Social metaphysics

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen Stuttle just made two exceptional posts on another forum on social metaphysics. I feel they deserve to be preserved in a better fashion than merely being lost in a thread somewhere, so I am starting a new thread with them here.

The first post is in answer to Bill Perry on April 13 2006:

I'll start with the concluding comment in Bill's reply. He wrote:

"I consider the 'second hand lives' theme, and by extension the concept of social metaphysics to be far more that 'something that worked as the basis of a novel.' Quite bluntly I find that comment to be shocking coming from someone with Ellen Stuttle's long experience in the Objectivist movement. The the conflict between the second-handers vs. Roark is central to the novel and to Rand's theme of individualism vs. altruism."

Bill, I agree that "the conflict between the second-handers vs. Roark is central to the novel and to Rand's theme of individualism vs. altruism," but where I'm disagreeing is that I don't consider the "concept of social metaphysics" -- at least as Branden originally presented it (he's gone through some stages with it) -- a legitimate extension. (Technically, I don't even consider it a concept, since I consider it an invented diagnosis.) You write that you "don't use it in the DSM [...] sense" and don't "go around calling people social metaphysicians as was done in the NBI days." I'm glad to hear that. But it was used in the New York circles I became familiar with as a diagnostic category; I think that's how Nathaniel was using it in the original articles; and I think that this is a good example of the incorrect extension of a philosophical abstraction into the realm of pyschological theory. I think that it's a good example of the whole way psychology was addressed in the formative articles (those in the Newsletter and The Objectivist) -- a way which I consider most unfortunate since, with its mixing of philosophizing and psychology, it produced people quick to find "evil" in themselves and (often even more quickly) in others and not well equipped to understand themselves and others.

You write that you personally find the idea "critical to living in today's world" and that you use it for "test[ing] [yourself] to try to avoid an overconcern about what others think about me" and for observing and assessing others. Also that you've lectured on "this concept." It sounds as if you may be using it in a way which is your own practical development rather than what NB wrote in his articles. I'd be interested to hear more about the details (though I realize you likely haven't time for discoursing on the subject, since you're planning to take a year's break from list exchanges starting in May). What I have to go on is what I've observed of the uses made of the notion. I haven't noticed anything of help to Objectivists coming of it; instead I've noticed a lot which I've considered detrimental.

Re Ayn Rand's "attempts to figure out her relationship with Nathaniel Branden," I believe you've read PARC. She gives considerable thought in the entries to the hypothesis of NB's being a repressed social metaphysician, and pondering what type.

Ellen

The second is entitled "Living Up," dated April 13 2006:

I indicated that I think the idea of "social metaphysics" as presented in the early Objectivist writings doesn't describe an actual psychological syndrome. Thus I think I should say for the record that there is a recognizable syndrome which both Allan Blumenthal and I -- independently -- coined a term for as a result of numerous observations of Objectivists (though of course it applies more widely) and which I think well fits those speculations I consider sound in Ayn Rand's journal entries about Nathaniel. Allan called the syndrome "living for self-esteem"; I called it simply "living up."

"Living up" consists of striving to be one's idealized image of oneself -- in Nathaniel's case striving to be the idealized "John Galt" Objectivist hero figure whom both he and Ayn Rand believed would fill the role of having the desired emotional/sexual reactions to her.

If Rand had had the idea of "living up" to work with instead of that of "social metaphysician," I think her attempts to comprehend what was going on with Nathaniel would have been easier (and I could hope very much quicker). Instead of speculating about "repression" of "social metaphysics or some other evil premise" (what a massive repression would have been needed! -- I think even a Freudian wouldn't have gone that far in ascribing near-magical powers to "repression"), she might instead have asked herself what I kept feeling screamed out to be asked: What might the conscious component she suspected from the first entries onward be? Might that conscious component consist of outright lying? Lying about what? Might Nathaniel have been coming up with an elaborate story to disguise the nature of his relationship with Patrecia?

And notice that she described "social metaphysics" as an "evil premise." That right there indicates a bad flaw in the notion as they thought of it, the inappropriate mixing of philosophy and psychology. A psychological syndrome isn't an "evil premise"; it's a way of coping and striving that a person gets into.

(The quote is from pp. 348-49 of PARC; it's from the concluding paragraphs of her long July 4, 1968, entry.)

Ellen

This makes a lot of sense to me, but I still haven't stopped my thinking on all this.

Michael

[JennaW]

I had no idea what social metaphysics was, so I looked it up:

"Social metaphysics studies the nature of sociality and its relation to individual human beings (and more broadly, the world). It overlaps the foundations of social theory, philosophical social theory, the philosophy of social science, and the metaphysical foundations of social and political philosophy. There are at least two components to social metaphysics.

One is the study of sociality and especially collectivity: the nature of social actions, social relations, joint agents and actions, joint intentions and beliefs, social groups and group mentality and activity, society and culture, social institutions and institutional facts, social role, norms, and practices, and social and linguistic conventions. One basic question here is how social relations and collectivities relate to the individual human beings who instantiate or constitute them. Do collectivities amount to anything over and above these individuals?

The other component of social metaphysics is the flip side of collectivity. One question here is whether individual human beings are already social in a way that precludes any sensible reduction of collectivities to individuals. In this vicinity, we find such questions as whether solitary individuals are possible, whether language and mental representation are inherently social, whether a private language is possible, etc. A broader issue is whether nature is already in some sense social." from this website

I can definitely see where it overlaps with psychology and cognition. But I don't understand.... what's wrong with social metaphysics?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Jenna,

The way the term "social metaphysics" is used in Objectivism is as a concept created by Nathaniel Branden (and sanctioned by Rand), based on an elaboration of her "second-hander" idea in The Fountainhead. Basically a social metaphysician substitutes approval of and relationship with other people for dealing with reality. His metaphysics is people, not reality. (Thus, for example, a social climber would most likely be a social metaphysician, substituting "political relationships" where "competence" should be in his soul.)

NB wrote an article called "Social Metaphysics" in the November 1962 issue of The Objectivist Newsletter (which was referenced in a footnote by Rand in "The Argument from Intimidation" in The Virtue of Selfishness). Chapter 10 in The Psychology of Self Esteem by Branden is also called "Social Metaphysics."

This concept as a psychological syndrome was used for a while during NBI days as a form of punishment and control. Many mistakes were made by the general misuse of it by several people and damage resulted in many people's lives.

Rand bought into the idea so much that the core of her analysis of NB in her 1968 journal entries in PARC is based on the premise of social metaphysics.

That's a start.

Michael

[L W HALL]

Ellen said:

Might that conscious component consist of outright lying? Lying about what? Might Nathaniel have been coming up with an elaborate story to disguise the nature of his relationship with Patrecia?

If this were true- and I personally do not know enough about the situation to comment on that part of it- then would it be that much of a stretch to believe Rand could have went into a in-depth analysis of what was wrong with NB(as she saw it) rather than deal with the pain of outright rejection, which could have been the result of facing the possibility of the aforementioned relationship?

[JennaW]

The way the term "social metaphysics" is used in Objectivism is as a concept created by Nathaniel Branden

The whole thing about vocabulary is really showing up the more I engage with people. More often than not, I am drawn into disagreements because I use words that are from the dictionary, or from Wikipedia, or from science. I'm finding that there is often an "Objectivist definition" -- however, that definition may not be the *only* definition that exists in the world. I really applaud your efforts, MSK, in elucidating the definition of "sacrifice" from a dictionary entry. There are usually more perspectives than just one.

[Kat]

Here are NB's definitions of Social Metaphysics

From The Objectivist Newsletter, November 1962 (pg 50):

"Social Metaphyics," then may be defined and summarized as follows: the psychological syndrome that characteries an individual who holds the consciousnesses of other men, not objective reality, as his ultimate psycho-epistemological frame of reference.

From Taking Responsibility by Nathaniel Branden, 1997 (chapter 3, pg 69)

Social metaphysics is the psychological condition of one who holds the minds and perspectives of other people, not objective reality, as the ultimate authority and frame of reference.

It basically means putting too much value on what others think.

Kat

[JennaW]

It basically means putting too much value on what others think.

Oh, I call that BritneySpearsism.

[Ellen Stuttle]

It ["social metaphysics," as used in Objectivism] basically means putting too much value on what others think.

Kat,

No, that rather tame description isn't how the term was (and sometimes still is) used in the Objectivist movement. If that had been all it meant, there'd have been no basis for a specifically Objectivst "psychological syndrome" being developed and elaborated upon. That some people are insecure and worry too much about what others think, generally what others think of them, is an observation probably older than the proverbial hills. The term "social metaphysics" meant much more. It was used to delineate a supposed type of human being, the "social metaphysician," who defaulted on the responsibility of thought and attempted to place metaphysics (the branch of philosophy that studies being qua being) on the shifting grounds of what others say reality is. It was a term of opprobrium, of condemnation of a person's essential approach to dealing with reality. It was in the category of a "dread sentence." To say of someone, "You're a social metaphysician," was to accuse that person of having an evil "psychoepistemology."

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

L. W. Hall quoted me and then speculated:

Ellen said:

Might that conscious component consist of outright lying? Lying about what? Might Nathaniel have been coming up with an elaborate story to disguise the nature of his relationship with Patrecia?

If this were true- and I personally do not know enough about the situation to comment on that part of it- then would it be that much of a stretch to believe Rand could have went into a in-depth analysis of what was wrong with NB(as she saw it) rather than deal with the pain of outright rejection, which could have been the result of facing the possibility of the aforementioned relationship?

L. W., I noticed your post when I signed on earlier but didn't have time to give a considered reply. The possibility you raise suggests a subconscious desire on her part not to see the truth. I don't know that I'd go that far in trying to explain her slowness of uptake. I think she was very honest.

She herself attributed her "hav[ing] seen farther than others" (borrowing from a comment famously attributed to Newton) to her "honesty." Leonard Peikoff, in his "memoir" of his 30 years with Ayn Rand (originally delivered as a speech at the Ford Hall Forum), says that he thinks there had to be more involved; after all, he says, he too was honest but couldn't have come up with the sort of pathbreakingly brilliant work she did. I agree with Leonard there. More was involved than "honesty" in her genius. Still, I do think that she had a direct view on the world which I might even describe as "ferociously" direct and lacking in any ability to engage in disguises. Thus, among the reasons why I find reading her journal entries pertaining to her relationship with Nathaniel painful is because she seems to be trying so hard to understand what she doesn't understand.

Yet...I think that the average professional waitress/waiter (I'm speaking of someone who's made a career of serving tables in restaurants) would have seen within months what she hadn't perceived in almost four years when the entries started. The term to which I keep reverting is "naivety," but that doesn't do justice to why she'd have been so slow to see. It's just the best term, thus far, I've found for describing her ignorance about the details of the psychology of real people.

Ellen

___

[Barbara Branden]

Ellen: "The term to which I keep reverting is "naivety," but that doesn't do justice to why she'd have been so slow to see. It's just the best term, thus far, I've found for describing her ignorance about the details of the psychology of real people."

I think what was also involved -- and "naivety" is certainly relevant, because in other ways as well it was typical of Rand -- was a failure to question certain of her own convictions, specifically in the realm of psychology. One has to remember that in her dealings with people, she tended to judge their psychology by what she understood to be the meaning of their stated philosophy. If one was what she termed a mystic, one was a Witch Doctor, with all that that implied; if one was a materialist, one was an Attila. These were, to her, not merely apt metaphors, they were descriptions of real mental and psychological states.

In judging Nathaniel’s apparent growing indifference to her, she faced an insuperable problem in understanding him. I'll explain in probably somewhat oversimplified terms, but I believe they are accurate. First, she had concluded, at least in significant part because he appeared to understand and accept the total of her philosophy, that he was the equal of her fiction heroes; second, she was convinced that such a man, according to her theory of sex, would have to be sexually and romantically drawn to her above all other and lesser women. In order to doubt him seriously, she had to be convinced that he was not philosophically what she had thought him to be. She was able to do this to a significant degree only after Nathaniel presented her with his paper attempting to explain that the age barrier between them was, for him, an insuperable problem to their romance. It was when she knew that he was not sexually in love with her, that she was able finally and fully to damn him.

[Ellen Stuttle]

I think what was also involved [...] was a failure to question certain of her own convictions, specifically in the realm of psychology. One has to remember that in her dealings with people, she tended to judge their psychology by what she understood to be the meaning of their stated philosophy. [....]

In judging Nathaniel’s apparent growing indifference to her, she faced an insuperable problem in understanding him. [....] First, she had concluded, at least in significant part because he appeared to understand and accept the total of her philosophy, that he was the equal of her fiction heroes; second, she was convinced that such a man, according to her theory of sex, would have to be sexually and romantically drawn to her above all other and lesser women. In order to doubt him seriously, she had to be convinced that he was not philosophically what she had thought him to be.

That's hot, Barbara. It is a premise that underlies all her speculating about Nathaniel in the journals that of course IF he really is the John Galt figure of her fictional world, then inevitably he will respond to her as she desires. She never asks if her assumptions about the nature of sexual response might be incorrect, never recognizes that she's thinking of actual people as if they were walking philosophic abstractions. (And an added problem was the extent to which Nathaniel shared her belief that he'd respond to her as she wanted if he really were his own idealized image.)

Your point about "such a man, according to her theory of sex, [having] to be sexually and romantically drawn to her above all other and lesser women [emphasis added]" is why I think that "insult" is the more accurate description for her reaction to his being attracted to Patrecia than "jealousy." I think her focus wasn't on Patrecia's being young and beautiful, as "jealousy" would imply, but instead on Patrecia's being what she thought of as inferior, an intellectual lightweight. She says someplace in the journals, "What is he giving up, for what?" (I don't have the exact quote and page number immediately to hand.)

Ellen

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[Ellen Stuttle]

So...naivety combined with that unshakeable conviction, that indeed axiomatic conviction, that of course her theories were right. "Innocent absolutism" might be a good way to describe it. (I solicit better suggestions; I never have found the exact wording I want; I can feel the quality I'm trying to describe, a palpable sense of it; but what are the best words for it?)

Ellen

___

[Barbara Branden]

"Original innocence??"

[Ellen Stuttle]

Barbara suggests: "Original innocence??"

Interesting, and deft play on "original sin." But more childlike than I have in mind. Not that she wasn't in some modes "childlike," but that doesn't capture the ferocious singleness, like a primal force. All of which images combined lead me to think of William Blake's "Tyger" from his "Songs of Experience," companion poems to his "Songs of Innocence." Maybe a combination of Blake's lamb and his tyger. ("Did he smile his work to see? Did he who made the lamb make thee?")

Ellen

___

[Barbara Branden]

Ellen, I agree that "original innocence" isn't quite right. But I like it because it conveys that Rand's particular kind of innocence (innocence of the complexities of human psychology) began very early in her life, and it remained a part of her just as original sin supposedly is inescapable throughout one's life. Perhaps most of us, as children, have this kind of straighforward and fierce innocence about other people, we see them as black or white; this was a perspective that Rand never lost.

[L W HALL]

Ellen, the dialogue between you and Barbara on this subject is quite fascinating to say the least.

The way you both describe Rand in this facet of her being somewhat reminds me of a person who tries to direct life as if it was a play, and then is unable to fully understand when others don't play the part that is assigned.

L W

[Paul Mawdsley]

LW,

I tend to see Rand the way you describe. It is the unconscious Plato in Rand: she created an elaborate fiction to represent reality and viewed reality through the lens of this fiction. When she stopped reality testing and developing her inner fiction, it stopped evolving. That's when she began to attack those who didn't fit with greater vigour.

Paul

[L W HALL]

Paul, I wonder how many of us(and I include myself) can truly view the world in a manner approaching strict objectivism? While I have no problem with the idea of "existence exists", and I am not proffering a case for subjectivism; could it not be that by the time we get past filtering our thoughts through various likes and dislikes, experiences, and overall worldviews that we hold, we then arrive at a point that by it's nature is somewhat tainted.

It would also seem that the higher level concepts such as those we hold in regards to other people would be more subject to this type of determination as they are further removed from percepts and thus easier to make mistakes(if that's a good word) about.

L W

[Paul Mawdsley]

L W observes:

Paul, I wonder how many of us(and I include myself) can truly view the world in a manner approaching strict objectivism? ...could it not be that by the time we get past filtering our thoughts through various likes and dislikes, experiences, and overall worldviews that we hold, we then arrive at a point that by it's nature is somewhat tainted.

It would also seem that the higher level concepts such as those we hold in regards to other people would be more subject to this type of determination as they are further removed from percepts and thus easier to make mistakes(if that's a good word) about.

I see objectivity as being the result of isolating, identifying and integrating the elements of reality that inform and mould our worldview. Objectivity requires that we not only focus our awareness on the objective world but also on the orientations of consciousness, interpretive frameworks, and motivations that actively shape our interpretations of that world.

If what a thing is determines what it does, then who and what we are determines how information from the objective world is processed. Therefore, who and what we are must be considered in any objective account of existence.

The further we are removed from percepts, the greater is the need to identify and integrate the factors in our psyche that influence our interpretations. This is where Rand’s views fall short of the mark. Rand created a brilliant system of thought. Her work presented a vision of human nature that was proactive, passionate, rational, and self-responsible. Personally, this showed me a choice about how to live my life that I had not, and probably would not, have discovered on my own. Despite the brilliance of her view, she did not identify and integrate all the factors in our psyche that influence our interpretations. This is where her view became less that objective.

Nathaniel Branden has taken our perspective of human nature considerably further, interpreting a greater amount of psychological information from the same basic principles as Rand. I believe, Branden’s work, combined with Rand’s, provides us with the opportunity for greater objectivity than Rand’s by itself. I also believe there is much more to be understood about the fundamental dynamics of the human psyche. Branden’s is far from the final word. As our understanding of our own inner processes increases– eg: our orientations of consciousness, our interpretive frameworks, our motivations, etc., so too will our ability to be more objective about “higher level concepts such as those we hold in regards to other people.”

Imagine what it would be like to bring into focus the orientation of consciousness, the interpretive framework, and the motivations that influence our interpretation of a given event. There is no doubt greater objectivity would be the result. We know more today about the dynamics of our own psyche than our parents did. I think this has increased our potential objectivity.

The increased objectivity that comes from understanding our own psychological dynamics has far reaching effects. It effects how we process all information about existence. It affects how we interpret the behaviour of our cat, our clients, our colleagues, our opponents, our lovers, our children. It affects how we interpret the behaviour of a star, a planet, a billiard ball, a photon.

This last point, the effect of understanding psychological dynamics on our interpretations of the physical universe, is at the root of another discussion on this site. Under the title, Metaphysics, Dragonfly and I are disagreeing on the nature of the physical universe. At the root of this disagreement is differences in interpretive frameworks– ie: our understanding of the nature of causality. The problem is, Dragonfly seems unwilling to question his interpretive framework. So, based on what I said above, I would suggest he is being less objective than I.

Paul

[Dragonfly]

The problem is, Dragonfly seems unwilling to question his interpretive framework. So, based on what I said above, I would suggest he is being less objective than I.

With that kind of argument I see no point in continuing this discussion.

[Paul Mawdsley]

Dragonfly writes:

With that kind of argument I see no point in continuing this discussion.

Wow! I am shocked! I thought what I said was quite tame, pointed but tame. I was looking forward to going deeper into the discussion with Dragonfly, not pushing him away. As I have said before, I value his perspective. I didn't see what I said as disrespecting his value. It was just an attempt to identify a point of difference. I'm disappointed to not continue this line of thought with him. Oh well, moving on...

Paul

[Roger Bissell]

Paul, I agree that Dragonfly overreacted, but...

I think that you were being condescending and coming across as "more objective than thou." Perhaps you ARE more objective than Dragonfly, at least on the issue of being willing to re-examine your presuppositions about causality. But it is a bit of a hot-button to SAY that you are more objective than him, don't you think?

Dragonfly, if you're paying attention, I hope you realize that we are not all ganging up on you on this list. We're all just trying to keep each other honest. Equal opportunity pulling of covers, so to speak.

REB

[Paul Mawdsley]

Roger,

There is probably a hundred ways I could respond to your post and they have all spent some time circling in my consciousness since I read your post. I could take the defensive route. I could go to the offensive. I could be more empathic. I could be more detached. I think I’ll try to take a perspective that integrates all the information from the other perspectives and maintains a balance.

You said:

I think that you were being condescending and coming across as "more objective than thou."

I was not being condescending even though I may have come “across as ‘more objective than thou.’" I can understand how what I said can be interpreted as condescending. Believe me, there was no element of that intent in me.

It is symbolic that this issue comes up under the thread “Social Metaphysics.” I have my own twist on the meaning of “social metaphysics.” I see social metaphysics as a particular negative manifestation of a certain orientation of consciousness. We have the capacity to generate a recreation of another’s emotional and intellectual state via automatic perceptual processes. This creates in us an empathic experience of another’s perspective. By entering this mental orientation we are able to experience reality as being composed of interacting conscious entities. I call this the intersubjective perceptual realm.

In and of itself, this orientation of consciousness is not good or evil, not healthy or unhealthy. It is simply a means of processing the information of our senses into a specific type of perception that gives us insight into a certain aspect of reality. Social metaphysics is the result of unhealthy personal development in the intersubjective realm. When a person has an underdeveloped ego, they can loose their fragile identity in the empathic experience of another’s consciousness. A person with an underdeveloped ego will necessarily have low self-esteem. Since the need for self-esteem still persists, this person needs to generate a substitute for a healthy ego: they generate a fake ego with fake self-esteem. In the context of this perceptual realm of interacting conscious entities, authentic self-confidence is faked by learning to manipulate other people’s impressions of oneself so that one’s empathic experience contains a vision of oneself as powerful and confident. Authentic self-respect is faked by elevating one's relative social status so that one's value is experienced as superior to others. This is the essence of one particular form of pseudo- self-esteem.

This is how I have come to understand the underlying dynamics of what N. Branden calls “social metaphysics.” Social metaphysics necessitates treating people as means to end, not an end in themselves. Others are, to the social metaphysician, a means to his/her spiritual ends.

I assure you and Dragonfly, this was not the orientation I was acting from. It would be foreign to my spirit. I was literally trying to find a way to pinpoint why Dragonfly and myself could not find a way to start generating a shared perspective on causality. Generating a shared perspective is one of the ways the intersubjective realm can be used in a healthy, productive way. I find more growth can come from an orientation of an open, shared perspective than from one of a defensive, adversarial perspective.

You said also:

But it is a bit of a hot-button to SAY that you are more objective than him, don't you think?

Again, I see how it can be interpreted this way.

Let’s look at the precision of my words:

Objectivity requires that we not only focus our awareness on the objective world but also on the orientations of consciousness, interpretive frameworks, and motivations that actively shape our interpretations of that world...The increased objectivity that comes from understanding our own psychological dynamics has far reaching effects. It effects how we process all information about existence. It affects how we interpret the behaviour of our cat, our clients, our colleagues, our opponents, our lovers, our children. It affects how we interpret the behaviour of a star, a planet, a billiard ball, a photon.

This last point, the effect of understanding psychological dynamics on our interpretations of the physical universe, is at the root of another discussion on this site. Under the title, Metaphysics, Dragonfly and I are disagreeing on the nature of the physical universe. At the root of this disagreement is differences in interpretive frameworks– ie: our understanding of the nature of causality. The problem is, Dragonfly seems unwilling to question his interpretive framework. So, based on what I said above, I would suggest he is being less objective than I.

I identified a particular meaning of objectivity, pointed out that our differences were under the category of objectivity, and SUGGESTED that Dragonfly was BEING (NOT IS) less objective than I. I was presenting a logical argument, not attacking Dragonfly’s character. I was talking about his behaviour, not about his essence. I was trying to entice him to examine his interpretive framework so we didn’t start going around in circles with our discussions.

Bottom line is, if you interpret what I said with a slant towards social manipulation and status climbing you will see social manipulation and status climbing. If you interpret what I said with a slant towards objective identification and logical argument, you will see objective identification and logical argument. It is up to each participant to decide which interpretation is closest to the truth. Having the privileged information inside my own consciousness, I say the latter.

Paul

[Paul Mawdsley]

I woke up this morning and realized there is one more thought that should be added to what I said about social metaphysics: even healthy people with healthy self-esteem can be sucked into a social metaphysical state of mind. As long as we are not conscious of the inner dynamics of the process, we are vulnerable to the worldview and motivations of social metaphysics. This is one more example of the need to increase our objectivity by increasing our understanding of underlying orientations of consciousness, interpretive frameworks, and motivations.

Paul

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Projecting the concept of social metaphysics to a child's level and looking inside myself, I find that approval of others makes me feel good and disapproval makes me feel bad. This works on several levels, also - one being sexual, another in terms of my achievements and another in just plain getting attention.

Also, any creative pop artist in any field will do his utmost to create a fad. Fads appeal to a herding thing in the mind where people try to fit in with a group and be approved.

Some parts of social metaphysics comes from making wrong choices, but some of this is prewired in our brain.

Michael