.

Regarding buying the hat, in my understanding of Rand's view, one already has to have an objective view of values and self-interest before coming to the scenario. Without it, there is nothing to be said, especially if one adopts the vacuous definition of self-interest. With it, one would then have to ask, is buying the hat more or less objectively valuable or in his self-interest to the person than helping his child? One would not start with what the person does -- because this is what's to be judged. And, yes, the hat would likely have some place in his hierarchy of values, though my guess is Rand would believe it should be lower than his child in that hierarchy. Let's say I'm right about her view of objective value, self-interest, and the relative values of the person's hat and child. Then, obviously, buying the hat over helping his child would, even if he does it and does it fully consciously (in context as some might argue that one would have to fake reality on some level -- thereby reducing consciousness? -- to pull this off), would be going against his self-interest. Don't you agree?

[dan2100]

Countless species already have caused themselves to go extinct. Not by using intelligence in the human sense, but by failing to adapt to changing circumstances (which they may have contributed to themselves) or to compete successfully with other species. Human intelligence is just another feature that has evolved, which has its positive, but also negative effects. We may hope that we can neutralize the negative effects, but there is no guarantee. We may laugh about those antiquated dinosaurs as symbols of failure, but so far we're just an ephemeron compared to those extremely successful animals and I wonder if the existence of intelligence is not some inherently unstable factor that cannot survive in the long run (like a hundred million years for example - in the very long run all life on earth will of course disappear).

So, assuming we are not adapting well in this regard, what are we failing to adapt to? Our own intelligence?

I think you're looking for too abstract an answer to this question. Why did the dinosaurs die out? Letting birds aside -- since they seem to be the dinosaurs that did survive and flourish (if my memory's correct, there are more bird species than mammal species -- despite mammals being around, as a clade, for much longer than birds) -- yes, it was a failure to adapt in a sense and so it seems today. But given their times, they appear well suited to a range of environments and there's a good reason why so many dinosaur fossils abound -- probably because they were so successful that they left enough corpses around to be fossilized.

Are humans failing? I do not see this, but evolution and history are never truly over. Just as a person who is up until this moment successful in business can go bankrupt in the next, so might it come to pass with humans.

(Also, while I agree intelligence is just another trait, it does appear the smarter species often do fairly well. If we look at animal evolution, there does seem to be a trend toward larger brain size or larger encephalization quotients (brain-to-body ratio) -- and toward more sophisticated behaviors. The dinosaurs, despite having relatively small encephalization quotients compared with, say, modern mammals, were pretty smart for their time. I'm only bringing this up because intelligence is often shortchanged in discussions of evolution -- as if it didn't confer a huge advantage in the struggle. I think intelligence explains why human populations exploded while other primates are, for the most part, hangers on.)

[dan2100]

GS,

You say :

"So, assuming we are not adapting well in this regard, what are we failing to adapt to? Our own intelligence?"

And earlier you invent the term "UNnatural selection." (Applied to humans.)

YES. This is the direction I am moving as well.

Tony

What would "UNnatural selection" entail that would make it different from natural selection? I disagree about intelligence being different with respect to it being the trait a species has to adapt to. By this I mean that any trait a species has might be in conflict with its ability to survive and flourish -- not just intelligence. For instance, it's probably likely that the first organisms that excreted oxygen were making their environment, in the long run, poisonous to themselves. The conventional story I've heard is these organisms evolved and for a long time the oxygen they gave off had a neglible effect, but as they flourish and as more oxygen built up in the oceans and eventually the atmosphere, they likely poisoned themselves and brought up a global cooling event which further made their environment inhospitable to them. This doesn't appear to be the sort of thing one needs more than natural selection and the usual neo-Darwinian "tool kit" to explain.

[bmacwilliam]

That's the definition of altruism inside biology -- though it's not too far from Rand's view of it.

Regarding evolutionary theory, I was talking more specifically about evolutionary psychology. What I've seen in that field is much more heat than light. And the view that science self-corrects is not necessarily true. Incorrect theories sometimes have staying power. In fact, to me, from my studies, much evolutionary psychology just looks like warmed over sociobiology. Of course, the jury's still out.

I think that Rand's definition of altruism and biology's are sufficiently similar that we can meaningfully examine her ideas in a evolutionary light.

I understand your point about evolutionaly psychology, but I wanted to point out one think that people lose sight of sometimes when discussing evolution.

Evolution is not all about reproduction and survival of the individual. The individual is subordinate to his genes in very important ways. It's the gene perspective that is most meaniningful. Evolution is gene-centric. Therefore we would expect to see a general pattern of behaviour that would demonstrate a relationship between the strength of altruistic tendencies and kinship, this could include sacrificing one's life. Of course, this is indeed what happens, and is very well explained in his context. We don't need any separate "ethics of emergencies".

Bob

[tjohnson]

What would "UNnatural selection" entail that would make it different from natural selection? I disagree about intelligence being different with respect to it being the trait a species has to adapt to. By this I mean that any trait a species has might be in conflict with its ability to survive and flourish -- not just intelligence. For instance, it's probably likely that the first organisms that excreted oxygen were making their environment, in the long run, poisonous to themselves. The conventional story I've heard is these organisms evolved and for a long time the oxygen they gave off had a neglible effect, but as they flourish and as more oxygen built up in the oceans and eventually the atmosphere, they likely poisoned themselves and brought up a global cooling event which further made their environment inhospitable to them. This doesn't appear to be the sort of thing one needs more than natural selection and the usual neo-Darwinian "tool kit" to explain.

So what would you call it if an organism was polluting it's environment and gradually making it more hostile and it knew it was doing it and still continued doing it? I'm not saying mankind is doing this but the possibility presents itself.