A Bold New Step for Objectivist Scholarship

[Philip Coates]

Subject: KPSS (Keep Philosophy Simple, Stupid)

> We don't need morality to tell us that choosing life is good and choosing death is evil. The purpose of morality is to evaluate the consistency of our actions with that prior choice--a choice which can be evaluated as good or evil, not moral or immoral.

I think that's very well-put, Ted. I said the same thing to Dennis on this thread on Feb. 18, but you've stated it more simply and economically.

Huge waste of time for Dennis (and David Kelley?) and others to view this as a "problem" in Objectivism and to write huge scholarly articles on it with footnotes or references to other thinkers. It's 'enabling' bad academicism in the realm of ideas, when things should be stated at no greater length than the subject objectively merits.

[George H. Smith]

We now come to your question, "if someone simply decides life is not worth the effort, are we wrong to judge them morally?" Yes, in my opinion, this is wrong (in the sense of "mistaken"). You may regard their decision as mistaken or unwise, but I don't see what moral principle they have violated. Where is it written that we must continue to live even when we believe that our life is not worth living? What better reason can there be for ending one's life?

Ghs

You’re not quite addressing the technical philosophical paradox involving the premoral status of the choice to live, but that may be simply because you regard it as too esoteric. Fine. Since you don’t consider yourself an Objectivist, I can understand that. I agree with a number of your statements above. Many people, sadly, definitely do choose to go on living more out of fear of dying than love of life.

I don't think the "premoral status of the choice to live" is a paradox at all. It is an ambiguous question, one that admits of various answers depending on how we understand the key terms.

The first thing we need to do is to clarify what we mean by "premoral." Do we simply mean a choice that has no moral implications whatsoever, such as choosing among flavors of ice cream? Or do we mean something more, i.e., a foundational choice without which ethics would have no meaning or application?

I assume the second, stronger interpretation is intended. If so, the answer depends on whether we are talking about theoretical ethics (especially metaethics) or practical ethics (i.e., the specific application of moral principles to one's life). Each level of analysis involves a number of subsidiary issues, some of which I will try to address at a later time. To take them up now would require a lengthy essay, so I will break them down as we go along.

A major problem here relates to my previous remarks to the effect that we rarely make an explicit choice to live. To sustain our lives is our natural default setting, and we rarely think about the alternative of death except in unusual circumstances. To live is to show a demonstrated preference for life over death, but it is not as if we made an explicit choice early in our lives to live rather than to die. It is therefore difficult to pin down the precise choice posited in the original question.

Of course it could be argued that we implicitly choose to live every time we take a life-sustaining activity, such as eating and drinking. But we normally eat and drink because we are hungry and thirsty, not because we think of them as life sustaining activities. I personally do not see myself as making a moral decision each time I eat dinner or drink water.

I have only scratched the surface here, so please don't construe my remarks as some kind of definitive answer to the "premoral" question. All I am doing here is laying some groundwork for later comments.

Ghs

[kiaer.ts]

I note that while Phil addresses me, he "quotes" someone else.

My own statement was not a criticism of Dennis. I agree that the choice to live is premoral. I have no problem with people explaining or exploring that.

I think history records one skeptic philosopher who lived by his words, and walked into ditches, not trusting his eyes to warn him of their existence.

Those who want to play at moral skeptics are invited also to put their money where their mouths are. No one is forcing them to choose to live.

Edited March 13, 2011 by Ted Keer

[George H. Smith]

I suspect we may be wading into a psychological quagmire here, speculating about what various suicidal people have felt throughout the annals of history. I question the validity of judging the psychology of crusaders from the Middle Ages. Given the era they were living in, God knows what their motivation might have been. Perhaps they did genuinely believe the afterlife/nirvana fantasy. But then are we to suggest that anyone who kills himself and thinks he is going to heaven is not really committing suicide? That makes no sense to me. I think it’s fairly clear that today’s suicide bombers are people with nothing to live for, and that we can’t ignore that fact.

Kamikaze pilots in World War II were supposedly killing themselves to achieve some sort of ultimate honor within the Shinto religion. I find that entirely believable, given the extent of their cultural indoctrination. But I don’t think that means their suicidal actions are fundamentally different from other suicides. Whether Shinto or Muslim or the crazies of Heaven’s Gate, suicide is suicide and it entails a rejection of life.

But I am willing to admit that all of this is very debatable, and that I may well be psychologizing as much as anyone.

Oh, hell. Who is John Galt?

I see no essential difference between kamikaze pilots and Muslim suicide bombers. Both groups have values that they regard as more important than life on earth, so they are willing to kill themselves in the course of pursuing these "transcendental" values. These transcendental values need not include an afterlife. In warrior cultures, dishonor is often viewed as worse than death. The samurai culture comes immediately to mind, but there are many others. Indeed, many Americans would willingly sacrifice their own lives to save their children. In no case, unless there is evidence to the contrary, should we ever assume that individuals who are willing to give up their own lives in pursuit of a greater value have psychological problems or nothing to live for.

A good example can be found in the movie "Gran Torino." If it is said that Walt Kowalski (Clint Eastwood's character) was ill and probably didn't have long to live anyway, I would respond by pointing out the obvious, namely, that all of us will eventually die. So the pertinent question is not Should I give up my life for a greater value? -- as if our lives would never end otherwise. Rather, we are dealing with estimates of how many years of life we have left.

This raises the interesting question of whether how old we are influences how much we value our own lives. I think it does (in some cases), but to explain why I think this would take us on a long detour.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Re: suicide bombers and vengeful suicides

But the common denominator is the destructive intent--whether you kill other people or merely hurt other people. The essential nature of the immorality involved is the same--using your life as a means to the end of ruining other lives rather than treating your life as an end in itself. The key ethical principle being violated is independence.

I don't agree with this. When you commit mass murder, for whatever reason, the key ethical principle being violated is respect for the rights of innocent victims. Whether or not you kill yourself in the process is relatively insignificant from a moral point of view.

Clearly we do have a difference of opinion here, but I want to clarify my own position. Your view is consistent with the fundamental premise of libertarianism, i.e., that our most important ethical-political principle is the social rule of noncoercion. I regard that as a derivative, second-level principle, resting upon the more fundamental premise of rational egoism. As human beings, we have an obligation to do those things which our nature requires for us to have a satisfying life. Rationality, independence, productivity—all those things are ethical principles because they represent objective requirements of human life. The social principle of dealing with others as a trader--neither sacrificing others for self nor self to others—derives from and logically depends upon the virtue of independence. If I am committed to fulfilling my own needs and not living as a parasite, I will have no reason to use force against others against their will or to destroy others out of my own self-hatred.

That's why I think the more fundamental ethical principle is the ego-based principle: independence.

What makes you think that I regard rights as somehow more fundamental than rational self-interest? I have never held any view like this. I am basically a Randian in my moral theory, and Rand was a libertarian (by any reasonable definition of this term) in political theory. Libertarianism is a political theory; as such, it says nothing about the moral foundations of individual freedom. Some libertarians are Christians, some libertarians are utilitarians, some libertarians are Randians, etc.

As an egoist, why should I regard the rationality and independence of a mass murderer as more fundamental, morally speaking, than the lives of his innocent victims? His murderous rampage made it impossible for his victims to be rational or independent or anything else.

Ghs

[Dennis Hardin]

Subject: KPSS (Keep Philosophy Simple, Stupid)

> We don't need morality to tell us that choosing life is good and choosing death is evil. The purpose of morality is to evaluate the consistency of our actions with that prior choice--a choice which can be evaluated as good or evil, not moral or immoral.

I think that's very well-put, Ted. I said the same thing to Dennis on this thread on Feb. 18, but you've stated it more simply and economically.

Huge waste of time for Dennis (and David Kelley?) and others to view this as a "problem" in Objectivism and to write huge scholarly articles on it with footnotes or references to other thinkers. It's 'enabling' bad academicism in the realm of ideas, when things should be stated at no greater length than the subject objectively merits.

Jesus F-ing Christ! Where do I begin?

That was my post you were quoting, Phil.

We don't need morality to tell us that choosing life is good and choosing death is evil. The purpose of morality is to evaluate the consistency of our actions with that prior choice--a choice which can be evaluated as good or evil, not moral or immoral.

Words matter, Phil. The key words here--the words which constitute the "solution"--are good vs. evil, which you do not use at all in your post of February 18. So there is no way that you said “the same thing” in your post. Not even close. I'm not even sure what the hell you meant by what you said. Just saying that it’s a “formulation issue” does not put your “solution” in the same universe, much less the same ballpark.

And I “wasted” seven “scholarly” pages filled with “footnotes and references” to fully flesh it out 19 years ago. (See the link in my prior post.)

But thanks, anyway. I’m delighted to have your endorsement of my unique position on this issue.

[Dennis Hardin]

I don't think the "premoral status of the choice to live" is a paradox at all. It is an ambiguous question, one that admits of various answers depending on how we understand the key terms.

The first thing we need to do is to clarify what we mean by "premoral." Do we simply mean a choice that has no moral implications whatsoever, such as choosing among flavors of ice cream? Or do we mean something more, i.e., a foundational choice without which ethics would have no meaning or application?

I assume the second, stronger interpretation is intended. If so, the answer depends on whether we are talking about theoretical ethics (especially metaethics) or practical ethics (i.e., the specific application of moral principles to one's life). Each level of analysis involves a number of subsidiary issues, some of which I will try to address at a later time. To take them up now would require a lengthy essay, so I will break them down as we go along.

A major problem here relates to my previous remarks to the effect that we rarely make an explicit choice to live. To sustain our lives is our natural default setting, and we rarely think about the alternative of death except in unusual circumstances. To live is to show a demonstrated preference for life over death, but it is not as if we made an explicit choice early in our lives to live rather than to die. It is therefore difficult to pin down the precise choice posited in the original question.

Of course it could be argued that we implicitly choose to live every time we take a life-sustaining activity, such as eating and drinking. But we normally eat and drink because we are hungry and thirsty, not because we think of them as life sustaining activities. I personally do not see myself as making a moral decision each time I eat dinner or drink water.

I have only scratched the surface here, so please don't construe my remarks as some kind of definitive answer to the "premoral" question. All I am doing here is laying some groundwork for later comments.

Ghs

You’re correct. It isn’t really a “paradox,” although the issue is often presented that way. It deals with “a foundational choice without which ethics would have no meaning or application.” It is definitely a metaethical/theoretical issue, separate from practical applications. It is the question of whether the primary choice to live—which is necessary as a precondition of individual morality—is itself subject to any form of judgment or evaluation. If it is not—if an individual can choose to opt out of morality altogether—then how can morality be truly objective? Putting it another way, does Rand really answer Hume?

The book to which this thread is dedicated has two articles dealing with this. David Kelley ("Choosing Life") has also written on this topic. I have strong differences with all of their viewpoints.

I provided my own answer to the “problem” in the 1992 Full Context article referenced numerous times on this thread. I am in the process of writing an updated article integrating some of the work done in this area since then. I will very much look forward to reading your further thoughts on this.

[Dennis Hardin]

I see no essential difference between kamikaze pilots and Muslim suicide bombers. Both groups have values that they regard as more important than life on earth, so they are willing to kill themselves in the course of pursuing these "transcendental" values. These transcendental values need not include an afterlife. In warrior cultures, dishonor is often viewed as worse than death. The samurai culture comes immediately to mind, but there are many others. Indeed, many Americans would willingly sacrifice their own lives to save their children. In no case, unless there is evidence to the contrary, should we ever assume that individuals who are willing to give up their own lives in pursuit of a greater value have psychological problems or nothing to live for.

A good example can be found in the movie "Gran Torino." If it is said that Walt Kowalski (Clint Eastwood's character) was ill and probably didn't have long to live anyway, I would respond by pointing out the obvious, namely, that all of us will eventually die. So the pertinent question is not Should I give up my life for a greater value? -- as if our lives would never end otherwise. Rather, we are dealing with estimates of how many years of life we have left.

This raises the interesting question of whether how old we are influences how much we value our own lives. I think it does (in some cases), but to explain why I think this would take us on a long detour.

Ghs

The question of when giving up your life for the sake of something greater constitutes suicide can get rather complicated. I’m not sure the Walt Kowalski character truly committed sucide or not. He knew he would probably die, and his age and illness made that acceptable to him. He was obviously willing to die. But I think he probably would have chosen to go on living if he could have achieved the same result some other way.

Clearly old age does often create a situation of diminishing returns. Look at Arthur Koestler, the brilliant writer who committed a double suicide with his wife in 1983 at the age of 77. Koestler suffered from Parkinson’s disease and terminal leukemia. He killed himself because he did not care to suffer the horror of a slow, painful death—and his wife decided to join him because she did not care to live without him.

I don’t consider a person who dies or risks their life for the sake of a child or spouse to be committing suicide at all. To me that’s an entirely separate category. Often it's simply a case of being faced with equally unacceptable alternatives. Such a person is not choosing to die; he/she is choosing not to live without certain crucially important values. A soldier who deliberately draws fire from an enemy to spare his comrades is not choosing to die. Again, he would doubtless prefer to live. Kamikase pilots and Muslim suicide bombers are choosing to die. Harris and Klebold chose to die.

This is taking us off topic, as you say, but I find it interesting that there could be so many situations where the issue of suicide seems to be a judgment call. And the age and/or illness factors obviously do become significant at a certain stage.

[Dennis Hardin]

What makes you think that I regard rights as somehow more fundamental than rational self-interest? I have never held any view like this. I am basically a Randian in my moral theory, and Rand was a libertarian (by any reasonable definition of this term) in political theory. Libertarianism is a political theory; as such, it says nothing about the moral foundations of individual freedom. Some libertarians are Christians, some libertarians are utilitarians, some libertarians are Randians, etc.

As an egoist, why should I regard the rationality and independence of a mass murderer as more fundamental, morally speaking, than the lives of his innocent victims? His murderous rampage made it impossible for his victims to be rational or independent or anything else.

Ghs

. . .Why should I regard the rationality and independence of a mass murderer as more fundamental, morally speaking, than the lives of his innocent victims?

Because it is their selflessness—their total lack of rationality and independence—that is the real source of their evil. That fundamental lack is what makes their monstrous behavior possible. First they default on their human obligation to be rational and independent and self-responsible—and then they become monsters as a consequence. One behavior is causally related to the other. The mass murders make the killer incalculably worse morally than some drunk wallowing harmlessly in the gutter, but both behavior patterns (killing innocent people and alcohol abuse) have the same fundamental cause and the same beginning in a person's soul. The moral treachery takes root long before he buys the gun.

[George H. Smith]

What makes you think that I regard rights as somehow more fundamental than rational self-interest? I have never held any view like this. I am basically a Randian in my moral theory, and Rand was a libertarian (by any reasonable definition of this term) in political theory. Libertarianism is a political theory; as such, it says nothing about the moral foundations of individual freedom. Some libertarians are Christians, some libertarians are utilitarians, some libertarians are Randians, etc.

As an egoist, why should I regard the rationality and independence of a mass murderer as more fundamental, morally speaking, than the lives of his innocent victims? His murderous rampage made it impossible for his victims to be rational or independent or anything else.

Ghs

. . .Why should I regard the rationality and independence of a mass murderer as more fundamental, morally speaking, than the lives of his innocent victims?

Because it is their selflessness—their total lack of rationality and independence—that is the real source of their evil. That fundamental lack is what makes their monstrous behavior possible. First they default on their human obligation to be rational and independent and self-responsible—and then they become monsters as a consequence. One behavior is causally related to the other. The mass murders make the killer incalculably worse morally than some drunk wallowing harmlessly in the gutter, but both behavior patterns (killing innocent people and alcohol abuse) have the same fundamental cause and the same beginning in a person's soul. The moral treachery takes root long before he buys the gun.

Lots of people lack rationality and independence, but only a tiny fraction of these choose to become mass murderers. I am not a psychological (or "soft") determinist. I don't believe that the choice to commit mass murder was caused (in a deterministic sense) by earlier psychological conditions and choices. Mass murder is not the inevitable consequence of irrationalism. The choice to murder others is the cause of the evil. From a moral point of view, it doesn't matter what the motive for this choice may have been.

Ghs

[Xray]

One reason this topic fascinates me is because people such as yourself can use it to attack Objectivism.

Dennis, I have the impression that you are trying to backpedal now with regard to a contradiction you yourself have discovered.

So true. Choosing nonexistence over existence is the grandest of ambitions. Zero worship.

The choice of a religious term is quite interesting in this context. What "ought to" be worshipped? Life? If yes, who says one ought to worship life? Ayn Rand?

Ayn Rand said:

"All that which is proper to the life of a rational being is the good; all that which destroys it is the evil."

Lethal illness, earthquakes, tsunamis etc. would then all have to be regarded as "evil" too, right?

Here's another example: Rand: "that which furthers its [an organism's] life is the good, that which threatens it is the evil" ( TVOS, p. 17)?

But wouldn't the use of "evil" here be a moral demonizing of natural phenomena?

N. Branden wrote: "I don’t know of anyone other than the Church fathers in the Dark Ages who used the word “evil” quite so often as Ayn Rand." (NB)

http://www.nathanielbranden.com/catalog/articles_essays/benefits_and_hazards.html

"...[Your] life belongs to you and . . . the good is to live it." (Ayn Rand)

Statements like the above help to understand why Objectivists can have problems in accepting opposing choices, since these choices would go against the personal values of Objectivism's founder.

I have a question, Dennis: how can a "one set for all" catalog of what is 'morally good' and 'morally evil' be reconciled with the idea of individualism?

We don't need morality to tell us that choosing life is good and choosing death is evil.

But "evil" IS a moral term. So you are already arguing from a moral position here.

On the other hand, being moral only applies within the context of wanting to live.

No. For one can choose non-life over life according to the moral values one has. Just think of Janusz Korczak's choice as a poignant example.

This raises the interesting question of whether how old we are influences how much we value our own lives. I think it does (in some cases), but to explain why I think this would take us on a long detour.

I don't think the detour would have to be that long. Since valuing life is no immutable constant, it is only natural that variables like age, severe illness, chronic pain, loss of loved ones, etc. have an influence on our valuing. For the circumstances under which we want (or don't want) to live strongly influence or perspective.

As for age: there may even be a biological program at work which makes us cling to life less as we get older, making it more easy for us to finally let go.

Edited March 13, 2011 by Xray

[George H. Smith]

The book to which this thread is dedicated has two articles dealing with this. David Kelley ("Choosing Life") has also written on this topic. I have strong differences with all of their viewpoints.

I provided my own answer to the “problem” in the 1992 Full Context article referenced numerous times on this thread. I am in the process of writing an updated article integrating some of the work done in this area since then. I will very much look forward to reading your further thoughts on this.

I read David Kelley's article two times. It is excellent combination of philosophy and psychology, and I agree with it overall. I have also read your article, which I also think is excellent. What puzzles me is why you say that you have "strong differences" with Kelley. Although you guys approach the problem from different perspectives, I think your views are quite compatible. So what am I missing?

Ghs

[Dennis Hardin]

As an egoist, why should I regard the rationality and independence of a mass murderer as more fundamental, morally speaking, than the lives of his innocent victims? His murderous rampage made it impossible for his victims to be rational or independent or anything else.

Ghs

. . .Why should I regard the rationality and independence of a mass murderer as more fundamental, morally speaking, than the lives of his innocent victims?

Because it is their selflessness—their total lack of rationality and independence—that is the real source of their evil. That fundamental lack is what makes their monstrous behavior possible. First they default on their human obligation to be rational and independent and self-responsible—and then they become monsters as a consequence. One behavior is causally related to the other. The mass murders make the killer incalculably worse morally than some drunk wallowing harmlessly in the gutter, but both behavior patterns (killing innocent people and alcohol abuse) have the same fundamental cause and the same beginning in a person's soul. The moral treachery takes root long before he buys the gun.

Lots of people lack rationality and independence, but only a tiny fraction of these choose to become mass murderers. I am not a psychological (or "soft") determinist. I don't believe that the choice to commit mass murder was caused (in a deterministic sense) by earlier psychological conditions and choices. Mass murder is not the inevitable consequence of irrationalism. The choice to murder others is the cause of the evil. From a moral point of view, it doesn't matter what the motive for this choice may have been.

Ghs

I’m not arguing for determinism, soft or hard. I am simply pointing to one potential scenario of psychological cause and effect. A person who defaults on the responsibility of rationality and independence is behaving destructively, and that destructiveness can take many forms. Mass murder is only one of them. That may be more likely if the person is totally obsessed with anger due to pain from his past, but it is still only one of many, many ways that his irrationality might manifest itself.

The person could be horribly abusive to his family, or a drunk who lives in the gutter, or a garden variety career criminal, or a blood-thirsty mafia boss, or a lazy, worthless welfare recipient, or a filthy derelict, or maybe just an obnoxious SOB who lives off his or her spouse.

People certainly do have free will. It is by no means automatic that an unthinking, irresponsible, brain-dead dolt will become a mass murderer. Most obviously do not. On the other hand, a rational, independent thinker will never become a mass murderer. Being stupid and irresponsible help turn a person into a monster, but they are a necessary condition and not a sufficient condition.

We are free to act against the requirements of our nature, to reject our means of survival—our mind—but we cannot escape the consequences: misery, anxiety, destruction. Our life depends on achievement, not destruction. Mindlessness, passivity, parasitism or brutality are not and cannot be principles of survival; they are merely the policy of those who, not wishing to face the issue of survival, live off the thinking and achievements of others.

To hold life as a standard of value means more than survival for the next moment of time or what is sometimes called “mere physical survival.” It means recognition of and respect for the life principle, the ongoing process by which life sustains itself and advances. . . [Those who default on this responsibility] are persons who implicitly resent the human mode of existence and who ultimately depend for their survival on those who do not resent it. Life, for a human being, is a constant process of thought, of motion, of purpose, of achievement; it is not the state of merely not being dead.

The criminal who attempts to survive by violence specifically seeks to escape life as his standard of value. He wants to reverse the nature of reality and to survive, not by producing, but by destroying. He expects to exist by means of those who practice a code opposite to his own—those who produce that which he seeks to expropriate. The terror that is his chronic state is not primarily fear of retaliation at the hands of the police; it is terror at the dimly sensed and frantically evaded knowledge that he is attempting to survive by means of a contradiction; that he has betrayed his status as a human being; betrayed his self-esteem, made himself into something inappropriate to life.

Nathaniel Branden, Honoring the Self, pp. 211-212

[Dennis Hardin]

The book to which this thread is dedicated has two articles dealing with this. David Kelley ("Choosing Life") has also written on this topic. I have strong differences with all of their viewpoints.

I provided my own answer to the “problem” in the 1992 Full Context article referenced numerous times on this thread. I am in the process of writing an updated article integrating some of the work done in this area since then. I will very much look forward to reading your further thoughts on this.

I read David Kelley's article two times. It is excellent combination of philosophy and psychology, and I agree with it overall. I have also read your article, which I also think is excellent. What puzzles me is why you say that you have "strong differences" with Kelley. Although you guys approach the problem from different perspectives, I think your views are quite compatible. So what am I missing?

Ghs

First of all, thank you very much for the kind words about my article. I really appreciate it, especially coming from you.

Kelley lays out the problem this way:

Here's the puzzle: is life a value because one chooses it, or does one choose it because it is a value? Which comes first? The opposing theses are: (1) Life is a value because one chooses it; and (2) One chooses life because it is a value.

On the first alternative, the choice comes first. Life is not a value for a person until he chooses to live. So choosing to live is a pre-moral choice. One is not morally obliged to make that choice, and if a person does not choose to live he is outside the realm of morality; there is no moral basis for evaluating his choice as wrong, immoral, or irrational. This is the view that Rand appears to espouse in the passages I quoted.

On the second alternative, life is inherently a value because of our nature as living beings. We recognize life as a value by the same means—reason looking at reality—that we grasp any other value. Of course humans must choose their values, since they act by choice, but the point of ethics is to guide our choices in light of the facts of reality. If so, choosing to live is just as much an obligation as choosing to be honest, and a person can be faulted if he does not choose life. Indeed, since life is the ultimate moral value, and since death is a state of nonexistence, there can be no greater fault.

Kelley argues that the first position is correct: Life is a value because one chooses it. If a person does not choose to live, there is no basis for evaluating his choice as wrong, immoral or irrational.

I don't agree with Kelley that these are the only two alternatives. I don't contend that "one chooses life because it is a value," because I think that's oversimplified. I argue that the person who throws away their life—given normal conditions—is both irrational and evil (as opposed to immoral). I strongly believe that a person can be faulted for choosing death over life, when and if their life satisfies certain normal conditions. Moral principles, however, only apply in the context of choosing to live. (I also disagree with Kelley that Rand would endorse his position.)

Kelley maintains that I am advocating a form of intrinsicism because my position implies that life is a value whether or not we choose it. Something cannot be a value unless we decide to make it so, he says. I maintain that life--under normal conditions--is self-evidently a value whether any given person chooses it or not, and that this is not intrinsicism because the ruling factor here is always the specific context: the relationship between a specific person and their particular quality of life.

I hope that’s clear enough. It will have to do for now.

[Brant Gaede]

Dennis, I'm beginning to suspect you hold my old psychotherapist in high esteem.

--Brant

[Dennis Hardin]

One reason this topic fascinates me is because people such as yourself can use it to attack Objectivism.

Dennis, I have the impression that you are trying to backpedal now with regard to a contradiction you yourself have discovered.

My own position has been consistent all along. You misunderstood me. I was simply stating the opposing point of view as clearly as possible without endorsing it, which I always do.

So true. Choosing nonexistence over existence is the grandest of ambitions. Zero worship.

The choice of a religious term is quite interesting in this context. What "ought to" be worshipped? Life? If yes, who says one ought to worship life? Ayn Rand?

Personally, I don't need to be told to worship the glory of life and of being alive.

Ayn Rand said:

"All that which is proper to the life of a rational being is the good; all that which destroys it is the evil."

Lethal illness, earthquakes, tsunamis etc. would then all have to be regarded as "evil" too, right?

Here's another example: Rand: "that which furthers its [an organism's] life is the good, that which threatens it is the evil" ( TVOS, p. 17)?

But wouldn't the use of "evil" here be a moral demonizing of natural phenomena?

N. Branden wrote: "I don’t know of anyone other than the Church fathers in the Dark Ages who used the word “evil” quite so often as Ayn Rand." (NB)

In the case of natural phenomena like earthquakes, etc., evaluation of behavior would obviously not be an issue. The concept of "evil" would still apply, but it would not be a quality attributed to an agent.

"...[Your] life belongs to you and . . . the good is to live it." (Ayn Rand)

Statements like the above help to understand why Objectivists can have problems in accepting opposing choices, since these choices would go against the personal values of Objectivism's founder.

I have a question, Dennis: how can a "one set for all" catalog of what is 'morally good' and 'morally evil' be reconciled with the idea of individualism?

The range of options available to human beings as moral, rational individuals is limitless.

We don't need morality to tell us that choosing life is good and choosing death is evil.

But "evil" IS a moral term. So you are already arguing from a moral position here.

Not true. The terms 'good' and 'evil' have a wider application than the sphere of morality.

On the other hand, being moral only applies within the context of wanting to live.

No. For one can choose non-life over life according to the moral values one has. Just think of Janusz Korczak's choice as a poignant example.

One can certainly choose to die for moral reasons. That's a separate issue.

All of your comments reflect a fundamental disrespect for the context of this discussion.

[Dennis Hardin]

Dennis, I'm beginning to suspect you hold my old psychotherapist in high esteem.

--Brant

Brant,

I was in one of Saint Nathan's therapy groups for a year in the early 70s. And I attended four of his week end intensives.

Whatever would make you think such a thing?

[anthony]

The book to which this thread is dedicated has two articles dealing with this. David Kelley ("Choosing Life") has also written on this topic. I have strong differences with all of their viewpoints.

I provided my own answer to the “problem” in the 1992 Full Context article referenced numerous times on this thread. I am in the process of writing an updated article integrating some of the work done in this area since then. I will very much look forward to reading your further thoughts on this.

I read David Kelley's article two times. It is excellent combination of philosophy and psychology, and I agree with it overall. I have also read your article, which I also think is excellent. What puzzles me is why you say that you have "strong differences" with Kelley. Although you guys approach the problem from different perspectives, I think your views are quite compatible. So what am I missing?

Ghs

First of all, thank you very much for the kind words about my article. I really appreciate it, especially coming from you.

Kelley lays out the problem this way:

Here's the puzzle: is life a value because one chooses it, or does one choose it because it is a value? Which comes first? The opposing theses are: (1) Life is a value because one chooses it; and (2) One chooses life because it is a value.

On the first alternative, the choice comes first. Life is not a value for a person until he chooses to live. So choosing to live is a pre-moral choice. One is not morally obliged to make that choice, and if a person does not choose to live he is outside the realm of morality; there is no moral basis for evaluating his choice as wrong, immoral, or irrational. This is the view that Rand appears to espouse in the passages I quoted.

On the second alternative, life is inherently a value because of our nature as living beings. We recognize life as a value by the same means—reason looking at reality—that we grasp any other value. Of course humans must choose their values, since they act by choice, but the point of ethics is to guide our choices in light of the facts of reality. If so, choosing to live is just as much an obligation as choosing to be honest, and a person can be faulted if he does not choose life. Indeed, since life is the ultimate moral value, and since death is a state of nonexistence, there can be no greater fault.

Kelley argues that the first position is correct: Life is a value because one chooses it. If a person does not choose to live, there is no basis for evaluating his choice as wrong, immoral or irrational.

I don't agree with Kelley that these are the only two alternatives. I don't contend that "one chooses life because it is a value," because I think that's oversimplified. I argue that the person who throws away their life—given normal conditions—is both irrational and evil (as opposed to immoral). I strongly believe that a person can be faulted for choosing death over life, when and if their life satisfies certain normal conditions. Moral principles, however, only apply in the context of choosing to live. (I also disagree with Kelley that Rand would endorse his position.)

Kelley maintains that I am advocating a form of intrinsicism because my position implies that life is a value whether or not we choose it. Something cannot be a value unless we decide to make it so, he says. I maintain that life--under normal conditions--is self-evidently a value whether any given person chooses it or not, and that this is not intrinsicism because the ruling factor here is always the specific context: the relationship between a specific person and their particular quality of life.

I hope that’s clear enough. It will have to do for now.

Dennis,

When confronted with a 'chicken or egg' question like this one seems to be, I'm inclined to answer "both, simultaneously". Life has intrinsic value - and it has value because you and I choose it.(imo)

Independently, each person has to see the need for the choice, and then next, to make that choice. Also, it's an ongoing choice, made day to day.

Am I missing something? - I don't want to 'strawman' this.

"We don't need morality to tell us that choosing life is good, and choosing death is evil."[DH] Well said.

There is a range between those two poles of choice, of course, varying from what could be a 'half-life' of disgust at existence and oneself, to a total commitment to reality, and enjoyment of it.

From only-just-sustaining, to consciously flourishing - the degree attained is proportionate to the degree of effort one puts in.

The level of morality is defined by this, the effort (not the choice), not so?

Valuable discussion from you guys, by the way.

Tony

[rhartford]

. . . Something cannot be a value unless we decide to make it so, [Kelley] says. I maintain that life--under normal conditions--is self-evidently a value whether any given person chooses it or not . . .

I think your differences with Kelley hinge on your differing definition of what it means to be a "value."

"Value" and its cognates all imply action by an organism. A "value" is something an organism pursues that is beneficial to its life. For a human, many such actions are chosen. This is the essence of "valuing," choosing "to value" something, and that something is the pursued "value."

You seem to view "value" as something that is benefical to your life whether you pursue it or not. Those things may be beneficial or good for one's life, but they are not "values" because they are not the object of a valuing process.

[Philip Coates]

> Kelley argues that the first position is correct: Life is a value because one chooses it. If a person does not choose to live, there is no basis for evaluating his choice as wrong, immoral or irrational. [Dennis]

Assuming you've paraphrased him correctly and there is no further nuance or qualification to his view, that's not only wrong but disastrous philosophically. It leads to the idea that "well, I never fully chose life in the first place, so slow death, irrationality, unhappiness, partial destruction are moral for me" or "well, my choice is inconsistent, but I chose to be inconsistent prior to any morality" and to the fact that an Objectivist would have no answer. At least not to the first.

You are correct and David Kelley is wrong: Rand would -not- have agreed with this.

In fact, she actually expressed her violent disagreement. There is a passage somewhere of her withering contempt and moral disapproval for those who had essentially and gratuitously made the fundamental choice of death in one way (or degree)or another.

I wish I had the exact quotation.

PS, Couldn't you say that Atlas Shrugged largely deals not with people who are inconsistent but with people like James Taggart who never actually chose life from their earliest days, who are 'on the premise of death'? And her whole discussion of the anti-life mentality throughout the book and elsewhere.

Edited March 14, 2011 by Philip Coates

[Brant Gaede]

Dennis, I'm beginning to suspect you hold my old psychotherapist in high esteem.

--Brant

Brant,

I was in one of Saint Nathan's therapy groups for a year in the early 70s. And I attended four of his week end intensives.

Whatever would make you think such a thing?

People who contemn Nathaniel don't generally come with multi-paragraph quotes of him.

It's interesting that I was in his NYC group for a year (76-77) and went to a bunch of his intensives too.

--Brant

(I don't really want to get into a NB discussion)

Edited March 14, 2011 by Brant Gaede

[merjet]

Rand would -not- have agreed with this.

In fact, she actually expressed her violent disagreement. There is a passage somewhere of her withering contempt and moral disapproval for those who had essentially and gratuitously made the fundamental choice of death in one way (or degree)or another.

Rand or Peikoff?

In answer to this, I want to mention first that suicide is sometimes justified, according to Objectivism. Suicide is justified when man's life, owing to circumstances outside of a person's control, is no longer possible; an example might be a person with a painful terminal illness, or a prisoner in a concentration camp who sees no chance of escape. In cases such as these, suicide is not necessarily a philosophic rejection of life or of reality (247-8).

A man who would throw away his life without cause, who would reject the universe on principle and embrace a zero for its own sake—such a man, according to Objectivism, would belong on the lowest rung of hell (248).

[jriggenbach]

I wish I had the exact quotation.

I suggest skimming some secondary sources in search of it.

Helpfully,

JR

[Philip Coates]

> I suggest skimming some secondary sources in search of it.

Jeff, if anyone has enough interest, feel free.

> I want to mention first that suicide is sometimes justified, [Peikoff]

Merlin, it wasn't in the context of suicide but in terms of fundamental choices about life...not in extremis or in metaphysical emergencies. (I thought that was clear and didn't need to be explained.)

[Dennis Hardin]

. . . Something cannot be a value unless we decide to make it so, [Kelley] says. I maintain that life--under normal conditions--is self-evidently a value whether any given person chooses it or not . . .

I think your differences with Kelley hinge on your differing definition of what it means to be a "value."

"Value" and its cognates all imply action by an organism. A "value" is something an organism pursues that is beneficial to its life. For a human, many such actions are chosen. This is the essence of "valuing," choosing "to value" something, and that something is the pursued "value."

You seem to view "value" as something that is benefical to your life whether you pursue it or not. Those things may be beneficial or good for one's life, but they are not "values" because they are not the object of a valuing process.

I was wondering if someone was going to highlight that issue. I have been struggling with it in my own thinking about this for a long time. I question whether it is really necessary that humans “choose” life in any meaningful sense. Animals don’t, obviously, since they don’t have free will. But with animals you could say that they are programmed to pursue life as a value. I wonder if, in some sense, the same might be true of humans.

I don’t argue that we don’t also choose it. We may or we may not, in any given instance. I say that life, in some sense, may be programmed into us a goal--hard-wired, so to speak. I am wondering if all living things are not programmed in this way.

If we are ‘programmed’ to act in the service of our life, life need not take on the status of an intrinsic value, since we can choose otherwise based on our particular circumstances (suffering, hopelessness, etc.).

But I will be the first to admit that this notion of innate human 'programming' is radically controversial, and I am still struggling with it. I welcome any feedback.