Volitional Will vs Determinism

[BaalChatzaf]

I am interested in the folks who like to consider themselves *nearly Objectivists* or at least want to *hang out* with Objectivists but fail to accept the key tenets of Rand's philosophy as demanded by Ayn Rand herself. She maintained that her philosophy must be integrated. Anyone who has not integrated and accepted the whole of her philosophy is not an Objectivist. From Rand's perspective, at some point these *failures* are being stubborn or irrational and should not be associated with. I prefer the sociability of the David Kelley's and Michael Stuart Kelly's approaches.

I believe the reality is real and it is what it is regardless of our wishes, hopes, prayers, hallucinations and errors. Facts are hard. Opinions are sometimes vapor-ware.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[peterdjones]

Interesting. So Mr. Jones is NOT a hard determinist? And he recently used the word "evasion." And he has spoken to numerous Objectivists over the years. And he may like to hang out with us. I hope peterdjones in particular would be a bit more forthcoming with HIS THEORIES of human consciousness. Do you agree with other aspects of the Objectivist Philosophy? Show us how to correct Objectivism, if you can.

Peter Taylor

I am a naturalistic libertarian on free will. That has nothing to do with whether or not

Rand contradicted herself. Objectivism cannot be corrected until it admits it has flaws.

You can judge for yourself how objectivists react to having problems pointed out to them.

[Selene]

Peter Jones:

This is the second time that I have asked you for this "list" of alleged contradictions in Objectivism.

Please provide the list,

Adam

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Adam,

Peter Jones is a collectivist to the core.

Imagine going into a Catholic website and start saying things like "Christianity needs to correct itself because Joseph Smith said blah blah blah ..." Or "Christians say black people are not equal to white people because this guy from the KKK said blah blah blah..." Or even something less harsh (still on the Catholic site): "Christians think the Haitian people made a pact with the Devil because Pat Robertson said blah blah blah..."

This dude is not only a collectivist, he knows precisely what he is doing. Look at the garbage he posted above: "Objectivism cannot be corrected until it admits it has flaws."

Do you know anyone named "Objectivism"? I don't. Neither does he and he knows it. Objectivism cannot admit anything because Objectivism is not a person. Does anyone think this dude is stupid enough to believe that? I know I don't.

So he knows he is not communicating information, but instead, playing a game so he can entertain some petty conceit. And to get the attention his parents didn't give him when he was growing up, he makes these veiled insults. He knows they get a rise out of people. Nothing gets a rise more than accusing someone of something he isn't.

Well, I ain't going for it. I don't give a damn what he thinks about fair and unfair. I don't like bigots. If you want an exercise in bigotry, just look at his rhetoric.

Even a cursory reading of this website will show that the stereotypes of his bigotry do not post here. Criticism of Objectivist ideas is the last thing that is lacking on OL. Many fundy types don't even think this is an Objectivist site, fer Petesake. Yet this dude keeps parroting his party line of stereotype-bashing and insinuating that OL members are that.

Bigots don't like facts and they don't like to look at anything but the reflection of their bigotry. They do like to bait people, though. You can bet your sweet boody that the fundy types ain't going for his BS. He can't bait them, so he comes here to bait folks.

Rand said that "racism is the lowest form of collectivism." In my book, that goes equally for bigotry.

If this dude wants to keep this crap up, there's the entire Internet to do it. He's not going to come here just to shit on OL members so he can get his jollies.

Peter Jones--consider this addressed to you. I started it to Adam, but it grew this way as I wrote it and I don't think you're worth the time to rewrite it.

Michael

[Selene]

Michael:

I sensed this about him from his first posts. I have learned to hold back from a quick judgment on posters here, but invariably my initial impression has been borne out.

I was right on the verge of calling him out by his tenth post, but I frankly did not think he was worth it and I was reasonably certain that other folks would expose him.

I agree with your analysis.

Adam

[kiaer.ts]

Michael:

I sensed this about him from his first posts. I have learned to hold back from a quick judgment on posters here, but invariably my initial impression has been borne out.

I was right on the verge of calling him out by his tenth post, but I frankly did not think he was worth it and I was reasonably certain that other folks would expose him.

I agree with your analysis.

Adam

You are slow on the ball.

[Ellen Stuttle]

Continuing from post #73.

Their [Rand and Peikoff's] theory has it that only humans can perform actions that are not necessitated by causality, [...].

Not quite. The theory holds that humans are causally necessitated to choose, that choosing is the action that a human must take (disregarding that choosing X is a different action from choosing Y). [....]

Here, again (previously quoted here), is the core contention of Objectivism's thesis on Identity and Causality, as stated by Peikoff in OPAR:

pg. 14

[italics in original]

A thing cannot act against its nature, i.e., in contradiction to its identity, because A is A and contradictions are impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity. This is the action it will take, the action that is caused and necessitated by its nature.

And here, also from OPAR, is Peikoff's attempt to fit choice into the mold of only one possible action per set of circumstances:

pp. 68-69

[italics in original]

There is one further question to consider before we turn to the validation of volition. How does the law of causality apply to the primary choice itself? Since one cannot ask for the cause of a man's choice to focus, does it follow that, on this level, there is a conflict between freedom and causality?

Even in regard to the primary choice, Ayn Rand replies, the law of causality operates without breach. The form of its operation in this context, however, is in certain respects unique.

The law of causality affirms a necessary connection between entities and their actions. It does not, however, specify any particular kind of entity or of action. The law does not say that only mechanistic relationships can occur, the kind that apply when one billiard ball strikes another; this is one common form of causation, but it does not preempt the field. Similarly, the law does not say that only choices governed by ideas and values are possible; this, too, is merely a form of causation; it is common but not universal within the realm of consciousness. The law of causality does not inventory the universe; it does not tell us what kinds of entities or actions are possible. It tells us only that whatever entities there are, they act in accordance with their nature, and whatever actions there are, they are performed and determined by the entity which acts.

The law of causality by itself, therefore, does not affirm or deny the reality of an irreducible choice. It says only this much: if such a choice does exist, then it, too, as a form of action, is performed and necessitated by an entity of a specific nature.

The content of one's choice could always have gone in the opposite direction; the choice to focus could have been the choice not to focus, and vice versa. But the action itself, the fact of choosing as such, in one direction or the other, is unavoidable. Since man is an entity of a certain kind, since his brain and consciousness possess a certain identity, he must act in a certain way. He must continuously choose between focus and nonfocus. Given a certain kind of cause, in other words, a certain kind of effect must follow. This is not a violation of the law of causality, but an instance of it.

On the primary level, to sum up, man chooses to activate his consciousness or not; this is the first cause in a lengthy chain--and the inescapability of such choice expresses his essential nature. Then, on this basis, he forms the mental content and selects the reasons that will govern all his other choices. Nothing in the law of causality casts doubt on such a description.

If man does have free will, his actions are free and caused--even, properly understood, on the primary level itself.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

And here, also from OPAR, is Peikoff's attempt to fit choice into the mold of only one possible action per set of circumstances:

Ellen,

If you mean by "set of circumstances" simply being a human entity, then choice itself is the action at stake. If "set of circumstances" means the act you do after a choice has been made, it's hard to square your statement with the following:

The content of one's choice could always have gone in the opposite direction; the choice to focus could have been the choice not to focus, and vice versa.

My problem with Peikoff's formulation is not him postulating a God's eye view of predestinatioin. He doesn't postulate that. But he does make a human nature error (right in the following words.)

But the action itself, the fact of choosing as such, in one direction or the other, is unavoidable. Since man is an entity of a certain kind, since his brain and consciousness possess a certain identity, he must act in a certain way. He must continuously choose between focus and nonfocus.

The mind is not an on-and-off button controlled solely by conscious will. Sometimes we are thrown into a trace without choosing that. Often we fall asleep without choosing to do so. I can think of several unfocused states where choice is not involved. Sometimes we can't concentrate despite consciously choosing to do so over and over. And when there is a sudden rush of hormones from danger, we focus real quick without choosing to do that. It happens automatically. I could go on and on with examples, including getting into the flow as described by Csikszentmihalyi.

This much is true. We can choose to focus and not to focus, but that's only one way the mind works. That's not the only way. When I see an error of that magnitude (claiming that this is the only way the mind works), I find the issue of whether Peikoff contradicted himself according to a determinism theory foreign to his thinking trivial hairsplitting at best.

It's like arguing over if a red car were blue, whether it would be dark blue or light blue. The fact is it is red. If it were blue, it could be any shade when speculating.

When people argue over things that are not real, it doesn't matter.

My only issue is that his words not be misrepresented. From what I read, he is wrong about human nature, but not wrong about causality.

And even then, his human nature error is in scope, not in saying something totally wrong. The mind can do what he says it can do. His error is in saying that this is all it does (fundamentally);

Michael

[peterdjones]

Peter Jones:

This is the second time that I have asked you for this "list" of alleged contradictions in Objectivism.

Please provide the list,

Adam

Metaphysics. She accepts both free will and determinism (the law of causality) but rejects compatibilism.

Epistemology: There is no apriori, but there are axioms., which look and behave exactly like apriori knowledge.

Concepts are formed by the mind yet in a finite space of time, yet somehow contain vast amounts of information about the sum total of their referents.

Politics: Initiation of Force is always wrong, but pre-emptive military strikes are OK.

Ethics: People should behave as if they are selfless, but only for selfish reasons.

[BaalChatzaf]

Metaphysics. She accepts both free will and determinism (the law of causality) but rejects compatibilism.

Epistemology: There is no apriori, but there are axioms., which look and behave exactly like apriori knowledge.

Concepts are formed by the mind yet in a finite space of time, yet somehow contain vast amounts of information about the sum total of their referents.

Politics: Initiation of Force is always wrong, but pre-emptive military strikes are OK.

Ethics: People should behave as if they are selfless, but only for selfish reasons.

That looks like a list.

In the real world preemptive war is kosher provided there is a real threat of being attacked first. As it says in the Talmud: If he comes to kill you, rise up early and kill him first.

As to concept formation, a concept can be open ended and have a large information carrying capacity. Having a large jug does not mean it is full (yet).

The kind of axioms referred to here are self-referential. Because of their self-referential property they cannot be denied without producing a contradiction. For example: Something exists. To deny it would require the existence of the denial. This kind of axiom is so broad in its reference as to be rather useless in particular applications. Of course something exists. It takes something to think of and state the axiom. In fact the axiom itself exists. Useful axioms, such as those used in mathematics do not have this self referential property so they can be safely denied. Example: the parallel axiom which characterizes Euclidean space can be denied to produce a geometric theory than can be applied to non-Euclidean (i.e. non flat) spaces.

If the world is governed (or adequately described by) quantum laws then it is not deterministic. It has been show that hidden variables (unobserved causative factors) imply locality of action but this has been refuted by experiment. Conclusion, the world is not deterministic in the strict sense. For large systems, the quantum glitches cancel themselves out (or nearly so) so classical mechanics (which is deterministic) is applicable in the large.

Being generous, magnanimous and just plain good is not necessarily self denying or self abnegating. For example I donate blood platelets (I have super-dooper great platelets) frequently. Why? Because it is useful and because if I ever need a donation I will not be ashamed to ask for it. I have built up a blood-karma account of about 20 gallons.

I record books for the blind and reading disabled as a volunteer. Why? Because it is better for me and mine if the world is filled with people who know what they are doing and besides, if I should ever become visually impaired or reading disabled I will be able to ask for help without feeling ashamed. It is the karma of the trader that governs my choice here.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[peterdjones]

Are you familiar with the Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature site? If you bash Rand and Objectivism, you will be well received there--even if you do there like you do here. To be fair to the site's owner, Daniel Barnes (who I like), he prefers intelligent statements far more than unintelligent ones. But just bashing Rand is OK too.

You might think about giving it a try.

I have hear of ARCHN. I don't think there is much to be gained intellectually by discussing things with people who basically agree with you. If I were the sort of person who takes emotional comfort in knowing that N people agree with me (whether rightly or wrongly),

things might be different.

You might consider debating and analysing the truth of the actual issue: does Objectivism have a non-contradictory heory of free will and causality? Saying, in effect, "your criticism upsets me emotionally, so you must leave" is not rational thought or intellectual engagement.

The problem is that it is not the Rand-Peikoff theory (as their comments about the metaphysical versus the man-made illustrate),. Their theory has it that only humans can perform actions that are not necessitated by causality...

This is wrong. I can find quotes if need be, but these discussions are long and life is short, so I'll just comment on the obvious for now. Anyone with elementary familiarity with Rand's ideas on philosophy knows that she considers entities to be causal agents. And a human being is an entity in her understanding.

That is so vaguely phrased it is hard to see what the objection is. Does "causal" mean "caused" or "causing"? Is the causation

in question fine grained or course-grained?

It is easy enough to re-quote passages showing that Rand did not subscribe to your Revised Theory:-

"Any natural phenomenon, i.e., any event which occurs without human participation, is the metaphysically given, and could not have occurred differently or failed to occur; any phenomenon involving human action is the man-made, and could have been different. For example, a flood occurring in an uninhabited land, is the metaphysically given; a dam built to contain the flood water, is the man-made; if the builders miscalculate and the dam breaks, the disaster is metaphysical in its origin, but intensified by man in its consequences. To correct the situation, men must obey nature by studying the causes and potentialities of the flood, then command nature by building better flood controls. "

The problem is that the Revised theory only requires entities to refrain form behaviour that is contrary to

their natures. It is not contrary to the nature of a river to flood, and it is not contrary to the nature

of a river not to flood, so, by the Revised Theory, the flood is not inevitable. But Rand thinks it is.

Therefore, Rand does not hold to the Revised Theory.

In essence, this poster's line of argument is to keep saying "Rand was wrong"

That is false. I have carefully argued my points with appropriate textual references in previous postings, and I have done so

here. It is noticeable that you object to me the most when my arguments are at their strongest. Readers can judge for

themselves whether I am "just bashing".

[Brant Gaede]

Well, Peter, now that you've put Objectivism into the dumpster, what have you to replace it with?

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

... does Objectivism have a non-contradictory heory of free will and causality?

Peter,

Yup.

The Objectivist literature does. (What Mr. or Ms. Objectivism does or not--or has or not--I have no idea. You will have to ask him or her if you can find such a person...)

But as far as the idea in the literature is concerned, this has already been covered above several times. It's tedious when you go to the effort to explain something several times and a person keeps asking if an explanation is available. It makes you wonder if the person can read.

As to your gotcha stuff, you can't arrive at non-contradiction with the false meanings you graft onto the words of Rand and Peikoff. In rhetoric, this is called the strawman fallacy and you consistently make use of it. In Objectivist literature, the way you do it is also called the "stolen concept fallacy."

So in essence, the work of Rand and Peikoff with their meanings butchered by one Peter Jones does not "have a non-contradictory theory of free will and causality." The work of Rand and Peikoff without Mr. Jones's contribution does have such a theory.

You have to use the hierarchical system of concept formation to get at their meanings, but I have the impression that actually understanding this stuff is the last thing on your mind.

Once you learn how to read correctly and stop this kind of crap, we can discuss the actual ideas. I don't mind disagreement with Rand or Peikoff. (Just read the forum and you will see plenty of disagreement.)

I do mind the kind of crap you are doing.

Michael

[peterdjones]

Well, Peter, now that you've put Objectivism into the dumpster, what have you to replace it with?

Some other realistic philosophy? Thinking for yourself? Djangology?

[Brant Gaede]

Well, Peter, now that you've put Objectivism into the dumpster, what have you to replace it with?

Some other realistic philosophy? Thinking for yourself? Djangology?

Zip, nada, nothing? Aren't you some kind of libertarian?

--Brant

[peterdjones]

Well, Peter, now that you've put Objectivism into the dumpster, what have you to replace it with?

Some other realistic philosophy? Thinking for yourself? Djangology?

Zip, nada, nothing? Aren't you some kind of libertarian?

--Brant

Thinking for yourself is nothing? Someone who is some sort of libertarians shouldn't think

for himself?

[peterdjones]

In the real world preemptive war is kosher provided there is a real threat of being attacked first. As it says in the Talmud: If he comes to kill you, rise up early and kill him first.

The problem with that is the epistemology. How can you tell a threat is real before the first shot is fired? There have been

many examples of wars started in response to spurious threats. The NoIF principle seems to say that you have to wait

for a shot to be fired. That's a nice clear principle. But it doesn't work in practice. So "force" gets redefined to something

vague, and we end up back with the epistemological problem.

As to concept formation, a concept can be open ended and have a large information carrying capacity. Having a large jug does not mean it is full (yet).

Peikoff needs concepts to contain all their referents, because his strategy for collapsing the A/S distinction is to declare

that everything already has concept-containment analycity.

[BaalChatzaf]

The problem with that is the epistemology. How can you tell a threat is real before the first shot is fired? There have been

many examples of wars started in response to spurious threats. The NoIF principle seems to say that you have to wait

for a shot to be fired. That's a nice clear principle. But it doesn't work in practice. So "force" gets redefined to something

vague, and we end up back with the epistemological problem.

In 1967, if the Israelis had waited for the blow they would have been wiped off the map. So much for waiting.

The advice to strike first is from the survival manual of a people which have been the target of genocide several times in the past 2500 years. I am inclined to accept the tactics of chronic survivors. What works, works.

Principles are fine among polite self controlled people. When dealing with beasts one must be beastly.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Peter]

Ba'al Chatzaf wrote:

I believe the reality is real and it is what it is regardless of our wishes, hopes, prayers, hallucinations and errors. Facts are hard. Opinions are sometimes vapor-ware.

end quote

Exactly. I am an Objectivist. Whatever “is proven,” *IS*. Reality is the constant feedback to the veracity of our philosophy, Mr. Jones. Errors in phraseology are not flaws in a chain of thought linked to reality.

Adam asked Mr. Jones:

This is the second time that I have asked you for this "list" of alleged contradictions in Objectivism . . . Please provide the list.

End quote

I second that wish.

Peterdjones wrote:

"Objectivism cannot be corrected until it admits it has flaws."

and Michael responded:

Do you know anyone named "Objectivism"? I don't.

Your analysis of his posts is good. And thanks Michael, for going to Peter D. Rabbit’s “website slash downward sloping event horizon to Dis-Wonderland.”

I will continue to support Objectivist Living . . . . right after I hang up.

Jones?

‘Splain yourself!

Peter Taylor

[Brant Gaede]

Well, Peter, now that you've put Objectivism into the dumpster, what have you to replace it with?

Some other realistic philosophy? Thinking for yourself? Djangology?

Zip, nada, nothing? Aren't you some kind of libertarian?

--Brant

Thinking for yourself is nothing? Someone who is some sort of libertarians shouldn't think

for himself?

That's the way to come up with a philosophy.

--Brant

[Dennis Hardin]

David Kelley's lectures on volition, part of the "Foundations of Knowledge" set, are the best explanations I have come across of this topic. However, I just checked the Atlas Society web site and its store doesn't appear to have the set. Kelley explores causality, why volition would have survival value and other interesting issues in his set of lectures.

I agree that Kelley’s presentation in “The Nature of Free Will” was excellent. I have no idea why The Atlas Society is no longer offering the tape presentation for sale.

Here is a brief excerpt from the lecture, as quoted by Diana Hsieh (Analytics on the Mind):

In saying that consciousness is epistemologically fundamental, that it’s axiomatic, we’re looking at it from the inside. We know from the inside, as subjects of conscious experience, that we are conscious and that we have volition. But we can also examine consciousness (and conceptual awareness and volition) from the outside, so to speak, as capacities possessed by certain kinds of entities in nature and as having arisen in a certain way.. . .Explaining how consciousness arose is primarily a scientific question, but because it involves trying to relate something we know about from the inside as subjects of awareness to something that scientists discover from the outside by studying the causal processes of physical nature, somebody’s got to cross that gap. The methods of neurophysiology will not, in and of themselves, be able to relate neurophysiological phenomena and causal laws with consciousness. So one role for philosophy here is to provide the integrative principles. Then the details have to be worked out scientifically.

David Kelley, “The Nature of Free Will”

And here is a summary of Kelley’s thesis, which I have always thought was brilliant:

Rand's insight also provides a basis for a likely hypothesis regarding the evolutionary selectional advantage of free will. (The hypothesis I present here was presented by David Kelley in his lecture course The Nature of Free Will, presented at the Portland Institute, 1986. As far as I know it has never been presented in any printed or online publication.) The function of free will becomes an extension of the function that William James pointed out for consciousness: allowing higher animals to deal with the greater range of information they receive from the environment and the greater number of possible actions they have to choose from.

Plants and lower animals have a quite narrow range of possible actions that they can take, and their actions depend on relatively simple information from the environment - detecting the presence and direction of sunlight, the presence of nutrients, etc.; they are therefore able to control their actions through direct stimulus-response relations. But higher animals have a much wider range of possible actions, and their actions have to depend on a lot of information from the environment. This makes necessary for the animal to have more complex internal control over its actions, and the function of consciousness is to provide this control.

Man, because of his ability for conceptual thought, has a range of possible actions, and a range of information he can receive from the environment, that is far wider than that of even the most developed of other animals. The range is not only greater in quantity, but in kind; rather than choosing from a pre-existing set of options, man's conceptual faculty allows him to create new kinds of actions and of information, thus making his range of actions and of information unlimited. For example, consider that 20 years ago, reading information on web sites was not yet one of the possible actions man could choose from; and yet now it has become one (in fact, if you are reading this paper on a web site, you are engaged in this new kind of action right now.) And this means that in making decisions, the range of information that could potentially be relevant, that might need to be considered, is also unlimited. For every decision man needs to make, he has to determine what information is relevant, and what information he would spend his time thinking about in making the decision; and because the range he must choose from is unlimited, the choice can't be made by any deterministic mechanism. The function - and the evolutionary selectional advantage - of free will, therefore, is in making it possible for man to direct his decisions based on an unlimited range of possible information [i.e., to focus]; and therefore to make possible the functioning of the conceptual faculty, which creates this unlimited range.

The above is, of course, only a hypothesis; whether this really is the selectional advantage that led to the development of free will through evolution, would need to be proved or disproved by scientific research. But the point is, Rand's identification of mental focus as the center of free will allows us to identify the advantage that free will provides to man. Therefore there is no longer any basis for regarding the development of free will, through evolution by natural selection, as far-fetched or inexplicable; it is just as likely as the evolution of any other useful trait.

From: Is there a rational basis for determinism?

[Ellen Stuttle]

And here, also from OPAR, is Peikoff's attempt to fit choice into the mold of only one possible action per set of circumstances:

Ellen,

If you mean by "set of circumstances" simply being a human entity, then choice itself is the action at stake.

The wording comes directly from Peikoff, so you might ask him what it means. See the passage quoted from OPAR in the post to which you responded (adding bold emphasis):

pg. 14

[bold added]

[italics in original]

A thing cannot act against its nature, i.e., in contradiction to its identity, because A is A and contradictions are impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity. This is the action it will take, the action that is caused and necessitated by its nature.

That's the central claim of Objectivism's thesis on identity and causality -- a claim you earlier called not Peikoff's finest moment.

I gather from the rest of your post that you aren't enamored by what Peikoff says in the other passage I quoted either.

---

Peter, if you're still reading the thread...

A further problem in the presentations is that of the discrepancy between what Peikoff says in OPAR (and what Branden said in his "Volition and the Law of Causality" article in the March '66 Objectivist) and the praise of Newton's physics in The Logical Leap. Newton's model of motion is just the model Peikoff and Branden before him said was wrong.

Ellen

[Dennis Hardin]

From my notes on David Kelley’s 'The Nature of Free Will’:

Consciousness emerges as a control mechanism at a certain stage of development within a nervous system, to preserve an organism’s ability to function as a unit—i.e., to deal with numerous external factors in such a way as to preserve its integrity. The organism must evaluate input by the standard of needs in the context of the overall value of preserving its life.

For man, the same problem breaks out at the level of consciousness itself. The conceptual mind is in danger of being pulled in a hundred different directions at once. To preserve man’s ability to function as a unit—to enable him to make choices appropriate to his needs in light of an open-ended amount of knowledge and values available—man needs a higher-level control mechanism. That control mechanism is the ability to focus.

Causality is often viewed simplistically as a linear sequence through time. Within a complex system of organization, however, such as the human brain, an event could easily be the product both of antecedent factors and of simultaneous factors operating at higher and lower levels of organization. The capacity to focus is a product of ‘upward’ causation’ (i.e., evolution), the context is a product of antecedent factors, but the choice to focus is an instance of pure ‘downward’ causation’—i.e., of conscious activity directly affecting neural activity. The same cause only obtains at the moment of conscious effort; it is only then that we see ‘the same effect.’

'Downward causation' involves factors operating at higher levels setting constraints on what happens at lower levels at the same moment. For example, the effect of recognition on the visual cortex.

Edited March 18, 2011 by Dennis Hardin

[Peter]

Ellen wrote:

A further problem in the presentations is that of the discrepancy between what Peikoff says in OPAR (and what Branden said in his "Volition and the Law of Causality" article in the March '66 Objectivist) and the praise of Newton's physics in The Logical Leap. Newton's model of motion is just the model Peikoff and Branden before him said was wrong.

end quote

I seem to remember you brilliantly discussing this about five or seven years ago. I am still looking for that conversation.

I did find these two letters. Searle makes some interesting points.

Peter Taylor

Notes:

From: Ellen Stuttle <egould@mail.hartford.edu>

To: atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: ATL: REFERENCE SOURCE: Key Searle Quote

Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 22:39:46 -0500

[Those interested in the volition/determinism debate, please save this post. I think that it pretty well captures the core of Searle's views on "the gap." It also provides succinct statements which can be used to formulate the essential differences between hard determinists, soft determinists, soft volitionists, and hard free-willists. (I'll highlight the key sentences in my next post.) All italics are in the original.]

ES

_

From: *rationality in Action*, John R. Searle, 2001, Massachusetts Institute of Technology pp. 64-67

The simplest proof of what I am describing as the special causal and volitional elements of the gap is in the following thought experiment, based on the research of Wilder Penfield. (2) He found that by stimulating the motor cortex of his patients with a microelectrode he could cause bodily movements. When asked, the patients invariably said, "I did not do that, you did it" (p. 76). So the patient's experience, for example, of having his arm raised by Penfield's stimulation of the brain is quite different from his experience of voluntarily raising his arm. What is the difference? Well, to answer that, let us imagine the Penfield cases on a grand scale. Imagine that all of my bodily movements over a certain period of time are caused by a brain scientist sending electromagnetic rays into my motor cortex. Now clearly the experience would be totally different from normal conscious voluntary action. In this case, as in perception, I *observe* what is happening to me. In the normal case, I *make it happen*. There are two features of the normal case. First, I cause the bodily movement by trying to raise my arm. The trying is sufficient to cause the arm to move; but second, the reasons for the action are not sufficient causes to force the trying.

If we put this under the magnifying glass we find that the action consists of the two components I described in chapter 2, the intention-in-action (the trying), which, when conscious, is a conscious experience of acting, and the bodily movement. The intention-in-action is causally sufficient for the bodily movement. So, if I raise my arm the intention-in-action causes the arm to go up. But in a normal case of voluntary action, the intention- in-action does not itself have psychologically causally sufficient antecedent conditions, and when I say the whole action lacks sufficient conditions it is because the intention-in-action lacks them. That is a manifestation of the gap of human freedom. In the normal case, the experience of acting will cause the initiation of movement by sufficient conditions, but that experience itself (the experience of trying, what William James called the feeling of "effort") does not have sufficient pychological causal conditions in the free and voluntary cases.

In the first chapter I briefly mention a second argument: I believe the most dramatic manifestation of the gap in real life comes out in the fact that when one has several reasons for performing an action, or for choosing an action, one may act on only one of them; one may select which reason one acts on. For example, suppose I have several reasons for voting for a particular political candidate. All the same, I may not vote for the candidate for all of those reasons. I may vote for the candidate for one reason and not for any of the others. In such a case, I may know without observation that I voted for the candidate for one particular reason and not for any of the others, even though I know that I also had those other reasons for voting for him. Now, this is an amazing fact and we ought to ponder it. There are several reasons operating on me, but only one of these is actually effective and *I select which one will be effective*.

That is, as far as my awareness of my own actions is concerned, my various beliefs and desires don't *cause* me to behave in a particular way. Rather, I select which desire I act on. I decide, in short, which of the many causes will be effective. This suggests a fascinating hypothesis that will also come up in later chapters. If we think of the reasons I act on as the reasons that are *effective*, then it emerges that where free rational action is concerned, *all effective reasons are made effective by the agent*, insofar as he chooses which ones he will act on.

When I say that we "select" which reasons to act on, or that we "make" reasons effective, I do not mean that there are any separate acts of selecting and making going on. If there were, we could quickly construct vicious-infinite-regress arguments about making the makings and selecting the selectings. (3) I just mean that when you freely act on a reason you have thereby, in that act, selected that reason and made it effective.

A third, more indirect way to argue for the existence of the gap is to note that rationality is only possible where irrationality is possible. But the possibility of each requires freedom. So in order to behave rationally I can do so only if I am free to make any of a number of possible choices and have open the possibility of behaving irrationally. Paradoxically, the alleged ideal of a perfectly rational machine, the computer, is not an example of rationality at all, because a computer is outside the scope of rationality altogether. A computer is neither rational nor irrational, because its behavior is entirely determined by its program and the structure of its hardware. The only sense in which a computer can be said to be rational is observer-relative.

(2) *The Mystery of the Mind*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, pp. 76-77.

(3) Gilbert Ryle is known for these types of regress arguments against traditional action theory. See his *The Concept of Mind*, New York: Harper and Row, 1949.

From: Ellen Stuttle <egould@mail.hartford.edu>

To: atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: ATL: Key Distinction Among Contending Views

Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 23:35:52 -0500

Quotes are from: *rationality in Action*, John R. Searle, 2001, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pp. 64-65.

"There are two features of the normal case [in voluntary action].

First, I cause the bodily movement by trying to raise my arm. The

trying is sufficient to cause the arm to move; but second, the reasons

for the action are not sufficient causes to force the trying."

Alright, here's an easy way to keep in mind the difference between hard determinism and all the other views:

Hard determinism says that the trying has nothing to do with the real causal sequence, that it's but an experiential after-effect of the real causal sequence.

All the other views at least agree that the trying really is causally necessary in the sequence.

"If we put this under the magnifying glass we find that the

action consists of the two components I described in chapter 2,

the intention-in-action (the trying), which, when conscious, is a

conscious experience of acting, and the bodily movement. The

intention-in-action is causally sufficient for the bodily movement.

So, if I raise my arm the intention-in-action causes the arm to go up.

But in a normal case of voluntary action, the intention-in-action

*does not* [my emphasis] itself have psychologically causally sufficient

antecedent conditions, and when I say the whole action lacks sufficient

conditions it is because the intention-in-action lacks them. That is

a manifestation of the gap of human freedom. In the normal case,

the experience of acting will cause the initiation of movement by

sufficient conditions, but that experience itself (the experience of

trying, what William James called the feeling of "effort") does not

have sufficient pychological causal conditions in the free and

voluntary cases."

Here's the central point on which the soft determinist differs from the hard free-willist:

The soft determinist says, contra Searle, that the intention-in-action DOES have psychologically causally sufficient antecedent conditions.

Ellen S.

[peterdjones]

Is there a rational basis for determinism?

Good, but not good enough

"Given the importance of consciousness, and the great differences it makes to the animal's actions; and given that the brains of man and the higher animals are a vastly more complex structure than any other we know of; it is a totally fallacious use of induction to try to extrapolate from the deterministic laws discovered for other entities "

..which just begs the reductionistic argument, or as he calls it, the argument from composition: that humans are made of electrons and quarks like everything else..

The argument from "composition" may not have logical necessity, but it can still have

scientific validity, if it can be shown the behaviour of the wholes is generally determined by the behaviour of

the parts (ie reductionism is true). Oh, and that the behaviour of the parts is deterministic.