My problem with Free Will

[anthony]

Peikoff explains determinism there, simply and accurately (without making any extravagant claims for free-will) so I don't get your argument.

Yes, memory serves as the store of experience, and external stimuli are the reality - both CAN initiate the action of thought...but don't HAVE to. And which particular thoughts out of an endless fund of data, in memory, or existence? Our hiker may just as well be thinking about his wife, or a blister on his heel--etc. etc., as about one rock.

Another thing that is puzzling: a libertarian-determinist is a contradiction in terms (it seems to me). How do you resolve the voluntarism of the first with the fatalism of the second? If it is pre-determined that you will initiate force (say), why and how could you choose otherwise?

[Francisco Ferrer]

Peikoff explains determinism there, simply and accurately (without making any extravagant claims for free-will) so I don't get your argument.

Yes, memory serves as the store of experience, and external stimuli are the reality - both CAN initiate the action of thought...but don't HAVE to. And which particular thoughts out of an endless fund of data, in memory, or existence? Our hiker may just as well be thinking about his wife, or a blister on his heel--etc. etc., as about one rock.

Another thing that is puzzling: a libertarian-determinist is a contradiction in terms (it seems to me). How do you resolve the voluntarism of the first with the fatalism of the second? If it is pre-determined that you will initiate force (say), why and how could you choose otherwise?

I quoted Peikoff and Rand to show the divide between determinism and free will.

If, as I hold, all events are caused, then a thought must be the result of a prior event. Now you can claim, if you will, that free will is the cause of the thought to pick up a particular rock.

But this claim is no different than the theist's Argument from First Cause for the existence of God. The atheist can effectively counter, "But what caused God?"

Similarly, the determinist can respond, "What caused the so-called 'free will' to pick up a particular rock?" If it has no prior cause, then implausibly man's mind stands disconnected from the rest of the physical universe: able to initiate actions but somehow unaffected by other forces in the universe.

As for libertarianism, I do not see a contradiction. People who read Mises, Hazlitt, Rand and Rothbard are generally less likely to initiate force than those who read Marx, Keynes, and Galbraith.

But why did I read Mises? Because a few years earlier I had read 1984, which scared the daylights out of me, made me worry that LBJ was Bolshevizing America, which led me to subscribe to National Review, which featured an advertisement for the Conservative Book Club, which sold me Human Action.

Was it "pre-determined"? That term suggests an Almighty at work. It would be more correct to say that given the circumstances, it was a certainty that I would become a libertarian. If you examine Obama's life, you would have to conclude that there was an inevitability about his becoming a progressive.

Can my mind be changed? Remote as it may seem, I acknowledge the possibility that I might encounter a body of data that would lead to me to revise or reject my current philosophy.

But the same possibility exists, in theory, for all the statists in the world too, including the 44th President.

[BaalChatzaf]

We are not going in the direction of the novel 1984. We are tending toward the dystopia of -Brave New World-, the Vonegut novel -Harrison Bergeron-.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Darrell Hougen]

I don't think the idea of determinism holds up under scrutiny. It may be that it is impossible to give a proof of either determinism or randomness, but let's look at the evidence.

The complexity of the world is increasing. Billions of years ago, there were no living things. Then came single celled organisms, then multicellular organisms, then more complex multicellular organisms and finally intelligent living beings. Look at the advance of science and technology. It is hard to account for an increase in complexity with a deterministic model. It is necessary to have an information source which, in turn, necessitates randomness.

People have gotten the idea that the world is mechanical from the study of physics and other branches of science and engineering. Of course, physics and other sciences are concerned with predicting things. Therefore, physicists generally tackle problems where there is some hope of a solution. If a deterministic solution is found, the evolution of a system can be predicted and the physicist has been successful. Physics professors then teach their students about problems that can be solved. But what about problems that can't be solved or ones that don't have deterministic solutions?

In order for a system of differential equations to have a deterministic solution it must satisfy the Lipschitz conditions. But what about equations that don't satisfy the Lipschitz conditions? It turns out that some systems of differential equations have non-deterministic solutions. That is, there are points at which the solution in the next instant of time is not determined by the initial conditions. There may be infinitely many solutions at a single point. I'm not an expert, but here is a paper by Alfred Hubler describing one such situation.

Of course, a system of differential equations is just a model of a physical system that may not take everything into account. But, that limitation applies to deterministic systems as well as non-deterministic systems. In fact, it may turn out that most systems of differential equations are actually non-deterministic. I've heard that the Helmholtz equations might be non-deterministic. The Helmholtz fluid flow equations describe water flow and air flow and hence the weather and the climate. If it is true that the equations are non-deterministic, it is no wonder the weather cannot be predicted with any degree of accuracy.

I know it is pleasant to think that everything can be predicted or is governed by a giant set of deterministic equations, but such a conclusion is not supported by the evidence.

Darrell

[BaalChatzaf]

I don't think the idea of determinism holds up under scrutiny. It may be that it is impossible to give a proof of either determinism or randomness, but let's look at the evidence.

The complexity of the world is increasing. Billions of years ago, there were no living things. Then came single celled organisms, then multicellular organisms, then more complex multicellular organisms and finally intelligent living beings. Look at the advance of science and technology. It is hard to account for an increase in complexity with a deterministic model. It is necessary to have an information source which, in turn, necessitates randomness.

People have gotten the idea that the world is mechanical from the study of physics and other branches of science and engineering. Of course, physics and other sciences are concerned with predicting things. Therefore, physicists generally tackle problems where there is some hope of a solution. If a deterministic solution is found, the evolution of a system can be predicted and the physicist has been successful. Physics professors then teach their students about problems that can be solved. But what about problems that can't be solved or ones that don't have deterministic solutions?

In order for a system of differential equations to have a deterministic solution it must satisfy the Lipschitz conditions. But what about equations that don't satisfy the Lipschitz conditions? It turns out that some systems of differential equations have non-deterministic solutions. That is, there are points at which the solution in the next instant of time is not determined by the initial conditions. There may be infinitely many solutions at a single point. I'm not an expert, but here is a paper by Alfred Hubler describing one such situation.

Of course, a system of differential equations is just a model of a physical system that may not take everything into account. But, that limitation applies to deterministic systems as well as non-deterministic systems. In fact, it may turn out that most systems of differential equations are actually non-deterministic. I've heard that the Helmholtz equations might be non-deterministic. The Helmholtz fluid flow equations describe water flow and air flow and hence the weather and the climate. If it is true that the equations are non-deterministic, it is no wonder the weather cannot be predicted with any degree of accuracy.

I know it is pleasant to think that everything can be predicted or is governed by a giant set of deterministic equations, but such a conclusion is not supported by the evidence.

Darrell

Even if a chaotic dynamic system is deterministic, if one cannot specify the initial or boundary conditions with infinite precision the answer you get soon become chaotic. An example is Lorenz system of differential equations were are completely deterministic but are chaotically dependent on initial conditions. Lorenz discovered to his surprise that using two initial values that differed by very little lead to wildly different solutions. Lorenz rediscovered chaotic dynamics first studied by Poincare' back in 1905. In those days they did not have computers so Poincare' was limited in his study of such systems.

Please see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorenz_system

Ba'al Chatzaf

[anthony]

Peikoff explains determinism there, simply and accurately (without making any extravagant claims for free-will) so I don't get your argument.

Yes, memory serves as the store of experience, and external stimuli are the reality - both CAN initiate the action of thought...but don't HAVE to. And which particular thoughts out of an endless fund of data, in memory, or existence? Our hiker may just as well be thinking about his wife, or a blister on his heel--etc. etc., as about one rock.

Another thing that is puzzling: a libertarian-determinist is a contradiction in terms (it seems to me). How do you resolve the voluntarism of the first with the fatalism of the second? If it is pre-determined that you will initiate force (say), why and how could you choose otherwise?

I quoted Peikoff and Rand to show the divide between determinism and free will.

If, as I hold, all events are caused, then a thought must be the result of a prior event. Now you can claim, if you will, that free will is the cause of the thought to pick up a particular rock.

But this claim is no different than the theist's Argument from First Cause for the existence of God. The atheist can effectively counter, "But what caused God?"

Similarly, the determinist can respond, "What caused the so-called 'free will' to pick up a particular rock?" If it has no prior cause, then implausibly man's mind stands disconnected from the rest of the physical universe: able to initiate actions but somehow unaffected by other forces in the universe.

As for libertarianism, I do not see a contradiction. People who read Mises, Hazlitt, Rand and Rothbard are generally less likely to initiate force than those who read Marx, Keynes, and Galbraith.

But why did I read Mises? Because a few years earlier I had read 1984, which scared the daylights out of me, made me worry that LBJ was Bolshevizing America, which led me to subscribe to National Review, which featured an advertisement for the Conservative Book Club, which sold me Human Action.

Was it "pre-determined"? That term suggests an Almighty at work. It would be more correct to say that given the circumstances, it was a certainty that I would become a libertarian. If you examine Obama's life, you would have to conclude that there was an inevitability about his becoming a progressive.

Can my mind be changed? Remote as it may seem, I acknowledge the possibility that I might encounter a body of data that would lead to me to revise or reject my current philosophy.

But the same possibility exists, in theory, for all the statists in the world too, including the 44th President.

I like how you almost negotiated around this, with "People who read Mises, Hazlitt..."!!

Seems you were almost on the point of admitting that while you could possibly have been "pre-determined" to have come across Mises and so then to read him, to however go further and choose to read the other authors, was of course volitional. Ha.

But to view people as so dominated or determined by their arbitrary reading material, is frankly quite scary.

Since, to recognize and hold to any conviction (or morality) requires (what else?)...free will.

Including a conviction in determinism.

So I could throw a little bit of Stolen Concept at you.

It's the big stumbling block when arguing for determinism, as I see it -that while a (Objectivist)volitionist will openly agree to a degree of influence by one's previous circumstances, for the determinist to admit a single instance of free will would be self-refuting, the end of his case. So, while I argue you're proposing a false alternative -you cannot have the luxury of permitting any exception.

I believe it would simplify matters if only 'human determinism' instead were honestly re-named 'Fatalism'.

Ah well, it has been pre-ordained that you aren't going to admit you've lost this argument...

[anthony]

I don't think the idea of determinism holds up under scrutiny. It may be that it is impossible to give a proof of either determinism or randomness, but let's look at the evidence.

The complexity of the world is increasing. Billions of years ago, there were no living things. Then came single celled organisms, then multicellular organisms, then more complex multicellular organisms and finally intelligent living beings. Look at the advance of science and technology. It is hard to account for an increase in complexity with a deterministic model. It is necessary to have an information source which, in turn, necessitates randomness.

People have gotten the idea that the world is mechanical from the study of physics and other branches of science and engineering. Of course, physics and other sciences are concerned with predicting things. Therefore, physicists generally tackle problems where there is some hope of a solution. If a deterministic solution is found, the evolution of a system can be predicted and the physicist has been successful. Physics professors then teach their students about problems that can be solved. But what about problems that can't be solved or ones that don't have deterministic solutions?

In order for a system of differential equations to have a deterministic solution it must satisfy the Lipschitz conditions. But what about equations that don't satisfy the Lipschitz conditions? It turns out that some systems of differential equations have non-deterministic solutions. That is, there are points at which the solution in the next instant of time is not determined by the initial conditions. There may be infinitely many solutions at a single point. I'm not an expert, but here is a paper by Alfred Hubler describing one such situation.

Of course, a system of differential equations is just a model of a physical system that may not take everything into account. But, that limitation applies to deterministic systems as well as non-deterministic systems. In fact, it may turn out that most systems of differential equations are actually non-deterministic. I've heard that the Helmholtz equations might be non-deterministic. The Helmholtz fluid flow equations describe water flow and air flow and hence the weather and the climate. If it is true that the equations are non-deterministic, it is no wonder the weather cannot be predicted with any degree of accuracy.

I know it is pleasant to think that everything can be predicted or is governed by a giant set of deterministic equations, but such a conclusion is not supported by the evidence.

Darrell

Even if a chaotic dynamic system is deterministic, if one cannot specify the initial or boundary conditions with infinite precision the answer you get soon become chaotic. An example is Lorenz system of differential equations were are completely deterministic but are chaotically dependent on initial conditions. Lorenz discovered to his surprise that using two initial values that differed by very little lead to wildly different solutions. Lorenz rediscovered chaotic dynamics first studied by Poincare' back in 1905. In those days they did not have computers so Poincare' was limited in his study of such systems.

Please see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorenz_system

Ba'al Chatzaf

The first and most critical separation to make, is physical determinism from 'human' determinism.

[Francisco Ferrer]

I know it is pleasant to think that everything can be predicted or is governed by a giant set of deterministic equations, but such a conclusion is not supported by the evidence.

Darrell

Just to be clear, the argument for determinism (that human thoughts and actions ultimately have an external, prior cause) is not the same as the argument that "everything can be predicted or is governed by a giant set of deterministic equations."

That erroneous assumption is answered here.

[BaalChatzaf]

The first and most critical separation to make, is physical determinism from 'human' determinism.

Humans are physical down to the subatomic level. We are made of stuff and energy. There is no more to us than that.

Everything in the Cosmos is made of stuff and energy.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[deanwins]

Darrell,

That "in our reality simulation math we use random inputs" makes no case for or against whether there are non-causal events in our reality. Let me reiterate that we commonly use such inputs to our math when the system we are trying to model is significantly influenced by a larger portion of reality than we know or requires computing more interactions between parts of reality than we have computational resources to compute.

Cheers,

Dean

[Francisco Ferrer]

I like how you almost negotiated around this, with "People who read Mises, Hazlitt..."!!

Seems you were almost on the point of admitting that while you could possibly have been "pre-determined" to have come across Mises and so then to read him, to however go further and choose to read the other authors, was of course volitional. Ha.

If by "volitional" you mean that no one put me in a cage and used a cattle prod to force me to read Human Action, then, yes, it was volitional.

If by volitional, you mean that I had a choice about being born into a home with many books, about having a personality that was naturally curious and skeptical, about coming of age in a time period when libertarianism was a new, exciting idea and when works on the subject were suddenly coming into print or reprint, then, no, that was not volitional.

Again, one's picking up a particular rock (or book or frozen entree) is the product of a myriad of factors, some of which may not be evident to the actor at the time or later.

But to view people as so dominated or determined by their arbitrary reading material, is frankly quite scary.

I'm not sure what you mean by "arbitrary reading material." One day I was perusing my parents' library (several thousand books) and came across a title that was in the form of a number (spelled out Nineteen Eight-Four). Slowly it dawned on me that the number was a year in the future. Like my friends, I had always enjoyed science fiction in movie serials and comic books, and I was instantly curious about what the world might look like one quarter century from then.

Since, to recognize and hold to any conviction (or morality) requires (what else?)...free will.

Including a conviction in determinism.

In order to hold a conviction, the human mind has to be aware of certain information. How that information becomes available is the result of many prior events that the individual has no control over: early childhood development, the atmosphere for learning in the home, the availability of informational outlets as the person matures.

For example, in order to hold the conviction that raising the minimum wage is a bad idea, a person would first have to have some concept of supply and demand, of how prices are set in the marketplace, of what the results of an artificial price floor would be on the availability of jobs. Since public schools do a very poor job of teaching price theory (intentionally, I think), it is no accident that 2/3 to 3/4 of the American public support raising the required minimum wage.

To say the average American of his own will rejects a free market in wages does not tell the whole story.

So I could throw a little bit of Stolen Concept at you.

It's the big stumbling block when arguing for determinism, as I see it -that while a (Objectivist)volitionist will openly agree to a degree of influence by one's previous circumstances, for the determinist to admit a single instance of free will would be self-refuting, the end of his case. So, while I argue you're proposing a false alternative -you cannot have the luxury of permitting any exception.

I believe it would simplify matters if only 'human determinism' instead were honestly re-named 'Fatalism'.

Ah well, it has been pre-ordained that you aren't going to admit you've lost this argument...

Pre-ordination (or predestination) is a religious concept, not to be confused with non-theistic determinism.

The idea that some statements are true and that some statements are false does not require the existence of free will. I hold to the concept of determinism because no information showing the existence of free will has yet passed before my eyes.

Determinism does not state that one must cling to an idea forever. I've changed my mind on a number of matters, including intellectual property, school vouchers, and voting. But the change occurred only because I was exposed to sufficient information to refute my earlier views.

You have not yet done that on this topic.

[anthony]

But the change occurred only because I was exposed to sufficient information to refute my earlier views.

You have not yet done that on this topic.

And I won't be able to, since all the "information" in the world will never be enough. One's integrated hierarchical concepts reaching back to first hand experience (and affirmed daily)validate free-will, not (directly) facts or information.

Per your example of "the conviction of raising the minimum wage is a bad idea" - that's an opinion, hardly a conviction; still, the answer of good or "bad" doesn't lie in facts of supply and demand,etc. It lies in the metaphysical nature of man, a concept which all the rest hangs upon. A conviction (such as free-will)is elicited by a chain of concepts traced back to what is proper for man's life -- not by narrow pragmatism of 'what works'.

And why not name it "fatalism"? Man, according to determinism, is as much in the grip of forces beyond his knowledge and control, as any theist believes he is - but more so. The distinction between supernatural predestination and human determinism, is one of degree not of kind, I think.

The consequences (and the causes, too, imo) of each of those convictions are equally mystical.

[anthony]

"In order to hold a conviction, the human mind has to be aware of certain information". [FF]

heh, I had to look at this again, Francisco.

Indeed - "certain information". How about the information of - life?

[anthony]

The first and most critical separation to make, is physical determinism from 'human' determinism.

Humans are physical down to the subatomic level. We are made of stuff and energy. There is no more to us than that.

Everything in the Cosmos is made of stuff and energy.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Ba'al:

What do you have against the concept of emergent properties?

There is no more to your life, and that of others in your life, than particles?

Really?

I wish to know how one person's particles rebound off another person's to change his velocity and position.

[Francisco Ferrer]

But the change occurred only because I was exposed to sufficient information to refute my earlier views.

You have not yet done that on this topic.

And I won't be able to, since all the "information" in the world will never be enough. One's integrated hierarchical concepts reaching back to first hand experience (and affirmed daily)validate free-will, not (directly) facts or information.

Per your example of "the conviction of raising the minimum wage is a bad idea" - that's an opinion, hardly a conviction; still, the answer of good or "bad" doesn't lie in facts of supply and demand,etc. It lies in the metaphysical nature of man, a concept which all the rest hangs upon. A conviction (such as free-will)is elicited by a chain of concepts traced back to what is proper for man's life -- not by narrow pragmatism of 'what works'.

And why not name it "fatalism"? Man, according to determinism, is as much in the grip of forces beyond his knowledge and control, as any theist believes he is - but more so. The distinction between supernatural predestination and human determinism, is one of degree not of kind, I think.

The consequences (and the causes, too, imo) of each of those convictions are equally mystical.

In all my first-hand, daily experience (integrated hierarchical or otherwise) I've never observed any human process, whether it was digesting an apple or thinking about free will, that could not be said to be the end result of prior forces of genetics and environment.

Now, regarding the example of the minimum wage, the case for determinism rests not on whether the opponents of a federally mandated wage floor derive their convictions (or even their mere opinions) from the economic certainty that the law governing wages will lead to greater unemployment--or from some notion about the metaphysical nature of man. Either way, the opponents arrived at their position as a result of being exposed to ideas and information provided by others or by first hand observation. Once again, it is the interplay of genetics and environment.

I call my viewpoint "determinism" and not" fatalism" because the later word is frequently associated with an attitude of resignation: that the future will happen a certain way no matter what I do. Obviously, my future will play out quite differently depending on whether or not I swallow 100 micrograms of Batrachotoxin.

I am unfamiliar with the term "human determinism." But if you wish to say my position and religious determinism differ by degree, you may say so, in the same respect that atheists and theists differ about the existence of God only by a matter degree--about 180 of them.

[anthony]

As reminder, the central position of Objectivism is that "man is a being of volitional consciousness".

That is - the generation, direction, control and intensity of his thought are within his power. This is either a pretty innocuous statement, or one of startling implication - depending on one's existential experience. I must mention it again, as you turn this discussion toward what occurs or doesn't occur as disproof of free-will. I.e., simply - you have been viewing only the end result, I start at the beginning.

Although I've dismissed the implied false dichotomy (and strawman) of prior conditions ~never~ influencing one's present and future condition, it's evident and self-evident that the power to observe and direct one's own thinking (even emotions, to a point) will certainly influence the creation of one's character and convictions. These in turn must logically influence future actions ("character is destiny") seldom in ONE decision or choice, but as sum total of a thousand thought-action-choices.

That, and constant reference, volitionally, back to objective standards of optimum principles, conviction and character - culminates in a sort of freely-willed "self-fulfilling prophecy".

[anthony]

I am unfamiliar with the term "human determinism." But if you wish to say my position and religious determinism differ by degree, you may say so, in the same respect that atheists and theists differ about the existence of God only by a matter degree--about 180 of them.

Of course, it is a made up term in order to differentiate from 'hard determinism'. Literally, in the latter view: all existence is composed of interacting atomic particles; man is composed of the selfsame particles; ergo, man is determined by interaction with other particles. It's not your conviction as far as I can tell, so making you a "human determinist" by my definition.

You may be familiar with Rand's writing in ITOE of the skeptic as a "disillusioned" mystical intrinsicist.

"Different sides of the same counterfeit coin" - she called them. A false dichotomy iow.

In essence the skeptic switches his deity, from god to--whatever: the authority of collectivism or State, or even Science, or perhaps the floating abstraction of the free market.

What seems 180 degrees different, e.g. between theist and atheist, is often much closer than one thinks.

[Francisco Ferrer]

Clearly, we disagree about volitional consciousness. You have said first-hand experience may be used to validate certain concepts. Well, with regard to consciousness, I have never experienced a moment when I've been able to shut it off. That is to say, I do not know how not to think. I admit being able to put myself to sleep and having the power to take certain strong drugs which would knock me out for several hours, but I do not think that is what you mean.

But what about the "direction, control and intensity" of thought? Are those not a matter of free will? I am giving this discussion far more concentration than I would, say, the pick of a Super Bowl winner. Is that not evidence of choice? As it happens, I was always a poor athlete, came from a home where playing stringed instruments was more highly regarded than sports. When I discovered in my early teens that I did not have the aptitude of even a mediocre musician, much less a great one, I turned to the world of ideas.

As one Objectivist website puts it, "Causality is the law that states that each cause has a specific effect, and that this effect is dependent on the identities of the agents involved." The words you are reading now and the nature of the author who wrote them are all dependent on prior agents.

If you want to start at the beginning, let's do. The sentences that appear in this post and the ideas they represent were composed by me. But I am not the First Cause. I am the biological product of two other humans. I came into the world with particular strengths and weaknesses. I was exposed to certain influences and kept away from others. I am the creature of a specific time period in history, shaped by events before, during and after my birth.

You used the term "dependent on one's existential experience." That is the very essence of my argument.

As for the strawman charge, I assure you, there is none. At no point have I described your position as one of "prior conditions *never* influencing one's present and future condition." Rather, I have focused on my own position: everything, including human thought and action, has a cause. A baby's preference for a set of blocks over a toy train, for example, is the culmination of a series of biological and environmental factors that make the baby's "choice" inevitable.

I understand the comfort that "free will" must give to those who, like myself, uphold individual political autonomy. I understand the convergence of those who espouse "free will" and libertarianism. I see it as a convenient fiction. The word "Creator" in The Declaration of Independence and individual "will" are both a form of shorthand for a complex set of forces.

Since theists believe with 100% certainty that things are caused by God, and I believe with 100% certainty that they are not, you might say we are about as close as Objectivism is to Marxism. I've never switched my deity--for I have never believed in a deity.

The "free market" a "floating abstraction"? Then so is "capitalism," "individualism," or virtually any other idea of merit discussed on this forum.

[Darrell Hougen]

I don't think the idea of determinism holds up under scrutiny. It may be that it is impossible to give a proof of either determinism or randomness, but let's look at the evidence.

The complexity of the world is increasing. Billions of years ago, there were no living things. Then came single celled organisms, then multicellular organisms, then more complex multicellular organisms and finally intelligent living beings. Look at the advance of science and technology. It is hard to account for an increase in complexity with a deterministic model. It is necessary to have an information source which, in turn, necessitates randomness.

People have gotten the idea that the world is mechanical from the study of physics and other branches of science and engineering. Of course, physics and other sciences are concerned with predicting things. Therefore, physicists generally tackle problems where there is some hope of a solution. If a deterministic solution is found, the evolution of a system can be predicted and the physicist has been successful. Physics professors then teach their students about problems that can be solved. But what about problems that can't be solved or ones that don't have deterministic solutions?

In order for a system of differential equations to have a deterministic solution it must satisfy the Lipschitz conditions. But what about equations that don't satisfy the Lipschitz conditions? It turns out that some systems of differential equations have non-deterministic solutions. That is, there are points at which the solution in the next instant of time is not determined by the initial conditions. There may be infinitely many solutions at a single point. I'm not an expert, but here is a paper by Alfred Hubler describing one such situation.

Of course, a system of differential equations is just a model of a physical system that may not take everything into account. But, that limitation applies to deterministic systems as well as non-deterministic systems. In fact, it may turn out that most systems of differential equations are actually non-deterministic. I've heard that the Helmholtz equations might be non-deterministic. The Helmholtz fluid flow equations describe water flow and air flow and hence the weather and the climate. If it is true that the equations are non-deterministic, it is no wonder the weather cannot be predicted with any degree of accuracy.

I know it is pleasant to think that everything can be predicted or is governed by a giant set of deterministic equations, but such a conclusion is not supported by the evidence.

Darrell

Even if a chaotic dynamic system is deterministic, if one cannot specify the initial or boundary conditions with infinite precision the answer you get soon become chaotic. An example is Lorenz system of differential equations were are completely deterministic but are chaotically dependent on initial conditions. Lorenz discovered to his surprise that using two initial values that differed by very little lead to wildly different solutions. Lorenz rediscovered chaotic dynamics first studied by Poincare' back in 1905. In those days they did not have computers so Poincare' was limited in his study of such systems.

Please see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorenz_system

Ba'al Chatzaf

The first and most critical separation to make, is physical determinism from 'human' determinism.

In my view, if the physical world is deterministic, then humans must be also. Humans must follow the laws of physics. However, if the physical world is non-deterministic, then humans and other living things need not be deterministic. In fact, they can't be. But, more than that, I think that living things may make use of randomness to enhance their probability of survival. There is, in fact, some evidence of this. For example, the thymus, an organ of the immune system works with T-lymphocytes to generate receptors for new kinds of infections by randomly shuffling genetic material. It may be that the brain also makes use of randomness in suggesting possible actions. The latter is my hypothesis.

Darrell

[Darrell Hougen]

I know it is pleasant to think that everything can be predicted or is governed by a giant set of deterministic equations, but such a conclusion is not supported by the evidence.

Darrell

Just to be clear, the argument for determinism (that human thoughts and actions ultimately have an external, prior cause) is not the same as the argument that "everything can be predicted or is governed by a giant set of deterministic equations."

That erroneous assumption is answered here.

Just to be clear, the argument that everything can be predicted is not the same as the argument that everything is governed by a giant set of deterministic equations. By saying that "everything is governed by a giant set of deterministic equations" I'm saying that everything is causal in the sense that one precise state of existence at a given time can only give rise to one state at a later time --- ignoring the problems with specifying time in different reference frames. The latter state is determined exactly by the earlier state. I used the terminology, "giant set of deterministic equations" partially as a reply to what Dean had said earlier.

I'm not claiming that everything could be predicted even if it were deterministic. In order for reality to be exactly predictable, several things would have to happen. Reality would have to be deterministic, it would have to be governed by laws that could be discovered, we would have to know what they were, we would have to know the initial conditions, it would have to be possible to build and program a computer to simulate those laws and the computation would have to finish before the future arrived, so to speak.

Stephen Wolfram, in "A New Kind of Science" lays out an elaborate case for determinism but points out that the universe or some significant chunk of it is likely to be so complex that only a complete simulation could predict its state at a future time and it is not clear whether such a simulation could be accomplished in time.

Darrell

[Darrell Hougen]

Darrell,

That "in our reality simulation math we use random inputs" makes no case for or against whether there are non-causal events in our reality. Let me reiterate that we commonly use such inputs to our math when the system we are trying to model is significantly influenced by a larger portion of reality than we know or requires computing more interactions between parts of reality than we have computational resources to compute.

Cheers,

Dean

Hi Dean,

I don't know who you're quoting above, but the point of the paper that I referenced was that there may be non-deterministic systems that obey all of the laws of physics. If a family of trajectories are tangent at a point, a system can smoothly transition from one trajectory to another without violating conservation of momentum or energy and, in fact, physics doesn't tell us which trajectory will be chosen by an actual physical system. So, even if reality is governed by a finite set of physical laws or equations, it need not be deterministic. Simply knowing the precise initial conditions of all particles may not be sufficient to predict the future state of the system.

There might also be an interaction between deterministic chaos and non-deterministic chaos. Small scale non-determinism could be amplified by deterministic, chaotic systems. The small scale non-determinism might be viewed as noise, but that noise could significantly alter the trajectories of large scale systems that go through phases in which neighboring trajectories diverge exponentially.

Darrell

[anthony]

Clearly, we disagree about volitional consciousness. You have said first-hand experience may be used to validate certain concepts. Well, with regard to consciousness, I have never experienced a moment when I've been able to shut it off. That is to say, I do not know how not to think. I admit being able to put myself to sleep and having the power to take certain strong drugs which would knock me out for several hours, but I do not think that is what you mean.

But what about the "direction, control and intensity" of thought? Are those not a matter of free will? I am giving this discussion far more concentration than I would, say, the pick of a Super Bowl winner. Is that not evidence of choice? As it happens, I was always a poor athlete, came from a home where playing stringed instruments was more highly regarded than sports. When I discovered in my early teens that I did not have the aptitude of even a mediocre musician, much less a great one, I turned to the world of ideas.

Hold it right there. Once again you have demonstrated that your consciousness operates by the principle of free will: at the least, implicitly. If you'd acknowledge it, only...;)

"The world of ideas" you say you turned to were -of course- other thinkers' ideas to start with-

however, you first had to apply your mind to those ideas to grasp them; then, it's certain you selected some that appealed to, inspired you and ultimately grabbed you as true; then gradually the ideas became your own, as you formed and perfected certain concepts for yourself, then you related them to reality, i.e. your own experience.

At the end of it all, the net gain is not that you were 'determined' by those other minds (who are undoubtedly deserving of our respect and appreciation, whomever they may be) but that you 'self-determined' the content of your consciousness.

To put up complex arguments against free will, requires free will.

Instead of taking the obvious route, determinists -I'm realising- would rather contort their thinking, pretzel-like, into brain-numbing debate to try to establish the unestablishable: that the happenstance of birth, their upbringing, or just a random gust of wind blowing a newspaper across their path, had more control over them than their own independent mind.

"The true opposite and enemy of altruism is not selfishness, it is independence."[AR]

Why I bring it up, is that here is the reason free-will is non-negotiable to Objectivists. Altruism, as Rand had it, is basically self-sacrifice, or the willing surrender of one's mind; usually to other convictions and principles which are not your own --and/or, blindly accepted from a collective. (The close, interdependent link between mind-independence and free-will must be apparent to you without explanation). And in the sense she posited it, one could say that adhering to pre-determinism is altruistic also.

I notice as I said, a contradiction in your writing, of one who is apparently an avidly independent thinker, but one who explicitly rejects free-will. If you can reconcile them, good luck, but I don't see how.

[Francisco Ferrer]

Clearly, we disagree about volitional consciousness. You have said first-hand experience may be used to validate certain concepts. Well, with regard to consciousness, I have never experienced a moment when I've been able to shut it off. That is to say, I do not know how not to think. I admit being able to put myself to sleep and having the power to take certain strong drugs which would knock me out for several hours, but I do not think that is what you mean.

But what about the "direction, control and intensity" of thought? Are those not a matter of free will? I am giving this discussion far more concentration than I would, say, the pick of a Super Bowl winner. Is that not evidence of choice? As it happens, I was always a poor athlete, came from a home where playing stringed instruments was more highly regarded than sports. When I discovered in my early teens that I did not have the aptitude of even a mediocre musician, much less a great one, I turned to the world of ideas.

Hold it right there. Once again you have demonstrated that your consciousness operates by the principle of free will: at the least, implicitly. If you'd acknowledge it, only...;)

"The world of ideas" you say you turned to were -of course- other thinkers' ideas to start with-

however, you first had to apply your mind to those ideas to grasp them; then, it's certain you selected some that appealed to, inspired you and ultimately grabbed you as true; then gradually the ideas became your own, as you formed and perfected certain concepts for yourself, then you related them to reality, i.e. your own experience.

At the end of it all, the net gain is not that you were 'determined' by those other minds (who are undoubtedly deserving of our respect and appreciation, whomever they may be) but that you 'self-determined' the content of your consciousness.

I was not self-determined. Certain writers appealed to me as a result of my prior experience (environment) and my personality at that time (environment plus genetics). The assertion of free will is at best shorthand for a myriad of external forces and at worst an illusion.

To put up complex arguments against free will, requires free will.

Not at all. It only requires a brain capable of processing the available stock of ideas and information. In short, environment plus genetics. We don't need to suppose the brain is independent of external forces in order for it to reach a conclusion, anymore than we need to suppose a programmed computer is independent of prior factors in order for it to render certain results.

Instead of taking the obvious route, determinists -I'm realising- would rather contort their thinking, pretzel-like, into brain-numbing debate to try to establish the unestablishable: that the happenstance of birth, their upbringing, or just a random gust of wind blowing a newspaper across their path, had more control over them than their own independent mind.

Free will is anything but obvious. It supposes a form of causeless activity that we do not see in the rest of the natural world. As for "contorting my thinking," I've provided simple, straightforward lines of causation for how I arrived at my present set of values. If they were difficult for you to follow, that is my regret.

"The true opposite and enemy of altruism is not selfishness, it is independence."[AR]

Why I bring it up, is that here is the reason free-will is non-negotiable to Objectivists. Altruism, as Rand had it, is basically self-sacrifice, or the willing surrender of one's mind; usually to other convictions and principles which are not your own --and/or, blindly accepted from a collective. (The close, interdependent link between mind-independence and free-will must be apparent to you without explanation). And in the sense she posited it, one could say that adhering to pre-determinism is altruistic also.

I notice as I said, a contradiction in your writing, of one who is apparently an avidly independent thinker, but one who explicitly rejects free-will. If you can reconcile them, good luck, but I don't see how.

I regard my life as its own end and I hold that I have a right to do as I please with my life and my property--without regard for how it may affect others.

On the other hand, there is altruism, which according to Ayn Rand holds "that man has no right to exist for his own sake, that service to others is the only justification of his existence, and that self-sacrifice is his highest moral duty, virtue and value."

Now, if you think those beliefs are congruent, then perhaps the free will argument is clouding your judgment.

The fact that I am attracted to rebels and dissenters hardly proves that my preference does not have an external cause.

[BaalChatzaf]

I regard my life as its own end and I hold that I have a right to do as I please with my life and my property--without regard for how it may affect others.

You have no warrant or right to recklessly endanger others.

Do no harm.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Francisco Ferrer]

I regard my life as its own end and I hold that I have a right to do as I please with my life and my property--without regard for how it may affect others.

You have no warrant or right to recklessly endanger others.

Do no harm.

Ba'al Chatzaf

So if I wish to build a skyscraper on a downtown lot I own, I may not do so if the new building blocks the view of the skyline from a neighboring building and causes the condominiums therein to decline in value? "Do no harm"?

So if I publish an investment newsletter, I may not recommend that my readers sell their stock in the Acme Long Playing Record Company when a new product called compact discs comes out on the market because to do so would impoverish Acme's majority shareholder? "Do no harm"?

So if I own a bar I must stop selling alcohol because the product may adversely affect the health of some of my patrons? "Do no harm"?