On February 3, 2002 on the old Atlantis email list, R. Christian Ross asked: "what, if any, ought to be the goals of Objectivism? If you were CEO of Objectivism Inc. what would you do? What is Objectivism 404?"

Here are several theoretical topics in Objectivism that have long interested me, and which I think are crucial to its future viability:

1. Rand's Trichotomy. Starting with his lectures on Objectivism in 1975-76, Peikoff has warped the intrinsic-subjective-objective trichotomy, due to his acceptance of the need to define the concept of "objective" in terms of volition. The trichotomy needs to be re-defined, so that each of the three members has a better definition, and so that the interrelationship of the three is seen more clearly. Peikoff's wonderful earlier discussion of the metaphysical status of sense data could then be resubsumed, where it belongs, under the trichotomy. [i made a decent start at this in a paper I delivered to the 2003 TOC Advanced Seminar. The paper was updated and published in the Journal of Ayn Rand Studies.]

2. Metaphysics. The structure of the Objectivist metaphysics needs to be more clearly spelled out, showing the progression of concepts needed to arrive at the Primacy of Existence. Also, it should be more clearly explained that the existence, identity, and consciousness are inseparable correlates of all human experience, and thus are indispensable axioms of all human knowledge. It does not mean that each of them is also inseparable from reality. Existence exists, and existence is identity, whether there is any consciousness or not. If there were no consciousness, there would still be existence and identity; on the other hand, it is impossible for there to be no existence and identity. Since the ways in which consciousness and causality are involved in everything that exists are derivative and limited (not everything has been, is, or will be the object of awareness, and not everything has been, is, or will be an entity or an action), the respect in which these two concepts are a proper part of metaphysics must be carefully explained. "Consciousness is conscious of existence" is the basic axiom of epistemology, along with its corollaries: the validity of the senses and the volitional (deliberate, self-aware) ability to detect and correct one's mistakes. "Causality is the relation between an entity and its actions" is the basic axiom of the sciences. Since each of these is of more limited application in reality than existence and identity, it would (in my opinion) be better to show them as metaphysical applications to the areas of epistemology and the sciences. Above all, it is important to distinguish between what is true of everything (existence, identity, and the independence of existence from consciousness) and what is true of all experience (existence, identity, consciousness), but not necessarily of everything (viz., consciousness is only true of everything in a restricted sense: everything is independent of it). [update: to this I would now add some related improvements in the Objectivist epistemology. In particular, I think that how Rand's unit-perspective applies to propositions and arguments needs to be made explicit, and the distinction between fact and truth needs to be clarified. Also, it should be explained how axiomatic concepts and axioms differ and clarified which is being appealed to in a given argument. For instance, when you hear someone speaking about the "axiom of volition," he is not just talking about the concept, but about the proposition that "human consciousness is volitional." Also, it should be recognized that there are three basic kinds of existents in the world, corresponding to the three levels of conceptual cognition: simple existents which are grasped by concepts, compound existents or facts which are grasped by propositions, and complex existents or reasons which are grasped by arguments. I am aware that Bryan Register has done some work along these lines]

3. The Categories. The relations between entity and attribute and between entity and action need to be integrated into Aristotle's "four causes," and that into Chris Sciabarra's dialectics. (See Total Freedom.) This material then needs to be applied to analyzing causal situations of all kinds, as well as to the nature of the relationships between knower and known (with perception as the model). [update: I am currently at work on a paper on this subject for JARS.]

4. Mental realism and introspection. Peikoff's analysis of perceptual realism needs to be applied, in parallel, to the issue of mental realism. There is no causally efficacious entity, consciousness, that is separate from the brain, any more than there is a causally efficacious entity, a red color patch, that is separate from a red object. Once introspection is seen in the same light as perception, it will be realized that our self-awareness of our conscious processes is the form in which we are directly aware of certain brain processes, and that it is not the mind, but the brain that has causal efficacy. Better: the mind is the conscious causal efficacy that the brain has. (The brain also has non-conscious causal efficacies, e.g., to regulate hormonal production.) [update: this topic was discussed at length in my 2003 TOC Advanced Seminar paper, and it was updated and published in JARS.]

5. Frozen Abstraction Fallacy. Rand's brief description and definition of the Fallacy of the Frozen Abstraction needs to be integrated into her overall structure of valid and invalid abstractions, so that the relationship of such faulty abstractions can be seen in relation to floating abstractions and valid abstractions. Learning to spot and avoid this fallacy should be part of basic Objectivist training. [update: thanks to the unwitting cooperation of numerous Objectivists, I continue to accumulate more and more material on this fallacy, which I intend to publish some day as a book or on the Internet as downloadable files. Also, just in case there is any confusion, frozen abstractions are not the same as floating abstractions. I seem to recall that Barbara Branden does a good job of discussing the latter in her lectures on efficient thinking.]

6. Human freedom. Volition must be explicated as conditional, epistemic freedom of choice, in contrast to the presently accepted model of categorical, ontological freedom of choice. This will be seen to be compatible with determinism of a kind that does not require predeterminism or fatalism, and that does not preclude knowledge and correction of error, moral responsibility, and individual rights. [update: Although I still hold that human freedom is conditional not categorical, I no longer refer to "free will" per se, after reading Locke's views. I agree with Locke that what is free is not the will, but a human being. It is just as absurd to say that the will has freedom as that the mind has causal efficacy. The will and freedom are both powers of humans, just as the mind and causal efficacy are both powers of humans. It is absurd to say that "a power has a power." This insight has long been resisted by Objectivists, and it's about time that the mental block is removed!]

7. Art as microcosm. Rand's definition of "art" must be taken literally as being about re-creation of reality, i.e., the creation of a microcosm, an imaginary "world" in which the spectator is able to see an abstract view of reality embodied in discriminable figures within the microcosm. This definition is broad enough to encompass music, without falling prey to naive, simplistic theories of music as "a language of the emotions," and to explain how architecture, though also utilitarian in its function, is a re-creation of reality and thus art. (This will require loosening Rand's criterion that art be strictly non-utilitarian -- or else Objectivists will have to boycott commencement ceremonies at which "Pomp and Circumstance" is played :-) [update: I spoke on this at the 2002 TOC Advanced Seminar, and a considerably expanded version was published in JARS Vol. 5, No. 2. I pointed out similar views in Langer and Camus in a more recent essay, JARS Vol. 7, No. 1. Both of these essays are posted as PDF files on the second webpage linked below.]

This is a good start on the things that I think need changing and/or bolstering in Objectivist theory. These views have gradually taken shape over 40 or more years of study and thought, and I hope to write about them in a more organized way at some point in the future. In the meantime, those interested in more details on the direction my thoughts have taken are welcome to peruse essays and reviews at my web site:

http://www.rogerbissell.com