Greg Nyquist replies to Seddon

[Dragonfly]

None of the other definitions make your case any better.

This is not precise. None of the other definitions make YOUR case, not mine, any better. They work well for mine. You keep putting your case in my mouth and saying I have been contradicted. But all you are doing is covering over my case and pretending it is something else, not refuting it.

I have been able to articulate my case well, but I don't seem to be able to communicate it to people of a Popperian bent, not even as a hypothetical consideration. And you are not the only one.

No, you didn't articulate your case well, or what you did articulate is simply wrong. Let me repeat what you really said:

Note also that this process is always done in a completely reliable and perfect manner unless the faculty of sight is damaged or diseased.

There is no doubt about the meaning of "in a completely reliable and perfect manner", if you are talking about a process this can only mean without any error, and that is simply dead wrong. Now you can try to weasel out of it by looking for alternative dictionary meanings of "perfect", which doesn't work however, as these meanings are clearly used in a different context than that of your sentence I quoted here (for example "exactly fitting for a certain purpose" is obviously not applicable to the quoted sentence, and I'm really amazed that you don't see that). Furthermore you confirm our interpretation by adding that the process is completely reliable, so there isn't any misunderstanding possible. This has nothing to do with a "Popperian bent", but everything with the precise use of language. The process may be in general reliable, but it is definitely not completely reliable, and neither is it perfect. Really, you can do better than this.

[Daniel Barnes]

Why don't we get back to the point of the thread; that is, given the fact that Rand offers no empirical evidence for her views, isn't it therefore fair to say, as Nyquist puts it, that "Objectivism is largely a rationalization of Rand’s peculiar vision of man and society"?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

There is no doubt about the meaning of "in a completely reliable and perfect manner", if you are talking about a process this can only mean without any error, and that is simply dead wrong.

Dragonfly,

No. That is exactly dead right. Our faculty of sight, when healthy, will ALWAYS transform light waves into nerve impulses for the purpose of identifying entities "in a completely reliable and perfect manner." It will not err in the process itself of such transformation, meaning it will always do the same process. An eye will never start processing sound waves, for example. Nor will it arbitrarily filter out certain types of light waves (but it might if it becomes ill, deformed, exhausted, or other factors are added to the source). There is only one process, not many. Light waves to nerve impulses to integration is perfect and reliable as a process in healthy organisms. That is my meaning and that is its reliability.

This holds respectively for all other sense organs.

You either accept that you have yet to acknowledge what I am talking about or not. I have been talking about this point since the beginning, but you always miss my meaning. Ignoring the subject does not make it disappear.

I know you and some others like to criticize Rand's ideas and I have no problem with that where applicable. But isn't it reasonable to understand what she is talking about before criticizing the ideas?

Now if you want to talk about weasels, we can open a new thread. There is one on polar bears, for instance, here. But we can vary.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

No. That is exactly dead right. Our faculty of sight, when healthy, will ALWAYS transform light waves into nerve impulses for the purpose of identifying entities "in a completely reliable and perfect manner." It will not err in the process itself of such transformation, meaning it will always do the same process. An eye will never start processing sound waves, for example. Nor will it arbitrarily filter out certain types of light waves (but it might if it becomes ill, deformed, exhausted, or other factors are added to the source). There is only one process, not many. Light waves to nerve impulses to integration is perfect and reliable as a process in healthy organisms. That is my meaning and that is its reliability.

I have here a radio, which transforms radio waves into sound. The sound you hear suffers from cross-over distortion, harmonic distortion, switching distortion, cross-talk, multipath distortion and a few other problems. However, it will always do the same process, it will never start processing light waves for example. So it is a completely reliable and perfect system! And here I have a camera, that transforms light waves (photons) into pixels that are coded into computer memory. It suffers from astigmatism, spherical abberation, chromatic aberration, incorrect white-balance, incorrect focus, inaccurate exposure times, "bleeding" of pixels, low S/N ratio, dead pixels and a few other problems. Nevertheless it will always do the same process, it will never start processing radio waves for example, so it is also a completely reliable and perfect system!

Well, that is using your language. I don't speak that language, in my language this is bullshit, so I see no point in continuing this discussion.

I know you and some others like to criticize Rand's ideas and I have no problem with that where applicable. But isn't it reasonable to understand what she is talking about before criticizing the ideas?

I may have some criticisms of Rand's ideas, but I wonder if she really said such outrageous things as you are trying to tell me. I can guarantee you one thing: you won't convince many non-Objectivists with this kind of argument.

[Brant Gaede]

I might see the value of this discussion if it were keyed off of David Kelley's "Evidence of the Senses" or direct quotes from AR. If someone has already done that I apologize because I've skipped most of the posts. I hate arguments that are mostly semantical or seem to be. It's what we do with sensory data that seems important to me. However "complete and reliable" they may be they are easily misused or misunderstood.

--Brant

Edited April 28, 2007 by Brant Gaede

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Brant,

More than semantics is at work here. Notice that Dragonfly usually gets upset. He would not do this over semantics.

Part of the reason is that knowledge is hierarchal and, from what I am able to gather, this approach fudges over the foundations of how knowledge starts, or at least it disagrees with Objectivist fundamentals. The plain fact is that this approach cannot really explain the meaning of life, yet it tries. (I believe the irritation comes from the people who use this approach knowing this, too.)

So for such a person, when you ask, "How does the mind one is using to evaluate things work?," you always get some nonessential technical comments and then something to the effect that it just sort of does and there is a built-in process called deduction. This is held as God (monotheistically and jealously). Then you will be told to forget about why and how, it is not important, and just get into the experiments, etc.

Then you ask, er... what is the mind/brain connection? And that is where the real problem arises. Dragonfly is a reductionist. This means that he holds that just because one can break down entities into smaller and smaller entities and combine them to form new entities, this negates the possibility that the entities that exist (the given in existence) have any other principle operating. This gets especially hairy when discussing life and consciousness (which he calls "systems").

Objectivism starts with the axiom that life and consciousness exist. Period. Entities exist. Period. They are fundamental forms of existence. The reductionist does not deny that they exist, but he denies their fundamentality. To him, the only fundamentality is (1) subparticles (and their inherent properties), and (2) deductive logic somehow based on mental "models" of reality (apparently based on defective observation). These are his axioms. All the rest is merely a bunch of results.

Actually and ironically, the connection between subparticles (and inherent properties) and deductive logic is made through induction and is not deduced. If you ask why deductive logic is the only valid means of reasoning, he will answer, "Because it works." And that will be that. (Strangely enough, when faced with the same argument about entity identification, he will balk.)

Then you add to this is a highly emotional commitment to debunk Rand and voila! Nasty outbursts when discussing fundamentals and disagreement arises.

I don't mind, though. I think it is kind of cute seeing Dragonfly act like a Randroid, but from the other side.

(And speaking seriously, I really like this guy. That is from the heart. He is smarter than me about so many things.)

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I have here a radio, which transforms radio waves into sound. The sound you hear suffers from cross-over distortion, harmonic distortion, switching distortion, cross-talk, multipath distortion and a few other problems. However, it will always do the same process, it will never start processing light waves for example. So it is a completely reliable and perfect system!

Dragonfly,

Actually, if the following conditions are met, it will be a completely reliable and perfect system:

1. It is used under the same conditions (with no new elements added) for which it was designed, like when it did function perfectly,

2. There has been no decay or breakdown in its parts.

I see nothing wrong with such reliability, either. I would even say that if its properties did not include such reliability, it can never be fixed or adapted—and that would be by definition.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

More than semantics is at work here. Notice that Dragonfly usually gets upset. He would not do this over semantics.

I don't get upset, I get only tired of nonsensical arguments.

Part of the reason is that knowledge is hierarchal and, from what I am able to gather, this approach fudges over the foundations of how knowledge starts, or at least it disagrees with Objectivist fundamentals. The plain fact is that this approach cannot really explain the meaning of life, yet it tries. (I believe the irritation comes from the people who use this approach knowing this, too.)

So for such a person, when you ask, "How does the mind one is using to evaluate things work?," you always get some nonessential technical comments and then something to the effect that it just sort of does and there is a built-in process called deduction. This is held as God (monotheistically and jealously). Then you will be told to forget about why and how, it is not important, and just get into the experiments, etc.

Then you ask, er... what is the mind/brain connection? And that is where the real problem arises. Dragonfly is a reductionist. This means that he holds that just because one can break down entities into smaller and smaller entities and combine them to form new entities, this negates the possibility that the entities that exist (the given in existence) have any other principle operating. This gets especially hairy when discussing life and consciousness (which he calls "systems").

Objectivism starts with the axiom that life and consciousness exist. Period. Entities exist. Period. They are fundamental forms of existence. The reductionist does not deny that they exist, but he denies their fundamentality. To him, the only fundamentality is (1) subparticles (and their inherent properties), and (2) deductive logic somehow based on mental "models" of reality (apparently based on defective observation). These are his axioms. All the rest is merely a bunch of results.

Actually and ironically, the connection between subparticles (and inherent properties) and deductive logic is made through induction and is not deduced. If you ask why deductive logic is the only valid means of reasoning, he will answer, "Because it works." And that will be that. (Strangely enough, when faced with the same argument about entity identification, he will balk.)

Then you add to this is a highly emotional commitment to debunk Rand and voila! Nasty outbursts when discussing fundamentals and disagreement arises.

Now you're really talking like a Randroid, I get a feeling of déjà-vu of my previous experiences with Objectivists, been there, done that. Attributing all kinds of opinions and imaginary reactions of me that are completely misrepresenting everything that I've ever said and attributing things to me I've never said (for example all that talk about deduction exists only in your feverish imagination), creating all kinds of straw men, and psychologizing me too, instead of really answering my arguments. I wonder why you resort to this kind of ad hominem argument. Take those remarks in your last posts like "I know you and some others like to criticize Rand's ideas" and "a highly emotional commitment to debunk Rand". How do you "know" that? You haven't any shred of evidence for it. Being critical of some bad arguments does not imply a "highly emotional commitment to debunk", that is just psychologizing and I really wonder why you're doing that. Maybe you should think about that yourself. I'm really disappointed.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Attributing all kinds of opinions and imaginary reactions of me that are completely misrepresenting everything that I've ever said and attributing things to me I've never said...

Dragonfly,

Why do I get the feeling you do this with me? You even owned up to this above ("Sorry, I'd forgotten that you are more original than the average Objectivist...")

... (for example all that talk about deduction exists only in your feverish imagination)...

I will have to check, but I actually think I got it right. Sometimes you (reductionist a la Dennett) overlap with Daniel (Popperian) and this gets confusing, at least until I read more of them (I have only read excerpts of Dennett and an essay or two by Popper in addition to exceprts). I do know you have constantly criticized fundamental axioms as being without content and I vaguely remember you not having a very high opinion about induction. btw - I am not suffering from any fever at the moment.

... creating all kinds of straw men, and psychologizing me too, instead of really answering my arguments. I wonder why you resort to this kind of ad hominem argument.

Would this be because of constant claims like "nonsense" and "outrageous" and "bullshit" and "I see no point in continuing" and so forth when I do try to answer? I can't even get you to consider what I am talking about, much less stop spouting those kinds of appraisals. And from your posts above, it is clear you still didn't understand what I am talking about. For some reason, that doesn't seem to bother you while you rant and rail against the wrong thing. I find that curious. This is where I compare it to Randroids. They do that a lot.

Take those remarks in your last posts like "I know you and some others like to criticize Rand's ideas" and "a highly emotional commitment to debunk Rand". How do you "know" that? You haven't any shred of evidence for it.

The only evidence I have is your rhetoric when you criticize her. It seems to express the pleasure of vanquish and conquest, but I admit I might be mistaken. If I am, my apologies. No offense was intended, anyway, even if I am not mistaken.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael K wrote about Dragonfly:

>Then you add to this is a highly emotional commitment to debunk Rand...

Hey, I'd be real careful about coming out with stuff like that if I were you. I'd imagine Dragonfly's "emotional commitment to debunk Rand" can only be a fraction of your own emotional commitment to promoting her!

Has Dragonfly started an elaborate website and discussion board? Does his criticism amount to even 5% of what you've written in favour of Objectivism? Is his life partner another Objectivist critic? Does he number prominent Objectivist critics among his close friends? Has he been debunking Rand for decades?

Please. If you're going to start throwing stones like that, surely you realise you're in one mother of a glass house yourself. So best to not do it.

Edited April 28, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Please. If you're going to start throwing stones like that, surely you realise you're in one mother of a glass house yourself. So best to not do it.

Daniel,

Woah theah! Who is throwing stones? Is it somehow insulting to want to debunk Rand?

Also, my philosophical base is Objectivism and I do wish to promote that to an extent, but I am far more committed to understanding it properly. That is one of the actual reasons of OL—not preaching (shudder).

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I am going to try another attempt at simplifying the sensory premise of Objectivist epistemology. (Rand called "percepts" the given, but I am one stage before percepts in the sensation-percept-concept sequence.)

Sense organs exist and they have a definable nature, which includes how they function. They work perfectly and reliably for what they were evolved to do under the conditions they evolved. But there are three observations that provide correct context:

1. Human beings have designed instruments that show a greater degree of precision in handling data than sense organs through amplification, reduction, filtering, etc. I have seen these instruments called "more reliable" than sense organs, although this means something quite different. It entails using a different meaning for the same word, "reliable." (Notice, however, that the results of of these instruments must be processed through sense organs in the normal fashion in order to become knowledge in a brain and that processing must be 100% reliable for the knowledge from the instruments to be correctly formed.)

2. If a sense organ is used outside the standard conditions for which it evolved, it may not be reliable. (Example: sense of smell under water.) As an extension of this, if a new element or elements are added to the standard conditions, a new interpretation of the data (percept) will be needed, but the operation itself of capturing the sensation is reliable. (Example: pencil in air appearing straight and pencil in water appearing bent. In the underwater example, the pencil in water will ALWAYS appear bent, so that is merely a new integration, not a problem of reliability.)

3. A sense organ will age and decay over time along with the organism it is part of, and it can become tired, ill or deformed (like if it gets squished). These conditions also impair reliability. Often, however, these states can be reversed and the sense organ returned to normal reliability.

I get the impression that the present arguments against all this is to basically affirm that sense organs are never 100% reliable—not under ANY circumstances. And if this is the argument, I disagree.

My base principle, of course, is the law of identity. A sense organ cannot function (as it exists) and not function (as it exists) at the same time. It is not some kind of metaphysical defect. It works perfectly according to its nature.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael:

>I get the impression that the present arguments against all this is to basically affirm that sense organs are never 100% reliable—not under ANY circumstances. And if this is the argument, I disagree.

Well it isn't! All you are doing is arguing with your own "impression".

Dragonfly and I say that sense organs are generally reliable, but are fallible, and can err in various circumstances. We offer the various sensory illusions as an example. In additiion, they are also filters of reality, useful for our particular evolutionary niche, but obviously they exaggerate some things (as any lens must do) and also leave an awful lot of reality out (for example, we can't smell a small amount of blood in a large amount of water, like a shark, or hear high-pitched sounds that dogs can) Thus, while generally reliable, the senses cannot be viewed as infallible sources of truth about the world.

That's where it's at. If you argue that what we're saying here is wrong, I'd be interested in exactly how, with some real examples. On the other hand, if you want to say that you basically agree with the above, but all you want to do is use words like "perfect" or "100% reliable" or whatever to express the exact same situation, well then there's no real problem. We can then move on - hopefully - to the point of the thread.

Let's remind ourselves of that point again: Given the fact that Rand offers no empirical evidence for her views, isn't it therefore fair to say, as Nyquist puts it, that "Objectivism is largely a rationalization of Rand’s peculiar vision of man and society"?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

Do I understand you to mean that under certain circumstances, you believe the senses to be 100% infallible? I will agree with that and then we can move on.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael K:

>Do I understand you to mean that under certain circumstances, you believe the senses to be 100% infallible? I will agree with that and then we can move on.

If by "100% infallible" you mean the senses are doing their usual job of filtering, exaggerating and omitting various parts of reality as per my description above then of course I agree, though it seems a potentially misleading way to put it, because of course our senses do err now and again. But I suppose if you make that clear there's no issue.

Incidentally like "under certain circumstances...100% infallible" is yet another for my collection of Objectivist oxymora. In all seriousness, while you may think it's just a stylistic issue, things like this actually affect your writing's credibility the same way it hurts Rand's. I mentioned rhetorical redundancies before. Have a read of this short wiki article on them:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Redundancy_%28language%29

"Like prolixity, oxymora are often used to mislead or euphemize, though often they are simply the product of questionable logic or underdeveloped writing skills."

I'm sure this isn't the kind of impression you want to make with what you're saying. Hence I suggest you try use them less. Say, instead of "100% infallible...under certain circumstances", all you need to do is just write "fallible." (Fallible after all only means capable of error; not "always wrong".)

Just a thought.

Edited April 29, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

If by "100% infallible" you mean the senses are doing their usual job of filtering, exaggerating and omitting various parts of reality as per my description above then of course I agree, though it seems a potentially misleading way to put it, because of course our senses do err now and again.

Daniel,

I agree about redundancy being a stylistic problem. This is something I should work on. This impulse comes from trying to nail down a concept against repeated misunderstanding.

I don't agree with your notion of not allowing a time limit for judging reliable, perfect or infallible performance. That seems awfully arbitrary and unrealistic. To be clear, a performance can be perfect one time (or during a time period under one set of circumstances) and imperfect another when context changes.

This does not make the nature of the sense organ unreliable. It merely identifies when it is unreliable and most importantly, why it was so during that time or those times. Neither of these two possibilities can exist with an inherently unreliable entity since the "when" would be always (thus unidentifiable against a standard) and the "why" would be part of its identity.

However, I want to be clear about your meaning. Are you saying that under two identical circumstances and conditions of health, the eye will process identical light waves in a different manner, "filtering, exaggerating and omitting various parts of reality" more or less arbitrarily, or are you saying that in comparison with memories formed in other circumstances of other integrations, and in comparison with data from specialized instruments, there is "filtering, exaggerating and omitting various parts of reality"? In other words, is the problem a defect in the sense organ that has a random nature, or is it because of comparing natural performance against other knowledge?

I couldn't tell from your answer.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael:

>I don't agree with your notion of not allowing a time limit for judging reliable, perfect or infallible performance. That seems awfully arbitrary and unrealistic. To be clear, a performance can be perfect one time (or during a time period under one set of circumstances) and imperfect another when context changes.

Look, it's not my "notion" of what infallible means! It's not "arbitrary and unrealistic either" - it's the generally accepted meaning of the term. For When Catholics talk about the Pope's teachings being "infallible", they don't mean only in "certain circumstances"! That's your oxymoronic bent. If something is "infallible", the usual meaning is that it never errs under any circumstances!

>This does not make the nature of the sense organ unreliable.

Look, the law of identity, and scholastic appeals to such-and-such a "nature" are no use to your argument either. I can just as easily say it is in the "nature" of human senses to err now and again, just as a car can be a very good car, but the "nature" of cars is such is that they now and then break down. So what? Does making this observation invalidate car travel, make it "arbitrary" or "random"? I know Rand comes out with this sort of stuff all the time - if something's not "absolute" or "infallible" it's completely "arbitrary" or "random". But this is quite wrong of course. It's an issue of degree, like anything. Try asking an engineer instead of a dang novelist!

>In other words, is the problem a defect in the sense organ that has a random nature, or is it because of comparing natural performance against other knowledge?

If I say the senses err, or are inaccurate, or similar, there are two main meanings which apply.

1) The first I'll call functional inaccuracy in that they always have the potential to err or be inaccurate by mechanical glitch, or individual parts wearing out, etc. The senses are physical mechanisms, and subject to the same problems any other material machine.

2) The second I'll call filter inaccuracy, in that they never give us a fully accurate picture of the world (including X-rays, high sound frequencies etc etc) but edit out some aspects and exaggerate others. So what? Our brains can only handle so much, nature aims at optimisation.

As I've said, these are the plain facts, expressed in a straightforward, ordinary way. If you want to dispute these facts, I'm interested, though frankly I doubt you will. If, however, you just want to say the exact same thing in your own idiosyncratic way - like "100% infallible...under certain circumstances" where just plain "fallible" would normally do - well go right ahead. It's a free country. I'm sure you understand what I'm saying by now. So I'll just point out, as I did, that you're likely to confuse people a mite, then ask politely, as I'm doing now, if we can move on to less pedantic issues. (For example, the point of this thread!)

Edited April 29, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

If I say the senses err, or are inaccurate, or similar, there are two main meanings which apply.

1) The first I'll call functional inaccuracy in that they always have the potential to err or be inaccurate by mechanical glitch, or individual parts wearing out, etc. The senses are physical mechanisms, and subject to the same problems any other material machine.

2) The second I'll call filter inaccuracy, in that they never give us a fully accurate picture of the world (including X-rays, high sound frequencies etc etc) but edit out some aspects and exaggerate others. So what?

Daniel,

We are almost getting there.

For Point 1, when not suffering the functional inaccuracy as you describe (and as I have mentioned at least 4 or 5 times so far, but using other words), do you agree that sense organ functioning is accurate? (I prefer reliable, but I will run with accurate. I am talking about the sensory process here, not the percept.)

For Point 2, the organ for sight did not evolve with knowledge of X-rays, etc. All that came later. Was the organ inaccurate (defective) before this stuff was discovered? If so, does that mean regardless of how much it evolves, it will always be defective? If that is the case, (now please pay very close attention here so you don't fall off into induction), how do you know your present knowledge is accurate?

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael:

>when not suffering the functional inaccuracy as you describe (and as I have mentioned at least 4 or 5 times so far, but using other words), do you agree that sense organ functioning is accurate?

Obviously.

>For Point 2, the organ for sight did not evolve with knowledge of X-rays, etc. All that came later. Was the organ inaccurate (defective) before this stuff was discovered?

Obviously. Though I wouldn't call it "defective", that seems to have an overly negative connotation, as though the senses were completely useless. "Inaccurate" is fine. But if you really want to call it "defective", fine. It's a free country.

>If so, does that mean regardless of how much it evolves, it will always be defective?

To some degree, obviously, tho once again I wouldn't use "defective" myself.

> how do you know your present knowledge is accurate?

Just as my senses are roughly accurate and a reasonably reliable approximation in most cases, so I hope my knowledge is similar. However, I would never dream of saying my present knowledge was perfect, 100% infallible, and could never be improved! (It's always possible that my present knowledge is entirely mistaken too)

Heavens, man, what did you expect me to say? Michael - do you have an actual point to make - maybe some factual or logical statement I've made you want to dispute - or are we going to be here all night while you try to spring some verbalist version of The Fool's Mate on me? You know I have little patience for word-games.:devil:

Can I ask you a question now: Are you ever going to begin to start discussing the topic of the thread - that is, Rand's lack of empirical responsibility?

Here's my summary of it again:

Given the fact that Rand offers no empirical evidence for her views, isn't it therefore fair to say, as Nyquist puts it, that "Objectivism is largely a rationalization of Rand’s peculiar vision of man and society"?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Just as my senses are roughly accurate and a reasonably reliable approximation in most cases, so I hope my knowledge is similar. However, I would never dream of saying my present knowledge was perfect, 100% infallible, and could never be improved! (It's always possible that my present knowledge is entirely mistaken too)

Daniel,

We ain't done yet, but we are almost done.

I want to make something clear that still is not, based on your statement above. Knowledge in Objectivism has three cognitive components or levels. I was only discussing the first level, not the other two. Call it the primary or automatic level if you will.

I would never say "my present knowledge was perfect." That would entail all 3 levels. When you make a statement like that, it signals to me that you have not understood yet what I am talking about. I may be wrong and you actually do understand, but I cannot draw any other conclusion from a statement like that.

I have been saying (over and over and over) that under normal and healthy conditions, the operation of sense organs is perfect (or reliable or infallible or whatever) as sense organs—only on the first automatic level. The sense organs do what they are supposed to do, time and time again and they do it automatically and completely reliably (unless degraded or there is an external change). This is not full knowledge yet.

If you want to look at it from the external level, I am only discussing the stage of knowing that something is, not what it is. A sense organ does that perfectly. The only real integrative function of a sense organ is to condense the vast array of chaotic stimuli bombarding it to the type specific enough to let the brain know that there is an entity out there. That and nothing more. It does not say what the entity is or what its features are, except in the most general terms. This is not full knowledge, just the start of it.

Knowledge as you have been discussing it (and Dragonfly, too) entails two more stages. Reliability decreases as it gets more complex, which is why logic kicks in to set a standard of contradiction.

This is very important, which is why I am harping on it. Sensory evidence is the foundation of all knowledge about external reality. Errors are made at a higher level. Not at this one, unless a monkeywrench gets thrown in the mix.

(As an aside, and I hope I am not ahead of myself, I mentioned to Robert Campbell that these stages—sensation, percept and concept, are basically like notches on the same continuum. The continuum goes from the simplest level to the most complex. So these stages are not 3 different things. They are merely 3 degrees of the same thing.)

Are we agreed about this? I know you are chomping at the bit to get to Nyquist's theory about how Rand came up with her philosophy.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael K:

>We ain't done yet, but we are almost done.

Well for the sake of brevity, let's cut to the chase already. I know exactly how this routine goes.

All you're trying to do here is claim that the senses are "100% infallible" so you can then try to use this to claim that your "second" and "third" levels of knowledge have a "100% infallible" basis.

Unfortunately, your first problem is that while we assume the senses function automatically and reliably in general, we have no automatic way of knowing if they are doing so at any particular point. Your senses are a mechanism, like a speedometer. Now, your speedometer may be malfunctioning slightly, so you may be going a little faster or slower than it says. But you don't automatically know that by just looking at it.

So your senses may err, and you do not necessarily have to know it!

But I think the far more fundamental problem is this: observe that the only way you - and Rand - can make this claim is by continually relying on self-contradictory statements - your various oxymora, like "100% infallible...under certain circumstances"!!! (because of course, "100% infallible" means nothing if not "never fails under any circumstances")

Now, Rand held that if you found yourself in continual contradiction, this was the sign that you had made a conceptual level error.*

As it happens, I agree with her! I think the reason you - and her - continually have to fall back on on various oxymorons and rhetorical redundancies is not because you're "trying to nail down a concept against repeated misunderstanding", but because Rand's basic position, that the senses are "100% infallible" is what you fellas would call a conceptual level error.

Simple as that. Unless you can express your argument without self-contradictory qualifications, I'm afraid you're on a hiding to nothing. So, at this point I suggest we park this point for now, so you can suitably mull your problems, and meantime we can move on to more interesting pastures..

*In fact, this is what you were trying to do earlier, use the boilerplate Objectivist argument against skepticism to catch me in contradiction, and thus show that I am in error. But unfortunately this standard argument is itself a naiive error; Rand did not understand that skepticism is not logically contradictory!

Edited April 29, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Unfortunately, your first problem is that while we assume the senses function automatically and reliably in general, we have no automatic way of knowing if they are doing so at any particular point. Your senses are a mechanism, like a speedometer.

Daniel,

I have a longer post coming, but just briefly, I am at a loss to understand what is so unfortunate. I think it is a good thing to start with reliable data and build on it. This allows us to organize it and develop it. If it were unreliable, we would not be able to do that.

I am glad to see we are in agreement about the mechanism thing. But we are not in agreement about the later conclusion (especially not the attempt to be something and stand away from it and observe it at the same time).

The "chase" is actually the starting point of how we view human beings. We either view man as a fact of reality just like any other fact, or we view man as somehow separate because he has a sui generis quality (conceptual consciousness). In my view, man is able to abstract information about himself, but he cannot detach himself from his own fundamental processes at the moment he uses them.

We would not say that the wings of a bird are a mechanism and that sometimes the bird isn't flying with them, it just thinks it is. We say wings are for flying period. They are perfect for flying, too. (And reliable and infallible and everything else when discussing healthy wings under normal circumstances. They always work.)) Only then do we notice some limitations when the context changes (health, exhaustion, storms, etc.)

Yet with man, there is this strange proposition to describe him as some kind of metaphysical botch on a sensory level. I have never really understood this, even before reading Rand way back at the end of high school. We grant the epistemology of hogs and insects more respect than we do man.

Disagreeing with that is part of the reason I am an Objectivist.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael

>Yet with man, there is this strange proposition to describe him as some kind of metaphysical botch on a sensory level.

There's no difference, Michael. Wings are good and useful for flying, but are not "perfect" or "infallible"! Lungs are good for breathing,but are not perfect or infallible. Eyes are good for seeing, but not perfect or infallible. And so forth. What is so hard to understand about this, I'm not sure.

The problem is, as I've said, that you and Rand are continually relying on self-contradictory, oxymoronic statements to make your case. You're like salesmen boosting your product as "100% infallible!" but then in the small print adding "...in certain circumstances." This sort of thing really does not pass the laugh test.

>I have a longer post coming...

I think you should write a bit less, and think a bit more about why your position keeps coming back to self-contradictions. Sounds like you've got yourself a "conceptual level" error, my friend.

Edited April 30, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[galtgulch]

>>>" What is so hard to understand about this, I'm not sure.

Sounds like you've got yourself a "conceptual level" error, my friend. "<<<

I discern an example of the "stolen concept" here. It seems that you are suggesting that since Man's senses might be fallible, that no knowledge of reality is possible. If that were the case all your concepts would be equally baseless yet you assert them with abandon.

I understand that humans are in contact with reality through our senses and that it is up to our conceptual ability and rational faculty to come to grips with these issues and to verify the evidence provided by our senses.

The last time I drove on the highway I noticed that huge tractor trailer trucks which seemed enormous as they passed me seemed to shrink in size as they pulled away and were mere dots in the distance. It is nonsense to conclude that our senses do not provide evidence of reality at all because of such experiences.

Also the very essence of an axiomatic concept is that it does not require proof to someone who doesn't get it. How do you set up an experiment to show that Existence exists or that Consciousness is conscious for the benefit of someone who asks us to prove Existence and Consciousness to them?

At this point I am reduced to resorting to profanity based on my uncivilized roots on the wrong side of the tracks in Brooklyn.

galt (no relation)

Edited April 30, 2007 by galtgulch

[Daniel Barnes]

Galt:

>It is nonsense to conclude that our senses do not provide evidence of reality at all...

Actually, it is nonsense to conclude that because our senses are fallible, they do not provide any evidence of reality at all!

Is this your idea of sound logic, my friend?