Another view of Leonard Peikoff

[kiaer.ts]

Atoms have a diameter several orders of magnitude less than the shortest wavelength the human retina can resolve. We -cannot- see individual atoms, even if they stood still which there do only under special circumstances (as in being in Penning trap). This is optics 101.

This is selective scientific sophistication. We see by means of detecting photons. Atoms give off photons. Hence, we see atoms. (Unless you want to say that we see photons - which disproves your point just as well.) We may not be able to identify or distinguish individual atoms perceptually. I have not claimed this. Identification is conceptual, as you yourself have noted.

[BaalChatzaf]

This is selective scientific sophistication. We see by means of detecting photons. Atoms give off photons. Hence, we see atoms. (Unless you want to say that we see photons - which disproves your point just as well.) We may not be able to identify or distinguish individual atoms perceptually. I have not claimed this. Identification is conceptual, as you yourself have noted.

If you think you have -seen- an atom, could you tell us what it looks like? Is it round? Is it flat? Is it smooth?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Reidy]

What does the signature quote in #376 mean? As nearly as I can figure, it says "I am a pervert (homo sum), a bomb-thrower (nihil), an illegal immigrant (alienum) and a prostitute (puto)." I considered that alienum means from outer space, yet you claim to be humani. Don't put too much weight on any of this, as my Spanish is rusty.

[kiaer.ts]

Peter, LOL! Put the phrase in google for a translation.

Ba'al, I'll answer if you will answer my direct question to you above.

[tjohnson]

[

This is selective scientific sophistication. We see by means of detecting photons. Atoms give off photons. Hence, we see atoms. (Unless you want to say that we see photons - which disproves your point just as well.) We may not be able to identify or distinguish individual atoms perceptually. I have not claimed this. Identification is conceptual, as you yourself have noted.

We don't "see things", atoms or photons, we manufacture images.

[kiaer.ts]

We don't "see things", atoms or photons, we manufacture images.

Neither do we know reality, just our own ideas, nor do we speak the truth, just sentences...

I was wondering how long it would take for the relativists to reveal their Kantian mistakes.

[Mindy Newton]

William,

In the blurb for Peikoff's course Induction in Philosophy and Physics, we are told

These historic lectures present, for the first time, the solution to the problem of induction—and thereby complete, in every essential respect, the validation of reason.

Shouldn't such an epoch making discovery be published? I think Peikoff and Harriman were working on a book about this, but Peikoff has apparently dropped out of this project.

-NEIL

____

I am curious how L.P. could claim induction is a valid mode of reasoning (correct in every instance) when it is not. The discovery of white crows, black swans and the falsification of the the caloric theory of heat is sufficient to show that induction on a finite set of facts sometimes leads to hypotheses which are not generally true.

Induction is a nifty way of producing general hypotheses from particular facts, but there is no guarantee that these hyp;otheses (general statements) are true. Induction and Abduction are the among the means we have to get beyond a finite collection of facts. They are essential for the discovery phase of science. But neither are guaranteed to produce generally true hypotheses.

In effect, L.P. has "proved" that the square root of two is rational, which it is not. The general logical invalidity of induction has been known for hundreds of years (at least) and certainly since the time of David Hume.

Ba'al Chatzaf

From what I've read, Peikoff's theory of induction is the theory of concept-formation. I would suppose, then, that the process by which one delineates a subset of a genus, and parses out the differentiating characteristic, is part of the process of induction. If I'm right, it doesn't aim at explaining hypotheses, unless they are in the form of provisional definitions or some such.

--Mindy

[kiaer.ts]

I am curious how L.P. could claim induction is a valid mode of reasoning (correct in every instance) when it is not. The discovery of white crows, black swans and the falsification of the the caloric theory of heat is sufficient to show that induction on a finite set of facts sometimes leads to hypotheses which are not generally true.

...

In effect, L.P. has "proved" that the square root of two is rational, which it is not. The general logical invalidity of induction has been known for hundreds of years (at least) and certainly since the time of David Hume.

Induction is not invalid. It is fallible. There is a huge difference. The black swan issue is so trite. So people make unwarranted overveneralizations. Knowing that swans are biological creatufres, anyone with enough knowledge would know that color variations occur and that whiteness is not an essential property, just a typical property of a species. How do we know that whiteness is not such an essential property? Induction. Mistakes in induction are corrected by induction. Invalid methods used repeatedly do not result in better results. Induction is not invalid.

[Brant Gaede]

I am curious how L.P. could claim induction is a valid mode of reasoning (correct in every instance) when it is not. The discovery of white crows, black swans and the falsification of the the caloric theory of heat is sufficient to show that induction on a finite set of facts sometimes leads to hypotheses which are not generally true.

...

In effect, L.P. has "proved" that the square root of two is rational, which it is not. The general logical invalidity of induction has been known for hundreds of years (at least) and certainly since the time of David Hume.

Induction is not invalid. It is fallible. There is a huge difference. The black swan issue is so trite. So people make unwarranted overveneralizations. Knowing that swans are biological creatufres, anyone with enough knowledge would know that color variations occur and that whiteness is not an essential property, just a typical property of a species. How do we know that whiteness is not such an essential property? Induction. Mistakes in induction are corrected by induction. Invalid methods used repeatedly do not result in better results. Induction is not invalid.

Induction, deduction, reduction, what-duction. How about simple "rational"? Absent the illogical all one is talking about is additional facts to throw into the mix or the realization that a fact is actually not a fact. Galt had a motor. It worked. Absent something that works it's all blabber. Of course, if something works doesn't necessarily explain WHY it works.

--Brant

[tjohnson]

We don't "see things", atoms or photons, we manufacture images.

Neither do we know reality, just our own ideas, nor do we speak the truth, just sentences...

I was wondering how long it would take for the relativists to reveal their Kantian mistakes.

Do you deny that we manufacture images in our nervous system? This is not "a Kantian mistake", LOL, it is simply basic anatomy.

[Roger Bissell]

We don't "see things", atoms or photons, we manufacture images.

Neither do we know reality, just our own ideas, nor do we speak the truth, just sentences...

I was wondering how long it would take for the relativists to reveal their Kantian mistakes.

Do you deny that we manufacture images in our nervous system? This is not "a Kantian mistake", LOL, it is simply basic anatomy.

Yes, but images are not (normally) the object of our awareness. They are the ~means~ of our awareness.

The error is not just Kant's. More generally, it is the indirect or "representative" realist error of thinking that the object of perception is the image we form in the act of perceiving. In a sense, looking at something in reality is looking "through" the image, but certainly not ~at~ the image (unless we deliberately detach our awareness from the object and focus instead on the image in a kind of "phenomenological" (actually, introspective) attitude).

Similarly for propositions/sentences. We can grasp something about an objective in reality -- e.g., that my car is green -- and that mental grasp is in the form of a proposition/sentence: "My car is green." But in knowing the fact about my car by ~means~ of the proposition, we are not mentally aiming our awareness ~at~ the proposition, but ~at~ my car ~with the aid of~ the proposition. The proposition is our ~means~ of awareness of a fact about the car. We can detach our focus from the car and what we know about it, and instead focus on the form/means of awareness, the proposition, and study it, just as we can study images, rather than what they are images of. But that is a separate and different kind of mental act.

The Aristotelian/Thomist logicians call these two perspectives "first intention" (focusing on reality) and "second intention" (focusing on the form of awareness of reality). Much of the preceding discussion is a simple failure to acknowledge this crucial distinction in theory of knowledge.

REB

[tjohnson]

We can grasp something about an objective in reality -- e.g., that my car is green

Observe what happens to the the statement "my car is green" when you modify it to this; "I perceive a green car". The first statement attributes a property of "greeness" to "an object" , thinking which dates back to Aristotle, while the second statement falls in line with modern scientific theory about how our nervous system works. The only "reality" we have is the one our nervous systems give us. Science is a method of bringing all our unique "realities" together and formulating structure we can agree on.

[BaalChatzaf]

We can grasp something about an objective in reality -- e.g., that my car is green

Observe what happens to the the statement "my car is green" when you modify it to this; "I perceive a green car". The first statement attributes a property of "greeness" to "an object" , thinking which dates back to Aristotle, while the second statement falls in line with modern scientific theory about how our nervous system works. The only "reality" we have is the one our nervous systems give us. Science is a method of bringing all our unique "realities" together and formulating structure we can agree on.

The "greeness" of he car is in three places:

1. The chemical properties of the car's paint which causes it to absorb some wavelengths of light and to reflect other wavelengths.

2. The spectrum of the ambient light that illuminates the car.

3. The functioning of the rod's and cones in the retinas.

Phsyiology and physics are everything. Philosophy is ka ka.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[BaalChatzaf]

Similarly for propositions/sentences. We can grasp something about an objective in reality -- e.g., that my car is green -- and that mental grasp is in the form of a proposition/sentence: "My car is green."

Green is the name you give to the color you experience when gazing on your car. If the ambient light spectrum contained no wavelength for green you would not say your car was green, or more exactly, green is not what you would experience.

So how much of the green is in your car, in the light that illuminates your car and in the functioning of the rods and cones in your retinas?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

Also, modern science tells us that what we perceive as solid objects are actually processes at sub-atomic levels and only appear as static, unchanging "things with properties" at macroscopic levels to our limited nervous systems. Much of our ancient language does not reflect this and so statements like "the car is green" should be interpreted as Baal has stated above.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

GS,

Just because mankind didn't know about as aspect of reality before (like the microscopic level) doesn't mean that it didn't exist. I find that fact to be so obvious I still get astonished when I find someone trying to deny it.

Michael

[Roger Bissell]

We can grasp something about an objective in reality -- e.g., that my car is green

Observe what happens to the the statement "my car is green" when you modify it to this; "I perceive a green car". The first statement attributes a property of "greeness" to "an object" , thinking which dates back to Aristotle, while the second statement falls in line with modern scientific theory about how our nervous system works. The only "reality" we have is the one our nervous systems give us. Science is a method of bringing all our unique "realities" together and formulating structure we can agree on.

Yes, but observe what happens to normal human communication when, in response to someone's request to describe the color of your car, you say, "I perceive a green car," and the blooming thing isn't even there! Wouldn't you normally say "My car is green"? Why would you say something bizarre like, "If my car were here, I would perceive a green car"?

That whole locution, "I perceive a green car," is more like a phenomenological report, the kind of thing someone would say when reporting on their ~experience~, rather than on the ~object of their awareness~.

Also, bear in mind that many of our "S is P" propositions are formulated only ~after~ we form the relevant concepts. We are combining concepts we already have formed -- concepts such as "car" and "green" -- in a way that propositionally expresses some fact we have seen or mentally grasped (by inference, for instance).

For that matter, even phenomenological (experiential) reports can be rephrased as factual reports. The example you gave ("I perceive a green car") can be rephrased in S/P form as "I am perceiving a green car." And that is certainly the expression of a fact, but it is primarily an experiential fact about ~me~, rather than an existential fact about ~my car~.

You can nudge us toward experientialism all you like. I will simply continue to incorporate (as I always have) such verbalisms into my own broader subject-predicate factualism. I think it avoids the subjectivist (perhaps even solipsistic) problems that your approach could get us into.

REB

[Roger Bissell]

Similarly for propositions/sentences. We can grasp something about an objective in reality -- e.g., that my car is green -- and that mental grasp is in the form of a proposition/sentence: "My car is green."

Green is the name you give to the color you experience when gazing on your car. If the ambient light spectrum contained no wavelength for green you would not say your car was green, or more exactly, green is not what you would experience.

So how much of the green is in your car, in the light that illuminates your car and in the functioning of the rods and cones in your retinas?

Ba'al Chatzaf

Yes, in an environment temporarily devoid of certain lighting conditions, we would not experience greenness. And in a world permanently devoid of such conditions, we would not even have formed the concept of "green." So?

Our color concepts are merely some of the ways we have discovered to make survival-relevant distinctions among objects in our environment. In a counterfactual environment, whether temporarily or permanently inimical to our making those distinctions, we'd perhaps not have survived to be having this discussion. So?

The point is that the differences in the objects we perceive, in "normal" conditions, as green vs. red vs. yellow &c are ~real~ differences and we ~perceive~ those differences, which are real, in the ~experiential form~ of the ~color~ of the objects whose differences they are.

Here's how I answer your question about where is the greenness:

Intrinsically (i.e., apart from its relationship to a perceiver), greenness is the real attribute of a physical object by virtue of which it

can be

perceived in certain "standard" lighting conditions by a person with "normal" vision as "green."

Objectively (i.e., in its relationship to a perceiver) greenness is the form in which a person with "normal" vision perceives intrinsic greenness in certain "standard" lighting conditions.

This, by the way, is how to resolve the ancient conundrum about the tree falling in the forest. (The facetious version of which is: if a tree fell in the forest, and there were no one there to hear it, the husband would still be wrong, and the wife right. <g>)

REB

[BaalChatzaf]

Also, modern science tells us that what we perceive as solid objects are actually processes at sub-atomic levels and only appear as static, unchanging "things with properties" at macroscopic levels to our limited nervous systems. Much of our ancient language does not reflect this and so statements like "the car is green" should be interpreted as Baal has stated above.

"Solid" steel is 99.99 percent empty space. What makes solid stuff solid is the electrical forces of repulsion that prevent atoms from being squashed together too much. Almost all of the sensible properties of matter that we perceive is electromagnetic in nature.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Roger Bissell]

Also, modern science tells us that what we perceive as solid objects are actually processes at sub-atomic levels and only appear as static, unchanging "things with properties" at macroscopic levels to our limited nervous systems. Much of our ancient language does not reflect this and so statements like "the car is green" should be interpreted as Baal has stated above.

"Solid" steel is 99.99 percent empty space. What makes solid stuff solid is the electrical forces of repulsion that prevent atoms from being squashed together too much. Almost all of the sensible properties of matter that we perceive is electromagnetic in nature.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Yes, there are real physical causes of the perceptual properties of the things we perceive. But those causes are not more real than their causal consequences, whether microscopic or human-scale.

So why the quotes around "solid," as though the solidity of steel were less real than the "electrical forces of repulsion that prevent atoms from being squashed together too much." It's all real. To deny this is the basic error of Naive Scientific Realism.

There is no clash between Enlightened Scientific Realism and Perceptual Realism. They both describe real aspects of the world. Lucky us, we get to start with the most survival-relevant aspects, the ones we perceive, the ones that are causal consequences of the electromagnetic &c ones.

REB

[BaalChatzaf]

Yes, there are real physical causes of the perceptual properties of the things we perceive. But those causes are not more real than their causal consequences, whether microscopic or human-scale.

There is no clash between Enlightened Scientific Realism and Perceptual Realism. They both describe real aspects of the world. Lucky us, we get to start with the most survival-relevant aspects, the ones we perceive, the ones that are causal consequences of the electromagnetic &c ones.

So why the quotes around "solid," as though the solidity of steel were less real than the "electrical forces of repulsion that prevent atoms from being squashed together too much." It's all real. To deny this is the basic error of Naive Scientific Realism.

REB

"Solid" is not a precise term. If a fluid were viscous enough ti would be perceived as solid. For example glass. Glass if really a highly viscous liquid that can shatter if quickly and sufficiently stressed. Left on its own, it can run (liquidly ooze) but very slowly. Ordinary glass does not have a crystal structures (as do strong metals) which is why they arfe not exactly solid.

Anyone who has belly flopped from a 5 foot board onto water discovers that liquid water is pretty "solid" The surface tension coulomb forces impart a solidity to water when it is not cut cleanly by a wedge shaped object.

Everything that exists physically is real.

Demokritos was right. Real = physical. Physical = real.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

That whole locution, "I perceive a green car," is more like a phenomenological report, the kind of thing someone would say when reporting on their ~experience~, rather than on the ~object of their awareness~.

The "object of your awareness" does in fact reside in your brain, the stimuli is what exists outside of your nervous system. When we look at the sky at night do we "see a star" or do we register some light and create an image in our brain? Is this little pinprick of light a star?

[tjohnson]

I just had a thought. In Newton's work there is an unstated assumption that the speed of light is infinite. You can see this in the relativistic equations if you let c ->oo. It seems to me that this same unconscious assumption is being played out in this business about objects existing independent of observer. This becomes clear when you consider distant "objects" like stars. The light could be billions of years old and we have no idea where this star is now, if it even exists now or what. So when we "see a car" there is a small amount of time that passes while the light travels from there to here and in that time "the object" has changed due to it's process nature. But because the time is so short we unconsciously assume it's zero and "the object" is unchanging, has properties, etc.

[Mindy Newton]

There is a prior concept of the objective. It just doesn't apply to some areas, such as ethics or artistic taste.

(sigh)

1. If you do things that kill you, you die.

What has that to do with ethics? You shouldn't believe everything Rand wrote!

2. Any child can easily learn a major scale in music and use it to anchor musical ideas like melody. It can let you easily identify melodies and when one is reproduced correctly or if there is a sour note. Almost nobody can learn a dodecaphonic sequence and recognize when it is right or wrong in a composition.

What has that to do with artistic taste? Is music that is easily recognized and reproduced "better" than difficult music like dodecaphonic music? Never mind that I don't like dodecaphonic music either, I cannot prove that it is bad, because the criteria I use to judge it are subjective. That said, I far prefer Berg's violin concerto, that is largely dodecaphonic, over any pop song with easy tonality.

"Dodecaphonic" wasn't in my OED, but it must mean 12-tone scale. I assume you mean the chromatic scale? I like chromatic melodies particularly, when I can find a good one. The melody to A-Train is chromatic, and it is an addictive delight!

More to the point, the division of tones into a scale does have an objective basis. Harmonious and inharmonious steps and chords have an objective basis also. So there's a pop song with ?uneasy? tonality. If you were talking about tone-rows, there are still objective bases on which to evaluate such, and they are chiefly what was claimed for them: the ease of, or even the possibility of relating them given the perceptual capacities of the human ear.

--Mindy

[Mindy Newton]

Oh, brother! Philosophy continues to over-reach itself. Why did it take so long to see them in the first place? I'm talking about 3-6 million years of human evolution and being. Oxygen wasn't "seen" until the 18th Century.

--Brant

To see, to recognize, and to identify are different things. Oxygen was always seen, but only lately identified. There are many things that are seen and not recognized, or which many cannot identify. Can you identify monocots and dicots by sight? Can you identify different alloys by sight? Can you tell a mole from melanoma by sight? Does your inability to identify mean that you cannot see plants, metals, or disease? Perhaps you would tell an old friend whom you did not recognize that you "did not see him." Would that mean he was invisible? I could just as easily ask you how many millions of years it will take for you to understand the difference between seeing and identifying.

According to your understanding what would it mean to see an atom, since you know what it is that you deny? You cannot answer this without conceding my point. You continue to imagine your conception of an atom, and, because your perception of atoms does not match your imagined idea of a ball or a solar system, you deny that you see atoms. The problem is your conceptual understanding, not your eyes.

To be perceived is to be perceived in some form. We smell atoms as odors. We feel atoms as textures, and their motion as temperature. We hear atoms vibrate as sound. We see atoms as the colors and visual forms of substances and entities of everday experience.

My claim is orthodox. Read Kelley's book. There is no accepted refutation, Kelley is correct. I write for those who wish to understand, not those who take there own ability to scoff as proof.

We do see atoms. We see them in the way that they appear to us as humans with a certain form of awareness. Some of us simply do not fully understand or recognize what we see. I myself make no claim to be able to identify individual atoms. But we all see much more than we can identify.

How do you separate "identification" from "recognition?" When we recognize something, we recognize in in some respect, which is also an identification of it in that respect. So to recognize is to identify, at least it is making a partial identification, right?

--Mindy