A Bold New Step for Objectivist Scholarship

[Dennis Hardin]

> Kelley argues that the first position is correct: Life is a value because one chooses it. If a person does not choose to live, there is no basis for evaluating his choice as wrong, immoral or irrational. [Dennis]

Assuming you've paraphrased him correctly and there is no further nuance or qualification to his view, that's not only wrong but disastrous philosophically. It leads to the idea that "well, I never fully chose life in the first place, so slow death, irrationality, unhappiness, partial destruction are moral for me" or "well, my choice is inconsistent, but I chose to be inconsistent prior to any morality" and to the fact that an Objectivist would have no answer. At least not to the first.

You are correct and David Kelley is wrong: Rand would -not- have agreed with this.

In fact, she actually expressed her violent disagreement. There is a passage somewhere of her withering contempt and moral disapproval for those who had essentially and gratuitously made the fundamental choice of death in one way (or degree)or another.

I wish I had the exact quotation.

Phil,

I quoted Kelley's exact words in my response to George:

On the first alternative, the choice comes first. Life is not a value for a person until he chooses to live. So choosing to live is a pre-moral choice. One is not morally obliged to make that choice, and if a person does not choose to live he is outside the realm of morality; there is no moral basis for evaluating his choice as wrong, immoral, or irrational. This is the view that Rand appears to espouse in the passages I quoted.

This is from the article, Choosing Life. The link is repeated several times on this thread.

PS, Couldn't you say that Atlas Shrugged largely deals not with people who are inconsistent but with people like James Taggart who never actually chose life from their earliest days, who are 'on the premise of death'? And her whole discussion of the anti-life mentality throughout the book and elsewhere.

Kelley would probably argue that James Taggart is immoral because he is obviously choosing to live but behaving in a manner that is inconsistent with that choice (i.e., anti-life). He is choosing to live, so his conduct can be evaluated morally, as opposed to someone who blows his brains out, and therefore should not be judged. I can't speak for Kelley, needless to say. But I am guessing this is what he might say.

[Selene]

But I will be the first to admit that this notion of innate human 'programming' is radically controversial, and I am still struggling with it. I welcome any feedback.

Dennis:

I am surprised that a hardwired innate programming to live is "radically controversial." I am not privy to the arguments on the issue.

Would it be possible for you to summarize the positions, or, in the alternative, direct me to links on the differing positions.

I would be quite grateful.

Adam

[Dennis Hardin]

But I will be the first to admit that this notion of innate human 'programming' is radically controversial, and I am still struggling with it. I welcome any feedback.

Dennis:

I am surprised that a hardwired innate programming to live is "radically controversial." I am not privy to the arguments on the issue.

Would it be possible for you to summarize the positions, or, in the alternative, direct me to links on the differing positions.

I would be quite grateful.

Adam

Adam,

To do an adequate summary of all the various arguments relevant to this issue would take a lot more time than I have. But I can briefly summarize the two perspectives on choosing to live.

Kelley puts it this way:

Is life a value because one chooses it, or does one choose it because it is a value? Which comes first? The opposing theses are: (1) Life is a value because one chooses it; and (2) One chooses life because it is a value.

(Actually, I think Doug Rasmussen was the first to pose the issue this way.)

The issue is relevant to morality because the goal of living is the foundation of morality.

The teleology is: If you want to live, then you must follow these principles. However, since the choice is the base of morality, it cannot be evaluated in moral terms. This opens the door for some to claim that people can legitimately opt out of morality, thus rendering it arbitrary and subjective as opposed to objective. Ergo, Rand has not solved the is-ought dichotomy.

Option one (above) says life does not become a value until we choose it, so ethics des not apply unless we choose it. On this option, choosing to throw your life away is not deemed to be wrong in any way.

Option two says life is inherently choice-worthy, so no act of explict choice is required for morality to apply. We somehow “ought” to choose life, even though there is no standard above life that would justify it. On ths option, the choice not to live can be evaluated, although this seems to imply intrinsicism—i.e., a value that exists apart from our choice.

If, however—as I am proposing--we are programmed to pursue life, then life becomes a goal and/or value without any prior act of choice on our part. The foundation of morality is secure and not open to arbitrary whim. We retain free will—i.e., the ability to intensify the pursuit of that goal by making it an explicit choice, or the ability to over-ride our programming and reject life. The added aspect of human free will renders the goal objective, because the individual context is always relevant. The terms moral and immoral would not apply on this level, but we can judge the choice to pursue life as good and the choice to reject it as evil.

This pro-life programming would seem to conflict with John Locke’s notion of tabula rasa. It sounds like antiquated instinct theory. But I think there is basis for it in the behavior of human infants long before they develop any capacity for conscious choice.

On one of Ayn Rand’s appearances on the Tonight Show, I recall Johnny Carson aking her if being selfish isn’t natural for a small child. Ayn Rand responded with something like: “I think that’s inherent in everything that’s living.”

If selfishness is inherent in all living things, so is the programming to want to live.

If you are aware of any scientific research that would support or disprove this premise, I would love to hear about it.

[Philip Coates]

Subject: False Conundrum

> Kelley puts it this way: "Is life a value because one chooses it, or does one choose it because it is a value? Which comes first? The opposing theses are: (1) Life is a value because one chooses it; and (2) One chooses life because it is a value." (Actually, I think Doug Rasmussen was the first to pose the issue this way.) [Dennis]

Dennis, I think the term value is being used in two somewhat different senses here.

In the second sentence, (2), life is a value in the objective, independent of you sense of something pleasant, that feels good, is stimulating, has positive, reinforcing results on a living organism. Life is a 'value' in this sense to a plant or a sea slug or a cockroach. In the first sentence, (1), after one chooses life (whether explicitly or implicitly), it has a value for him. It becomes a goal for him, one that requires consistency, a specific course of action, etc. This is the sense of "a value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep."

It's a -goal- for a living organism in (1). That's not true in (2) in which it is simply something experienced which has not yet been transmuted into a goal.

So Kelley and Rasmussen are committing the logical fallacy of equivocation: Using the same term in different senses in an argument. Shifting its meaning.

Edited March 15, 2011 by Philip Coates

[merjet]

Merlin, it wasn't in the context of suicide but in terms of fundamental choices about life...not in extremis or in metaphysical emergencies. (I thought that was clear and didn't need to be explained.)

Really? You thought wrong. Here is what you wrote:

Rand would -not- have agreed with this.

In fact, she actually expressed her violent disagreement. There is a passage somewhere of her withering contempt and moral disapproval for those who had essentially and gratuitously made the fundamental choice of death in one way (or degree)or another.

[George H. Smith]

Adam,

To do an adequate summary of all the various arguments relevant to this issue would take a lot more time than I have. But I can briefly summarize the two perspectives on choosing to live.

Kelley puts it this way:

Is life a value because one chooses it, or does one choose it because it is a value? Which comes first? The opposing theses are: (1) Life is a value because one chooses it; and (2) One chooses life because it is a value.

(Actually, I think Doug Rasmussen was the first to pose the issue this way.)

The issue is relevant to morality because the goal of living is the foundation of morality.

The teleology is: If you want to live, then you must follow these principles. However, since the choice is the base of morality, it cannot be evaluated in moral terms. This opens the door for some to claim that people can legitimately opt out of morality, thus rendering it arbitrary and subjective as opposed to objective. Ergo, Rand has not solved the is-ought dichotomy.

Position #1 does not entail the view that choice is the basis of morality. At most, it means that moral principles are irrelevant to a dead person (i.e., a person who has chosen not to live).

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Subject: False Conundrum

> Kelley puts it this way: "Is life a value because one chooses it, or does one choose it because it is a value? Which comes first? The opposing theses are: (1) Life is a value because one chooses it; and (2) One chooses life because it is a value." (Actually, I think Doug Rasmussen was the first to pose the issue this way.) [Dennis]

Dennis, I think the term value is being used in two somewhat different senses here.

In the second sentence, (2), life is a value in the objective, independent of you sense of something pleasant, that feels good, is stimulating, has positive, reinforcing results on a living organism. Life is a 'value' in this sense to a plant or a sea slug or a cockroach. In the first sentence, (1), after one chooses life (whether explicitly or implicitly), it has a value for him. It becomes a goal for him, one that requires consistency, a specific course of action, etc. This is the sense of "a value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep."

It's a -goal- for a living organism in (1). That's not true in (2) in which it is simply something experienced which has not yet been transmuted into a goal.

So Kelley and Rasmussen are committing the logical fallacy of equivocation: Using the same term in different senses in an argument. Shifting its meaning.

Kelley does not equivocate on the meaning of "value." He understands that the answer we give to the key question depends on what we mean by "value." Consider Kelley's remark that immediately follows the quotation given above.

The Objectivist morality, Ayn Rand said, is based on the choice to live. A perennial question in Objectivism is whether (1) life is a value because one chooses to live, or (2) one should choose to live because life is a value.. When the question is posed in this form, (1) is the correct answer.

But what does this abstract issue mean in our actual lives as individuals? At this level, there is truth in both (1) and (2). The perennial search for the meaning of life shows that we do choose our lives because they are valuable. (My italics.)

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

According to David Kelley, "The Objectivist morality, Ayn Rand said, is based on the choice to live."

This is a misleading way of putting the matter.

In an earlier post, I mentioned the distinction between theoretical ethics (especially metaethics) and practical (or applied) ethics. This distinction is relevant for the following reasons:

When Rand forges the theoretical link between "life" and "value," she does so without any reference to personal choices. For example, the truth of her contention that the concept "value" presupposes the concept "life" does not depend on whether I personally choose to live. The same is true of her argument that man's life is the standard of value.

To contend that the truth of these and other points in Rand's theoretical ethics depends on the choice to live would be like saying that the truth of the laws of mathematics depends on whether a given individual chooses to do math.

It is only on the level of practical ethics that personal choice becomes relevant. A person who chose not to live will be dead, so he obviously will have no use for a code of ethics. But -- to repeat -- this doesn't mean (as Kelley put it) that the Objectivist ethics "is based on the choice to live." Rather, the Objectivist ethics is based on the conceptual relationship between life and value. The choice to live kicks in only when Rand's general principles are applied to specific individuals.

Ghs

[rhartford]

If value only has meaning if it is something one "acts to gain and/or keep," and if value only has meaning if one can specify "value to whom" and "value for what," then I don't understand the question, "does one choose [life or anything else] because it is a value?"

One chooses to pursue (act to gain and/or keep) something because it contributes benefit to one's life, and by so choosing that thing, it becomes a value to one for the particular benefit it provides to one's life.

One chooses to value something because it will benefit one's life. Until one makes the choice to value it, it is a potential "good" for one's life but not one of a person's values. It is the act of choosing, because it would be beneficial if chosen, that converts it from a potential benefit to a value. One can't choose something because it is a value, because it doesn't become a value until it is chosen.

Is there any advantage to thinking of some potentially beneficial end as "a value," before it is chosen to be valued and pursued for its benefit?

[George H. Smith]

(This is a continuation of my last post.)

I have argued that the choice to live is relevant only to practical (or applied) ethics. It has no bearing on the purely theoretical level. But I have not yet addressed the question: Is the choice premoral or moral?

I don't care for the word "premoral." It is exceedingly ambiguous, for one thing. If "premoral" means a choice that is temporally prior to the implementation of moral principles, then a premoral choice is simply impossible. It seems that "premoral" is intended to signify a choice that is logically prior to moral choices.

Even this logical sense of "premoral" doesn't get us out of the woods. Only a living human being can make choices, including the choice to continue living, and every living person has some code of values. Whether or not a given value qualifies as a moral value depends, in my view, on its fundamentality. And it is difficult to conceive of a person who contemplates suicide but who does not consult his fundamental (i.e., moral) values before making a final decision. If anything qualifies as a fundamental choice, the choice to live or die surely does. There can be nothing "premoral" about such a choice.

Let me put this issue in a somewhat different way. I have said that every living person shows a demonstrated preference for life. (If a person really preferred death in this sense, he would be dead.) This means that any subsequent choice between life and death can be made only within the context of previous choices to continue living. Hence the choice to live or die is never made in a value vacuum, because the person pondering this choice has already affirmed the value of his life countless times in the past. He therefore understands, on some level, why his life is a value to him.

Thus in contemplating suicide, a person is not debating whether his life is a value -- for he already knows it is; rather he is debating whether the remainder of his life will be of sufficient value to justify living it. And to suppose that this decision can be made on some "premoral" level, as if one's fundamental moral values do not (or should not) play a significant role in the decision-making process, strikes me as absurd. (A possible problem here lies in the fact that I draw a line between "moral" and "nonmoral" values and choices that some O'ists do not accept, but to explain this difference would take some time.)

Here I need to insert a caveat. In claiming that the choice to live is a moral choice, I am contrasting "moral" with "nonmoral," not with "immoral." By "moral," I mean that a person will need to refer to his fundamental values in order to make an informed choice. I will take up the distinction between "moral" and "immoral," and how it applies to this problem, in another post.

Ghs

[Dennis Hardin]

Subject: False Conundrum

> Kelley puts it this way: "Is life a value because one chooses it, or does one choose it because it is a value? Which comes first? The opposing theses are: (1) Life is a value because one chooses it; and (2) One chooses life because it is a value." (Actually, I think Doug Rasmussen was the first to pose the issue this way.) [Dennis]

Dennis, I think the term value is being used in two somewhat different senses here.

In the second sentence, (2), life is a value in the objective, independent of you sense of something pleasant, that feels good, is stimulating, has positive, reinforcing results on a living organism. Life is a 'value' in this sense to a plant or a sea slug or a cockroach. In the first sentence, (1), after one chooses life (whether explicitly or implicitly), it has a value for him. It becomes a goal for him, one that requires consistency, a specific course of action, etc. This is the sense of "a value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep."

It's a -goal- for a living organism in (1). That's not true in (2) in which it is simply something experienced which has not yet been transmuted into a goal.

So Kelley and Rasmussen are committing the logical fallacy of equivocation: Using the same term in different senses in an argument. Shifting its meaning.

I can see how you might think that, Phil, but only if you disregard the context of Kelley's remarks. It is easy to reinterpret “choosing life because it is a value” as “holding onto something that feels good.” But the context is the theoretical question of how ethics applies to any given individual—i.e., the relationship between the individual’s value for his own life and the relevance of ethics. Since you must have a goal before you can pursue it, how does one get started on the path to living successfully (i.e., morally)?

The context strictly has to do with when and how the 'life as value' choice occurs. Kelley’s option (2) says that we first recognize life as an inherent value and then choose life as a goal. If this isn't clear, you should probably read the whole article. I think you will see that Kelley is not being equivocal.

[Dennis Hardin]

According to David Kelley, "The Objectivist morality, Ayn Rand said, is based on the choice to live."

This is a misleading way of putting the matter.

In an earlier post, I mentioned the distinction between theoretical ethics (especially metaethics) and practical (or applied) ethics. This distinction is relevant for the following reasons:

When Rand forges the theoretical link between "life" and "value," she does so without any reference to personal choices. For example, the truth of her contention that the concept "value" presupposes the concept "life" does not depend on whether I personally choose to live. The same is true of her argument that man's life is the standard of value.

To contend that the truth of these and other points in Rand's theoretical ethics depends on the choice to live would be like saying that the truth of the laws of mathematics depends on whether a given individual chooses to do math.

It is only on the level of practical ethics that personal choice becomes relevant. A person who chose not to live will be dead, so he obviously will have no use for a code of ethics. But -- to repeat -- this doesn't mean (as Kelley put it) that the Objectivist ethics "is based on the choice to live." Rather, the Objectivist ethics is based on the conceptual relationship between life and value. The choice to live kicks in only when Rand's general principles are applied to specific individuals.

Ghs

George,

When I think of the term ‘applied ethics,’ I think of how a given principle applies to a specific, concrete situation. For instance, whether or not honesty is necessary when someone has a gun to your head. I see this issue ('the choice to live') as theoretical because it applies generally to anyone and everyone: can a person’s choice to live be evaluated morally?

You are clearly correct that the Objectivist ethics is derived from adopting man’s life as the standard of value. That is definitely theoretical. But so is the question of why a person would need a code of values in the first place. And the answer is: because he/she wants to live.

The issue is not whether the Objectivist ethics is valid or not—i.e., will they help you lead a successful life? The issue is whether, for the individual who disvalues his life, the Objectivist ethics are in any way relevant. Is such a person exonerated from moral judgment?

Using your analogy: Someone who did not choose to do math would be unlikely to challenge the truth of mathematical theorems. He would simply not care if they were true or not. And someone who does not choose to live would say the same thing about the Objectivist ethics.

[Dennis Hardin]

(This is a continuation of my last post.)

I have argued that the choice to live is relevant only to practical (or applied) ethics. It has no bearing on the purely theoretical level. But I have not yet addressed the question: Is the choice premoral or moral?

I don't care for the word "premoral." It is exceedingly ambiguous, for one thing. If "premoral" means a choice that is temporally prior to the implementation of moral principles, then a premoral choice is simply impossible. It seems that "premoral" is intended to signify a choice that is logically prior to moral choices.

Even this logical sense of "premoral" doesn't get us out of the woods. Only a living human being can make choices, including the choice to continue living, and every living person has some code of values. Whether or not a given value qualifies as a moral value depends, in my view, on its fundamentality. And it is difficult to conceive of a person who contemplates suicide but who does not consult his fundamental (i.e., moral) values before making a final decision. If anything qualifies as a fundamental choice, the choice to live or die surely does. There can be nothing "premoral" about such a choice.

Let me put this issue in a somewhat different way. I have said that every living person shows a demonstrated preference for life. (If a person really preferred death in this sense, he would be dead.) This means that any subsequent choice between life and death can be made only within the context of previous choices to continue living. Hence the choice to live or die is never made in a value vacuum, because the person pondering this choice has already affirmed the value of his life countless times in the past. He therefore understands, on some level, why his life is a value to him.

Thus in contemplating suicide, a person is not debating whether his life is a value -- for he already knows it is; rather he is debating whether the remainder of his life will be of sufficient value to justify living it. And to suppose that this decision can be made on some "premoral" level, as if one's fundamental moral values do not (or should not) play a significant role in the decision-making process, strikes me as absurd. (A possible problem here lies in the fact that I draw a line between "moral" and "nonmoral" values and choices that some O'ists do not accept, but to explain this difference would take some time.)

Here I need to insert a caveat. In claiming that the choice to live is a moral choice, I am contrasting "moral" with "nonmoral," not with "immoral." By "moral," I mean that a person will need to refer to his fundamental values in order to make an informed choice. I will take up the distinction between "moral" and "immoral," and how it applies to this problem, in another post.

Ghs

That’s a fascinating perspective, George. The best way I can respond is to further elucidate my own views.

I would argue the opposite—that the term ‘premoral choice’ is mainly theoretical and, once made, has no practical significance. It refers to the relationship between wanting to live and being ethical, or ends and means. It refers to the fact that a single condition must be met before ethics applies—the person wants to live. Beyond that, it has no practical implications whatever. Most people will have no awareness of any such “premoral” decision. They simply know they want to live. The practical principles of moral conduct assume that pro-life commitment, and I don’t see how the term “premoral” would ever again apply after that initial commitment. Either you want to live or you don’t.

For Ayn Rand, the whole purpose of morality is to live successfully. If a person is ready to commit suicide, that context has been dropped. The person has determined that success is not attainable, and if he is objectively warranted in that conclusion, morality (in the Objectivist sense) would no longer apply. If the person is merely depressed, and still operating on a pro-life (i.e., moral) premise, his prior decision to live will still hold sway and hopefully help him persevere and regain a rational grasp of his situation.

Technically, in such a situation, the rational decision to kill oneself would be “post-moral”—if and to the extent that it was justified (as in the case of Arthur Koestler, for example). If the person simply gave up on life out of weakness or cowardice, I would judge his action as immoral, because he was violating his prior commitment to live successfully.

[Dennis Hardin]

Dennis,

When confronted with a 'chicken or egg' question like this one seems to be, I'm inclined to answer "both, simultaneously". Life has intrinsic value - and it has value because you and I choose it.(imo)

Independently, each person has to see the need for the choice, and then next, to make that choice. Also, it's an ongoing choice, made day to day.

Am I missing something? - I don't want to 'strawman' this.

"We don't need morality to tell us that choosing life is good, and choosing death is evil."[DH] Well said.

There is a range between those two poles of choice, of course, varying from what could be a 'half-life' of disgust at existence and oneself, to a total commitment to reality, and enjoyment of it.

From only-just-sustaining, to consciously flourishing - the degree attained is proportionate to the degree of effort one puts in.

The level of morality is defined by this, the effort (not the choice), not so?

Valuable discussion from you guys, by the way.

Tony

Hi Tony,

Thanks for your comments. Sorry for the belated response. I certainly agree with you that, for a given individual, the degree of effort [and courage] the person brings to daily living is the key factor for assessing their moral stature. This discussion has more of a theoretical flavor; i.e., how the choice to live impacts the applicability of the Objectivist ethics.

The only thing I would disagree with in what you said is that life has intrinsic value. This would mean that life has value independent of the valuer, which I don't think is ever the case. The very nature of life makes it a highly conditional value, and each individual has to consider whether the pay-off is worth the price being paid (e.g., suffering, physical pain, hopelessness).

[Philip Coates]

> we first recognize life as an inherent value and then choose life as a goal. If this isn't clear, you should probably read the whole article. I think you will see that Kelley is not being equivocal. [Dennis]

That makes much more sense. And if you say reading the entire article makes it clear he is not equivocating, you're right I will have to carefully read the entire article and not "shoot from the hip" about one paragraph.

[George H. Smith]

The issue is not whether the Objectivist ethics is valid or not—i.e., will they help you lead a successful life? The issue is whether, for the individual who disvalues his life, the Objectivist ethics are in any way relevant. Is such a person exonerated from moral judgment?

Using your analogy: Someone who did not choose to do math would be unlikely to challenge the truth of mathematical theorems. He would simply not care if they were true or not. And someone who does not choose to live would say the same thing about the Objectivist ethics.

What do you mean by "the individual who disvalues his life"? If you mean someone who chooses not to live, then we are talking about a dead person, not a living person to whom ethics would apply. If you mean a person who has chosen to die but who has not yet killed himself, then we are talking about whether suicide can be evaluated morally.

I get the feeling that you are not talking about either of these alternatives.

Ghs

[rhartford]

The below quotation from my paper, Objectivity and the Proof of Egoism, is relevant to the moral status of "the choice to live" that has been discussed on this thread.

. . .

Objectivity thus has two distinct roles: its descriptive role for logically proving the choice to live, and its normative role for implementation of the choice to live. Choosing life is both logically and morally valid. Therefore, it is not surprising to find commentary that treats the failure to choose life as a logical failure and other commentary that treats the failure to choose life as a moral failure.

Rasmussen, in particular, interprets Leonard Peikoff’s comments on this issue as contradictory. Rasmussen (2006, 310) concludes that Peikoff on one hand “condemn morally the choice not to live” and that Peikoff on the other hand asserts that “the choice to live precedes morality.”

The equivocal use of “the choice to live” in the above quotations may make the accusation of contradiction appear valid. For clarity, “the choice to live” often needs to be modified by “to prove,” “proof of,” “to implement,” or “implementation of.” It is not at all contradictory to “condemn morally the failure to implement the choice to live” and on the other hand to assert that “proof of the choice to live precedes morality.”

. . .

Earlier portions of the paper provide supporting analysis for the above quotation.

[anthony]

Dennis,

When confronted with a 'chicken or egg' question like this one seems to be, I'm inclined to answer "both, simultaneously". Life has intrinsic value - and it has value because you and I choose it.(imo)

Independently, each person has to see the need for the choice, and then next, to make that choice. Also, it's an ongoing choice, made day to day.

Am I missing something? - I don't want to 'strawman' this.

"We don't need morality to tell us that choosing life is good, and choosing death is evil."[DH] Well said.

There is a range between those two poles of choice, of course, varying from what could be a 'half-life' of disgust at existence and oneself, to a total commitment to reality, and enjoyment of it.

From only-just-sustaining, to consciously flourishing - the degree attained is proportionate to the degree of effort one puts in.

The level of morality is defined by this, the effort (not the choice), not so?

Valuable discussion from you guys, by the way.

Tony

Hi Tony,

Thanks for your comments. Sorry for the belated response. I certainly agree with you that, for a given individual, the degree of effort [and courage] the person brings to daily living is the key factor for assessing their moral stature. This discussion has more of a theoretical flavor; i.e., how the choice to live impacts the applicability of the Objectivist ethics.

The only thing I would disagree with in what you said is that life has intrinsic value. This would mean that life has value independent of the valuer, which I don't think is ever the case. The very nature of life makes it a highly conditional value, and each individual has to consider whether the pay-off is worth the price being paid (e.g., suffering, physical pain, hopelessness).

Dennis, thanks.

I'm first to admit that I don't have the grounding to argue on a purely theoretical basis - applications are always what I fall back on.

"Choice to live" seems a 'no-brainer' for me.

What it does pre-suppose is, how? How does one choose to live?

Bear with me here, but is the alternative to life actually death? I am thinking of course of life qua Man, not just of having a pulse.

If, as I am considering, there is a third option which is 'choosing' not to physically die, but not choosing a moral and virtuous life, then this is where the choice is most critical. (This may be a strange concept for those who have never experienced nihilism.)

To come into existence demands nothing from a person, to continue demands everything.

Surely this was Rand's interpretation of Life, and its value?

About the intrinsic value of life, I am still uncertain; if there is only one intrinsic value, from which all objective values originate, *life* would have to be it. Yes, I'm saying it has independent value of the valuer, but only until he seeks to make it his primary value, because the lack of it is non-life, nothingness, with zero possibility. I guess I'm arguing for a premoral stage (which Ghs doen't agree with - WTH, let's call it 'ante-moral', to try to sneak it in ;) )

This reminds me of Rand's famous reversal of Descartes, "I am, therefore I'll think." The "I am" is a given - but the "I'll think", is volitional and effortful, and the only valid choice to life.

(imo)

Confusedly,

Tony

[Selene]

Dennis,

When confronted with a 'chicken or egg' question like this one seems to be, I'm inclined to answer "both, simultaneously". Life has intrinsic value - and it has value because you and I choose it.(imo)

Independently, each person has to see the need for the choice, and then next, to make that choice. Also, it's an ongoing choice, made day to day.

Am I missing something? - I don't want to 'strawman' this.

"We don't need morality to tell us that choosing life is good, and choosing death is evil."[DH] Well said.

There is a range between those two poles of choice, of course, varying from what could be a 'half-life' of disgust at existence and oneself, to a total commitment to reality, and enjoyment of it.

From only-just-sustaining, to consciously flourishing - the degree attained is proportionate to the degree of effort one puts in.

The level of morality is defined by this, the effort (not the choice), not so?

Valuable discussion from you guys, by the way.

Tony

Hi Tony,

Thanks for your comments. Sorry for the belated response. I certainly agree with you that, for a given individual, the degree of effort [and courage] the person brings to daily living is the key factor for assessing their moral stature. This discussion has more of a theoretical flavor; i.e., how the choice to live impacts the applicability of the Objectivist ethics.

The only thing I would disagree with in what you said is that life has intrinsic value. This would mean that life has value independent of the valuer, which I don't think is ever the case. The very nature of life makes it a highly conditional value, and each individual has to consider whether the pay-off is worth the price being paid (e.g., suffering, physical pain, hopelessness).

Dennis, thanks.

I'm first to admit that I don't have the grounding to argue on a purely theoretical basis - applications are always what I fall back on.

"Choice to live" seems a 'no-brainer' for me.

What it does pre-suppose is, how? How does one choose to live?

Bear with me here, but is the alternative to life actually death? I am thinking of course of life qua Man, not just of having a pulse.

If, as I am considering, there is a third option which is 'choosing' not to physically die, but not choosing a moral and virtuous life, then this is where the choice is most critical. (This may be a strange concept for those who have never experienced nihilism.)

To come into existence demands nothing from a person, to continue demands everything.

Surely this was Rand's interpretation of Life, and its value?

About the intrinsic value of life, I am still uncertain; if there is only one intrinsic value, from which all objective values originate, *life* would have to be it. Yes, I'm saying it has independent value of the valuer, but only until he seeks to make it his primary value, because the lack of it is non-life, nothingness, with zero possibility. I guess I'm arguing for a premoral stage (which Ghs doen't agree with - WTH, let's call it 'ante-moral', to try to sneak it in ;) )

This reminds me of Rand's famous reversal of Descartes, "I am, therefore I'll think." The "I am" is a given - but the "I'll think", is volitional and effortful, and the only valid choice to life.

(imo)

Confusedly,

Tony

Tony:

This is the way I perceive resolving the issue also.

Adam

[Dennis Hardin]

The issue is not whether the Objectivist ethics is valid or not—i.e., will they help you lead a successful life? The issue is whether, for the individual who disvalues his life, the Objectivist ethics are in any way relevant. Is such a person exonerated from moral judgment?

Using your analogy: Someone who did not choose to do math would be unlikely to challenge the truth of mathematical theorems. He would simply not care if they were true or not. And someone who does not choose to live would say the same thing about the Objectivist ethics.

What do you mean by "the individual who disvalues his life"? If you mean someone who chooses not to live, then we are talking about a dead person, not a living person to whom ethics would apply. If you mean a person who has chosen to die but who has not yet killed himself, then we are talking about whether suicide can be evaluated morally.

I get the feeling that you are not talking about either of these alternatives.

Ghs

The two best examples that come to mind are Ben Sanderson, the anti-hero of the novel, Leaving Las Vegas, who went to Vegas for the explicit purpose of drinking himself to death; and Arthur Koestler, the writer who killed himself at 77 because he was suffering from Parkinson’s and terminal leukemia.

Nick Cage played Sanderson in the film. It is interesting to note that the author of Leaving Las Vegas, John O’Brien, committed suicide shortly after the film rights to the book were sold. His book is considered somewhat autobiographical, since he was also an alcoholic tormented with depression. He was 34.

Each of these men were relinquishing their lives. In the case of Koestler, he was entirely justified in doing so. He wanted to avoid a slow and painful death. (The case of his wife, Cynthia, who committed suicide along with him even though she was perfectly healthy, is very debatable. She, too, wanted to avoid suffering—emotional suffering--but she was only 55 and could likely have eventually recovered from his loss. She may well have thrown away 30 or more years of living out of weakness and cowardice.)

In both cases—Koestler and Sanderson--the Objectivist ethics would have no longer applied. Personally, I would condone Koestler, but I would probably condemn Sanderson’s action as evil. In the film version, he appeared to have a lot to live for, but just preferred booze to life. Once Sanderson decided he wanted to die, I would not call his actions technically immoral, however.

Since John O’Brien, the author, was also an alcoholic, I am guessing that he simply threw his life away as well.

The principle involved is: once a person decides they want to die, ethics becomes inapplicable. But their positive or negative attitude toward life can be judged as good or evil, respectively. That’s how I see it.

(Please note: I am using these cases as philosophical examples. I do not know enough about either Cynthia Koestler or John O’Brien to judge their choice to die.)

[Dennis Hardin]

The below quotation from my paper, Objectivity and the Proof of Egoism, is relevant to the moral status of "the choice to live" that has been discussed on this thread.

. . .

Objectivity thus has two distinct roles: its descriptive role for logically proving the choice to live, and its normative role for implementation of the choice to live. Choosing life is both logically and morally valid. Therefore, it is not surprising to find commentary that treats the failure to choose life as a logical failure and other commentary that treats the failure to choose life as a moral failure.

Rasmussen, in particular, interprets Leonard Peikoff’s comments on this issue as contradictory. Rasmussen (2006, 310) concludes that Peikoff on one hand “condemn morally the choice not to live” and that Peikoff on the other hand asserts that “the choice to live precedes morality.”

The equivocal use of “the choice to live” in the above quotations may make the accusation of contradiction appear valid. For clarity, “the choice to live” often needs to be modified by “to prove,” “proof of,” “to implement,” or “implementation of.” It is not at all contradictory to “condemn morally the failure to implement the choice to live” and on the other hand to assert that “proof of the choice to live precedes morality.”

. . .

Earlier portions of the paper provide supporting analysis for the above quotation.

Robert,

Thanks for your comments. I read your article and thought it was a worthwhile contribution to the discussion. However, as both Tibor Machan and Douglas Rasmussen commented in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, the article seemed to raise as many questions as it answered. Have you thought about writing a follow-up article to answer their questions?

[Brant Gaede]

The principle involved is: once a person decides they want to die, ethics becomes inapplicable. But their positive or negative attitude toward life can be judged as good or evil, respectively. That's how I see it.

In the first case you are talking about ethics, choices; in the second the possible evil in abandoning ethics--aka, choices = morality. Qua morality, good or evil, as you say. Using ethics is the cause, morality, the result. The judgment. Morality is a judgment about ethics. Ethics must move, like a shark, or die. If you live, you move. You have to.

A semantical criticism can aid clarity. I know I've probably failed thusly, but just keep thinking.

--Brant

[Dennis Hardin]

. . .Bear with me here, but is the alternative to life actually death? I am thinking of course of life qua Man, not just of having a pulse.

If, as I am considering, there is a third option which is 'choosing' not to physically die, but not choosing a moral and virtuous life, then this is where the choice is most critical. (This may be a strange concept for those who have never experienced nihilism.)

To come into existence demands nothing from a person, to continue demands everything.

Surely this was Rand's interpretation of Life, and its value?

Tony,

Your third option is the most critical topic for any ethical discussion (although not precisely the topic of this thread). It is because so many people ‘choose life’ but don’t bother to live a virtuous life that we need a code of morality. My interest on this thread is to clarify one specific theroretical question in order to defend the validity—the objectivity--of the Objectivist ethics.

About the intrinsic value of life, I am still uncertain; if there is only one intrinsic value, from which all objective values originate, *life* would have to be it. Yes, I'm saying it has independent value of the valuer, but only until he seeks to make it his primary value, because the lack of it is non-life, nothingness, with zero possibility. I guess I'm arguing for a premoral stage (which Ghs doen't agree with - WTH, let's call it 'ante-moral', to try to sneak it in ;) )

This reminds me of Rand's famous reversal of Descartes, "I am, therefore I'll think." The "I am" is a given - but the "I'll think", is volitional and effortful, and the only valid choice to life.

(imo)

But to say that the value of life is intrinsic would be to suggest that life is always preferable to death, which it clearly is not. What rational person would want to live when they are racked with unbearable pain and suffering every hour of every day? But I do agree with you that there is a premoral stage. This has recently become even more clear to me.

Rand defined life as “a process of self-generated and self-sustaining action.” An infant is clearly engaged in self-sustaining activity—goal-directed action aimed at preserving the organism—long before we “choose life”—i.e., make the value of our lives a self-conscious issue. That is the premoral stage. [Even then, clearly, the value of life is not independent of the valuer.] At whatever point we become self-aware would be about the same time that we begin to be guided by our awareness—often subconscious—of the value of life.

[Dennis Hardin]

If you live, you move. You have to.

--Brant

Tell that to my girlfriend.

[George H. Smith]

The issue is not whether the Objectivist ethics is valid or not—i.e., will they help you lead a successful life? The issue is whether, for the individual who disvalues his life, the Objectivist ethics are in any way relevant. Is such a person exonerated from moral judgment?

Using your analogy: Someone who did not choose to do math would be unlikely to challenge the truth of mathematical theorems. He would simply not care if they were true or not. And someone who does not choose to live would say the same thing about the Objectivist ethics.

What do you mean by "the individual who disvalues his life"? If you mean someone who chooses not to live, then we are talking about a dead person, not a living person to whom ethics would apply. If you mean a person who has chosen to die but who has not yet killed himself, then we are talking about whether suicide can be evaluated morally.

I get the feeling that you are not talking about either of these alternatives.

Ghs

The two best examples that come to mind are Ben Sanderson, the anti-hero of the novel, Leaving Las Vegas, who went to Vegas for the explicit purpose of drinking himself to death; and Arthur Koestler, the writer who killed himself at 77 because he was suffering from Parkinson’s and terminal leukemia.

Nick Cage played Sanderson in the film. It is interesting to note that the author of Leaving Las Vegas, John O’Brien, committed suicide shortly after the film rights to the book were sold. His book is considered somewhat autobiographical, since he was also an alcoholic tormented with depression. He was 34.

Each of these men were relinquishing their lives. In the case of Koestler, he was entirely justified in doing so. He wanted to avoid a slow and painful death. (The case of his wife, Cynthia, who committed suicide along with him even though she was perfectly healthy, is very debatable. She, too, wanted to avoid suffering—emotional suffering--but she was only 55 and could likely have eventually recovered from his loss. She may well have thrown away 30 or more years of living out of weakness and cowardice.)

In both cases—Koestler and Sanderson--the Objectivist ethics would have no longer applied. Personally, I would condone Koestler, but I would probably condemn Sanderson’s action as evil. In the film version, he appeared to have a lot to live for, but just preferred booze to life. Once Sanderson decided he wanted to die, I would not call his actions technically immoral, however.

Since John O’Brien, the author, was also an alcoholic, I am guessing that he simply threw his life away as well.

The principle involved is: once a person decides they want to die, ethics becomes inapplicable. But their positive or negative attitude toward life can be judged as good or evil, respectively. That’s how I see it.

(Please note: I am using these cases as philosophical examples. I do not know enough about either Cynthia Koestler or John O’Brien to judge their choice to die.)

I will relate a real-life example...

A good friend of mine in Bloomington is a self-proclaimed alcoholic. And I mean big time. On average he drinks around 20 beers every night and tops these off with a pint or more of whiskey. He doesn't start drinking until around 9 p.m., after he has taken care of all his work for that day. He is sober as a judge until late evening, and for some reason he experiences very little in the way of hangovers. He is a very productive guy.

We have had many long conversations about this problem. He has said repeatedly that he is committing "slow suicide." Why? Well, at age nine he accidentally shot and killed his twin brother with a shotgun blast. They were so close, as identical twins often are, that it was like killing half of himself. To make matters worse, his father barely spoke to him for the next several years, and even after they reconciled, the relationship remained awkward. (His father died just a few days ago.)

My friend still has horrific nightmares, virtually every night, about all the blood and confusion surrounding the event; and when night falls, all he wants to do is to escape his memories and feelings of gut-wrenching guilt. He underwent years and years of intensive therapy, but nothing really helped.

My friend is not the morose type, and while functioning during the day, he is gregarious, well-liked, and highly productive. And he is not a mean drunk. Even when he can barely walk, he remains jovial and surprisingly clear-headed in some ways.

So how am I to assess my friend? Shall I view him as evil or immoral? Such terms do not seem at all applicable in his case. I have never seen someone struggle so hard and so long to overcome a psychological problem. It may be that some problems simply cannot be overcome. I cannot begin to conceive of the kind of horror he experienced, and if his demons overtake him one day, I will be his most vocal defender.

Ghs