Why does an Epistemology of reason necessarily lead to an ethics of self-interest and egoism?

[Xray]

And XRAY just wrote:

Empathy cannot be enforced. The effectiveness of empathy does not lie in the application of force.

End quote

Tell that to the celebrating North Korean people cheering and sobbing for their “Dear Fearless Leader,” on his birthday.

The behavior of faking reality (i. e. pretending to be empathetic) can be enforced. But the feeling of empathy cannot be enforced just as the feeling of love cannot be enforced.

Daunce, I am waiting for her to talk about her primary principle, *empathy.* Empathy is good. It leads to cooperation and peace. It leads to compassion for animals. I also experience the empathy she describes but it is not an overriding principle. She is quite capable of writing O’ist geek speak.

Non-Initiation of Force is an overriding principle. The Rights of Humans is an overriding, primary principle.

And on what are these principles based? On empathy.

Empathy as part of a political document is a roadmap to totalitarianism. Does she feel empathy for the “first rebel” Satan? Serial killers? Poor misunderstood Adolf and Mao? Nicolai Lenin and Uncle Joe? Without knowing if XRAY’s empathy is all inclusive it is dumb and dangerous.

It is not all-inclusive of course.

More in the next few days.

Edited April 20, 2011 by Xray

[Peter]

I wrote:

Empathy as part of a political document is a roadmap to totalitarianism. Does she feel empathy for the “first rebel” Satan? Serial killers? Poor misunderstood Adolf and Mao? Nicolai Lenin and Uncle Joe? Without knowing if XRAY’s empathy is all inclusive it is dumb and dangerous.

Xray replied:

It is not all-inclusive of course.

More in the next few days.

End quote

I knew it. Adolf is included in your circle of empathy!

Look out Czechs und Poles, Xray’s in her panzer.

Lebensraum, lebensraum

I must have mein elbow room.

Peter

[Xray]

I wrote:

Empathy as part of a political document is a roadmap to totalitarianism. Does she feel empathy for the “first rebel” Satan? Serial killers? Poor misunderstood Adolf and Mao? Nicolai Lenin and Uncle Joe? Without knowing if XRAY’s empathy is all inclusive it is dumb and dangerous.

Xray replied:

It is not all-inclusive of course.

More in the next few days.

End quote

I knew it. Adolf is included in your circle of empathy!

Look out Czechs und Poles, Xray’s in her panzer.

Lebensraum, lebensraum

I must have mein elbow room.

Peter

You completely missed my point. Empathy as I understand it is with the victims of crimes, not with the perpetrators. That's what I meant by "not all-inclusive". For it is the perpetrator who goes against the empathy principle.

[william.scherk]

I knew it. Adolf is included in your circle of empathy!

Look out Czechs und Poles, Xray’s in her panzer.

Lebensraum, lebensraum

You completely missed my point. Empathy as I understand it is with the victims of crimes, not with the perpetrators. That's what I meant by "not all-inclusive". For it is the perpetrator who goes against the empathy principle.

I don't think you need to bother with Peter Taylor -- he has shown only a thug's understanding of reason. His grasp of 'empathy' (or his awe-inspiring misreading in this case) suggests that he prefers bigoted hyperbole over any other form of communication.

[IamBalSimon]

There is a lot that has been said here. I cannot possibly respond to every point, so I will simply make my own.

For me this is a very simple thing to answer - *IF* we take out the word "necessarily" from the opening question. I don't believe that there is a "necessity" about any kind of "reason" (objectivist included) that MUST lead to an ethics of self-interest and egoism. Unlike something like geometry, in real life there are very few supremely simple, straightforward axioms that lead to theorem that lead to postulates, etc. We are free to start from whatever premises we want and construct all kinds of widely divergent "philosophies" and "epistemologies." So much of this kind of material seems like talking about angels singing above the Titanic, deciding on which people will get lifeboats. Not very useful, and certainly nothing to get worked up about.

That said, let me make my case by beginning with something that Xray said: "I'm now interested in knowing to what degree the Objectivist morality includes empathy toward e. g. workers in the Third World who work in sweatshops run by capitalist firms who pay them a mere pittance in wages, or who are being paid way to little for their produce (like e.g. coffee)."

I think that there is a rule that makes a lot of sense: The Golden Rule - Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.

Meaning of course: You don't want your kid to be be put in a sweat shop; you shouldn't be willing for someone else's kid to be put in a sweat shop. Especially since children do not have the power to avoid the force of adults nor the wisdom to navigate the harshness of Nature. When we moved from Los Angeles to Seattle, our son had zero choice, let alone an ability to exercise a choice if he had one, to stay in L.A.

I think that the Golden Rule is a wonderful rule - if viewed properly as a rule of self-interest - what might be called "enlightened self-interest."

I know the kind of society I want to live in. I want one that tends toward civility and courtesy. I want one where I don't have to look over my shoulder to see if someone is gunning for me. I want a society where I don't have to lock my front door (the way it was in the 1950s according to my parents - in Los Angeles! Can we even IMAGINE not locking our doors today?).

There are people who say that illegals should not get medical treatment paid for by taxpayers. I agree they should not get anything elective. But what if they have whooping cough. Do we really want them to walk the streets with that dread disease? I don't think so. So out of my own self-interest, I want them healthy enough to not have communicable diseases. One might say "it's also the humane thing to do" - but whether or not you think there's anything to there being a "humane thing," your own self-interest should have you saying that as long as they are here, they shouldn't be kept from getting health treatment.

A similar, though lesser case can be made for educating them. Do we really want to live in a society filled with the children of illegals who have zero vision of how to live in a more civilized way all because we didn't want our tax dollars to be "wasted" on supporting people who ought not be here in the first place? As long as they are here, I'd like them to be educated to the point that they don't see gang banging, mugging me and mine as their only intellectual alternatives. So out of that self-interest, I'd like them educated to a point - even if I have to pay for it - even if I find it galling that I have no real choice as long as the Federal government remains derelict in its function, etc.

The point is that my self-interest goes out into the universe and rebounds toward me in ways both anticipated and not. It collides with everyone else's self-interest too. I choose to not be a hermit (and even then, if I am using the English language, I'm not totally a hermit either). It is in my self-interest that society be as robust, alive, AND pleasant as possible. These go beyond mere transactional events. They help formulate policies and procedures. They help for overall ethics of what kind of person I have to be in order to get the kind of society that I want.

If this is true, then epistemology - the structure of my knowledge/beliefs/orientations/etc. - forces me to acknowledge that I do not have the power of omniscience; that I am not omnipotent; and that we have social compacts into which we were born and that we did not construct ourselves, and now have ongoing opportunities to bend per our vision of things. We will always do this in what we believe to be our self-interest. The question arises: how broadly do you define "self-interest?"

- Bal

[anthony]

If this is true, then epistemology - the structure of my knowledge/beliefs/orientations/etc. - forces me to acknowledge that I do not have the power of omniscience; that I am not omnipotent; and that we have social compacts into which we were born and that we did not construct ourselves, and now have ongoing opportunities to bend per our vision of things. We will always do this in what we believe to be our self-interest. The question arises: how broadly do you define "self-interest?"

- Bal

Bal,

Whether people are fully aware of it or not, we are all born into a world that prizes the collective, above the singular. The influence of this is so insidious, that no matter how people try to resist, intuitively sensing it is not right, mostly they eventually give up the struggle, and force themselves to accomodate it.

To even begin, we have to question if "They" are actually right - and who is one person to fight all the 'received wisdom' of humanity?

Reality, the way the world is, and the identity of you and I, can be the only starting-point. What else is there?

How to live, when we lack the tools and instincts of animals?

Okay, through self-generated thought, through reason.

But who's property is that mind? Who's property are the material fruits of that mind? Self-evidently, the nature of Man is complete autonomy (self-authority) and independence - an individual disconnected metaphysically from all other individuals. He must, ought to, and can only, be deliberately conscious for his own sake. All the rest is choice.

This is the raw beginning of a rational morality - reality and consciousness. What is, dictates what should be done about it.

Without this morality it's obvious that we are 'sitting ducks' for everyone elses' ideas of morality, and their demands upon us.

I (also) like, as a rough guide, "Do unto others..." - and I see no contradiction with Objectivism's morality of the supreme value, Life.

The fact remains, that the egoist morality does not despise or denigrate other lives; it is not the monopoly of the collectivist morality to respect, be considerate of, and empathize with, others - or, to do something to help them.

This either/or exclusivity is a particularly nasty fallacy, which attempts to conceal a basic truth: that one cannot have full, focused appreciation of all life (even lower forms) without fully focusing on one's own life, first. And holding it up as the highest value.

Which lends credibility to PJ O'Rourke's wry observation that liberals actually hate other people.

As an Advocacy, altruism is doomed to fail - without coercion and guilt supporting it; as an Advocacy, rational selfishness is ultimately the only human and humane system.

Tony

(Ask a simple question, and... )

[Xray]

I don't think you need to bother with Peter Taylor -- he has shown only a thug's understanding of reason. His grasp of 'empathy' (or his awe-inspiring misreading in this case) suggests that he prefers bigoted hyperbole over any other form of communication.

I can see your point, William, but I'm not really bothering with Peter who either can't or won't understand what I was trying to convey.

A while ago there was a discussion about the special communication form on forums where the aspect of 'addressing the public' was mentioned, i. e. that every public forum dialogue between individuals is "out in the open" for all to read, and in the recent exchange with Peter Taylor, my focus was not on him (which is why I did not react to his flying off the handle), but on the presentation of the empathy/Golden Rule idea, and I was hoping others would join in the discussion (which happened; very impressive #55 post by IamBalSimon!).

There is a lot that has been said here. I cannot possibly respond to every point, so I will simply make my own ...

Thank you very much for this insightful post, Bal, which offers a lot of food for thought. ITA with you on the Golden Rule as a guiding principle.

Edited April 22, 2011 by Xray

[IamBalSimon]

Hi Tony,

For me the important thing about "the collective" isn't that it's prized. It's that it's our de facto starting point.

I have no choice but that my native language is English. Even if I wanted to, I couldn't change that.

I could, of course, learn a second language. But my verbal thinking happens in English. That alone generates certain "collective" facts. On top of this, I stand on the "mental shoulders" of those many people who came before me, and I stand shoulder to shoulder with many of those with whom I communicate now (such as you). This "changes" my thinking in such a way that I can't easily tell, if I can tell at all, where your views end and my views begin. There's a kind of "bleed-over" between me and all with whom I communicate. I don't see any way around this, and I don't really see it as a "negative."

This is part of my epistemology. It is has nothing to do with "prizing" the collective over the individual or vice versa. It stands as a way of thinking about how I know what I know; how I am capable of communicating with you and others and the constraints that I face in doing so.

From the above, we at some point arrive at the issue of "self-interest." What do I have a right to? What, if anything, do others have a right to expect of me? These are very different questions than those that deal with the structure and processes of knowledge.

From the above overly long, yet too sketchy presentation of epistemology, I know that I am similarly situated in this world as pretty much everyone else. We rely on each other to get things done that we could not get done on our own. Moreover, we do so much unconsciously with one another (approaching intersections on highways, for instance) that we find ourselves "surprised" when someone doesn't honor a stop sign or runs a red light, etc. We have no person-to-person "contract" with our fellow drivers; but we do have a collective compact with them - that they are licensed; that they are insured; that they will honor the rules of the road. I might "choose" to go against traffic, but I think it would be perfectly reasonable for a cop to stop me and to say, "I don't care that you are a self-determined individual. When you are on a public road, you will obey the public laws regarding it. Here's your ticket for $175; payable in two weeks. Have a good day."

- Bal

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

For me the important thing about "the collective" isn't that it's prized. It's that it's our de facto starting point.

I have no choice but that my native language is English. Even if I wanted to, I couldn't change that.

I could, of course, learn a second language. But my verbal thinking happens in English. That alone generates certain "collective" facts. On top of this, I stand on the "mental shoulders" of those many people who came before me...

. . .

This is part of my epistemology. It is has nothing to do with "prizing" the collective over the individual or vice versa. It stands as a way of thinking about how I know what I know; how I am capable of communicating with you and others and the constraints that I face in doing so.

... we at some point arrive at the issue of "self-interest." What do I have a right to? What, if anything, do others have a right to expect of me? These are very different questions than those that deal with the structure and processes of knowledge.

Bal,

I excerpted this because you show a greater understanding of epistemology than many people I have read who can quote Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology chapter and verse.

(This is not a reflection on Tony's thinking. I have certain Objectivist scholars in mind.)

Are you familiar with recent advances in neuroscience (from, say, the last 15 years to the present)?

Some of the stuff I have read in the past two years, which is when I started, barbecues a lot of sacred cows.

Here's another thought for you--one outside of epistemology, but one reflecting your acknowledgment of what other people mean to an individual in terms of reality.

When you read Rand say things like "I have taught them that the world is ours, whenever we choose to claim it..." or "The world you desired can be won, it exists, it is real, it is possible, it's yours..." (both from Galt's speech) or "Art gives him that fuel; the pleasure of contemplating the objectified reality of one's own sense of life is the pleasure of feeling what it would be like to live in one's ideal world..." (from "Art and a Sense of Life" in The Romantic Manifesto), or any number of similar quotes I can dig up, she never says the following explicitly, but the "world" she talks about does not just mean the physical world without humans, it also includes society. And even more than society, the way knowledge and values are treated in that society.

This meaning is more evident when she talks about how the world is going to hell in a handbasket (it's always the fault of other people), but if you read carefully, this meaning is there when she talks about how an individual can make the world in his or her image and values.

This is a concept Rand treated with a bit of ambivalence, so you have to think this one through. And that makes it tricky. Some of her followers vest themselves in what they insinuate, not in what can be logically deduced from her concepts. I know I have read an/or heard several Objectivists refer to the world as a good place ("benevolent universe" and things like that) when they basically mean non-human reality except for the specific individual human under discussion, but when they say the world is rotten under certain conditions, or being destroyed. etc., they mean a place full of people.

I believe it is critically important to think about this and what it means

Michael

[George H. Smith]

Oh, an ethical system based on empathy does extend beyond the family.

I use it all the time in my work with children. Also with strangers. I can give you an example from this morning....

You should read Adam's Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith's entire theory of social ethics, including his notion of conscience, is built on the ability of human beings to experience empathy. It should be noted that Smith, like other 18th century philosophers, called this "sympathy" rather than "empathy" -- but the latter is what he meant. As Smith put it:

Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments is to moral theory what the Wealth of Nations is to economic theory. It is Smith's explanation of how our moral sentiments develop spontaneously in a social context, so that certain types of reactions are regarded as appropriate and others as inappropriate.

TMS was also Smith's response to the "moral sense" school of ethics, according to which we must posit an innate moral sense in human beings in order to explain moral phenomena. Moral sense theory was very popular among Smith's contemporaries. Its best known defender was Smith's teacher Francis Hutcheson, but it was also defended by David Hume and a host of other Scottish philosophers. Smith attempted to show that we don't need to posit a special moral sense in order to account for the moral nature of human beings; rather, our natural ability to empathize can explain everything that needs to be explained.

Keep in mind that TMS. like a lot of 18th century moral philosophy, would be described today as social psychology rather than "ethics" per se.

The definitive Glasgow edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments is available in an inexpensive Liberty Fund edition. The entire text is also available online. Go here for the first part.

Ghs

[anthony]

Hi Tony,

For me the important thing about "the collective" isn't that it's prized. It's that it's our de facto starting point.

I have no choice but that my native language is English. Even if I wanted to, I couldn't change that.

I could, of course, learn a second language. But my verbal thinking happens in English. That alone generates certain "collective" facts. On top of this, I stand on the "mental shoulders" of those many people who came before me, and I stand shoulder to shoulder with many of those with whom I communicate now (such as you). This "changes" my thinking in such a way that I can't easily tell, if I can tell at all, where your views end and my views begin. There's a kind of "bleed-over" between me and all with whom I communicate. I don't see any way around this, and I don't really see it as a "negative."

This is part of my epistemology. It is has nothing to do with "prizing" the collective over the individual or vice versa. It stands as a way of thinking about how I know what I know; how I am capable of communicating with you and others and the constraints that I face in doing so.

From the above, we at some point arrive at the issue of "self-interest." What do I have a right to? What, if anything, do others have a right to expect of me? These are very different questions than those that deal with the structure and processes of knowledge.

- Bal

Bal,

I'm aware that I did not directly address your thoughts and concerns in my last post, and apologize for that. Finding the starting point, drawing the parameters, is my way of going about all of this, and I spent over-long on stuff you probably already know.

I'm interested in how you view things - as in your conclusion, "we at some point arrive at the issue of "self-interest".

IS that the end point? It's a question I've wrestled with myself. Isn't the question really how much do we owe to our parents, our society, and other circumstances of birth, - and definitely not forgetting the giants who went before us - and how much do we NOT owe them?

(As many do here, I spend quite some time appreciating anything and every thing man-made, and I consider that for every one object or artwork that does exist, millions of objects and ideas did not eventuate, or survive. Who am I to judge the failure or success of those people by this standard - of what lived on after them?)

I'm digressing again, but essentially I take the angle that every person who existed and exists, aimed for some goal, modest or lofty, and mostly fell short of it, but achieved something of value to themselves at least. Perhaps their implied intention was the betterment of fellow man, but I am certain they were always acting in their self-interest, by dint of pushing their minds and energy to limits, towards some ideal.

Whether they knew it or not.

Simply, a morality of egoism makes explicit this concept: that one can only and best, fulfill himself by acting as close to the independent 'rational animal', that Man is. All without any undefined debt or 'due' to some vague and unspecified entity - the tribe or nation, the past, or future.

I think we should accept what already exists, and run with it - not forgetting to sometimes look back in respect and admiration at those who went before us.

Sure, there will always be consensual interaction with other people - what O'ists call 'the trader principle'; in this sense, no man is an island. But it only takes a monment's reflection to see the practical self-interest at work here.

While the "de facto starting point" of one's life does appear to be 'the collective', and as you infer, there is indeed a hierarchy here - but, I ask in all sincerity, don't you have the hierarchy inverted?

Tony

[Xray]

You should read Adam's Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith's entire theory of social ethics, including his notion of conscience, is built on the ability of human beings to experience empathy. It should be noted that Smith, like other 18th century philosophers, called this "sympathy" rather than "empathy" -- but the latter is what he meant.

<.......>

The definitive Glasgow edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments is available in an inexpensive Liberty Fund edition. The entire text is also available online. Go here for the first part.

Thank you George for providing the link to part 1 of Adam Smith's TMS. Much of what he wrote there about sympathy/empathy seems to be confirmed by recent research in neuroscience.

Edited April 23, 2011 by Xray

[Xray]

There is a lot that has been said here. I cannot possibly respond to every point, so I will simply make my own.

For me this is a very simple thing to answer - *IF* we take out the word "necessarily" from the opening question. I don't believe that there is a "necessity" about any kind of "reason" (objectivist included) that MUST lead to an ethics of self-interest and egoism.

The question of the thread creator "Why does an Epistemology of reason necessarily lead to an ethics of self-interest and egoism?" is a variant of the "ought to from is" issue.

Poster NateThe Great asked why an epistemology of reason necessarily leads to a specific kind of morality. The question suggested doubt about whether this is possible.

So maybe it would be a good approach to examine whether moral conclusions must necessarily follow from a rational asessment of a situation.

I'll exemplify with stray dogs.

A proposition is true if it corresponds to the facts, so here goes:

There exist a lot of stray dogs in the world. True.

The stray dogs frequently cause problems for the population living in the same area with them. True.

It has been attempted to solve the problem. True.

The ways in which it has been attempted to solve the problem differ. True.

But from all these true propositions it cannot be derived how the solution is to look like morally; it can for example not be derived that the stray dogs "ought to" be helped.

A few years ago, in Athens shortly before the Olympics, the authorities decided to solve the stray dog problem by killing them; a decision animal rights activists vehemently protested against.

In this context, the problem of basing an ethics on "rationality" becomes obvious.

It raises the question whether a term like "rational" belongs in the realm of morality at all.

For "rational" goes toward cognition, it goes toward evaluating adequate means to reach an end. For example, it is irrational for a person to expect to become an opera singer if this person can't carry a tune. The irrationality lies in failing to realize that his/her means to reach the desired goal are inadequate.

So from the perspective of the authorities of the City of Athens, they could have defended their decision as "rational".

Per Objectivist premises, every rational process is a moral process, and here is the wrinkle.

In case the decision is not to kill the dogs, but to help them (by creating shelters, etc.), this decision is based on an already existent ethical position directing the way the "is" situation is being dealt with.

Edited April 23, 2011 by Xray

[Selene]

Angela:

Prior to your set of assumptions as to the "stray dog" example, are there not "hidden assumptions?"

For example, substitute "rats" for "dogs."

Would we even be having the discussion about killing the substituted entity?

A priori, there is a hidden assumption that "dogs" have a relatively high value to rational humans and that hidden assumption changes the process.

Do you agree?

Adam

[Xray]

Angela:

Prior to your set of assumptions as to the "stray dog" example, are there not "hidden assumptions?"

For example, substitute "rats" for "dogs."

Would we even be having the discussion about killing the substituted entity?

A priori, there is a hidden assumption that "dogs" have a relatively high value to rational humans and that hidden assumption changes the process.

Do you agree?

Adam

Excellent counter example with the rats, Adam.

Imo the rational assessment here goes toward evaluating the rats as causing more damage to us than stray dogs in that they infest the canalization system in masses; they are connoted with transmitting deadly diseases (it was rat fleas which caused the plague).

Whereas with dogs, there is an emotional attachment to them in our society because they have been our faithful companions through many centuries; stray dogs are also far more likely to raise feelings of caring in us than rats who are better equipped to survive without human help.

As opposed to rats, dogs are the result of breeding humans did with wolves. "Dog" and "man" are therefore associated so closely that with stray dogs, we connote that they have "no home".

Edited April 23, 2011 by Xray

[Brant Gaede]

Angela:

Prior to your set of assumptions as to the "stray dog" example, are there not "hidden assumptions?"

For example, substitute "rats" for "dogs."

Would we even be having the discussion about killing the substituted entity?

A priori, there is a hidden assumption that "dogs" have a relatively high value to rational humans and that hidden assumption changes the process.

Do you agree?

Adam

Excellent counter example with the rats, Adam.

Imo the rational assessment here goes toward evaluating the rats as causing more damage to us than stray dogs in that they infest the canalization system in masses; they are connoted with transmitting deadly diseases (it was rat fleas which caused the plague).

Whereas with dogs, there is an emotional attachment to them in our society because they have been our faithful companions through many centuries; a stray dog is also far more likely to raise feelings of caring in us than rats who are better equipped to survive without human help.

Thanks for posting this. My rats belie your animadversion upon their corpuses delectuses.

--Brant

taste good too

[Xray]

Angela:

Prior to your set of assumptions as to the "stray dog" example, are there not "hidden assumptions?"

For example, substitute "rats" for "dogs."

Would we even be having the discussion about killing the substituted entity?

A priori, there is a hidden assumption that "dogs" have a relatively high value to rational humans and that hidden assumption changes the process.

Do you agree?

Adam

Excellent counter example with the rats, Adam.

Imo the rational assessment here goes toward evaluating the rats as causing more damage to us than stray dogs in that they infest the canalization system in masses; they are connoted with transmitting deadly diseases (it was rat fleas which caused the plague).

Whereas with dogs, there is an emotional attachment to them in our society because they have been our faithful companions through many centuries; a stray dog is also far more likely to raise feelings of caring in us than rats who are better equipped to survive without human help.

Thanks for posting this. My rats belie your animadversion upon their corpuses delectuses.

--Brant

taste good too

The fact that rats have risen to the 'status' of domestic animal in some cases does not erase the reaction most people have to them.

As for rat meat 'tasting good' - dog meat obviously "tastes good" to the human palate as well since it is eaten in some countries.

Edited April 23, 2011 by Xray

[Brant Gaede]

Angela:

Prior to your set of assumptions as to the "stray dog" example, are there not "hidden assumptions?"

For example, substitute "rats" for "dogs."

Would we even be having the discussion about killing the substituted entity?

A priori, there is a hidden assumption that "dogs" have a relatively high value to rational humans and that hidden assumption changes the process.

Do you agree?

Adam

Excellent counter example with the rats, Adam.

Imo the rational assessment here goes toward evaluating the rats as causing more damage to us than stray dogs in that they infest the canalization system in masses; they are connoted with transmitting deadly diseases (it was rat fleas which caused the plague).

Whereas with dogs, there is an emotional attachment to them in our society because they have been our faithful companions through many centuries; a stray dog is also far more likely to raise feelings of caring in us than rats who are better equipped to survive without human help.

Thanks for posting this. My rats belie your animadversion upon their corpuses delectuses.

--Brant

taste good too

The fact that rats have risen to the 'status' of domestic animal in some cases does not erase the reaction most people have to them.

As for rat meat 'tasting good' - dog meat obviously "tastes good" to the human palate as well since it is eaten in some countries.

And horsemeat in France. Does that spll over into Austria and Germany?

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

There is a lot that has been said here. I cannot possibly respond to every point, so I will simply make my own.

For me this is a very simple thing to answer - *IF* we take out the word "necessarily" from the opening question. I don't believe that there is a "necessity" about any kind of "reason" (objectivist included) that MUST lead to an ethics of self-interest and egoism.

The question of the thread creator "Why does an Epistemology of reason necessarily lead to an ethics of self-interest and egoism?" is a variant of the "ought to from is" issue.

This issue has nothing to do with the Is/Ought problem. Rather, it addresses the relationship between two disciplines -- epistemology and ethics -- and asks whether a given theory in the former will rationally compel us to accept a conclusion (egoism, in this case) in the latter. One could ask the same kind of question about the relationship between epistemology and aesthetics, epistemology and metaphysics, etc., etc.

Btw, Nate is correct; a given conception of reason will not lead us, through a string of deductive syllogisms, to a logically necessitated egoism. I don't know where this argument supposedly came from. I don't recall reading anything about it before in the O'ist literature.

Ghs

[IamBalSimon]

Hi Tony,

Let me preface what I write here by saying that I sense you and I would both agree that "it's just us chickens here" and that neither one of us is trying to pompously assert a position of authority. I certainly have no legitimate claim to any throne other than that of "balsimonism." (My wife, however, sometimes wonders about my reign on even *that* throne.)

I will begin my reply by quoting your question: "IS that the end point? It's a question I've wrestled with myself. Isn't the question really how much do we owe to our parents, our society, and other circumstances of birth, - and definitely not forgetting the giants who went before us - and how much do we NOT owe them?"

I believe this was in direct response to my statement: "I stand on the "mental shoulders" of those many people who came before me, and I stand shoulder to shoulder with many of those with whom I communicate now (such as you). This "changes" my thinking in such a way that I can't easily tell, if I can tell at all, where your views end and my views begin. There's a kind of "bleed-over" between me and all with whom I communicate. I don't see any way around this, and I don't really see it as a "negative."

I have a difficulty with your word-choice: owe.

Let me choose a word to help me out here: appreciate. Appreciation would seem to involve both "intellectual" and "feeling" components. One cannot fully appreciate what one does not understand. Once can easily find himself/herself (hirself) in awe of something not fully understood. But appreciation would seem to require something deeper and more abiding. Does this makes sense to you?

When I wrote that I stand on the shoulders and also shoulder to shoulder, this could have been otherwise stated thus: I can only begin to appreciate the many people who came before me and the many people who walk with me now, who have helped me form my understandings (plural) of the world in which I participate. This includes all the folks that you mentioned. It includes the institutions that have allowed people around the world to flourish. It includes all the hardships endured and overcome by ancestors, both direct and off-line, but who have nevertheless brought the world and me to the current configuration.

A far simpler way of saying this would be to simply state that there is no way, no how, that I could have arrived at my understanding of things without all that has served as a platform from which I currently experience, think, and participate.

I do indeed "feel" a sense of gratitude for this; and I usually pair the word "gratitude" with the word "debt." But this feeling is a very personal reaction, and I can concede that someone else might say s/he experiences all of this as a burden and thus feels anger rather than gratitude. That would seem very odd to me, but I acknowledge it to be a viable possibility.

This kind of "debt" however is not of a transactional kind. It is rather of the kind that generates a "salute" or a tip of one's hat. It stands as an assertion of thanks rather than a desire to compensate someone for a job well done. Does this makes sense? For there is no way that I can compensate Plato and Socrates for a sense of the Socratic method. There is no way I can thank Alfred Korzybski for helping me to understand that "the word is not the thing and that the map is not the territory." There is nothing I can offer to Alan Watts (or his estate, for that matter) in return for helping me see that boundaries also serve as bridges, that where you end and where I begin, where the sound waves end and the appreciation of music begins is not at all easy for me to ascertain.

I can, and do, *imagine* a debt that is "paid" by my continuing a "longitudinal wave" - a future-oriented effort - that can inspire others who might resonate with me. But really, there is no one who can receive my payment and call it "paid in full."

The way you phrased your query places too stark a differentiation between "you" and "me;" between the messages I have "received" and my "processing" and "generation" of thoughts that emerges over time. I cannot even begin to tell you what I owe or don't because that would require an accounting that I simply don't have the wherewithal to make.

This is a matter of epistemology - as I see it. It is NOT a matter of bargaining for goods and services (for what I guess objectivists call a "transfer of values?").

For me, epistemology deals with the largely unconscious platform upon which all policies, procedures, methods, tools, institutions, and transactions can take place. It is that which helps one makes sense of all of these and nothing more.

- Bal

[IamBalSimon]

I excerpted this because you show a greater understanding of epistemology than many people I have read who can quote Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology chapter and verse.

I appreciate that, but really - I am just an egg. There is much for me to learn, even as I directly assert my *current* understanding.

Are you familiar with recent advances in neuroscience (from, say, the last 15 years to the present)?

Some of the stuff I have read in the past two years, which is when I started, barbecues a lot of sacred cows.

I'm afraid there have been far too many advances for me to keep up with. But I understand what you say about sacred cows. I would suggest that it is the nature of human enterprise to oust the old understandings when more accurate, more workable understandings emerge. (I was going to say "better understandings," but "better" seems to form a mischief word as it allows for such monstrosities as political correctness - with the advocates saying that "xyz" is better than "abc" even though it makes understanding less accurate and participation between people less workable.) I would submit that this is part of the natural human condition and has been going on - in fits and starts - for as long as there have been people.

One area of study that I have found quite fascinating is that of "mirror neurons," which appear to be the basis for being able to put yourself in another's shoes. I'm not sure how accurate this is, but if the theory is born out, it would seem to provide evidence for a "hard wiring" of empathy as part of human neurology.

This meaning is more evident when she talks about how the world is going to hell in a handbasket (it's always the fault of other people), but if you read carefully, this meaning is there when she talks about how an individual can make the world in his or her image and values.

This is a concept Rand treated with a bit of ambivalence, so you have to think this one through. And that makes it tricky. Some of her followers vest themselves in what they insinuate, not in what can be logically deduced from her concepts. I know I have read an/or heard several Objectivists refer to the world as a good place ("benevolent universe" and things like that) when they basically mean non-human reality except for the specific individual human under discussion, but when they say the world is rotten under certain conditions, or being destroyed. etc., they mean a place full of people.

I believe it is critically important to think about this and what it means

Let me first paraphrase what you wrote to make sure I have it correct. You are saying that a person has it within his/her (hir) power to make the world per hir own images and values. You are further saying that many Objectivists consider the world to be a "benevolent place" and what screws it all up are people.

Do I have this correct? Please confirm or clarify before I continue. Thanks!

- Bal

Edited April 24, 2011 by IamBalSimon

[IamBalSimon]

Hey Tony,

I just re-read your post and realized I didn't adequately respond. Apologies. Let me try again...

... but essentially I take the angle that every person who existed and exists, aimed for some goal, modest or lofty, and mostly fell short of it, but achieved something of value to themselves at least. Perhaps their implied intention was the betterment of fellow man, but I am certain they were always acting in their self-interest, by dint of pushing their minds and energy to limits, towards some ideal.

Whether they knew it or not.

Simply, a morality of egoism makes explicit this concept: that one can only and best, fulfill himself by acting as close to the independent 'rational animal', that Man is. All without any undefined debt or 'due' to some vague and unspecified entity - the tribe or nation, the past, or future.

I think we should accept what already exists, and run with it - not forgetting to sometimes look back in respect and admiration at those who went before us.

Sure, there will always be consensual interaction with other people - what O'ists call 'the trader principle'; in this sense, no man is an island. But it only takes a monment's reflection to see the practical self-interest at work here.

While the "de facto starting point" of one's life does appear to be 'the collective', and as you infer, there is indeed a hierarchy here - but, I ask in all sincerity, don't you have the hierarchy inverted?

[my emphasis added]

I don't see it this way. I am open to being convinced.

What I write about in terms of standing on the shoulders of others or with them as I generate (hopefully) greater understandings deals with epistemology. The trader principle does not seem to be involved with epistemology at all, except in such specific instances where I might trade coin for mentoring or coaching.

When it comes to participation - with generating the "best values" (is that a correct usage in Objectivist language?) that I can, then yes - I act "as if" I am an independent agent (I prefer not to use the phrase "rational animal.") because my brain/mind isn't fast enough or powerful enough to deal with all of the relational aspects of the world while I navigate and do the work and play of the day.

When I dance with my wife, I am paying attention to the beat of the music; to the location of other people on the dance floor so as to avoid collisions with them. I am wrapped in the music, and there is no "bandwidth" in the moment for me to be thanking Benny Goodman or Glenn Miller. There is little time or mental energy available in me to thank those who taught me how to dance the Swing. There is no mental bandwidth - during the dance - for me to thank the carpenters and craftsfolk who made a building strong enough to withstand high-wind, deep cold and earthquakes. There is no bandwidth to thank the Founding Fathers, to be appreciative of Beethoven who might very well have influenced Benny Goodman or Glen Miller. I have no bandwidth in that moment to thank the people who produce the food I eat so that I don't have to spend life on a farm tilling soil or hunting prey. I just enjoy the dance and applaud at the end and maybe leave a tip in the jar at the door for a "job well done."

But in THIS MOMENT, in my slower moments, where I have time to consider all that MUST BE INVOLVED for me to enjoy the dance, and the myriad other things that I do and enjoy - well then I do have time to enjoy exploration of the epistemological. And repeatedly, without even the tiniest reservation beyond acknowledging "I too am fallible", I come to see that all that I enjoy; all that I can even think involves so many shortcuts I've been enabled to take by all that came before me and that surrounds me now. The notion of "independent agent" becomes much more complex and a much richer concept.

Does this make any kind of sense?

- Bal

Edited April 24, 2011 by IamBalSimon

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Let me first paraphrase what you wrote to make sure I have it correct. You are saying that a person has it within his/her (hir) power to make the world per hir own images and values. You are further saying that many Objectivists consider the world to be a "benevolent place" and what screws it all up are people.

Bal,

LOL...

I don't think anyone would phrase it that way, but from the discussions I have had over a few years online and from the things I have read, this is precisely the meaning I get from many Objectivists--in overall practice if not so much in explicit theory.

Not all, of course. There are many great warm and kind people who are Objectivists, too.

It seems like some people are deathly afraid of being rejected, so they start off by rejecting everybody. Boom. There. It's over. I quit before you can fire me. Then they start letting some people in between the cracks. But that's always risky.

This is one of the main reasons I believe these more tribal Objectivists congregate into group-think the way they do.

This is a long topic, but one of the things I have learned about it concerns emotional competence. Emotions come in three basic varieties: (1) acute emotions (the ones that come and go quickly), (2) chronic emotions (where you hang out long term emotionally, i.e., your predominant moods), and (3) social emotions (these are both true and false emotions--but they belong to a mask you show to others).

I believe the tribal Objectivists I criticize like to be in a group because they can use social emotions a lot--and everything is well defined on that level. They have to gush over XXX and YYY, they have to sneer at AAA and BBB, and so on. This way they don't have to worry about the holy mess they normally make with their relationships and emotional incompetence.

I believe this keeps them feeling safe and wards off the loneliness.

God, I could go on and on about this. But, please, don't think I am saying this to bash them and feel all superior and everything.

I can't.

I used to be that way, myself.

Michael

[Xray]

And horsemeat in France. Does that spll over into Austria and Germany?

No. We only have very few horse butcheries here in Germany.

I just did a quick Google search on Austrian horse butcheries and have also found only very few.

The question of the thread creator "Why does an Epistemology of reason necessarily lead to an ethics of self-interest and egoism?" is a variant of the "ought to from is" issue.

This issue has nothing to do with the Is/Ought problem. Rather, it addresses the relationship between two disciplines -- epistemology and ethics -- and asks whether a given theory in the former will rationally compel us to accept to a conclusion (egoism, in this case) in the latter. One could ask the same kind of question about the relationship between epistemology and aesthetics, epistemology and metaphysics, etc., etc.

I originally wanted to phrase it in other words, similar to those you used, pointing out that Nate's question was whether an epistemological theory necessarily leads to a specific kind of ethics.

I think the Is-Ought problem does factor in though; for didn't Rand try to build her ethics on an 'ought from is', using epistemology as the basis? Think of e. g. the example with the fish which, as she phrased it "ought to" live in water if it is to survive [it is actually "must" live in water but we can disregard Rand's word choice here].

I think this is what Nate meant by the thread title.

In his root post, he wrote:

All of the other paths in Ayn Rands philosophy I understand fairly well, except for this one. I have found some implicit examples in her books, but I have not come across any explicit examples.

I also find it's easier to follow Nathaniel Branden's or Leonard Peikoff's logic for me personally. I've gone through the FAQ and I read the sticky at the top of this forum.

Nate mentions "some implict examples in her books"; it would be helpful if he could present them here to provide us with a text corpus to study in detail.

Btw, Nate is correct; a given conception of reason will not lead us, through a string of deductive syllogisms, to a logically necessitated egoism. I don't know where this argument supposedly came from. I don't recall reading anything about it before in the O'ist literature.

I don't think Nate's focus was so much on a string of deductive syllogisms in this context, but that he was more in general doubt about the idea of a specific epistemological theory necessarily leading to a specific kind of ethics.

I don't know where this argument supposedly came from. I don't recall reading anything about it before in the O'ist literature.

Still, something in Rand's work seems to have given Nate this impression.

Nate: if you happen to read this, could you please provide some examples from Rand's work where you think this is the case. TIA.

Edited April 24, 2011 by Xray

[Brant Gaede]

And horsemeat in France. Does that spll over into Austria and Germany?

No. We only have very few horse butcheries here in Germany.

I just did a quick Google search on Austrian horse butcheries and have also found only very few.

I'll bet you guys import it from France: for shame.

--Brant

decades ago lots of wild horses were found dead in Nevada--bones and such--they couldn't figure it out, but I got it on good authority that air force fighter jets targeted them